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ISTVÁN H . SZILÁGYI* 
Law and Literature in Hungary - An Introduction 
Abstract. This paper aims to give a concise review of contemporary Hungarian researches carried out in the field 
of "law and literature". It evokes the preliminaries form previous century's in Hungarian legal philosophy, and it 
discusses the recent achievements by taking a closer look on the results of three subsequent symposia organized in 
2006, 2008 and the previous year. In conclusion, the paper outlines the possible directions for further development 
of certain aspects of legal education and the critical potential of "law and literature" studies. 
Keywords: law and literature, Hungarian jurisprudence, legal education 
The recent development of "law and literature" studies, as occurred in the past decade, is 
not without antecedents in Hungarian legal thinking-as it is not either in the American1 or 
in the other European national jurisprudences.2 Hungarian legal philosophy was flourishing 
during the early 20th century due to the oeuvre of such internationally renowned scholars as 
Felix Somló or Julius Moór. In this period, Bama Horváth's work,3 Der Rechtsstreit des 
Genius,4 published in 1942, became a groundbreaking piece in the Hungarian study of "law 
and literature".5 
The theme of " law and literature" as a research subject reappeared on the horizon of 
the Hungarian legal thinking nearly a half century later, in the middle of the 1990's. During 
these years Hungarian legal scholars were beginning to look for new impulses following 
the enforced hegemony of the "socialist legal science". As a first sign of interest a 
* Associate professor, Faculty of Law, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, H-1088 Budapest, 
Szentkirályi u. 28-30. 
E-mail: kopi@jak.ppke.hu 
1
 About the origins and the "returns" of "law and literature" in the history of American 
jurisprudence see Ferguson, R.: Law and Letters in American Culture. Cambridge (Mass)-London, 
1984; Duxbury, N.: Patterns of American Jurisprudence. Oxford, 1995; Weisberg, R.: Coming of Age 
Some More: "Law and Literature" Beyond The Craddle. Nova Law Review, 13 (1988), 107-124; 
Smith, J. A.: The Coming Renaissance in Law and Literature. Journal of Legal Education, 30 (1979), 
13-26. 
2
 For a survey tracing "law and literature" in the European national jurisprudences see Varga, 
Cs.: Literature? A Substitute for Legal Philosophy? [2007]. In: Varga, Cs.: Contemporary Legal 
Philosophizing. Budapest, 2011 [forthcoming]. 
3
 For a concise curriculum vitae of Barna Horváth see Varga, Cs.: Barna Horváth. In: Horváth, 
В.: The Bases ofLaw/A jogalapjai, Budapest, 2006. xvii-xviii. 
4
 Horváth, В.: Der Rechtsstreit des Genius: I. Sokrates; II. Johanna: a) Der Tatbestand, b) Das 
Verfahren. Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 22 (1942) 1, 126-162; 2-3, 295-342; 4-5, 395 460. 
5
 Cf. H. Szilágyi, I.: Barna Horváth's Genius. In: Cserne, P.-H. Szilágyi, I.-Könczöl, M.-Paksy, 
M.-Takács, P.-Tattay, Sz. (eds): Theatrum Legale Mundi. Symbola Cs. Varga ohlata. Budapest, 2007. 
189-202. 
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propedeutical piece of Maria Aristodemou,6 providing a comprehensive survey of the 
aspirations and themes of the field, was published in a reader edited by József Szabadfalvi.7 
The present author started his studies in this field of study in the second part of the 
1990's because it offered new possibilities to combine the history of Hungarian political 
and legal thinking with the anthropological perspective—his previous research themes. The 
subject matter of an experimental course emerged, which, connecting Horváth's legal 
philosophical concept of drama with Victor Turner's anthropological ideas of "social 
drama" and with the Geertzean methodology of "thick description", arranging all these 
around the analysis of Gabriel Garcia Márquez's Chronicle of a Death Foretold,8 
In the first years of the 21th century, Tamás Nagy, one of the most influential author in 
the field up to now, began his researches. As a starting step, he methodologically mapped 
the American tradition of "law and literature" from the time of the antebellum up to the 
Posner-debate.9 
A group of younger scholars-Balázs Fekete, Miklós Könczöl, Máté Paksy, Szilárd 
Tattay—, members of the Department of Legal Philosophy in the Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University Faculty of Law participated in the organization of the I. Law and Literature 
Symposium in May 2006 in Budapest. Interestingly, although the majority of the participants 
could have been seen as "hard core" legal philosophers, a significant part of the presentations 
mixed a legal or political philosophical viewpoint with a historical perspective. 
Thus, Attila Simon rethinked Sophocles' drama, he analysed it with the fine tuned 
means of the post-modern literary hermeneutics in his "Antigone's and Kreon 's Law". The 
study not only painted a nuanced picture of the antique political and legal thinking for its 
reader, but also familarized them with the eternal tension of community life stemming from 
the ever present threat of using violence and power on the one hand, and the unforeseeable 
consequences of the enforcing actions on the other hand.10 In his reading of Thomas Mann's 
Magic Mountain, Balázs Fekete brought to the surface those contradictions which were 
perceived by the writer between the heritage of the traditional, middle age thinking and that 
of the enlightenment, and which were dramatised by the spiritual duel of Naphta and 
6
 Aristodemou, M.: Studies in Law and Literature: Directions and Concerns. Anglo-American 
Law Review, 22(1993), 157-193. 
7
 Szabadfalvi, J. (ed.): Mai angol-amerikai jogelméleti törekvések [Current Trends in Anglo-
American Legal Theory], Miskolc, 1996. 
8
 For a summary of the theoretical and didactic outcomes of this seminary course see H. 
Szilágyi, I.: The Chronicle of a Death Foretold: A Retrospection. In: Mittica, M. P. (ed.): ISSL Special 
Issue. Dossier on Law and Literature. Bologna, 2010. 105-127. [http://www.lawandliterature.org/ 
index.php?channel=PAPERS] 
9
 See Nagy, T.: Néhány eljárás: Kafka-olvasatok a jogirodalomban [Several processes: Kafka-
readings in the jurisprudence]. Jogelméleti Szemle, (2001) 3 [http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/nagyt7.html]; 
Narratív tematika a kortárs amerikai jogelméletben [The narrative theme in American jurisprudence !. 
Acta Universitatis Szegediensis, Acta Iuridica et Politica, Tomus LXIII, Fasc. 15, Szeged, 2003; Az 
amerikai jogelmélet és intézményrendszerének kapcsolata [The relationship of the American 
jurisprudence and its institutional system]. Acta Universitatis Szegediensis, Acta Iuridica et Politica, 
Tomus LXVI, Fasc. 15, Szeged, 2004; Jog és irodalom az antebellum korszakának Amerikájában 
[Law and literature in antebellum America], Jogelméleti Szemle, (2005) 4 [http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/ 
nagy24.html]. 
10
 Simon, A.: Antigoné és Kreón törvénye [Antigone's and Kreon's law], Iustum Aequum 
Salutare III, (2007) 2 [hereafter: IAS\. 71-94. 
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Settembrini." Szilárd Tattay interrogated Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose-as if he 
started an investigation as a detective-to what extent William Occam's person and 
philosophy could be recognized behind the character of the novel's protagonist, brother 
William.12 As for Tamás Nagy, he discussed the constellation of law and literature in 
antebellum America. 
Another part of the presentations were inspired by the "law as literature" perspective. 
Ferenc Horkay Horcher analysed the problem of the poetic justice on the basis of Martha 
Nussbaum's theory,13 furthermore the present author discussed Barna Horváth's conception 
of "law as drama".14 
Critical voices about the goals of "law and literature" were not absent either. In his 
provocative speech, Csaba Varga emphasized partly that the "law and literature" was not an 
American "discovery"-as a rich scholarly literature had already existed in the European 
national jurisprudences. And, similarly to Richard Posner,15 he also fervently criticised the 
feminist and the narrativist trends of "law and literature".16 While Lajos Cs. Kiss, basing his 
arguments primarily on the German social theoretical traditions, called attention to the 
limits of the efforts aiming to connect the law and literature.17 
Péter Sólyom introduced a theme which was considered by the skeptics as the only 
relevant context in which to study the relationship of law and literature:18 namely, when 
writers of literary works are tried for offence against public morality, for libel or for 
defamation. 
The following year the papers presented at this symposium were published in the 
journal of the Law Faculty. The event also stirred interest outside of the academic circles 
focusing strictly on legal theory. At this time we began to establish an informal framework 
for the symposium. According to our plans, symposia should be organized every second 
year, each time at another place, and the presentations and other invited author's articles 
should subsequently be published next year. It was also agreed that, since "law and 
literature" is an extraordinarily suitable field for interdisciplinary studies, we should not 
only invite scholars from different legal disciplines, but also researchers coming from the 
field of literary science and other humanities. 
The II. Symposium was organized in the spirit of these principles and it took place in 
Síkfőkút in October 2008, hosted by the Doctorate School of the Faculty of Law of the 
Debrecen University. The composition of the group of new participants fortunately mirrored 
11
 Fekete, В.: A századforduló szellemi körképe a Vará:shegyrö\ [The spiritual panorama of the 
tum of the century from the Magic Mount], IAS, 19-30. 
12
 Tattay, Sz.: A rózsa neve: Ockham. Nominalizmus és természetjog Eco regényében [The 
name of the rose: Ockham. Nominalism and natural law in Eco's novel]. IAS, 111-118. 
13
 H. Horcher, F.: A költői igazságszolgáltatásról [On the poetic justicef IAS, 43-56. 
14
 H. Szilágyi, I.: Horváth Barna géniusza. IAS, 31 42. For the English version see op. cit. in 
note 5. 
15
 Both Posner's and Varga's approach can be characterised by the attitude of "cultural 
conservativism". Cf. Seaton, J.: The Two Branches of Law and Literature Movement: A Critique of 
Stanley Fish. Legal Studies Forum, 15 (1991) 65-73. 
16
 Csaba, V.: Irodalom? Jogbölcselet? [Literature? Legal Philosophy?]. IAS, 119-132. For the 
English version see Varga: op. cit. in note 2. 
17
 Cs. Kiss, L.: Megjegyzések a jog és művészet viszonyához [Some remarks on the relation of 
law and art], IAS, 13-18. 
18
 Cf. Posner, R.: Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation. Cambridge, 1988. 319-352. 
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our efforts to encourage an interdisciplinary approach: legal philosophers, legal historians, 
legal sociologists, political philosophers, civil lawyers and literary scholars could exchange 
views in these two days. The papers were published in 2009, in a volume entitled Iustitia 
Goes on Excursion. 
Let us now take a closer look at the contents of the book in order to illustrate the 
diversity of the subjects! 
The series of studies is opened by Tamás Nagy's essay that enlightens the legal layers 
of The Stroker by Péter Hajnóczy, the literary genius' of the socialist era plagued by 
misfortune, and compares those with the findings of the contemporary sociographical 
literature.19 Ferenc Horkay Horcher examined the problem of breaching the rules in the 
dynamics of man-woman relationship by the discussion of another 20th century Hungarian 
literary classic's, Géza Ottlik's short story.20 Attila Horváth contextualized the highly 
celebrated Strange Marriage by Kálmán Miksztáth, one of the most well-known novelist of 
the 19th century, within the legal and political relations of the novel's birth, and openned up 
the inherent political content of the authorial intent.21 Balázs Fekete analysed, in turn, the 
legal historical, legal sociological, criminological and legal philosophical aspects of 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago.22 Ferenc Tallár demonstrated how little 
of the reality can be grasped by the narratives bom in the legal procedure by discussing the 
trial scene in Fyodor Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov, a classical piece of the "law and 
literature" canon.23 Dorottya Somlai characterized the sociological conditions of the 19th 
century French jurisdiction and legal profession, on the basis of Honoré de Balzac's novel-
cycles.24 Miklós Könczöl offered the "naturalist's perspective" for the analysis of the legal 
phenomena after the reading of Gerald Durell's two novels.25 The present author accounted 
for his experiences gained during the ten-year teaching of "law and literature".26 János Jany 
revealed the meaning of a 6th century Persian tale, the Dymnah's Trial, written in Pehlevi 
by the means of thorough legal historical investigations.27 Béla P. Szabó discussed a drama 
19
 Nagy, T.: Egy arkangyal viszontagságai a szocializmusban. Hajnóczy Péter A fíítő című 
elbeszélésének egy lehetséges olvasata [The vicissitudes of an arcangel in the time of the socialism. 
A reading of Péter Hajnóczy's Stoker]. In: Fekete, B.-H. Szilágyi, I.-Könczöl, M. (eds): Iustitia 
kirándul [Iustitia goes on excursion]. Budapest, 2009 [hereafter: Iustitia], 9-40. 
20
 H. Horcher, F.: Csalás és megcsalás. A szabályok áthágása és a férfi-nő kapcsolat természete 
Ottlik Géza Hamisjátékosok című elbeszélésében [Fraud and cheating. The transgression of rules and 
the nature of the man—woman relationship in Géza Otlik's Cardsharpers], In: Iustitia, 41-52. 
21
 Horváth, A.: Mikszáth Kálmán "különös" házassági históriája [Kálmán Mikszáth's "strange" 
history of a marriage]. In: Iustitia, 53-58. 
22
 Fekete, В.: A nyugati jog vágyálma. Jogi rétegek Szolzsenyicin Gulág szigetcsoport című 
művében [The dream of the western law. Legal layers in Solzhenitsyn' Gulag Archipelago], In: 
Iustitia, 59-72. 
23
 Tallár, F.: Regényköltészet Szkotoprigonyevszkban. A tárgyalás témája Dosztojevszkij 
Karamazov tesh'érek című regényében [Novel-poesy in Skotoprigonyevsk. The theme of trial in 
Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov], In: Iustitia, 73-80. 
24
 Somlai, D.: Jog a realista regényben. Két Balzac-regény jogszociológiai aspektusai [The law 
in the realist novel. The legal aspects of Balzac's two novels]. In: Iustitia, 81-100. 
25
 Könczöl, M.: Két per leírása Greald Durellnél [The description of two trials by Greald 
Durell], In: Iustitia, 101-110. 
26
 H. Szilágyi, I.: Egy előre bejelentett gyilkosság krónikája: visszatekintés [The chronicle of a 
death foretold: a retrospection]. In: Iustitia, 111-132. For an English version see op. cit. in note 8. 
27
 Jany, J.: Dymnah pere [Dymnah's trial]. In: Iustitia, 133-152. 
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about Papinianus, written by Andreas Gryphius, in his lenghty study. He considered one by 
one the different meaning-variations of the history of Papinainus' facing the will of 
Caracal la. He discussed the "messages" that can be drawn by a legal historian striving for 
objectivity, by the 17th-century drama writer, by the 17th-century audience, and by todays' 
lawyers from this drama based on the clash of law, political reason and ethical obligations.28  
Márton Falusi treated the changing roles of law and literature in the legitimizing of power 
after the 1989's political changes in Hungary.29 Péter Cseme investigated the altering 
meanings of the contra proferentem rule in the world of the civil law pointing out how the 
different legal-political aims influenced the interpretation of the rule in different historical 
periods and in different national legal systems.30 Finally, János Frivaldszky analyseed the 
relationship between the medieval jurisprudence and rhetoric in the light of the recent 
Italian legal philosophical findings.31 
The present author held his inaugural lecture in 2009 at the Law Faculty of the 
Pázmány Péter Catholic University giving a comprehensive account of the research topics 
related to the field of "law and literature".32 
One may call 2010, with some exaggeration, "the year of law and literature". The III. 
Law and Literature Symposium took place at Piliscsaba in April. The host institution was 
the Faculty of Humanities of the Pázmány Péter Catholic University, in this way expressing, 
in a symbolic form, too, the participants' commitment to the interdisciplinary approach. 
One interesting feature of the program was that the discussed literary works nearly perfectly 
drew the picture of the modem history of the Hungarian literature.33 A pleasing part of the 
symposium was the presence of Anna Kiss. She, as a criminologist, had started her 
researches in the field of "law and literature" almost a decade earlier, independently from 
the above sketched efforts of the legal philosophers. She also tried to integrate "law and 
literature" into the way criminal law is taught. She published her experiences in a 
monography in 2008 entitled Literary Heroes Fallen in Crime.34 
Three books also appeared in 2010 which practically summarized the outcomes of the 
researches of the past decade. An unusual reader on criminal law was edited by Anna Kiss. 
28
 P. Szabó, В.: Papinianus a színpadon. A jog mártírja vagy modem példakép? [Papanianus on 
the stage. A martyr of law or a modem model?]. In: Iustitia, 153-198. 
29
 Falusi, M.: Jog és irodalom Magyarországon 1990 előtt és után, avagy egy termékeny 
diszciplináris hasonlat [Law and literature in Hungary before and after 1990, or a fruitful disciplinary 
simile]. In: Iustitia, 199-208. 
30
 Cseme, P.: Szerződésértelmezés hermeneutika és jogpolitika között. A contra proferentem 
szabály [Interpretation of contracts between hermeneutics and legal policy. The contra proferentem 
rule]. In: Iustitia, 209-228. For an English version see Cseme, P.: Policy considerations in contract 
interpretation: the contra proferentem rule from a comparative law and economic perspective. In: 
Radhika, G. (ed.): Contract Theory-Corporate Law. Hyderabad, 2009. 66-104. 
31
 Frivaldszky, J.: Jogtudomány és diszkurzivitás a középkorban a kortárs olasz jogfilozófiai 
kutatások fényében [Jurisprudence and discourse in the Middle Age in the light of the current Italian 
legal philosophical researches]. In: Iustitia, 229-270. 
32
 H. Szilágyi, I.: Jog és irodalom. (Habilitációs előadás) [Law and literature. (Inaugural lecture 
held at the Faculty of Law, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 12 May 2009)]. Iustum Aequum 
Salutare, 6 (2010) 1, 5-27. 
33
 The list of the Hungarian masters' name treated in the lectures is eloquent: Dániel Berzsenyi, 
Ferenc Kölcsey, János Arany, Imre Madách, József Eötvös, Gyula Illyés, Géza Féja, Péter Hajnóczy. 
34
 Kiss, A.: Jog és irodalom. Bűnbe esett irodalmi hősök [Law and literature. Literary heroes 
fallen in crime]. Budapest, 2008. 
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It contained documents, taken from the various phases of the criminal process, which were 
based on the storylines of literary works.35 Just like Tamás Nagy in his Tracking Josef K.?6 
the present author published his collected essays under the title of Law-Literature?1 
Now, let us cast a glance on the above enumerated literary achievements from a more 
general angle, and investigate the general features of the state of art of the Hungarian 
research in "law and literature". 
The first striking feature is the dominance of the historical perspective. This is quite 
understandable, since the socialist era inflicted an artificial break in the Hungarian legal 
culture, as well in the literature. The endeavours to find the cut up threads of the traditions 
naturally appear in this post-colonial situation, and the "law and literature" field can be an 
excellent area for these efforts.38 
As for the strictu sensu legal philosophical studies, it can be clearly seen that the "law 
and literature" researches promotes the reception of the "linguistic turn" of philosophical 
thinking. 
Looking for positive trends, we can additionally point out that scholars of more and 
more legal disciplines are interested in the possibilities offered by "law and literature", and 
the interest in the involvement of "law and literature" in the legal education is also 
increasing.39 This kind of course is present in the curriculum of three out of nine Hungarian 
law faculties at the moment, but this number will probably grow thanks to the increasing 
number of the books suitable for educational purposes. 
At the same time, it is a huge problem that those currents of "law and literature" which 
have the highest critical potential are absent from the contemporary Hungarian research, 
especially minority consciousness and the feminist perspective. However, the "legal 
storytelling" could have an important role, for example, in calling the attention of the 
Hungarian lawyers to the disadvantaged legal position of the Roma minority. So the 
greatest challenge of the following years will be to integrate the critical thinking into "law 
and literature". 
35
 Kiss, A. (ed.): Bűntények a könyvtárszobából [Crimes from the library room], Budapest, 
2010. 
36
 Nagy, T.: Josef К. nyomában - jogról és irodalomról [Tracking Josef K.-on law and 
literature]. Máriabesnyő- Gödöllő, 2010. 
37
 H. Szilágyi, I.: Law-Literature. Szeged, 2010. 
38
 About the importance of "law and literature" in a post-colonial situation see Lenta, P.: Is 
There a Class in This Text? Law and Literature in Legal Education. The South African Law Journal, 
119 (2002), 841-865. 
39
 On the educational ambitions of "law and literature" see Ward, I.: The Educative Ambition of 
Law and Literature. Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 323-331 ; White, J. В.: From Expectation to Experience. 
Essays on Law and Legal Education. Ann Arbor, 2000. 
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BÉLA P. SZABÓ* 
Papinianus on the Stage: 
A Martyr of Law or a Modern Model? 
Abstract. This paper discusses Andreas Gryphius's tragedy (Großmütiger Rechtsgelehrter oder Sterbender 
Aemilius Paulus Papinianus: Trauerspiel) about the death of Papinianus, the famous Roman jurist of the Late 
Classic era. The author analyzes the historical context of the death of Papinianus in detail, and he also examines 
how Gryphius used the historical sources and his poetic imagination in writing his drama. The second part 
examines Gryphius's ideas about the law and state and argues that he followed Jean Bodin's teaching when he 
declared that the sovereign is bound by divine law and natural law. Additionally, the author also discusses the 
message of this 17th century drama for the contemporary lawyers. His main argument is that the exemplum of 
Papinianus encourages modem lawyers to create their professional value system and to insist on it conscientiously. 
Keywords: Aemilius Papinianus, Andreas Gryphius, Jean Bodin, drama and law, moral resistance, passive 
resistance 
It is probably a rare occurrence in the history of world literature that the protagonist of a 
work of "high literature" is a jurist. Even though the historical tragedy of Andreas Gryphius 
(1616-1664), one of the most important Baroque poets from Silesia, titled Großmütiger 
Rechtsgelehrter oder Sterbender Aemilius Paulus Papinianus: Trauerspiel (title of English 
translation: Papinianus) is not primarily about the professional activities of a lawyer, and 
not even about his life, but rather about his death, it may still be of interest to readers who 
wishes to discuss the relationship between law and literature, as well as interprets literary 
works (also) as legal professionals. 
Our job as jurists is to identify legally relevant facts, reconstruct the facts of a case, 
find solutions and answers (provided they exist) and evaluate those solutions. In the present 
case we only have limited opportunities to do this. Although-if we really insist-the 
historical facts of the case (in the legal sense of the word) can be reconstructed, yet it is not 
primarily the interpretation of the literary historical facts of the case that we are faced with, 
but rather the investigation and comprehension of the circumstances and motives that are 
behind the reconstructed events. 
Our situation is complicated by the fact that the events need to be reconstructed on two 
levels. When readers/interpreters defines themselves as historians and the author depicts 
well-known or easily identifiable events in history, the desire will inevitable emerge in the 
readers to know how much fiction encroached upon history. Historians compulsively 
compare and contrast the factual statements of a literary work that reaches back into the 
past with the historical facts identified by themselves: in addition to (before) outlining the 
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sequence of events in a the literary work-in our case, a drama-they must also outline the 
historical events on which the plot is built. 
It is evident that the task of approaches applying the historical method is not only to 
identify the antecedents of the solutions to certain problems that are, or appear, as accepted 
today. It is also their task to reconstruct such other possible solutions that were or may have 
been entirely accepted in their own age, but due to different-usually very complex-reasons 
have become worn out of practice or pushed into the background by more recent 
interpretations and solutions of problems. For this reason, the interpretation of Gryphius's 
text is also realized in several (historical) layers, on multiple levels. In other words, we will 
attempt to consider the message of the drama through the eyes of its contemporaries, and 
will examine what it may have had to say to audiences/readers of its own time. Further, we 
will also examine whether it is possible for a work written and frequently staged three and a 
half centuries ago, in a particular set of historical and intellectual circumstances, with 
certain, easily identifiable intentions-which were the characteristics of the given historical 
era-to speak ("convey a message") to the readers/legal professionals of our present age. 
The historical hero-the history of the hero 
Aemilius Papinianus1 was a Roman jurist in the Late Classic era. His origins are uncertain: 
some sources mention African, while others Syrian origins, but neither is certain. He was 
born around 150 AD, during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, and he was a student of the jurist 
Cervidius Scaevola, together with the would-be emperor, Septimius Severus.2 He started his 
career as a advocatus fisci. Under Septimius Severus he became the assessor of the 
praefectus praetorio assessor,3 then the chief of the bureau of the imperial chancery 
concerned with petitions (magister libellorum),4 and finally from between 203 and 205 he 
was praefectus praetorio, the commander of the Praetorian Guard, the highest ranking 
imperial officer and de facto deputy of the emperor.5 
Traditional sources assert that he was in close friendship with the emperor (some 
sources even say they were brothers-in-law). This was the reason why the two sons of the 
emperor (Caracal la and Geta) later asked Papinianus to support them as co-emperors.6 
A few months after the death of Severus, Caracalla (who is called Bassianus in some of the 
sources) ordered Geta to be murdered, for reasons and in circumstances that are still debated 
by historians, and soon afterwards Papinianus also fell victim to the "cleansing" by the 
emperor, sometime early in 212. 
In the Late Antiquity-due to his traditionally accepted martyrdom7-he was considered 
as the greatest of jurist, "a sanctuary of law and treasure-house of jurisprudence" ("asylum 
1
 On his life and work, see Kunkel, W.: Herkunft und soziale Stellung der römischen Juristen. 
Graz-Wien-Köln, 1967. 224—229; Schulz, F.: Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft. Weimar 
1961. 126 and 296—302; Vécsey T.: Aemilius Papinianus pályája és művei. Budapest 1884. 
2
 Hist. Aug. vita Caracallae 8, 3. Cf. Kniitel: ibid. 485. 
3
 Digesta 22, 1, 3, 3. praefectis praetorii suasi. 
4
 Digesta 20, 5, 12, pr. ...libellos agente Papiniano... 
5
 Hist. Aug. vita Severi 21,8. 
6
 Hist. Aug. vita Caracallae 8, 3. 
7
 Kniitel: ibid. 485. Nörr, by contrast, started out from the position that due because, among 
other things, the real reasons for the killing of Papinianus were unclear in the Antiquity, a cult of 
martyrdom could not be formed around his person, and he therefore assumes that its appearance dates 
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et doctrinae legális thesaurus'"). The evaluation of Papinianus as a jurist was extremely 
positive in the Middle Ages and also in the Modernity. It is enough to refer here to the 
notions of Jacobus Cuiacius. As one of the most important legal humanist-following the 
value judgment of St. Jerome, who considered Papinianus, as the teacher of lex caesaris, on 
par with the Apostle Paul, the teacher of lex Christi-he regarded Papinianus as Summus 
lurisconsultus, the paragon of jurists of unattainable professional and moral heights.8 In this 
he followed the tradition of the Late Antiquity in which Papinianus was considered the 
most important jurist.9 
The "historical facts of the case" 
Why Papinianus had to die is not clear on the basis of the sources. The diversity of the 
explanations given as the cause of his fall can already be seen in the História Augusta. 
According to one version, Papinianus became a victim of Caracalla, aiming at tyranny, 
because he was one of the supporters of the agreement (fautor concordiae) between the co-
emperor brothers.10 
This is the most neutral explanation, in which Papinianus appears as an entirely passive 
character. 
According to another explanation, later regaded as the "official" one, Papinianus had 
to die because he took the side of Geta." It is easy to see why this became the official 
version more often embraced by historians, since Caracalla was not subjected to a damnatio 
memoriae after his death; on the contrary, his successors (especially Elagabalus) referred to 
his reign as grounds of legitimation. It would have contradicted with subsequent dynastic 
aspirations to find anything to object to in the reign of Caracalla, and naturally it was also 
not in the interest of the historians to diverge from this explanation.12 
The view that Papinianus had to die because he disobeyed the orders of the emperor, 
and almost "impertinently" even justified his refusal, did not initially square with official 
historiography. Nevertheless, as a debatable claim it did find its way into the História 
Augusta and thus into common historical knowledge.13 What is more, Spartianus (the author 
of the given part of the História Augusta) only presents this version when describing the 
life of Septimius Severus, who "slew, because he refused to absolve him of his brother s 
murder, Papinian, a sanctuary of law and treasure-house of jurisprudence. .."14 
The hesitation of the author of História Augusta among the reasons leading up to the 
execution of Papinianus shows that, contrary to the official position, the historians of later 
periods (early 4th century) also started to consider other possibilities. In any case we can 
back to the age of humanism. Nörr, D.: Papinian und Gryphius: Zum Nachleben Papinians. Savigny-
Zeitschriftfiir Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, 83 (1966), 309-310. 
8
 Behrends, О.: Papinians Verweigerung oder die Moral eines Juristen. In: Mölk, U. (ed.): 
Literatur und Recht: Literarische Rechtsfälle von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart. Göttingen, 1996. 
248. 
9
 See also Giuffré, V.: Papiniano: fra tradizione ed innovazione. In: Aufstieg und Niedergang 
der antiken Welt II. 15. Berlin-New York, 1976. 632-666. 
10
 Hist. Aug. vita Caracallae 8, 2-4. 
11
 Hist. Aug. vita Caracallae 8, 7. 
12
 Behrends: op. cit. 264. 
13
 Hist. Aug. Vita Caracallae 8, 5-6. 
14
 Hist. Aug. Vita Severi 21,8. 
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start out from the assumption that there may have been some grounds in reality for the 
reasons later becoming dominant (and proposed last), which established the reputation of 
the uncompromising Papinianus for subsequent centuries: already in the Late Antiquity, the 
praefectus praetorio was viewed as a protector of justice, who became a victim of his 
consistency of principle.'5 This approach survived the Middle Ages and became generally 
accepted in the Early Modernity, since even those who did not think highly of his "sacrifice 
for justice" began the evaluation of his action from these historical facts of the case. (The 
most famous among them, as we will see, was Jean Bodin.) 
Gryphius and his historical raw materials 
As we have seen, it was debated already in the Antiquity whether Papinianus was indeed 
executed for refusing to absolve Caracalla of his bloody actions. Gryphius also knew this 
well; nevertheless, he consciously accepted this explanation and took it as the communis 
opinio, as the basis for his drama.16 In his notes written for the drama,17 he discusses why, 
from among the several possibilities that can be found in the historical sources as the cause 
of the death of Papinianus, after weighing their historicity, he chose the refusal to compose 
a speech defending the emperor as the most likely one.18 Although Gryphius reconstructs 
the external events leading to the death of Papinianus mainly on the basis of the ancient 
sources,19 in elaborating the character of Papinianus (due to dramatic constraints) he also 
relied on his own poetic imagination and didactic intentions. He relies on poetic liberty 
where he has to fill in certain gaps or to move the plot of the drama toward a purpose set by 
himself. 
In the light of this it may appear as odd to the contemporary reader that Gryphius also 
added footnotes to the manuscript of his drama, much as if it was a scholarly work. The 
reason for this is that in Gryphius's time the aim of history, as the teacher of life, was to 
give examples (exampla) for the future generations. 
However, for a historical event to be exemplary, it had to be "true", and the truth 
content consisted less in the-often uncritical—reconstruction of the historical connections, 
but rather in the faithful representation of the details.20 Accuracy of the details is important, 
15
 There is no agreement in the literature or in the modem era either: most frequently, historians 
phrase their words so carefully that all possible reasons for an execution could be understood. Perhaps 
the most characteristic phrasing is the following: "Caracalla had him executed in connection with the 
killing of Geta." Cf. Bund, E.: Papinianus. In: Ziegler, K.-Sontheimer, W. (eds): Der Kleine Pauly. 
Lexikon der Antike, Bd. IV. München, 1979. 487^188. 
16
 Modem analysts are divided on this issue, too: Dieter Nörr finds it more likely that Papinianus 
was executed for political reasons, because he was a follower of Geta. Okko Behrends, on the other 
hand, considering the available sources once again, accepts that the specific reason for Papinianus's 
death was his refusal to fulfil the request of the emperor. Nörr: op. cit. 308; Behrends: op. cit. 257— 
261. 
17
 Andreas Gryphii Kurtze Anmerckungen über seinen Papinianum. In: Barth, I-M. (pub.): 
Andreas Gryphius: Großmütiger Rechtsgelehrter oder Sterbender Aemilius Paulus Papinianus: 
Trauerspiel. Stuttgart, 2000. 117-135. 
18
 Anmerckungen III. 510. 
19
 His insistence on details is emphasized by many scholars. Heckmann, H.: Elemente des 
barocken Trauerspiels am Beispiel des "Papinian" von Andreas Gryphius. Darmstadt, 1959. 15-16; 
Keller: op. cit. 145; Michelsen: op. cit. 48; Nörr: op. cit. 317. 
20
 Nörr: op. cit. 346; Michelsen: op. cit. 48. 
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therefore, but larger historical connections are not to be discarded either, since the exempta 
cannot only be presented as models but also at the same time serve as evidence, and 
appropriate truth content is indispensible for this. Scholastic philosophers (and similarly 
also the Stoics in the Early Modernity) deduced the correctness of a statement from the 
consensus omnium; however, exempta that have been "historically" verified on the basis of 
the consensus also serve as proof for the existence and content of the consensus at the same 
time.21 
П. 
The first reading-Gryphius's theory of law and state 
For Gryphius and for contemporary readers, however, the "story" of Papinianus, with 
potential to develop it into an exemplum, offered opportunities for much more. Papinianus 
is not only one among the many martyr or tyrant dramas, which were "fashionable" at the 
time: the protagonist not only serves as a model, but his canonized decision was also 
debated in the Early Modernity, and thus served as a good moot point in university 
education. The conflict of the contemporary statesman is concretized through the example 
of Papinianus. One possibility is ensuring survival through energetic action, whereby we 
create the conditions of a good life for our fellow human beings. While the other is 
committing ourselves to a moral order and personifying it by way of identifying, preserving 
and supporting the basic convictions and aims of the given community.22 
With his tragedy, Gryphius also wanted to take a standpoint in this contemporary 
debate related to (what we would call today) the theory of law and state. 
At the beginning of the work, the dramatic Papinianus is not only a prestigious jurist 
and much sought expert on the responsum tax, but also a politician, in two senses of the 
word. On the one hand, he holds a high public office, and on the other hand, he is also an 
experienced expert, familiar with the basic principles of politicaP Naturally, Gryphius is 
not fashioning his protagonist into a modern "politician," but it is clear from the entire 
drama that Papinianus is well-versed in the "political" discourses of Gryphius's age (and so 
are also his adversaries). This is manifested in such sentences,24 that unmistakably reflect 
the constitutional debates of the second half of the 16th century, and this underlines, time 
and again, the topicality of the example of Papinianus. Gryphius, in his great introductory 
21
 Nörr: op. cit. 317. 
22
 Kreuz, R. G.: Überleben und gutes Leben: Erläuterungen zu Begriff und Geschichte der 
Staatsräson. Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 52 (1978), 
207. 
23
 The science of politico was a university discipline, emerging at the time, responding to the 
theoretical questions raised by the early absolutist states, which stood on the foundations of the 
received Roman law and attempted to draw up normative principles of the rules and regularities of the 
ratio status, looking for illustrations in the works of Tacitus. Cf. Die Lehre der Politik an den 
deutschen Universitäten vornehmlich vom 16-18. Jahrhundert. In: Oberndorfer, D. (ed.): 
Wissenschaftliche Politik. Eine Einführung in Grundfragen ihrer Tradition und Theorie. Freiburg, 
1962. 59-116; Maier, FL: Die ältere deutsche Staats- und Verwaltungslehre. München, 19863. 
24
 For example: V, 119. 
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monologue, presents to the audience a protagonist confronted primarily with political 
questions and exposed to political attacks.25 
Indisputably, the person of Papinianus was debated in this age. Large intellectual 
storms were caused by the antagonism between the views of Melanchton and Bodin 
concerning the role of divine and human law, as well as the issue of responsible action in an 
absolutistic state.26 The experiences gained in the French civil war, but especially the 
questions of state philosophy and political actions related to the then forming early 
absolutist state, made the exemplum of Papinianus particularly important for contemporary 
philosophers. The recurring discussions of the case of Papinianus in scholarship and 
literature indicate that this model reflects not only the basic dilemma of jurists and 
politicians (the intelligentsia) but also of the emerging bourgeoisie. The latter accepted and 
supported court centralization, on the one hand, which could ensure order and peace; on the 
other hand, however, they also had to reckon with the appearance of individual and group 
interests (primarily the interests of the ruler and his circle).27 
1. Gryphius's Papinianus reflects a peculiar understanding of the concept of state, 
which also highlights the final essence of the author's perceptions on political theory. 
Gryphius's dramas in this respect show some development; while in his earlier drama on 
Charles Stuart he clearly just positioned himself against the monarchomachs (those opposed 
to absolutism),28 in Papinianus (since it does not treat a contemporary issue) he had more 
leeway for clashing different political views. The rhetoricization of Macchiavellistic 
opinions (Laetus), the absolutist standpoint (Bassian, Cleander) and the pragmatic 
/vncfenr/a-consideration tied up with the situation (Hostilius) makes this work much more 
multilayered from the point of view of the history of ideas than his other tragedies are.29 
Gryphius does not deal with the question of whether or not the monarchy is a natural 
form of government. This, however, is much more the result of keeping out of the 
contemporary debates between monarchists and those advocating popular sovereignty30 
than the lack of a standpoint. In practice, on the analogy of monotheism, it was the 
25
 Barner, W.: Der Jurist als Märtyrer. In: Mölk, U. (ed.): Literatur und Recht: Literarische 
Rechtsfälle von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart. Göttingen, 1996. 324. 
26
 Hinrichs, E.: Fürstenlehre und politisches Handeln im Frankreich Heinrichs IV. 
Untersuchungen über die politischen Denk- und Handlungsformen im Späthumanismus. Göttingen, 
1969. 
27
 Kühlmann, W.: Der Fall Papinian. Ein Konfliktmodell absolutistischer Politik im 
akademischen Schrifttum des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts. Daphnis. Zeitschrift für Mittlere Deutsche 
Literatur, 11 (1982) 1-2, 252. 
28
 Fetscher, I.-Münkler, H. (eds): Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen. Bd. 3. Neuzeit: Von 
den Konfessionskriegen bis zur Aufklärung. München-Zürich, 1985. 107-124. 
29
 Gryphius's models with regard to his theories of state are discussed in detail in H. Hildebrandt: 
Die Staatsauffassung der schlesischen Barockdramatiker im Rahmen ihrer Zeit. Diss. Rostock, 1939. 
30
 On the debate between proponents of popular sovereignty (Althusius) and monarchic 
sovereignty (Bodin), which was also interpreted as the debate between the republic and autocracy. Cf. 
Scupin, H. U.: Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der Theorien von Gesellschaft und Staat des 
Johannes Althusius und des Jean Bodin. In: Dahm, K-W.-Krawietz, W.-Wyduckel, D. (eds): 
Politische Theorie des Johannes Althusius. Berlin, 1988. 301-311; Scupin, H. U.: Der Begriff der 
Souveränität bei Johannes Althusius und bei Jean Bodin. Der Staat, 4 (1965), 1-26. 
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monarchy that appeared to Gryphius as the state of government most corresponding to 
natural law.31 
At the same time, Gryphius's work also reflects Luther's perception of the state.32 
According to Luther's doctrine of two kingdoms,33 the representatives of both the secular 
and the ecclesiastical authority are ordained by God. Accordingly, the sovereign is not 
entirely legibus solutus, but is subordinated to the power of God. The subjects, on the other 
hand, are required to obey the sovereign ordained by God, which means that active 
resistance is impossible.34 At the same time, according to Luther's notions, passive 
resistance is allowed in such a way that the subject disobeys certain orders.35 Influenced by 
Luther's teachings, Gryphius also differentiated between the sovereign's claim to power 
and one's conscience, and divided the spheres of ratio status and ius divinum sharply.36 
On the basis of several passages in the text we can assume that Gryphius's concept of 
sovereignty is not based on the contract theory. This is somewhat unusual, since in the 17th 
century the various theories of state (both the defenders of absolutism and those advocating 
popular sovereignty) generally reached back to the tenet of the contract with the state. By 
contrast, Gryphius starts out from the divine origin of the sovereign's power: the gods are 
those, who delegate power to the sovereign. 
Building upon the above theoretical foundations, in Papinianus Gryphius takes sides 
in the most important questions of his age related to the theory of state. 
First of all, he rejects the paramount importance of state interests on moral grounds. 
As Cleander refers to ratio status, which may overrule any right (Die Stat-Sucht wischt das 
Recht bei allen Völckern aus), Papinianus immediately provides the already quoted maxim-
like answer: Wo Stat-Sucht herrscht: verfällt der Fürsten Stul und Haus?1 With this, 
Gryphius joins into one of the most topical debates of his age: while Cleander sees a legal 
horizon created by way of consensus omnium gentium in the usus gentium, which can be 
placed above conscience, Papinianus claims that sovereigns must, despite all this, remain 
immaculate, and there is no exemption from a gross violation of the law.38 Papinianus 
(i.e. Gryphius) is willing to accept that the state interest requires minor infringements on the 
part of the sovereign,39 but he finds the sins that shake the entire world,40 even if committed 
with reference to state interests, unbearable. This standpoint of Gryphius very much 
31
 Heckmann: op. cit. 87-89. 
32
 Barner: op. cit. 241-242; Keller: op. cit. 152; Michelsen: op. cit. 50 and 58; Nörr: op. cit. 
332. 
33
 Most recently, see N. H. Gregersen: Religion in der Öffentlichkeit. Die Zwei-Regimente-Lehre 
zwischen Privatisierung und Gouvernementalisierung [http://s6.rewi.hu-berlin.de/online/fhi/articles/ 
pdf-files/0808 greger-sen.pdf]. 
34
 Luther: Von weltlicher Obrigkeit. In: Dr. Martin Luthers Deutsche Schriften theils vollständig, 
theils in Auszügen I. Pub. F. W. Lomler. Gotha, 1816. 341. 
35
 Luther: op. cit. 342. Cf. also Heckel, J.: Widerstand gegen die Obrigkeit? Pflicht und Recht 
zum Widerstand bei Martin Luther. In: Wolf, G. (ed.): Luther und die Obrigkeit. Darmstadt, 1972. 
1-21. 
36
 Franck, L.: Die Papinian-Tragödie des Andreas Gryphius: Eine Lektürehilfe für Juristen. 
Zeitschrift für das Juristische Studium, (2009) 1, 108. 
37
 111, 491. 
38
 Bamer: op. cit. 235. 
39
 V, 119-122. 
40
 V, 123-125. 
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resembles the theory of Justus Lipsius analyzing the various forms o f f r a u s P Gryphius is 
certain that, using conscience, it is possible to differentiate between violations of law that 
can be explained by state interests and those that cannot. 
Gryphius is also formulating his position in the ratio status debate when Hostilius, 
Papinianus's father, using pragmatic considerations, tries to convince his rebelling son, who 
has already been sentenced to death. It is argued by Hostilius that contrary to the mere 
stubbornness of the emperor, Papinianus would have an opportunity, by way of delivering 
the speech they want him to, stabilize the state and save the empire.42 In its most interesting 
part, Hostilius's argumentation makes the claim that active deeds that may result in the 
saving of the state are at least as virtuous as Papinianus's stoic, reactive and rebellious 
persistence.43 
In addition to denying the omnipotence of the state interests, however, Gryphius also 
rejects the active resistance to the tyrant. He considers the ideal of passive martyrdom in the 
sphere of politics as valid as on the level of the individual: there is no opportunity for 
resistance, but the imperial power can only destroy the body, not the soul.44 Phrased in 
extreme terms we could say that Papinianus is prepared to obey the emperor if the latter 
wishes him to die, rather than to disobey the divine law.45 
Gryphius's position on the theory of state is very clear and received quite a bit of 
attention from his contemporaries. His work was quickly elevated into the ratio status 
discussion of his age, which is also indicated by the fact that the tragedy was staged 
unusually often over a short period of time.46 The drama had several adaptations until the 
18th century in the German-speaking world47 and also in Hungary. 
2. As we can already see from the above, there is a peculiar perception of law behind 
the political notions of Gryphius, which, of course, may also reflect the ideas of his 
contemporaries. 
In Papinianus there are two legal positions clashing:48 on the one hand, the sovereign's 
"natural law" claim for obedience by his subjects, and on the other hand, the possibility 
(obligation) of resisting the orders of the sovereign violating the natural law, also with a 
reference to natural law.49 
41
 In his work of political theory, Lipsius differentiates between allowed (fraus levis, fraus 
media) and not allowed fraus (fraus magna). What he calls fraus magna so much contradicts virtues 
and laws that it must be entirely avoided, the fraus levis used by the sovereign, may be useful to the 
state, while the fraus media is still tolerable. Lipsius: Politicorum libri, IV, 14. See also Nörr: op. cit. 
328-329. 
42
 V, 87-90. 
43
 Bamer: op. cit. 236. 
44
 111, 478. 
45
 This is what he said at the execution of his son: V, 257-259. 
46
 Cf. Gryphius, A.: Dramen. Pub. E. Mannack. Frankfurt am Main, 1991. 1003-1007. 
47
 Bamer: op. cit. 322-323. 
48
 Nörr: op. cit. 325. 
49
 Gryphius, therefore, examines the "evergreen" theme of the conflict between law and justice 
(positive law and natural law) using the approach of "law in literature" and using a specific historical 
example. Cf. H. Szilágyi I.: Előszó: A "Jog és irodalom" szimpózium előadásaihoz [Foreword to the 
lectures of the "law and literature" symposium], Iustum Aequum Salutare, 3 (2007) 2, 8. 
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These legal positions are clashed in case of Gryphius not only in the form of dry 
arguments, as is the case in contemporary writings on the theory of state, but in the full life-
likeness of dramatic action. Caracalla and his courtiers represent the unlimited application 
of the principle of princeps legibus solutus, while Papinianus stands for the natural law 
(manifested with the use of different concepts),50 the principles of which cannot restrict the 
autonomy of the sovereign. 
An important question is on what basis does Gryphius, advocating the theocratic nature 
of absolutism, accept the existence of law that is independent of the sovereign's power or 
can be located outside of it. The answer to this question is given by Papinianus when he has 
to administer the collection of laws deprived of his power.51 The "right" law of Papinianus 
stands above the positive law of the praefectus praetorio (Das Käyserliches Buch der hohen 
Ambts-Gesetze-'ihe imperial book of official laws"52), and for the sake of the latter he does 
not want to violate the general law that governs the world.53 There is, therefore, opposed to 
and above positive law, a certain "general law," which was written by God into our souls. 
Gryphius clearly refers here to the Epistle of Paul to the Romans.54 This idea of Paul reflects 
the stoic, natural law notions about a law given by nature, which also played an important 
role in the elaboration of theory of natural law in the Early Modem Age. Thus, in Gryphius's 
conception, the "divine law," rooted in the heart and in the conscience, is merged with the 
natural law (Natur-Recht) that we were bom with.55 
Caracalla, by contrast, refers to a distorted natural law, which forbids subjects to judge 
the actions of the sovereign and-at least in the opinion of Laetus-stands above the people's 
right ( Völcker-Recht).56 
In Gryphius's text, the law above the emperor is personified by Themis: she is the 
divine law and order, judge and avenger in one person. To die for Themis is sweeter than to 
sacrifice ourselves for our motherland.57 Themis, the avenger, the "dreadful," still wears an 
antique gown, but the hymn of the dying Papinianus already praises her as a divine figure 
who brings healing, and the pagan goddess is thus somewhat "Christianized."58 
By allowing the acts of Papinius to be governed by the naturally given law in the 
conscience, rather than positive law, Gryphius remains entirely within the theoretical 
boundaries of Neostoicism. Thus, indeed, conscience as the highest judge is the primary 
motif of Papinianus. The protagonist is a moral hero of rare purity, whose conscience (the 
"sacred law") is in the centre of the drama. The emperor has power over everything, except 
his conscience, which is untouchable. The preservation of this purity is the highest gain and 
glory of the protagonist: Diß ist der höchste Sieg / daß mein Gewissen rein.59 
50
 Due to the poetic language Gryphius cannot be expected to use legal terms always in the 
technical sense. Therefore, concepts such as the people's right ( Völkerrecht), divine right (göttliches 
Recht), conscience (Gewissen) and Themis cannot be sharply differentiated. 
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The only question is how one can act rightly in the given situations, lead by one's 
conscience. Gryphius provides the following guidance: in all cases where conscience-
rooted in the "sacred law," the ins divinum-does not forbid, one must be obedient, and 
suffer all vicissitudes without even thinking of resistance. 
At the same time, Gryphius's Papinianus also lives in this world, and he is willing to 
shut his eyes to many things. However, fratricide that serves as the foundation of tyranny 
does not belong in this category. The Heiige Recht does not allow him to accept fratricide 
and to absolve it with his speech. This is shown by his arguments raised in response to the 
arguments of his father.60 Disobedience starts here and also comes to an end, since when the 
defending his conscience brings him to deadly peril, he rather chooses glorious death.61 
By his poetic depiction of the relationship between positive and higher law, Gryphius 
addressed one of the highly debated issues of his own time in a very original way. As it is 
proved by the drama, in the debate about the principle ofprinceps legibus solutus, Gryphius 
occupied a middle position: he stood between those who advocated the sovereignty of the 
emperor above natural law (this position is best represented in the drama by Laetus) and 
those who insisted that the sovereign was fully bound by law.62 In the opinion of Gryphius, 
the sovereign is bound by leges divinae et naturales, but otherwise he is legibus solutus. In 
this respect he followed Bodin.63 
Papinianus is characterized by an acknowledgement of the transhistoricity of natural 
law, meaning that it is not only identifiable in the Christian world order.64 As a peculiar 
dilemma, however, Gryphius's concept of natural law may be interpreted to some extent as 
conflicting with his obligation of obedience (toward the sovereign in power at all times), 
which derives from his Lutheran faith. The ideological content of Gryphius's drama is 
measured against the touchstone of the obligation of obedience,65 based on the Epistle of 
Paul to the Romans. His choice of topic and the answer he attempted to give clearly testify 
to Gryphius's courage and intellectual anxiety, which elevates him from among his 
contemporaries not only as a lyric poet and dramatist, but also as political and legal thinker, 
and explains the high popularity of Papinianus in his own age and thereafter. 
The second reading-Papinianus "reloaded" 
We have examined through the eyes of a jurist what message Gryphius's drama, Papinianus's 
exemplum, may have conveyed to the intelligentsia and educated bourgeoisie of the 17th 
century. What may they have thought upon reading or seeing the dramatic depiction of the 
last day in the life of Papinianus. 
Finally, let us turn our attention to the drama through the eyes of a present-day reader, 
a jurist of the 21st century. Can a t h r e e - h u n d r e d - a n d - fi ft y - y e a г- о I d drama that-unlike the 
works of Shakespeare, which are only two generations older-is no longer performed on the 
stage teach us anything? 
60
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First of all, it is important to note that, however didactic the tragedy may have aimed 
to be, Gryphius was not looking for answers to simple questions and did not present the 
audience with the gift of dixit. And the lines of Gryphius may lead to many reflections also 
in today's readers-even despite the fact that certain approaches (such belief in suffering, 
martyrdom and a higher justice) are rather far from both today's jurists and people in 
general. It is not just a historical curiosity since-as we had mentioned before-the text 
probes constantly recurring questions. As is usual for all literary works, we have an 
extremely large number of interpretive possibilities, and in the present case it is a legal 
historian who is going to provide his analysis. 
It is obvious to us that Papinianus did not just have to prove his perseverance, but 
Gryphius also puts him to an intellectual test, and in this respect he apparently places much 
emphasis on ensuring that Papinianus can support his conduct in comparison with other 
standpoints and possible solutions.66 
Gryphius, however, does not simply present his protagonist with the simple choice of 
"you either obey or you die," but actually opens up several possibilities (temptations) with 
which he can react to the emperor's challenge. All temptations appeal to Papinianus with 
rational arguments. It is not sufficient either that the title character should repel these 
"attacks" schematically, by way of reference to Themis or his legal consciousness building 
on his conscience, but he is forced to bring forward objective-one could almost say 
"professional'-counterarguments, thus overcoming the temptations. Fighting a two-front 
intellectual war, he does not only have to justify why he refuses to comply with the 
emperor's request, but also why he abandons the possibility of resistance beyond the refusal 
of obedience. Conducting and following this discussion apparently had major significance 
for the author and not only his contemporaries (spectators and fellow scholars), but perhaps 
also for the posterity:67 What are the principles on which Papinianus is basing his 
standpoint? How does he answer all those questions raised from both sides to challenge his 
own position? 
Among the "temptations" that Papinianus-relying on higher legal and moral 
principles-must face, two may be of interest from the perspective of the theory of state: the 
reference to the state interest (raison d etat)bi and-perhaps the more important one-the call 
for rebellion against a tyrant.69 
I. Caracalla and his followers attempt to justify both the obvious violation of law that 
fratricide constitutes and the claim formulated against Papinianus by saying that it was, or 
would be, in the interest of the state.70 In the final analysis it is the state interests that force 
66
 See Schnabel: op. cit. 560-565. 
67
 Michelsen: op. cit. 50 and 54. 
68
 On the appearance of the notion of the "raison d'état " in the German empire, cf. Schönemann, 
В.: Staatsräson im Alten Reich der Frühen Neuzeit und im Deutschen Bund. In: Heydemann, G -
Klein, E. (eds): Staatsraison in Deutschland. Berlin, 2003. 23^14; Schnur, R. (ed.): Staatsräson. 
Studien zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs. Berlin, 1975. 
69
 Roth, K.: Geschichte des Widerstandsdenkens: Ein ideengeschichtlicher Überblick. In: Roth-
Ludwig (eds): op. cit. 
70
 III, 419: "Die Noth zwingt Fürsten offt, was auß der Bahn zu gehn."-It is not difficult to 
recognize in this the principle of ("Necessity has no law"), which functioned in the 17th and 18th 
centuries as a basic political principle. Cf. Oestreich: op. cit. 57. 
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Caracalla, against his own intention, to have Papinianus executed,71 since on the one hand 
his perseverance would generate sympathy in the population and tum the people against the 
emperor, and on the other hand the killing of his son would certainly prompt Papinianus to 
take revenge against the emperor. What Caracalla finds suspicious in Papinianus's behaviour 
is exactly that he knows: the praefectus is intelligent enough to recognize that the sovereign 
has to leave the path of unswerving lawfulness.72 
Formally, therefore, it would be easy for Papinianus to explain the deed of Caracalla in 
such a way that it would not extend beyond the powers vested in the princeps. However, he 
did not explain it in such a way, and this-based on our current knowledge-can only 
(perhaps) be explained with his specific view of law and his conscience. 
Reference to state interests appear even graver when coming from Papinianus's 
environment: he is warned that by his death he jeopardizes the existence of the empire. In 
the arguments set forth by his father and the responses that Papinianus gives, Gryphius 
deliberates all the points of view that Jean Bodin expounded in connection with Papiniaus's 
behaviour. The position of the father, Hostilius, is summarized in the following lines: 
"Schön ists / mit einem Wort / den Geist vors Recht hingeben / Doch schöner Recht und 
Reich erretten durch sein Leben. "73 
This suggestions stems from the virtue of prudentia, and it enlists such arguments that 
were explained in detail by Bodin. Bodin-who necessarily also started out from the fact 
that Papinianus disobeyed the order-condemned Papinianus's deed because with his (in 
itself commendable) perseverance he did not improve the public state of affairs, but rather 
deteriorated it. He expounds his criticism in the chapter of his work The Six Books of the 
Commonwealth74 in which he raises the question whether public officials must obey laws 
that contradict "natural law"? 
As a first step, Bodin sets up the basic principle that in such a case the official - in 
order to avoid being in conflict with leges divinae and leges naturae-resign his office. In 
this case, constantia can protect the state and also the sovereign himself from many bad 
things. 
His opinion is different, however, if constantia, perseverance rather deteriorates the 
situation, as it happened in the case of Papinianus, since his death caused much more 
damage to the empire than the violation of the higher values would have, if he had absolved 
the emperor from fratricide.75 Bodin, of course, starts out from the assumption that, after his 
surrender, Papinianus would have actually had an opportunity to have a moderating 
influence on Caracalla. Bodin, therefore, explicitly criticized Papinianus's conduct,76 
determined by tradition, since it did not help at all, and in fact caused much damage to the 
Empire. This criticism even questions Papinianus's stoic behaviour, since in his opinion the 
former praefectus was motivated in his act by an impulse that is inadmissible for a stoic: he 
let his pain control him.77 Gryphius may have adopted these arguments either directly from 
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Bodin's work or from authors who counted as Bodin's followers in contemporary debates 
on law. Yet, Papinianus does not heed the advice of his father (Bodin): his decision, 
however, is not based on principle, but is prudential, applied to the given situation. He 
explains his decision with the seriousness of the emperor's crime and the unavoidability of 
the situation. 
2. The other temptation-which could point beyond conscientious resistance to the 
emperor's order-is active resistance, the possibility of a rebellion against tyranny. It is very 
telling that Gryphius even flashes up this possibility for his protagonist. This is because if 
Gryphius's aim would have simply been to emphasize the martyrdom of his protagonist, 
then he-more in line with the historical sources and the constellation of the events-could 
have easily isolated the title character from the very emergence of the possibility of active 
resistance. This way, however, he would have excluded himself from the discussion of the 
right of active resistance against rulers. Papinianus would have been a great hero, the martyr 
of law, even without this. But Gryphius did not want to stop here, and by way of giving 
Papinianus the opportunity to actively influence the course of history, to act rather than to 
simply suffer the consequences, he also made his own further aims obvious.78 
Papinianus (and Gryphius) represent the type of monarchistic absolutism that is 
responsible only to God. Accordingly, the sovereign who is put in his position by God has 
only one obligation: to discharge his office in accordance with the natural and the divine 
law. However, individuals (the subjects) have no grounds for forcing their sovereigns to do 
so. Their only possibility is patient, suffering obedience.79 Since the sovereign received his 
power from God alone, he can only be judged by Him. The subjects have no power to judge 
the sovereign.80 At the same time, the divine tribunal passing judgment over the tyrant 
cannot exempt the subjects from the obligation to comply with the requirements of divine 
law. 
All of this conforms with the teachings of Luther, as well as of the proponent of 
sovereign monarchy, Bodin. It is more important to obey God than to obey man: regibus 
obedientia debetur, sed post deum immortalemP It follows from the above that active 
resistance to the sovereign is forbidden; however, passive resistance, i.e. the disobedience 
of orders that contradict the divine law, is outright an obligation of the subjects.82 For office-
holders, the obligation that follows from this is that they must resign their office if requested 
to do something that violates the divine or the natural laws.83 
Papinianus discards the possibility of active resistance on the same basis that he 
mounts his unswerving passive resistance on: the basis of "law."84 
In the interest of preserving his principles, Gryphius even goes as far as leading his 
protagonist into what appears to contemporary readers a dead-end street: there is no active 
way out if a contradiction emerges between the obligations toward a sovereign put on the 
throne by God and the divine legal order. The surrender of the right of resistance stems 
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from the pessimistic realization that a struggle for a good cause may itself lead to suffering 
and lawlessness. 
At the same time, the idea that the subject should passively accept unlawful death even 
was certainly welcomed by absolutistic monarchies. No matter how justice and ideology 
encounter in this conflict, for the people of the 17th century it was only suffering similar to 
Christ's that could mean transcendence of the ephemeral world and the only possible 
realization of human freedom.85 
3. Perhaps still the most important question of the drama is why Papinianus died. What 
forced him to undertake this fate? As the original title of the tragedy suggests, Papinianus 
died for law. But how is this to be understood? 
The law for which Papinianus died is an absolute value. In his eyes, law stands above 
the orders of humans and of emperor: it is the gift of heavens (Himmels Gabe)?6 burnt into 
the soul.87 The law is sacred,88 God and law are one.89 Papinianus, therefore, is not interested 
in the consequences of his conduct.90 It is not the public good he wants to serve with his 
death, he only wishes to give testimony, to be a placatory offering, whose death contributes 
to the survival of law in the world: Mehr wenn das Recht dardnrch erhalten in der Welt.9] 
The death of Papinianus teaches that the evil powers of this world destroy the just. At 
the same time, some "recompense" is available in the fact that the just are elevated by their 
fall, while the- seemingly victorious-unjust are sinking to the depth.92 The judgment of a 
sovereign's sins falls in the jurisdiction of the divine tribunal.93 Therefore, all left for an 
individual (Papinianus) confronted with the unlawful demands of the sovereign is endurance 
and suffering. However, the harmony between conscience and law makes it possible to rise 
above needs, transience and human fear. Obedience to conscience, which is linked to the 
divine law, earns one a lasting reward, which points beyond death.94 
Of course, for contemporary readers all of this is not satisfactory, since Gryphius 
leaves judgment to a transcendent forum, and even that does not work. This may have been 
an acceptable (although even then a not very practical) solution for the intelligentsia and 
bourgeoisie of the 17th century, but in our age the prevailing idea is that human jurisdiction 
can also restore the proper order of things and that a conflict between law and justice 
(positive law and principles of natural law) can be resolved still in this world. 
Contemporary readers may see the failure and complete un-lifelikeness of Gryphius's 
solution in the fact that Papinianus's martyrdom does not restore anything and does not 
recreate lawful conditions. What is more, this is something that Papinianus also had to see 
in advance. Furthermore, he must think it most likely (and historical sources also evidence 
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this) that after his death Bassianus will exercise his despotic power even more uncontrollably. 
His son's dramatic fate also warns him of this. Papinianus's son himself discloses to the 
spectators the point of view which demonstrates the terrible circumstances in advance: Wer 
nur das Recht ansiht schlägt Kinder in den Wind.95 
The fate of the son unmistakably foreshadows that the strict legal position of 
Papinianus-on which he bases his refusal of the emperor's request-will be the source of 
further injustice, including such that would not have happened otherwise. Paradoxically, the 
unwavering insistence on law gives rise to the lawlessness, and even prevents the possibility 
that, by way of strictly insisting on his own position the occurrence of these injustices could 
really be avoided. Of course, this is a situation stretched to the extremes. Gryphius made 
sure that Papinianus is faced with an extreme alternative: he either becomes an active agent 
in the interest of the public good, and thereby also positions himself across from "law" in 
the absolute sense of the word, or he follows his conscience only and thus accepts that this 
will also cause others to suffer negative consequences.96 
Bodin saw it only too well that politically Papinianus was defeated. With his self-
sacrifice (in which his political, moral and legal identities appear) he practically submits to 
the representatives of an unscrupulous sovereignty. Gryphius attempts to present on the 
stage the contradiction that emerged in his age in the rhetorical literature concerning the 
evaluation of Papinianus. However, as we can sense, he cannot find a satisfactory way out 
of the dilemma. 
If we examine the teachings of Gryphius, which he professes by way of the dramatic 
presentation of Papinianus's action, in the (even contemporary) political context, then-at 
first sight-the "failure" of Papinianus seems obvious, since it only offers the possibilities 
for the common man to either save himself-even if reluctantly-by way of being a partner in 
crime or to fall victim of the circumstances without any actual countersteps other than 
declaring his disobedience. The common man, therefore-in this constellation-can only 
choose between falling into sin himself or becoming persecuted: either committing a sin or 
being a victim of it.97 These are disappointing prospects. Consequently, to avoid this, in 
Papinianus's fate we can only see a warning against the individual to participate in public 
life, in politics. One should withdraw, live a simple life, far from the grandeur and misery 
of the court.98 Armed with conscience alone, one can only lose in the arena of politics.99 
A careful examination of the development of Gryphius as a poet and thinker, however, 
reveals that he moves beyond the proclamation of the "withdrawal from the world." In our 
reading of Papinianus the model to follow is no longer necessarily turning away from 
politics, but the demonstration of the politically (still more) active virtus, which serves 
perseverantly and committedly ideal aims, and is thereby able to lend politics certain sense 
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and values.100 This is also manifested in the fact that Papinianus does not run away, but 
stands up for his own legal and political principles. And in the given situation this insistence 
can have a huge weight. 
4. In any case, for a contemporary reader, a jurist in particular, Papinianus appears as a 
rather un-lifelike character: he is the complete opposite of the turncoat or (to use a milder 
expression) opportunist-and in this sense modem-image of jurists, having no difficulty in 
changing their standpoints. A modem jurist is an opportunist ex officio vis-à-vis the state 
power and the values it represents.101 
This, of course, does not mean that the self-reflection of contemporary jurists could be 
exempt from the questions raised by the example of Papinianus. It is evident that the acts of 
Papinianus could be evaluated differently if we relativize the human being and law, as soon 
as the necessity of self-preservation and, in connection with this, the preservation of society 
and the state replace absolute values. This is something that, to soothe their conscience-in 
the interest of the abovementioned objectives-European intellectuals of the 20th century 
were very much inclined to do, and—in the eyes of many-especially inclined among them 
were the members of the legal profession on the Continent who traditionally received a 
positivist education. Papinianus's upholding of the banner (which led to failure, if viewed 
pragmatically) was hardly ever followed by jurists who accepted, supported or served 
autocratic systems. It is commonly known that major traumas were necessary for such 
questions to be formulated in the thinking of Continental European legal professionals that 
Gryphius confronted his protagonist centuries before. 
However, while individuals in the Early Modernity could at least rely on-or believe 
more directly in-divine guidance (even in the form of Themis), jurists of our age stand 
alone with their conscience. 
Gryphius's Papinianus exemplum can be regarded as the warning of a Christian 
humanist Utopia, since, in a certain sense, we can also regard the conservative standpoint of 
the author as an indictment of the political reality. The reality, however, even at that time 
obeyed the laws of political schemes and games rather than the principles of justice and 
rationality. For us—in my opinion-even the possibility of the Utopia is gone. 
Even if the example of Papinianus is not capable of shedding light on how a jurist 
should actively proceed in a situation when his or her own value system and the orders of 
the power are in conflict, it will nevertheless encourage us to form our own (even 
professional) value system. And once this value system is established, we should insist on 
conscientiously, and be vocal about it, even if we are left alone in this. 
100
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Abstract. Politics and literature traditionally developed in a close contact with each other in Hungary. This paper 
argues that this intimacy had a particular reason: the fact that Latin educational ideals determined the way youth 
were brought up well into the 20th century. This had an impact on the way politics was understood here, including 
the fact that parliamentary debates were carried out in Latin well into the early 19th century. 
And this had a further consequence as well: literature was not viewed simply as an autonomous field of activity, 
aiming only at aesthetic merits, but as a way to reflect on the fate of the nation. Lawyers had a professional 
training in rhetoric and therefore they had a familiarity with classical literature, which led many of them towards 
their own creative writing. And professional writers, too, had no other education than that of the Latin Christian-
Humanist model, which made them representatives of the nation, as well as followers of earlier, classical patterns 
of writing. These features played a major role in the formation of the two heroes of the paper, the poets Dániel 
Berzsenyi and Ferenc Kölcsey, who had an internal conflict between each other, but who both embodied the type 
of late humanist political writers, so characteristic of the reform era of this region of Central Europe. 
Keywords: Christian-humanist ideal, lawyers, Latin education, rhetoric, political writers, Dániel Berzsenyi, 
Ferenc Kölcsey, reform era 
I. 19th-century Hungarian writers with a legal background-lawyers publishing fiction 
One of the key elements of Hungarian literature is that it is overloaded with politics, as 
memorably demonstrated by the competing views of two 20th century authors, Gyula Illyés 
and Péter Esterházy. While the former envisaged the Hungarian writer as thinking in terms 
of the people and the nation, according to the younger one the distinguishing feature of a 
writer was to think in terms of subject and predicate. These latter criteria do not make the 
Hungarian writer a homeless stranger, he claimed in one of his novels, and added that it was 
pointless as well as stylistically criticisable to use rhetorically charged sentences about your 
love of your home country. 
The opposition between these two, contrasting self-perceptions of the function of 
literature did not turn out to be very fruitful, and it resulted in rather gloomy and tragic 
consequences in Hungarian politics in the 20th century. The barren debate on these issues 
took place under the pseudo-name of the populist-urbanist conflict. But it had at least one 
lasting conclusion: it called attention to the fact that while in the more fortunate part of the 
globe politics and literature got separated, here they are still closely connected. 
If one looks for the reasons why the autonomy of literature was so hard to achieve in 
Hungary one should consider the traumas of national history (Tatars, Turks, Habsburgs, 
Russians, Trianon, the Holocaust, 1956) and the many sorts of sins, wrongdoings and 
cancelled choices which make 20th century Hungarian history such a hard reading. The 
answer to the above question is to be found somewhere among the balks of the breakdowns 
and other disasters of the political community. 
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To put it in a summary fashion, Hungary in the 19th century was very different from 
that of the 20th. It might be true, that urbanisation had its obstacles as well. But according 
to the hypothesis of this paper, the belatedness of Hungarian socio-political history left 
intact an even today very significant legacy among the changing circumstances of the early 
19th century. The fact that in the first half of the given period most frequently writers were 
recruited from the law students is just one reason why literature remained interpreted within 
a wider cultural-social and political-context. What follows is meant to illustrate the thesis 
that if we want to understand why literature was very much a political issue in the first half 
of the 19th century, and why politicians were still so eager to shine with their literary 
virtues, we should not overlook the fact that the nobility which took part in public life had a 
Latin-based culture, which had been the determining factor in Hungarian public life for 
centuries. Even in the first decades of the 19th century Latin was regarded as the official 
language of parliamentary debates. This paper argues that the literate nobility had natural 
roots in the Christian-Humanist heritage which had an impact through both primary 
education built on Latin language, and the higher education of lawyers based on Roman law 
legal terminology. This lead to a situation where the mind frame of the middle ranks of the 
Hungarian estates was formed by a late version of humanist Latin. 
In what follows 1 want to present the examples of two illustrious early 19th century 
authors, Dániel Berzsenyi and Ferenc Kölcsey, to propose that the Latin-based cultural 
substratum had a determining influence on the way of thought of literary gentleman, as far 
as both their legal and literary culture was concerned. They illustrate the extent to which 
legal professional qualification and literary "Bildung'' suited each other, under the aegis of 
the Latin Christian-Humanist educational ideal. In the latter part of the paper I shall 
reconstruct some segments of this tradition they both cultivated, and which played a role in 
keeping together literature and law well into the 19th century. 
II. Berzsenyi and Kölcsey-two examples of the Latin-based culture of Hungary 
The debate between Berzsenyi and Kölcsey is one of the most interesting literary quarrels 
in the 19th century Hungarian cultural history. It is certainly grown out of mutual 
misunderstandings, and we shall not be able to clear up all that mess here. To judge the 
merits of the two sides' cause is even less our job. What makes their story interesting for us 
is to show that the two opponents belonged more or less to the same cultural climate, a fact 
that came to light only when Berzsenyi-after much preparation and delay-has published the 
piece in which he defended himself against the accusations of his 14 year younger colleague. 
In this piece he vindicated his concept of literature, his moral-Aesthetic system of thought. 
And yet, a latecomer would recognise that the two of them belonged to the very same 
intellectual tradition. In order to make that recognition easier, we are not going to 
concentrate on the differences of the two authors. It seems more important to show the 
common cultural ground under their feet. It is worth considering why these two poets were 
so keen to defend political liberty in their literary texts. 
To draw the outlines of an answer to these questions, let us begin to deal with 
Berzsenyi. He received that upbringing of the Lutheran gentry, which kept the protestant 
ideal of Hungarian liberty in its focus, up to the beginning of the early Reform Era.1 The 
1
 "...that kind of urbanised gentry, whose intellectual horizon was determined by their lutheran 
upbringing, and by their need for culture. This way of life has been for long characteristic of the 
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poet attended the Liceum in Sopron, an institution which was established in the middle of 
the 16th century, in the fresh fever of reformation. As we shall see, the educational 
programme of the school determined in many respects the way of thinking and writing of 
its most famous student. Although the impatient and non-sociable youngster gave up his 
learning before matriculation, the nation- and knowledge-ideal of the school, inspired by 
ancient Roman historical narratives, did have a lasting influence on his poetic outlook. 
Kölcsey, on the other hand, was born into a gentry family with a Calvinist leaning, and 
was brought up in Debrecen, nicknamed in those years as the Calvinist Rome. Although it 
is well known that the poet-politician remained in conflict with his school, and with the 
provincialism embodied by it, and in spite of the fact that he turned out to be one of the 
proponents of reforming feudal Hungary, even his poetic vision is to be interpreted in the 
context of the nobleman's republic inspired by antique models. 
To compare Berzsenyi's and Kölcsey's views of the role of literature in the nation's 
life in what follows I sum up the line of arguments of one of their respective works. In 
Berzsenyi's case it is going to be his "Poétái harmonistica" (A Theory of Poetical 
Harmony), a theoretical work written in a Platonic vein as an academic inaugural speech in 
1833. My interpretative approach will be based on the primary research of Lajos Csetri and 
Agnes Bécsy. In Kölcsey's case, I take a short piece, entitled: Iskola és világ (School and 
world), which was written as an epistola in 1815, and published in 1826.2 
Agnes Bécsy interprets Berzsenyi's efforts in this late theoretical piece with the help of 
an earlier letter by him, stating: "I look at the Aesthetician... not only as a florist, like 
Kazinczy, but as in all respects the main defender of culture. Because of this, I cannot and 
do not want to separate the beautiful from the useful, and because of this, I made the job of 
my old age to defend our poesy from the harmful floristic ornaments, affectations, 
artificiality, and from drowning into music."3 From this quote, I would argue, one can see 
that Berzsenyi's aim is to show why poetry-or art in general-is not as autonomous as Kant 
and his followers would like it to be, and following the footpath of neokantianism and 
Romanticism modern Aesthetics claims it to be. Berzsenyi's main reason for his 
understanding of the term is that he does not want to see poetry as a feminine and 
sentimental attitude to the world, as it is stylized by sentimentalism. Berzsenyi finds the 
role of the critic also more than simply expressing the inner emotions brought out by a 
work of art: "... it is not enough to criticize the work in itself, but you have to be able to 
criticize it from the most important point of view, from where the question is: how does the 
whole work fit together with the aims of the nation and humanity and with the philosophy 
of the whole of culture".4 The reason behind the birth of a work of art is not simply to raise 
emotions, but to serve the aims of the nation-which seems to be in harmony with those of 
humanity in his philosophy of culture, in which the Roman inheritance remains a strong 
component of the order of values. A further aim of poetry is to train humans, and more 
particularly, to train the human spirit. According to Bécsy, it is here that the Platonic concept 
evangelical "intellectuals". The context was very nicely drawn by László Németh in his Berzsenyi-
book and in his essays on the great poet." Thimár, A.: Hol maradt cl Berzsenyi? [Where did Berzsenyi 
fall away?] Kortárs, 52 (2008) 9, 68-77. http://www.kortarsonline.hu/0809/thimar.htm (All 
translations mine, unless indicated.) 
2
 In: Kölcsey, F.: Erkölcsi beszédek és írások [Moral speeches and writings], Publ. by Csaba О. 
Budapest, 2008. 9-10. 
3
 Letter to Döbrentei, June 4, 1828. 
4
 Quoted by Bécsy, A: Berzsenyi Dániel [Daniel Berzsenyi], Budapest, 2001. 97. 
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of "ëros " re-emerges in an old-new gannent: "this tradition has been married in the retort 
of European Neohumanism with the Christian tradition".5 This ëros, which has its 
humanistic-educational function, raises man to follow "the harmonic middle" ("harmoniás 
közép"), a model, in which human spirit, responsive to beauty, is in connection with the 
morally good, itself supported by the ethics of the New Testament. 
In connection with the educational and spiritually motivating functions of poetry 
Bécsy reminds us that the late Berzsenyi held in high esteem the moral thought of Michel 
Montaigne.61 take this fact as a sign that whenever Berzsenyi thinks along ancient patterns, 
about the educational and nation-sustaining capacity of the concept of taste, he must be 
moving within the framework of those Christian (and neo-pagan) humanist ideals. 
Bécsy herself refers to Lajos Csetri's Berzsenyi analyses, which in an exemplary 
fashion showed other sources from which Berzsenyi's classical Bildung-conception might 
stem. Csetri adds to the list of the names of Horace and Plutarch the writers of German 
neoclassicism. Their texts are claimed by him to have established the antique ideal of the 
young Berzsenyi, that neoplatonic Hellenism, which was shared by Winckelmann and other 
late 18th century representatives of German neoclassicism: "his whole Greekness can be 
traced back to the German spiritual life of his age, his Greekness is the Hellenism of 
Winckelmann, of German neohumanism and the 'hellenism' of German classicism".7 Csetri 
also emphasizes that this is a pre-Kantian German influence, a mode of thinking in which 
ethics and aesthetics is closely connected-and here he discovers a further dimension of a 
strong English impact: "...practical English philosophy of life8, which in its more 
democratic context can realize more of the nature of Greek "phronesis", does never 
excommunicate rhetoric, the mediator of the two thousand years old tradition of the 
philosophy of life and its ideal of the human being".9 This English substratum is regarded 
as a counter current within German classicism by Csetri, and he connects it to the name of 
Herder, Jean Paul and Bouterwek. He claims that Berzsenyi is supported by this tradition, 
when he writes that human(e) education, meant in the most general terms, or "real poetry is 
a beautiful religion", and "its aim is not simply emotional, intellectual and imaginative 
perfection, but it has to be supported on the second level by moral greatness, and on the 
third level by the divine majesty and by the happy calmness of religion".10 
Now let us see, how Berzsenyi's debating partner, Kölcsey speaks about the problem 
of Bildung, or of the meaning of the original ancient Greek concept of poesisl Of the 
possible forms of knowledge he picks out four in the text we analyse: "fine arts" ("szép 
mesterségeket"), "human studies" ("Humanisticum"), "Mathematics" ("Mathésis") and 
"Metaphysics". Of these he shows as exceptionally relevant the man who lives in the fine 
arts, as "Grace connects itself to him". He contrasts the ancients, in other words the great 
5
 Bécsy: op. cit. 104. 
6
 "According to references in his letters and theoretical works, a great reading experience of his 
long sunset was a crumpled volume, which was saved in his library: Mihály Montaigne's ideas of 
different subjects, by Nagy Tóth József, 1803" Bécsy: op. cit. 216. 
7
 Csetri, L.: Nem sokaság, hanem lélek. Berzsenyi-tanulmányok [This is not crowd, but spirit. 
Studies on Berzsenyi]. Budapest, 1986. 377. 
8
 This is the English equivalent of the German term of "Lebensphilosophie". 
9
 Csetri: op. cit. 378. At another point, he mentions that Berzsenyi made extensive notes of his 
readings of the Aesthetic works by Home, Schiller, Bouterwek, Batteux, Jan Paul and Luden. Ibid. 
382. 
10
 Ibid. 384. 
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Greeks and some Romans with those who rule today, and he regards the former as belonging 
to the "happy skies". In their circle "the feeling for the beautiful" was paired with the 
wisdom of a matured age, that is why they could become lovable philosophers and soldiers, 
and "non-effeminate poets". The effeminate poet of modernity is a victim of "sensibility 
and speculation", while the ancients were formed by practice: "Actions, and public 
performance form a useful man, who, if he carries in his heart the seeds of the beautiful, 
will tum into Pászthori, Ürményi". 
As one can read in the notes to the modem edition, Pászthori, Ürményi refer to two 
contemporaries. Sándor Pászthori was "a legal scholar, governor of Fiume (Rijeka), 
appointed by Joseph II as the referent administrator of the Hungarian Schools". József 
Ürményi was " 'országbíró' (Judex Curiae Regiae). He created Ratio Educationis (1777)." 
This means that both lawyers excelled as reformers of the Hungarian school system." 
The short text of Kölcsey is a proof that for him, too, poetry preserved its antique 
Greek connotations. That is why "poesis " (according to its original meaning: creating) is 
connected to activity (praxis). It is not accidental that Kölcsey refers to the humaniores-his 
conception is also tied to the humanistic ideal of education. Before, however, we tum 
towards this ideal of human(e) education, we have to consider shortly the nobility's ideal of 
the state, which was also inspired by antique role-models. 
III. The ideal of the state of the Hungarian noble republic12-
as an idealised version of the antique polis and the Roman republic 
If we try to understand how the learned and educated13 nobility turned towards the problems 
of the country, first we have to reconstruct the language which was available for them to 
conceptualise their experiences. Naturally I do not mean that the artificial reformation of 
the language accomplished by the generation of the tum of the 18-19th century would be 
responsible for the schism between our political vocabulary and the political ideas of the 
early reformers. Rather, I claim that the patterns and patents of political thought and speech 
available in the age, were closely connected to those historically embedded moral elements 
of culture, which had been transmitted in the schools of the age, also in connection with the 
teaching of Latin, since the reformation, generation after generation. József Takáts, in a 
writing in which he reconstructs the political languages of the age, talks about the republican 
discourse14-the way of speaking which is identified by Csetri with the language of the 
young Berzsenyi's "Spartan type of plutarchism". This way of thought was introduced and 
first explained in Plutarch's Parallel lives, contrasting it with that of the Athenians, aimed at 
the all-round, bodily-cum-spiritual self-development. In Csetri's narrative Berzsenyi starts 
11
 In the original version József Dessewffy was mentioned instead of Ürményi. He was one of 
the founders of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and a translator of Cicero. 
12
 I take this term from the Polish ideal of Noble Republic, Nobles' Democracy or Nobles' 
Commonwealth (Polish: Rzeczpospolita Szlachecka). 
13
 These two terms are not simply synonyms, but rather complement each other in the usage of 
the age. 
14
 Takáts, J.: Magyar politikai beszédmódok a XIX. század elején. A keret [Hungarian political 
discourses at the beginning of the 19th century. The framework]. In: Szajbély, M. (ed.): Mesterek, 
tanítványok. Ünnepi tanulmánykötet a hetvenéves Csetri Lajos tiszteletére [Masters, followers. Studies 
dedicated to the 70 years old Lajos Csetri]. Budapest, 1999. 224-248. 
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out from a Spartan starting point and arrives at the Athenian paradigm at the end. That is, 
starting from the cult of physical exercise, and the purity of the soul and the body he arrives 
step by step at the Athenian ideal of the perfection of the human spirit. It is again the Anglo-
Saxon orientation that leads him in that direction, because "this Athenian humanistic ideal 
built on 'kalokagathia' will be the foundation of the gentleman-ideal of the English 
Enlightenment and through the Göttingen neohumanism of the German literary classicism 
and early Romanticism".15 
Yet Takáts also refers to another type of discourse, which he distinguishes from this 
republican discourse: and the second type is the discourse of the ancient constitution. In this 
version of the famous Pocockean theme,16 Takáts uses the earlier results of László Péter, 
Béla Németh G. and Miklós Szabó, claiming that the Hungarian version of patrician 
liberalism resembles "the classic Anglo-Saxon type". This constitutional thinking is not 
born in the age of written constitutions, but is based on earlier traditions of statesmanship. 
Analysing a text by poet Sándor Kisfaludy, Takáts characterises this discourse the following 
way: "According to this interpretation, the constitution has been in existence for 900 or 
1000 years, it is unchanged in its basic principles, as the common creation of the nation and 
its prince. The nation in this political language means the community of citizens 
participating in government: it means the nobility".17 Beside Kisfaludy, Takáts can show up 
the scheme of ancient constitution in the texts by Kölcsey, as well, mainly in his county 
assembly speeches. 
It is even more interesting that, as Takáts points out, the reference to the ancient 
constitution is often linked to the republican language.18 This rhetorical combination can be 
traced back at least to Cicero, who, as the last great ideologue of the Roman republic, 
taught, in accordance with Roman habits, the wisdom of the forefathers and the honour of 
accepted manners. It is, therefore, not accidental, that Takáts, too, accentuates the Latin-
humanist educational ideal, which is present in the contemporary Hungarian schools: "it is 
easy to answer the question where did Berzsenyi leam this republican language: from the 
middle of the 16th century up to the end of the 18th century the reading lists in the 
curriculum of the gymnasium classes included beside the Latin authors Sallust, Livy, and 
Cicero's De officiis. Their works are the most frequently mentioned classical sources of the 
republican discourse".19 
The Spartan and/or Athenean republican discourse, transmitted by Roman sources, and 
the language of the ancient constitution are both easily available to the early modem 
Hungarian nobles turned into lawyers and writers, when they draw the outlines of the 
patrician ideal of the nation and the state. The substance of their culture consisted of 
narratives taken from Latin (and Greek) authors and historians, and this predestined them to 
return to the language of neo-classicism. But the same direction was pointed at by their 
legal practice as well, which was based on the Tripartitum by Werbőczy, prescribing the 
privileges of the Hungarian nobility on a customary law basis. Werbőczy, who was educated 
15
 Csetri: op. cit. 64. 
16
 Pocock, J. G. A.: Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law. Cambridge, 1957. 
17
 Takáts: op. cit. 229. 
18
 Ibid. 230. 
19
 Cicero, in the second book of his The Republic lets "old Cato" claim that "Our constitution... 
had been established not by one man's ability but by that of many, not in the course of one man's life 
but over several ages and generations." The Republic, book 2, 1.1 used the following edition: Cicero: 
The Republic and the Laws. Transi, by Niall Rudd. Oxford, 1998. 35. 
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at the university of Kraków, was a kind of humanist himself, reading both Latin and Greek. 
Although he sharply opposed the reformation, his Tripartitum served as the ideological 
basis for the nobility's struggle to defend their independence. This law book soon turned 
into a historical-constitutional reference-point. It was used as a guide for political orators to 
preserve that Nobles' Commonwealth, which was itself based on Roman precedents. 
IV. Linguistic-rhetorical education, and the role of rhetoric in early 19th century 
culture 
Above I tried to reconstruct how our two heroes thought of their own poetic activity, and 
how it was connected to an idealised vision of education, which was claimed to bring 
perfection not only to the individual, but also to the nation. We have shown, that poetry for 
them was not a / 'art pour I 'art activity, but a part of the humanistic programme of human 
fulfilment, not the expression of an individual passion simply, but a service for the political 
community, a kind of cultural religion. We have seen the antique sources of these ideas, and 
that the self-concept of the patrician nation is also derived from those sources, although 
transformed by the local tradition of post-reformation Latin teaching established as part of 
the humanistic heritage. Now let us turn to the concept of rhetoric as understood within this 
framework of humanist education. The claim, here, is that this rhetoric served as a natural 
mediator between our heroes' literary-aesthetic and lawyer-politician ways of thinking and 
writing. 
The antique heritage was taken over in Renaissance Europe in the context of lively 
debates on Christian religion. Christian humanism took human self-fulfilment as its most 
important target. Already Pico della Mirandola's, or even Petrarca's writings outlined an 
ideal, based on antique sources, which saw the potential for this worldly human fulfilment 
in culture, in the cultivation of the human mind and spirit.20 Hans-Georg Gadamer nicely 
sums up in a comfortable way those terms, which played a major role in the human mission 
of realizing our potentials through culture.21 Through the categories of Bildung (culture), 
"sensus communis", judgement and taste Gadamer successfully reconstructs a vocabulary 
which proves that humanism-both in its Aristotelian, Neoplatonic or simply Christian 
version-was stronger philosophically than those historians of ideas claim, who take as the 
early modem lingua franca the new philosophy based on the fresh natural sciences, like the 
teachings of Descartes and Kant. Christian humanism turns out to be definitely more than 
simple rhetoric. And yet Gadamer also stresses that rhetoric has a major role in this tradition, 
even if the humanist programme of rhetoric was soon overtaken by hermeneutics, as a result 
of the spread of literacy and of the printed word. Yet for him, hermeneutics is not simple 
philology, but keeps its organic relationship with practical philosophy: the written word is 
connected to action, and its message is not simply of epistemological interest, but has 
20
 Words like culture and cultivation became frequently used only in the 18th century, following 
ciceronian-humanist patterns. About the historical development in the background, see the classical 
work of Joseph Niedermann. Niedermann, J.: Kultur: Werden und Wandlungen des Begriffs und seiner 
Ersatzbegriffe von Cicero bis Herder. Florence, 1941. 
21
 The guiding concepts of humanism, In: Gadamer, H-G.: Truth and Method. Transi. Rev. by 
Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. London-New York, 1975, 1989. 1.1.1. В., 8-36. 
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relevance in one's daily life, and therefore it is connected to the question of individual and 
communal fulfilment.22 
In the writings and deeds of its best representatives, the Hungarian reform age connects 
its national programme of cultivation (meant as the education of the spirit) to a kind of 
practical philosophy, the vita contemplativa to the vita activa. Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics helps to reconstruct the key concepts of the rhetorical tradition, including the 
principle that each item of communication is itself an (inter)action. Kölcsey is one of the 
best examples of the literary gentleman who does not refrain from political action, or of the 
statesman who is able to express himself in the world of ideas as well. Perhaps the key to 
the formation of this type of mind is the practice of being a lawyer, educated in the Roman 
model. The concept of law which has been preserved in Hungary for centuries guaranteed 
that the lawyer was practically oriented, learning his job by imitating the example of more 
experienced colleagues, and in the same time was historically or even also literally 
cultivated and well-versed, to be able to perform his role as a public orator. In the political 
and legal practice of the country, political and legal actors were expected to follow the role 
model of the cultivated, sociable humanist intellectual.23 The political situation, generally 
conceived in Hungary as being under the yoke of foreign despotism, and the traditional way 
of practicing politics in the county assemblies, both contributed to the continuing relevance 
of rhetoric and the public persona of the rhetor. This conclusion was also reasserted by the 
lively communities of protestants in the country who were trained in oral and written 
disputations. The teaching of the orator's skills in legal education remained important and 
according to the stylistic conventions of contemporary literature being rhetorically polished 
was a first requirement-it will remain the standard until Petőfi arrives on the scene, who 
transforms literary diction by denying the legitimacy of high flying, sublime rhetoric and 
preaching a poetics of honesty and the language of ordinary men. 
My claim is, therefore, that until Petőfi, both literature and law as a linguistic art was 
interpreted within the context of eloquence. Neither the lawyer's, nor the literary writer's 
activity was easily separable from forms of morally or politically relevant practices. The 
ideal form of education cherished by the humanists was not the way towards professionalism, 
or the working out of separate individual systems of rules for each discipline or skill. 
Instead, it promulgated an ideal of cultivation, based partly on the scholastic concept of 
potentiality, itself relying on certain Aristotelian insights, according to which one, as the 
creation of God, was called to exploit the most of his/her inner, still latent, and sleeping 
abilities, and to do it as radically as one could. Even more interestingly, these capacities 
were to be activated not by theoretical knowledge but in practice, empirically, in accordance, 
with the living tradition of the given form of activity.24 And these capacities could strengthen 
22
 A similar description of humanist thought is provided by Ernesto Grassi, see Grassi, E.: 
Rhetoric as Philosophy. The Humanist Tradition. University Park (Pennsylvania)—London, 1980. 
23
 An ideal, which Gadamer traced back to that of the courtier, as created by Castiglione and 
Balthasar Grácián, and even to earlier traditions of the heroic virtues of antiquity, and also relying on 
Christian virtues. 
24
 For a relevant theory of practices within a community, see A. Maclntyre's After Virtue, 
claiming: "By a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established 
co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and 
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended". Maclntyre, A.: 
After Virtue. London, 1985. 187. 
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each other in each individual's own practical economy, and contribute to the emergence of a 
general sense, which was perhaps the most important fruit of self-development: the ability 
to choose wisely, which was synonymous with taste or practical wisdom in this discourse. 
Through taste the individual acquired a direct insight into the value system of his 
community, but not in an abstract, universalisable format, but as applied in concrete, this 
wordly emergency situations. Each occasion, when the individual could operate his/her 
taste, contributes to the further refinement of the personality, and on the long run this 
enabled the individual to develop even further, learning also one's self better and better. In 
the humanist ideal, therefore, both literary and legal activity found its final raison d'être in 
the life long learning process in the school of self-cultivation.25 
The fact that both law and literature-as an oral art-was to be performed like eloquence 
lead to a situation where reflections on the inner dynamism and surprising mechanics of 
living language become ever more relevant. It is therefore logical, that the inheritors of 
German neo-classicism, who were inspired by the humanist heritage, paid particular 
attention to the nature and workings of language. The same is true about the Hungarian 
Reform age: an obvious sign of the refined linguistic reflectivity of the age is called in 
Hungarian intellectual history the "age of neology", with a language theoretical debate 
between neologs and traditionalists. Ironically, it is exactly this very same linguistic self-
awareness which led to a new bom interest in the primacy of the native language both in 
education, in legal practice and in political debates that has a disastrous effect on the 
keeping up of the Latin Humanist model. In Hungary, by the 1830s a new generation 
stepped up on the stage of public life and with them the Reform age was taking over another 
great intellectual inspiration-that of the Romantic movement-both in literature and in 
political thought. 
V. Summary 
This paper tried to answer the question how to explain the fact that the language of law and 
that of literature had an interface in the Hungarian Reform Age of the first half of the 19th 
century. What was the reason behind the fact that there was an overlap between the circles 
of writers and lawyers, that a number of writers were educated and even practiced as 
lawyers, and that lawyers tried themselves as writers, as well. The paper argued that the 
concept of literature which governed the early Reform Age was deeply embedded into the 
humanist tradition, which was supported by the widespread teaching of Latin, transmitting 
elements of antique culture and narratives of ancient history, presented as part and parcel of 
native culture. Humanist tradition also preserved a rhetorical practice for this period, which 
was opposed to the specialised languages of professional science in the early modem era, 
and provided a framework for understanding literature as part of a more general social 
normative system of personal virtue and decorum. Grassi and Gadamer provides a 
framework of interpretation in which a rhetorical humanism is opposed to a science based 
philosophical rationalism, as two competing systems of knowledge, or episteme in 
Foucault's sense of the word, within the early modem context. 
25
 The idea of a practice or tradition acquired by the individual as part of one's self-cultivation 
was introduced by Pierre Hadot. See: Hadot, P.: Philosophy as a Way of Life Spiritual Exercises from 
Socrates to Foucault. Oxford, 1995. Hadot had a huge impact on the late, although differently tuned 
philosophy of Michel Foucault. 
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As examples of the overlap between literary and legal forms of culture I presented 
Dániel Berzsenyi and Ferenc Kölcsey, two early 19th-century poets who were schooled in 
the manner characteristic of the middle ranks of the nobility in the protestant territories of 
Hungary, and this way acquired a culture, which looked at literature as a public activity, 
with very definite moral and political functions, and which encouraged its subjects to 
complement even their legal and political rhetoric with a literary-artistic ambition. 1 claimed 
that there was a common ground between the two fields of activity, which enabled 
practitioners to commute between the two genres. 
The humanist heritage could survive for a long time in Hungary, which, however, is 
not to be taken simply as a sign of Eastern-European provincialism, although the element of 
belatedness is very much there in the phenomenon. If the literary-cum-legal culture which 
was inherited from Latin-Christian humanism, prevailed in the first third of the 19th century 
and was nicely complemented by a robust political discourse of republican type ancient 
constitutionalism, it is the result of local-political, legal and theological-culture, which 
created new, unprecedented cultural configurations and often presented quite remarkable 
achievements. The cohabitation of the lawyer and the writer was one of the governing 
forces behind the emergence of a Reform Age in the political and cultural history of 
Hungary, behind the Age of Neology in the history of Hungarian as a native language. It 
had, though, a special effect on Hungarian literature, which on the long run has proven 
disadvantageous: a debate between "Nationalists" and "cosmopolitans". This afterlife of the 
phenomenon gives a special flavour to this tradition of the lawyer writers, unparalleled by 
other national literatures, except, perhaps, the Polish one. 
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The Lord of the Rings. 
The Tale and the Unfolding Wisdom of Lawyers 
Abstract. This essay aims to explore the political and legal philosophical layers of J.R.R. Tolkien's masterpiece. 
First, it demonstrates the ambivalent feature of power and authority appearing in The Lord of the Rings. The 
second part gives a reading of Tolkien's philosophical anthropology. Next, it is shown how Tolkien's concept of 
law can be placed in the framework of a Lockean political theory. Finally, the paper discusses the educational 
potential of this literary work in the process of moral and legal socialization of the "lawyers-to-be". 
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"1 have forgotten much that I thought 1 knew, 
and learned again much that 1 had forgotten. " 
1. The Dark Side of the Power 
The primary concerns of The Lord of the Ring are the nature and the division of power. The 
plot revolves around the Ruling Ring what Sauron, the Dark Lord, made forged in the fire 
of Mount Doom in the previous age of the world. Other magic rings were also created and 
the kings of the Elves, those of the Dwarves, and those of the Men got them from Sauron. 
These rings acquired their power from the One Ring serving as means for Sauron to subdue 
the peoples of the Middle-Earth. "One Ring to rule them all, One Ring to find them, One 
Ring to bring them all and in the darkness bind them."2 
The history of the One Ring reveals the immense corrupting force of the absolute 
power. First, it destructed Isildur who obtained it from Sauron defeating him in the last 
great battle of the previous age when the alliance of the Elves and the Men fought against 
the Dark Lord's forces. But Isildur could not resist the temptation of power, and therefore 
he failed to throw the Ring into the Cracks of Mount Doom. Two thousand years later the 
Ring got to Gollum who killed his cousin to claim it for himself. The Ring gave an unnatural 
long life to Gollum living nearly six hundred years under its magic. Being exiled from his 
people and lurking in the depths of the Misty Mountains, Gollum slowly became a pitiful 
and frightful monster. 
However, the Ring left Gollum since it felt the return of the spirit of its Master, and 
Bilbo, the Hobbit, found it, and he still kept the Ring by himself for sixty years. Although 
Bilbo was the only one among the "Ring-bearers" who could voluntary renounce the Ring, 
* Associate professor, Faculty of Law, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, H-1088 Budapest, 
Szentkirályi u. 28-30. 
E-mail: kopi@jak.ppke.hu 
1
 Tolkien, J. R. R.: The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers. New York, 1965 [hereafter: The 
Two Towers], 125. 
2
 Tolkien, J. R. R.: The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring. New York, 1965 
[hereafter: The Fellowship of the Ring], vii. 
3 4 ISTVÁN H. SZILÁGYI 
he needed to this the help of the wizard, Gandalf the Gray.3 Then the Ring was given to the 
noble-minded Frodo whom the White Council assigned the mission of destroying it. It 
meant that the Ring must have been returned to the Cracks of Doom in Mordor, the realm 
of Sauron. However, Frodo also failed in the last moment, his moral strength was broken by 
the Ring, and the success of his mission depended on pure luck. 
The absolute power can not serve any "good" aim. Gandalf's words, by which he 
declines Frodo's offer to take the Ring to himself, are illuminating. 
'"With that power I should have power too great and terrible. And over me the Ring 
would gain a power still greater and more deadly.' His eyes flashed and his face was lit 
as by a fire within. 'Do not tempt me! For I do not wish to become like the Dark Lord 
himself. Yet the way of the Ring to my heart is by pity, pity for weakness and the 
desire of strength to do good. Do not tempt me! I dare not take it, not even to keep it 
safe, unused. The wish to wield it would be too great for my strength.'"4 
Nevertheless, the absolute power ruins not only the true and the innocent but also the 
Ores, the servants of the Dark Lord. They are constantly wrangling, and they solace their 
fear from the "bigwigs" by cruelties against each other. Several times during his adventurous 
travel, Frodo can escape only because his pursuers start fight among themselves.5 
The Dark Lord's fall is also caused by the enchantment of power at the end. Sauron 
cannot reveal the imminent danger, while he cannot imagine that someone wants to get the 
Ring just for destroying it.6 On the other hand, he can trust neither in his servants and nor in 
his allies who, if they recognise the power of the Ring, would claim it for themselves. This 
enlights the self-destructive characteristics of tyrannical power. 
Saruman, who has been once the head of the Magicians' Order and of the White 
Council, betrays the Council and allies with the Dark Lord. He raises a great army in his 
fortress, Isengard, and with the Lord of Mordor, they take in crossfire the free peoples of 
Middle-Earth. But Saruman secretely wants the Ring for himself, and Sauron soon 
recognises the potential rival in him. So Saruman divides and distracts Sauron's attention 
from the real intention of his enemies. 
Sauron sets free Gollum to find and claim the Ring for him. But Gollum is driven by 
the only desire to retrieve the Ring-his precious-what he had owned for so long time once. 
He rather undertakes to lead Frodo in Mordor-meanwhile he is constantly looking for the 
opportunity to seize his precious from Frodo-just for precluding that the Dark Lord lays 
hands on it. And in the last moment, when Frodo realises that he cannot give up the Ring, 
then Gollum tears away it from him, and falls with it into the glowing cauldron. 
3
 Gandalf could persuade Bilbo to leave the ring to Frodo in fact only by a surprising action of 
his authority. First he tried to talk Bilbo over, but when the dispute deteriorated, Gandalf, who 
generally wandered "incognito", revealed his true power, "[ . . . ] and he seemed to grow tall and 
menacing; his shadow filled the little room." The Fellowship of the Ring, 59-60. 
4
 The Fellowship of the Ring, 95. 
5
 Tolkien, J. R. R.: The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King. New York, 1965 [hereafter: 
The Return of the King], 248-249; see also "The Uruk-Hai" in The Two Towers, 58-79 (esp. 66-69); 
"The Tower of Cirith Ungol" in The Return of the King, 211-235 (esp. 221-227). 
6
 See The Two Towers, 127-128, and also "The Last Debate" in The Return of the King, 181-
194 (esp. 190-193). 
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It is worth stopping, for a moment, at this dramatic scene, because its metaphorically 
thickening meanings illuminate further characteristics of the contradictory nature of power. 
The absolute power dwindles away in the tension of the forces aiming to hold it. The moral 
strength in itself is not enough to curb the concentrated power: it must to level power 
against power. In fact, this insight is the foundation of the division of power. 
But Gollum's fate exemplifies that rational deliberation of the risks of power is not 
enough for its limitation of absolute power. Gollum can reach to the Mount Doom only 
because first Bilbo, then Aragorn-the King of the Men-and Gandalf, and at last Frodo 
spared his life, although his corruption and wickedness has given several causes for his 
destruction.7 
Saving Gollum's life is not an irrational deed. On the one hand, Gandalf believes that 
Gollum can be healed out from his wickedness, even if this has not much of a chance to 
happen. On the other hand, Gandalf, just because he knows the self-destructing character of 
the absolute power, thinks that Gollum is involuntary capable to help them: "Let us 
remember that a traitor may betray himself and do good that he does not intend."8 Both 
reasons have been justified to a certain degree during the dangerous mission. At the last stay 
on the road to Mordor Gollum lets slip a chance to seize the Ring from Frodo, because he 
suddenly feels sorry for Frodo who has tried to handle him decently in the course of their 
forcedly shared travel. Gollum has seemingly started to cure out of his wickedness, at least 
for a while, under the influence of Frodo's goodness.9 And in the last dramatic moment, in 
the Crack of Mount Doom, Gollum falls with his madly desired precious in the seething 
kettle. 
The absolute power is destructing and self-destructing-this is the dark side of power. 
The tyrannical power is never capable to create: it can only imitate and distort the existing 
creatures.10 The existence of this dark power in the word notwithstanding contributes to the 
rich emanation of the creative forces. With the perishing of the One Ring, the other rings 
lose their magic forces, too, and all of those great works which have been built by their help 
dwindle to nothing. 
2. The Ages of the World and the Human Nature 
The Third Age of the World ends by the War of the Ring. Therefore, only rare references 
can be found to the events of the previous epochs in The Lord of the Rings.11 The history of 
these ages can be learned from The Silmarillion. 
The First Age of the World begins with the creation of the Earth-Arda-and ends with 
the expelling of Melkor-or Gorgoth as the Elves calls him-, the spirit of envy, revolt and 
evil, into to the Timeless Space. In this period takes form the face of the Earth in the midst 
of the fights of the Valars-the creating and protecting spirits of the Earth-against Melkor. 
Then the children of Ilúvatar, Father of All, awake: first the Elves, later the Men. 
7
 Cf. The Fellowship of the Ring, 92-93. 
8
 The Return of the King, 108. 
9
 See The Two Towers, 411. 
10
 Neither the Ores were created by Sauron: their ancestors had been Elves who were captured 
by the enemies, and their nature distorted by torture. See Tolkien, J. R. R.: The Silmarillion (ed. 
Tolkien, C.). London, 1999 [hereafter: The Silmarillion], 47. 
11
 See also: "Appendix B, The Tale of Years" in The Return of the King, 452-472. 
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The Elves resemble Men in their physical appearance, but they are alike to the Valars 
in their nature, since they are immortals: "For the Elves die not till the world dies, unless 
they are slain or waste in grief (and to both these seeming deaths they are subject); neither 
does age subdue their strength, unless one grow weary of ten thousand centuries; and dying 
they are gathered to the halls of Mandos in Valinor [the isle of the Valar], whence they may 
in time return.'"2 The Elves are high-minded and skilled in many trades and arts-especially 
in singing and poetry-what they have learned directly from the Valars. The Elves' wisdom 
increases by the time, but so does their sorrow, because they witness the changes of Arda, 
and see how the great works of the earlier times fall, and how the world "becomes 
colourless". 
The Men awake after the Elves. They have less physical strength and they are more 
vulnerable than the Elves, from whom they learnt most of their knowledge. But Ilúvatar has 
prepared a peculiar gift for them: the Men are free-"they should have a virtue to shape their 
life, amid the powers and chances of the world" [...]: 
"It is one with this gift of freedom that the children of Men dwell only a short space in 
the world alive, and are not bound to it, and depart soon whither the Elves know not. 
[...] [T]he sons of Men die indeed, and leave the world; wherefore they are called the 
Guests, or the Strangers. Death is their fate, the gift of Ilúvatar, which as Time wears 
even the Powers shall envy. But Melkor has cast his shadow upon it, and confounded it 
with darkness, and brought forth evil out of good, and fear out of hope.'"3 
The Dwarves also appear in the Old Times, however, they are not Ilúvatar's offspring, 
but the creations of a Vala. They are physically smaller than the Elves and the Men, but 
more stubborn, and they endure suffering more then any other people. Since their fathers 
were created in the time when Melkor's power shadows the world, the Dwarves have lived 
underground. Because of that, they are masters of mining and the art of metallurgy. The 
Dwarves are generally closed, so they do not care so much for the Elves and the Men, they 
have made closer friendship only with Elf smiths. The Dwarves are equally steady in 
friendship and hatred that is why Melkor's magic does not have much effect on them, and 
their primary habit is the avid love of treasures.14 
The Ents, the shepherds of trees, were also bom in the First Age. Yavanna, the creator 
Vala of the flowers and trees, gave life to these powerful beings, because she had seen that 
the fields and forests were threatened not only by Melkor's wrongdoings,15 but also by the 
Elves, the Men and the Dwarves.16 The Ents' task is to protect the forests and to punish those 
who absent-mindedly or unnecessarily cut down trees. There cannot be found too much 
about the Ents in the chronicles of the Old Times and those of the Second Age, so they 
12
 The Silmarillion, 36. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid; see also The Return of the King, 437-451. 
15
 The evil power threatens not only the speaking beings-the Elves, the Men and the Dwarves-
but all of the livings. Wherever it gets a foothold, it turns the landscape into dreary desert. The 
description of Mordor for example can at best evoke in the readers' mind the picture of an industrial 
wasteland, or a wreck dumping ground. Cf. The Two Towers, 302. 
16
 The Silmarillion, 40-42. 
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appear rather unexpectedly at the end of the Third Age, in the War of the Ring: they destroy 
a great part of Saruman's troops, and they imprison the magician in his tower at Orthanc.17 
The First Age of the Word is elapsing by the struggle of the Valars and the Elves 
against Melkor. The Men do not play a significant role in this epoch, although, by the end 
of the Old Times, several heroes emerge among them who have fought on the side of the 
Elves against Gorgoth. Yet these heroes are also tangled up in the net of Melkor's lies—he 
can raise discord even between the Elves-, so most of the Men become servant of the evil. 
Then the alliance of the Valas and the Elves defeats Gorgoth in the War of Wrath. Most of 
the Elves leave Middle-Earth after this, and move to the island of Tol Eressa, from where 
they can sail to Valinor. 
The Second Age begins with the rise of Númenor, the realm of the Men. But the Valars 
have not destroyed all the evil's power by expelling Melkor: a number of servants of the 
evil escape, among them Sauron who will collect the forces of evil later. Sauron feigned 
repentance for a long time, while he made the Rings of the Power with the help of the Elf 
smiths. Although the Kings of Elves realised that Sauron had betrayed them, so they hid 
their rings, the other rings given to the Dwarves and the Men fulfilled the power of the One 
Ring: the Kings of Men became the servants of the One Ring, the Ringwraiths, and the 
Dwarves were ruined by their rings from which two perished and the other five were 
reclaimed by Sauron in the Third Age. 
Suaron could not win Númenor with force, however, so he deployed a stratagem. He 
went to Númenor as a hostage, but he soon poisoned the mind of the King. Sauron 
persuaded him to turn against the Valars claiming the immortality for the Men with arms. 
The Valars got Númenor sunk in the depth of the sea, and they hid Valinor from the mortals: 
the face of the World changed again. 
Only a few men, who remained loyal to the Valars, survived the drowning of Númenor: 
Elendil and his two sons, Isildur and Anárion. The tide, which destroyed Númenor, cast 
them into the Middle-Earth where they founded two kingdoms, Gondor and Amor. Sauron's 
spirit reincarnated in Mordor, and he promptly attacked the two kingdoms. The Elves made 
alliance with the Men, and they defeated Sauron in the last battle of the Second Age 
whereupon Isildur took hand on the One Ring. 
At the beginning of the Third Age, Isildur was killed and the One Ring disappeared. 
The magicians-the Istars-, appeared around the end of the first millennium of the Second 
Age; they had been sent by the Valars to aid the Men and the Elves against Sauron, "and to 
unite all those who had the will to resist him; but they were forbidden to match his power 
with power, or to seek to dominate Elves or Men by force or fear."18 The two most important 
members of the Order of Magicians were Saruman and Gandalf, the "Gray Pilgrim". 
Saruman had already studied the skills of forging magic rings for long time, because he 
wanted to defeat Sauron with this knowledge. Although he was more and more involved in 
dark practices, and, first, he had started to admire Sauron, later to envy him, and, at the end, 
he betrayed the White Council for laying a hand on the One Ring. 
The story of The Lord of the Rings is set in the Third Age of the World, and it begins 
when Gandalf discovers that the Ring is in Bilbo's hand. The alliance of the Elves, the Men 
17
 Saruman's undoing has been caused by he made cut the forests around Eisengard for getting 
wood necessary to stir fire for the black magic, enraging the Ents with this. See The Two Towers, 
186-231. 
18
 See "The Grey Pilgrim", The Return of the King, 455. 
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and the Ents undo the power of Saruman and Sauron at the end of the Ring's War. The ring 
is perished in the fire of Mount Doom and Sauron's spirit is left for ever. Aragorn, Isildur's 
heir, takes Gondor's throne, and the rest of the Elves leave Middle-Earth, with the Ring 
bearers-Bilbo and Frodo-, they sail to Valinor. With this begins the Fourth Age of the 
World, the Age of the Men. 
What can we leam from this story about the world and the nature of men? First of all, 
that the world is declining. The forces forming the world have been losing their strength for 
Ages: Sauron was only a servant of Melkor, and, as first the Valars had left it, at the dawn 
of the Men's rule, the Elves also leave the world. The Men could become the master of the 
world only after the superhuman forces are already tamed it. The struggle of the creating 
and destroying forces wounds the face of Arda again and again while with their lessening 
strength, extinguishing each other, the world is "loosing its colour". 
But the Men are free, so it's only their turn when their times sets in, whether they save 
the beauty of Arda, they renew it, or they spoil her and make her infertile fulfilling her 
destiny. So, the Men are responsible for the fate of Earth. 
The primary problem of the human nature is the price of freedom: mortality. Originally, 
death was a gift—the spirit of the man can leave the circles of the Worldl9-but Melkor had 
changed it into a curse, into the fear from death that makes the Men defenceless against the 
power of violence and that of dread. This caused the fall of the mankind and that of the 
realm of Númenor: while the Númenorians' power and richness was increased, "but their 
years lessened as their fear of death grew, and their joy departed."20 They more and more 
desired immortality, and it caused the fall of Númenor at the end. 
Aragom's life exemplified the Men's original, uncorrupted relation to the death. He 
was the last breed of the Kings of Númenor, who had been given three times longer life 
than other common mortals. He fought as a hero against Sauron. He occupied the throne of 
Gondor at the end of the Ring's War, and married Arwen-his love since his youth-, the 
daughter of Elrond, who was the King of the Elves. Then Arwen waived the immortality for 
the sake of her love, and she chose the fate of the Men. Nevertheless, Aragom had not only 
the privilege of the long life, but, as all his ancestors, also of choosing the time of his exit. 
So, when he felt his decline arriving, he said farewell to Arwen, and offered her to choose 
between the fate of the Men and immortality once again. 
'"Nay, dear lord,' she said, 'that choice is long over. There is now no ship that would 
bear me hence, and I must indeed abide the Doom of Men, whether 1 will or I nill: the 
loss and the silence. But I say to you. King of the Númenoreans, not till now have 1 
understood the tale of your people and their fall. As wicked fools I scorned them, but I 
pity them at last. For if this is indeed, as the Eldar say, the gift of the One to Men, it is 
bitter to receive.' 
'So it seems,' he said, 'But let us not be overthrown at the final test, who of old 
renounced the Shadow and the Ring. In sorrow we must go, but not in despair. Behold! 
we are not bound for ever to the circles of the world, and beyond them is more than 
memory, Farewell!'"21 
19
 Cf. The Silmarillion, 316. 
20
 The Return of the King, 392. 
21
 The Return of the King, 427-428. 
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Well, the Man is free: even if he is exposed to the fear of death, yet he can overcome 
of it, and he can assure the peace of his conscience with virtuous deeds. Nevertheless, the 
virtues could be many kinds, and they are changing themselves by the ages of the word. 
The story of the Lord of the Rings ends at the dawn of the Men's Age, in the door of 
freedom, and we would not know to what direction will be taken the Mankind's fate. The 
Work calls the Reader by this, and encourages him to continue the tale, to think over and to 
make a decision about the Mankind's fortune. Did we really stop the decay of the Word? 
Several handholds are given to the Reader by the Work for the quest of the answer to this 
question-although the answer itself depends exclusively on the Reader-, because the 
various peoples and heroes playing roles in the story are exemplifying different virtues and 
characteristics that can lead the Mankind's fate in diverse directions. 
The Elves appearing in the Ring's War embody the refined aesthetic values, harmony 
and beauty.22 They are strange, dreamlike beings, whose bodily existence is airy, and their 
wisdom turns into silence and riddles.23 But their wisdom has been matured slowly. In fact, 
the Third Age Elves are inheritors of a heroic value system: their ancestors lived in a 
constant war against Melkor, and their exaggerated pride plunged them into fraternal war in 
the previous word age.24 It seems that their beauty is an essence distilled from heroism 
mellowed in their wisdom and grief. 
The beauty and perfection of the "Firstborns" is unattainable for the Men. Yet, the 
fading human memory still keeps the reminiscences of the Elves' love for Arda and their 
noble-mindedness in the everlasting craving for the Lost Paradise, for beauty, peace, and 
harmony. Among the Men, Aragorn embodies the most excellence by the Elves' virtues-the 
heroic desperation against the evil and the refined aesthetic sense-, although his eminence 
is "superhuman", like that of the Greek mythological half-gods. Nevertheless the source of 
his wisdom cannot be found in the Elves' thinking, but in the teachings of Gandalf, the 
Grey Pilgrim. 
As we have already seen, the two most prominent features of the Magicians' Order are 
Gandalf and Sarunran. Their prominence and power burst from the same stem: both of them 
lean upon the force of the rational. However, they know well the mysteries of the nature 
and of the human mind, as well as they are masters of the art of persuasion. Although, while 
Saruman symbolises the technical knowledge uncontrolled by the moral virtues,2S then 
Gandalf represents the wisdom guided by the moral virtues. 
The technical knowledge-the capacity for producing artefacts-is neutral in itself, 
neither good, nor bad. But the possession of this knowledge means a temptation for its 
bearer to enter in competition with nature.26 In fact, the arrogance and the desire of power 
defeated even Saruman at the end. 
22
 The Mobbits called the Elves as "Fair Folk". Cf. The Fellowship of the Ring, 119. 
23
 "Elves seldom give unguarded advice, for advice is a dangerous gift, even from the wise to 
the wise, and all courses may run ill." The Fellowship of the Ring, 123. 
24
 The Silmarillion, 68-107. 
25
 Saruman in Elvish was called Curunir, Man of Skill. 
26
 While Saruman's practices destroy nature (see note 15 and The Return of the King, 354), 
Gandalf wins with the force of nature: this is what symbolises the alliance of Gandalf and the Ents. 
4 0 ISTVÁN H. SZILÁGYI 
What are those virtues which give form and measure to Gandalf's wisdom, and 
examples and teachings for Aragorn? These are generosity, compassion, and humility.27 All 
these appear in a concentrated form in Aragorn's apotheosis, in the scene of his crowning: 
"Then to the wonder of many Aragorn did not put the crown upon his head, but gave it 
back to Faramir, and said: 'By the labour and valour of many I have come into my 
inheritance. In token of this I would have the Ring-bearer bring the crown to me, and 
let Mithrandir set it upon my head, if he will; for he has been the mover of all that has 
been accomplished, and this is his victory.'"28 
While the Elves exemplify an ideal value system unattainable for the men, then the 
description of the Dwarves can even be read as a critique of the modernity. The Dwarves 
are not evil by nature, and they are not so refined as the Elves,29 but they bear many virtues: 
they are determined and steadfast both in friendship and hatred, they are longing for 
freedom,30 and they are skilled in many kind of craftsmanship. However, their primary 
weakness is the selfishness- they do not care for nature or for the worries of other peoples, 
indeed, they have difficulties to get on with each other.31 To these failings the craving for 
treasure has been added by the curse of Melkor and Sauron.32 That being said, we can easily 
recognise the figure of the honourable, workaholic citizens of the modern industrial state in 
the Dwarves' character who push the world irresistibly, day by day, with their brave efforts 
to an ecological cataclysm.33 
Interestingly, at the dawn of the Men's Age, the human-sized "civil" virtues are 
embodied neither by the Elves or the Dwarves, nor by those heroes like Gandalf or Aragorn, 
but by the Hobbits.34 The Hobbits, about whom we have not talk much yet,35 albeit Bilbo 
and Frodo-the two ring-bearers-and Sam wise Gamgee—who is a real folk hero like Sancho 
Panza-are Gandalf's and Aragorn's companions in the story of The Lord of the Rings. We 
do not know much about the origin of the Hobbits: the chronicle of the first two ages of 
world does not mention them, they appear only at the fall of the Third Age. The land of the 
27
 We do not mention here the courage and the self-denial, because these virtues flow from 
different sources in the case of Gandalf and that of Aragorn. For Aragorn, these are parts of his 
"family heritage" and consequences of the Elf values. But for Gandalf, these are acquired virtues 
which he due to gain through a quasi initiation rite: he has to fight with a Balrog-an Old-Age 
daemon-, and to descend into the "hell" for returning as White Gandalf who can break the power of 
Saruman and help the Fellowship overcoming Sauron. 
28
 The Return of the King, 296. 
29
 It is characteristic that while the Elves made jewels then the Dwarves forged weapons and 
tools. Cf. The Return of the King, 435. 
30
 Cf. The Return of the King, 442. 
31
 See The Return of the King, 445-447. 
32
 Cf. The Return of the King, 442. 
33
 Just like the Dwarves who had delved too deep under the Misty Mountains arousing such 
forces which destroyed them at the end. Cf. The Return of the King, 434. 
34
 A big hit of the film version (The Lord of the Rings. Trilogy. Directed by Peter Jackson, New 
Line Cinema, 2001-2003) is that while every other character of the story wear the clothes and arms of 
the flourishing age of chivalry, then the Hobbits' cloths were of the 17-18 century "civic" fashion-
except that they do not were shoes, because, according to the book, they walk on barefoot, since their 
feet have tough leathery soles and are clad in a thick curling hair. Cf. The Fellowship of the Ring, 2. 
35
 See "Concerning Hobbits" in The Fellowship of the Ring, 1—21. 
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Hobbits is the Shire, the North-West angle of Middle Earth neighbouring the Grey Havens' 
land from which the Elves have shipped to Tol Eressa and to Valinor. In their bodily 
appearance the Hobbits are similar to the Dwarves, just more fragile-we would recon them 
children according to the human measure-that is why the Ores call them "Halflings".36 
The Hobbits are peaceful creatures, and heroic deeds of them had not been noted in the 
earlier times-that is why Sauron did not notice them at all-, though they can stand their 
ground if they are strained. They passionately love their land what they cultivate assiduously 
and diligently, and they do not leave their country's boundaries voluntary, that is why they 
regard Bilbo and Frodo, who have undertaken adventurous journeys, as a bit fool. However, 
the Hobbits' industriousness does not couple with selfishness as in the case of the Dwarves-
they are constantly make festivities and give presents for each other-, and their vice is not 
craving for treasures, but for a good meal and pipe weed. 
The most important virtue of the Hobbits, is the capacity for self-government: they 
themselves elect the leader of the Shire-the Thain-and the citizens of the villages elect 
Mayor for a certain period.37 So, the Hobbits do not need divine kings for keeping order 
and peace. And when Saruman has escaped, outwitting the Ents, from Isengard to the Shire 
to resume his dark practices, the Hobbits take their fate in their hands and expel the fallen 
magician and his servants from the Shire.38 
The Hobbits try to live in peace not only with their neighbours but also with nature: 
after expelling Saruman, the first task of Samwise Gamgee is to plant seedlings in the place 
of the demolished trees.39 
Besides Frodo, Bilbo and Sam transmit the virtues of Gandalf to the Hobbits as 
Aragom to the Men. As Gandalf says when he leaves his friends: 
"You must settle its [the Shire's] affairs yourselves; that is what you have been trained 
for. Do you not yet understand? My time is over: it is no longer my task to set things to 
rights, nor to help folk to do so. And as for you, my dear friends, you will need no 
help. You are grown up now. Grown indeed very high; among the great you are, and I 
have no longer any fear at all for any of you'"40 
36
 The smallness is symbolic, of course, and it can be unstitched a lot of layers of its meaning 
from the book, or from its context that means naturally nothing but the Reader's (now the present 
author's) background knowledge and associations: first of all, the smallness of the Hobbits enlarges 
their heroism; "we are dwarves, but we are standing on giants' shoulders"-as the modem men should 
think on the classics' works that laid the foundations of our civilizations; in the Chinese writing the 
same sign stands for the "wise", the "fool" and the "childe"; The Small Is Beautiful-albeit Tolkien 
could not read Ernest F. Schumacher's famous writing about a humanist economy, published two 
decades after appearance The Lord of the Rings, but the descriptions of the Hobbits' life easily can be 
read as illustrations of these essays. 
37
 See "Of the Ordering of the Shire" in The Fellowship of the Ring, 12-14. 
38
 See "The Scouring of the Shire" in The Return of the King, 334-364. 
39
 See The Return of the King, 367. 
40
 The Return of the King, 332. 
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3. Natural Law and the Nature of Law 
One can read about law just on a few pages, rather sporadic notes, in The Lord of the Rings. 
Furthermore, law plays an important role only in a couple of scenes. Although these 
fragmented references organically and coherently fit in the wider political philosophical 
frame of the work, we can even learn much about the nature of law from them. 
First, law has already existed in the Old Times and the Third Age,41 in the period that 
can be seen as the "state of nature" from the point of view the mankind.42 In Aragorn's 
story, it is mentioned, for example, that the laws of Kingdom of Gondor regulated the 
process of the choice of the King.43 Moreover, one can also find three eloquent episodes in 
the story of the Ring's War. 
In one of them, Aragom, with his fellows, is chasing a group of Ores entering the land 
of Rohan. Here, Eomer, the young Chief Marshal of Riddemark, leading a troop of mounted 
men, holds them up. Aragom reveals his identity then and asks him to help or let them 
continue the pursuit.44 Eomer is still reluctant, because he cannot let strangers wandering 
throughout the land of Rohan for their own good, unless the King gives his permission. 
'"How shall a man judge what to do in such times?' 
'As he ever has judged,' said Aragom. 'Good and ill have not changed since yesteryear; 
nor are they one thing among Elves and Dwarves and another among Men. It is a 
man's part to discern them, as much in the Golden Wood as in his own house.'"45 
Eomer decides to let Aragom on his way, and he even gives them two horses, but he 
asks Aragom to visit the King of Rohirs, Théoden, after the chasing, what Aragom promises, 
and he fulfills his promise later in fact. 
Faramir, son of Denethor, the Steward of the realm of Gondor, gets in a similar 
situation like Eomer. Denethor learns of the mission of the Ring bearer, and he orders 
Faramir to arrest the Hobbits and to bring them to him. Faramir, although, when he meets 
Frodo and understands the aim of the mission-the plan of the destruction of the Ring-, sets 
Frodo and his fellows free defying his father's command (and the temptation of the Ring).46 
In the third scene, Beregond, soldier of Gondor, Faramir's devoted man, saves the life 
of Faramir whom his father, in his bloody furry, wants to bum with himself in the House of 
41
 The Sil mar il I ion, 310,314. 
42
 I use the concept of the "state of nature" here somewhat altering from that of the traditional 
contractualism, because the "state of nature" happens not by some kind of contract-albeit we can 
trace the tracks of contract in the story of Aragorn's accession to the throne-, but by the symbolic 
action of bringing under control the absolute power, that is by the destruction of the Ring and Sauron's 
power with it. By the way, the concept that the transition from the "state of nature" into the civic state 
happens not by contracting, but by mastering the absolute power (of which the idea of the contract is 
only a symbolic expression), is according with the concept of such political thinkers as Guglielmo 
Ferrero or István Bibó. So the civic state is the subjection of power to the laws, the state of organised 
peace. On the other hand, the main characteristic of the state of nature is that the law is always 
threatened by the invasion of absolute power. In my opinion, the picture unfolding from The Lord of 
the Ring can mostly be related to the Lockean concept of the "state of nature". 
43
 See "Gondor and the Heirs of Anárion" in The Return of the King, 402-405. 
44
 See The Two Towers, 32. 
45
 The Two Towers, 38. 
46
 See "The Frobidden Pool" in The Two Towers, 361-375. 
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Dead. Thus Beregond impedes the execution of this mad order with arm breaching the rule 
of the Ancient Law that there should be no living in the House of Dead.47 
And, of course, we should not forget the Hobbits, as "[...] they attributed to the king of 
old all their essential laws; and usually they kept the laws of free will, because they were 
The Rules (as they said), both ancient and just."48 We can also learn that Bag End has been 
left by Bilbo to Frodo in a properly formed will49-for the most earnest pity of the legal 
heirs, Otho Sackwille-Baggins and his wife, Lobelia. 
These details refer to the fact that there is an existing law-the natural law-in the state 
of nature, although its foundations are not in the power, but in justice and virtues or-as in 
the Hobbits' "civic" everyday-in usage. Indeed the uncertainty of the state of nature arises 
from the fact that the absolute power, symbolised by the tyrannous power of Sauron and the 
One Ring, always threatens the sound functioning of law. For, in the state of nature, the true 
foundation of the law is not the power relying on force and fear but, on the one hand, the 
authority flowing from the personal excellency and charisma, and the art of persuasion, the 
rhetoric, on the other hand. 
At certain occasions both Gandalf and Aragorn reveal, respectively, their true 
personality letting overflow their personal charisma: for example, when Gandalf persuades 
Bilbo to pass the Ring to Frodo,50 when he exposes the intrigues of Saruman to Théoden,51  
or when Aragorn meets Éomer. The power of their personal influence does not stem from 
violence or fear, but from the excellence of their personality. This forcelessness belongs to 
the very core of his mission in the case of Gandalf, while it is granted to Aragorn by his 
fate-since he is nothing but a hiding heir, a "strider", in the time of the Ring's War. 
Although Gandalf and Aragorn use their personal authority only as a last resort, they 
usually try to persuade their friends or enemies by their arguments. They never ask or order 
anything without a reason. So the primary device for realising rights and duties is 
persuasion, the so-called "constitutive rhetoric".52 
The substance of the constitutive rhetoric is very well enlightened in a scene of the 
Lord of the Rings, in which Gandalf's constitutive rhetoric confronts Saruman's "destructive 
rhetoric". Following the defeat of Saruman's army by the Rohirs and their allies, he locks 
himself in Isengard surrounded by the Ents. Then Gandalf, accompanying by his fellows-
Théoden, Aragorn and Éomer-rides to the tower of the fortress to try to persuade him to 
give up his dark conspiracies and to join the Alliance. Though Saruman, a master of the 
words (and Gandalf has in advance warned his companions of the bewitching power of 
Saruman's voice), speaking from above the tower's balcony, tries to address them one by 
one-first Théoden, then Éomer and Gandalf-and to take them on his own part by flattery or 
threats, outwitting them against each other. First it seems that he succeeds, but as the 
47
 See "The Pyre of Denethor" in The Return of the King, 141-150. 
48
 The Fellowship of the Ring, 12. 
49
 Cf. The Fellowship of the Ring, 51. 
50
 See note 3. 
51
 See The Two Towers, 136-141. 
52
 I have borrowed the term of "constitutive rhetoric" from James Boyd White who sees in this 
the distinct form of persuasion aiming to re-establish the community of the disputing parties 
reinterpreting their own respective place in the community forming the face of the community itself 
by this way at the same time. In a wider sense the concept of "constitutive rhetoric" embodies all 
linguistic activities contributing to the maintenance of the human community and culture. Cf. White, 
J. В.-. Heracles' Bow. Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law. Madison (WI), 1985. 37-39. 
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conversation is going ahead, more and more of Saruman's real intention gets cleared before 
his audience. At the end of the scene Gandalf gives a last chance to Saruman for leaving 
freely and repairing his faults, but he answers Saruman's high-handed rejection by revealing 
his true power: he shows Saruman that he already is not "Gandalf the Grey" but "Gandalf 
the White" who has been returned from death, and he breaks Saruman's magic staff with 
the force of his mere thought.53 When he is questioned by a fellow why he has tried to 
negotiate with Saruman at all, he replies: 
"But I had reasons for trying; some merciful and some less so. First Saruman was 
shown that the power of his voice was waning. He cannot be both tyrant and counsellor. 
When the plot is ripe it remains no longer secret. Yet he fell into the trap, and tried to 
deal with his victims piece-meal, while others listened. Then I gave him a last choice 
and a fair one: to renounce both Mordor and his private schemes, and make amends by 
helping us in our need. He knows our need, none better. Great service he could have 
rendered. But he has chosen to withhold it, and keep the power of Orthanc. He will not 
serve, only command. He lives now in terror of the shadow of Mordor, and yet he still 
dreams of riding the storm. Unhappy fool!"54 
When the world steps out of the state of nature not the nature of law but the essence of 
power changes: the arbitrary, tyrannous power having an end in itself is replaced by the 
lawful power, and, for the law's foundations are justice and virtue, the lawful power means 
the morally justified power. The essence of the civic state is thus the rule of law. That is 
why the pre-existence of the (natural) law bears at least equal importance with that of the 
act of bringing under control the unlimited absolute power (by destructing Sauron and the 
Ring) for reaching the civic state. 
This can be seen when Aragorn carefully followed the old laws and traditions in the 
process of accessing the throne: he visited Minas Tirith, the town of Gondor's King, only 
incognito during its siege; he did not hold up neither the title of the Governor of Minas 
Tirith, nor that of the Steward of Gondor55-although it would be quite natural for everyone 
in the given situation; and, after the last victorious battle, he entered Minas Tirith only with 
the permission of the city's Governor and with the consent of the people.56 The first task of 
the King was the jurisdiction after his inauguration: he granted the defeated peoples pardon 
and delivered an equitable judgement in Beregond's case.57 
4. Three Questions 
Next I shall inquire three interrelated questions. First, whether it is worth for lawyers to 
read literature at all? Is it not enough for practising lawyers to read legal materials and 
treatises, or, for legal philosophers to read political or legal philosophical works? 
The second question is directly bounded to the previous, and it is preconditioned by 
the positive answer the first. That is, even if we suppose that the literary readings are not 
without any good for the lawyers yet we can pose the question whether it is worth reading 
53
 See "The Voice of Saruman" in The Two Towers, 219-234. 
54
 The Two Towers, 230-231. 
55
 See The Return of the King, 157. 
56
 The Return of the King, 293-297. 
57
 See The Return of the King, 297-298. 
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that kind of works like The Lord of the Rings? At last we can still ask why should we read 
particularly just The Lord of the Rings'? 
As for the first question it is enough, now and here, to refer to Ian Ward and James 
Seaton concerning the advantages and disadvantages of applying literature in legal 
education.58 
In answering the second question-whether it is worth reading the kind of works like 
The Lord of the Rings-Hrsi we should identify the work's literary genre. Behind this 
phrasing of the question stands, of course, the implicit assumption that the different literary 
genres have different importance for the legal mind. We have to add to this the thought 
already advanced in the title of the present essay, that is-against any opposing rumour-, 
nobody is born to be a lawyer. Which means that one's decision to choose law as a 
profession, and to hold herself to this decision subsequently in her later period of life, this is 
the outcome of a long socialising process developing special motives-striving for justice or 
wealth, social reputation etc.-and capacities-such as empathy or eloquence-in the 
personality. So the question of the literary genre can be precise in a way that who-if 
anyone-should read the kind of works like The Lord of the Rings'? Is it valuable for the 
"done" or for the "would be" lawyers? 
Three genres are at hand by the classification of The Lord of the Rings: the tale, the 
myth and the novel. It is worth recalling the thoughts of Bruno Bettelheim, as a starting 
point, who compared tale and myth and offered interesting standpoints for the following 
analysis.59 
Fist of all, the tale is optimist: it teaches the children that albeit the life keeps in reserve 
a lot of trials for them, it is always worth fighting, and they can be happy here, in this 
worldly, everyday life. The tale is related to our ordinary word, and it deals with even the 
most unexpected events in a natural, unaffected voice. This effect is increased by the fact 
that the protagonists of the tale are nameless-the "youngest son"-or bear such names-
"Johnny and July"-that can be seen as collective nouns. 
Contrary to tale, myth tells the extraordinary stories of superhuman heroes. Here the 
protagonists are individual, particular persons-not the "youngest prince" but Theseus or 
Oedipus-whose stories rather show us what can happen if we do not control certain 
instinctive impulses-such as vengefulness, jealousy or the marrying of one of our parents - , 
what tragic consequences will flow from our unchecked behaviour. 
When comparing tale and myth to a novel, it can be seen that the novel's main 
characteristics, and especially the modern novel's one, lies in its complexity. The personality, 
intentions and actions of the characters are contradictory, and they affect each other in a 
complex way, and they can change and transform with the move of the plot. That is why the 
"lesson" of the novel is never unambiguous, therefore it constantly forces the reader to 
confront with and to recognise the profound uncertainty of the human condition and the 
sometimes hardly foreseeable consequences of the individual actions. 
58
 See Ward, I.: "The Educative Ambition of Law and Literature". Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 
323-333; "From Literature to Ethics: The Strategies and Ambitions of Law and Literature". Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 14 (1994), 389—400; Seaton, J.: "Law and Literature: Works, Criticism and 
Theory". Yale Journal of Law and Humanities, 11 (1999), 479-507. 
59
 See Bettelheim, В.: "Fairy Tale versus Myth". In: Bettelheim, В.: The Uses of Enchantment: 
The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales. New York, 1989 [ 1976], 35^40. 
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While the tale as a literary genre is important in the psychic development and the 
shaping of the child's personality, the myth offers a transition from the tale to the adult 
literature requiring more mature thinking, so it is a characteristic reading of adolescence 
and of early adulthood. These points and conclusions are in accordance with the outcomes 
of the researches which have taken place in the field of "law and literature" concerning the 
relationships between the literary genres and the process of legal socialization.60 
Though it is not easy to identify the literary genre of The Lord of the Rings taking in 
account the above described viewpoints, because the characteristics of all the three genres -
the tale, the myth and the novel-can be found in the work. The Lord of the Rings tells us 
about the extraordinary events of an invented world in common parlance, and the story has 
a "happy end" within its own frames, so far the work is tale-like anyway. On the one hand, 
some characters are sketchily portrayed, they rather represent only "archetypes"-e.g. Gimli 
or Legolas. On the other hand, the protagonists are individuals and superhumans for a 
certain degree-mainly the character of Gandalf and Aragorn-, not to mention that the plot 
itself follows clichés of Old English and Celtic mythology. The work recreates this 
mythological world, so far it is close to the genre of myth. 
Although we can discover the characteristics of the novel in The Lord of the Rings, 
since the story's fictive social background is very elaborated-the author discloses 
geographical, ethnographic and linguistic descriptions in the Appendix in one and a half 
hundred pages length-and the "human sized" characters'-of Bilbo's, Frodo's and of 
Gollum's, not at last-personality is indeed dynamic, and it illuminates their controversial 
inducements. Furthermore the novel reveals-hopefully as I illuminated it in the previous 
part of this essay-the dialectic nature of power and authority. It is not by chance that 
Umberto Eco classified the work into a special genre of the historical novel, the romance, in 
which "the past [appears] as scenery, pretext, fairy-tale construction, to allow the 
imagination to rove freely."61 
If we accept Eco's stand-point then we can regard The Lord of the Rings as a kind of 
"modem myth"62 by which readers can be localised within the circles of adolescents and 
young adults. So we can offer the book for the "lawyers-to-be" (and their teachers) as a 
reading which dramatises the contradictory nature of power, and the relationship of law and 
justice with an extraordinary force. 
Finally, closing our inquiries, let us pose the third question what we can precise taking 
in account the arguments above: why should we chose just The Lord of the Rings to 
recommend to the "lawyers-to-be" from the other modem myths concerning the nature of 
power and law, to which belong such excellent works as Orwell's 1984 or Huxley's Brand 
New World? We may mention first the optimism of the work that is needed by all of us, not 
only by the "lawyers-to-be", at the dawn of the 21 st century. 
As for the aesthetic values of the work, it is no need to wonder on its linguistic richness 
and classic style, if we consider that the author was the professor of Old and Middle English 
60
 Cf. Ward, I.: Law and Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives. Cambridge, 1995, 90-118. 
61
 Eco, U.: Postscript to The Name of the Rose (translated by Weaver, W.). San Diego-New 
York-London, 1983. 
62
 Tolkien himself called his writing "mythopoesis" in a discussion in the early 1930s. Cf. 
Carpenter, H.: The Inklings: C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, Charles Williams, and their Friends. London, 
1978. 
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in Oxford, who invented new languages in his freetime.63 This linguistic richness is 
especially important for lawyers-to-be who will be "professional translators", since the 
mediation between the different subcultures of their professional groups-judges, attorneys, 
policemen-, and of the different social groups belongs to the very matter of their profession, 
they have to work as translators in the communication among these various groups.64 This 
means that they ought to learn to speak to everybody on her own language. 
The evaluation of the message of the work has divided the literary critics since its 
publication. Influential authors-e.g. W.H. Auden, C.S. Lewis-have enthusiastically praised 
it, while others of not less specific density-e.g. E. Wilson, E. Muir and P. Toynbee-, have 
heavily criticised it. The present author, as an uninitiated, would not incline to take part in 
this discussion, only brings out his opinion. 
In my opinion, The Lord of the Ring's primary value is that it re-tells the traditional 
mythological matter, expressing a heroic value-system, in a modern fashion inspired by the 
Christian values65-such as compassion, forgiveness, and generosity-adding to these the 
idea of undertaking responsibility for the future of our world and for the preservation of all 
the nature's values. I believe that these ideas will have an actual importance in the long 
run-maybe even for the lawyers-to-be. 
63
 On Tolkien's biography see Dougham, D.: "Who was Tolkien?" [http://tolkiensociety.org/ 
tolkien/biography.html]. White, M.: Tolkien: A Biography. London, 2002. 
64
 Cf. White, J. В.: Justice as Translation. An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism. Chicago, 
1990. 
65
 About the role played the Catholic faith in Tolkien's life see White: Tolkien, 22—31. 
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Abstract. The statement of the defence delivered in the criminal action (causa publica) of Aulus Cluentius 
Habitus-Cicero's longest actually delivered speech left to us-is from 66, that is, the year when Cicero was praetor. 
In certain respect, it is the precious stone of Cicero's ars oratorio since its narrative is vivid, full of turns like a 
crime story; events, scenes, planes of time replace one another boldly, sometimes seemingly illogically but, being 
subordinated to the effect the orator means to attain, in an exactly premeditated sequence. Cluentius was charged, 
on the one hand, with poisoning his stepfather, Statius Albius Oppianicus. The other part of the charge was 
founded on the criminal proceedings under which eight years before Cluentius charged Oppianicus with poisoning 
attempt against him, as a result of which Oppianicus was compelled to go into exile-in the current lawsuit, 
however, the prosecution brought it up against him that the fonner court of justice declared Oppianicus guilty 
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outstanding rhetorical achievement,7 and from among Claudius Tryphoninus mentions it.8 
Philology of the modern age also devoted considerable scope to the Pro Cluentio, Theodor 
Mommsen refers to the speech as an outstanding example of antique "criminal statistics".9 
The accused of the lawsuit, A. Cluentius Habitus was bom in Larinum in north Apulia 
controlled by the Aurii, Albii, Cluentii and Magii related by manifold marriage connections 
and kinship,10 which shows the reflection of crimes growing wild in Rome" and it cannot 
be said that at a rate of a small town.12 He lost his father, Cluentius senior when he was 
fifteen, in 88;13 two years later his mother, Sassia got married again, and to the husband of 
her daughter, Cluentia, that is, her own son-in-law, A. Aurius Melinus, at that.14 That is 
where Cicero dates the bad relation between the accused and his mother from as he claims 
that Cluentius was so much shocked at Sassia's act that he decided not to maintain any 
relation with his mother.15 Aurius-purportedly as a result of the machinations of St. Abbius 
Oppianicus-fell victim of Sulla's proscriptions,]6 and Cluentius's mother married 
Oppianicus, who earlier divorced at least two wives, Papia (Magius's widow) and Novia, 
and lost two wives, the elder Cluentia and Magia.17 
It is worth noting that to illustrate the hatred between Oppianicus senior and Cluentius 
Cicero does not use the opportunity that he could properly exploit as the psychological 
motivation of the assassination attempted by Oppianicus against his stepson, namely, he 
does not mention how Cluentius responded-possibly with antipathy or anger-to the fact of 
the marriage of his mother and Oppianicus.18 Magia was the mother of Oppianicus junior, 
who acted as accuser against Cluentius, that is, the son of his stepmother in 66. Oppianicus 
senior purportedly wanted to get his stepson, Cluentius poisoned and used C. Fabricius for 
carrying out his plan, who tried to win the help both of Scamander, the libertine and the 
slave of the physician who treated Cluentius for performing the murder.19 It is impossible to 
clarify how much the fact of the assassination attempt could be considered proved; however, 
Cluentius brought a charge first against Scamander, then Fabricius and finally his stepfather, 
Oppianicus senior. The court of justice found all the accused persons guilty; however, 
7
 Plinius minor, Epistulae 1, 20, 4. 
8
 Tryphoninus, D. 48, 18, 39. Cf. Nörr, D.: Cicero-Zitate bei den klassischen Juristen. Zur 
Bedeutung literarischer Zitate bei den Juristen und zur Wirkungsgeschichte Ciceros. In: Ciceroniana. 
Atti del III Colloquium Tullianum. Roma. 1978. 111-150, 122ff. 
9
 Mommsen, Th.: Römische Geschichte, III. Berlin, 18756. 528. Die Criminalstatistik aller 
Zeiten und Länder wird schwerlich ein Seitenstück bieten zu einem Schaudergemälde so 
mannichfaltiger, so entsetzlicher und so widernatürlicher Verbrechen, wie es der Prozeß des Aulus 
Cluentius in einem Schoß einer der angesehensten Familien einer italischen Ackerstadt vor uns 
aufgerollt. 
10
 See Hoenigswald, G. S.: The murder charges in Cicero's Pro Cluentio. Transactions of the 
American Philological Association, 93 (1962), 109-123, 109f. 
11
 Cf. Sallustius, De coniuratione Catilinae 11,4. 
12
 Kroll, W.: Ciceros Rede für Cluentius. Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, 53 
(1924), 174-184, 176. 
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Oppianicus was convicted with a little majority of the votes cast.20 The lawsuit involved 
several suspicious circumstances, for example, the judges were drawn irregularly,21 the 
suspicion of bribe22 emerged with respect to several senators, e.g. C. Fidiculanius Falcula,23 
M. Atilius Bulbus and Staienus.24 
Based on all that, suspicion extensively spread that the lawsuit was influenced by 
bribes and bribe attempts. In spite of the fact that Oppianicus was convicted, Cicero tries to 
present the case as if Oppianicus himself might have been the briber and it was thanks to 
this that almost half of the members of the court of justice voted for his innocence, in 
contrast with Scamander and Fabricius who were unanimously convicted; on the other 
hand, Oppianicus's counsel, L. Quinctius suspected Cluentius of bribe as by his formal 
accusation he eventually won success, and used this case for agitating as a tribune before 
the popular assembly against the corruptness of the order of senators constituting the courts 
of justice.25 Consequently, the lawsuit caused political stir and served as grounds for 
proceedings against several senators who participated in the lawsuit as judges.26 Cicero, 
who defended Scamander in the 74 proceedings, refers to the case as a textbook example of 
the bribeability of courts of justice just because Oppianicus was sentenced by only little 
majority of the votes cast, from which he wanted to create evidence of or at least arguments 
on the bribe committed by the accused.27 
Two years after he was convicted, in 72, Oppianicus senior died in exile but near 
Rome28-the prosecution claimed that Cluentius had him poisoned29-however, no factual 
data are available on the circumstances of his death. His widow, Sassia suspected her son 
(that is, Oppianicus's stepson), Cluentius of having poisoned Oppianicus, and she tried to 
confirm her suspicion by testimonies-primarily forced from slaves-but she did not succeed 
in it.30 However, after further deaths occurred, and Cluentius got involved in them under 
unclarified circumstances, in 66 Abbius Oppianicus junior-presumably twenty-one years 
old at the time of the lawsuit3'-brought a charge against Cluentius, a member of the order 
of knights, based on Sulla's lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis, which contained the state 
of facts elements homicide, illegal possession of amis, making and passing on poison for 
the purpose of manslaughter, arson and certain procedural crimes, such as for example 
bribing the court of justice in order to have innocent persons sentenced-however, it 
extended this later scope of state of facts to magistrates and senators only.32 Based on that-
20
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Darmstadt, 1985. 21. 
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31
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Stuttgart, 1975. 195. 
32
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paying regard to the letter of the law-Cluentius could not be declared guilty in the charge of 
bribe if for no other reason than because he did not belong to the scope of subjects of the 
law as he came from a family in the order of knights and had never held a state office.33 The 
office of iudex quaestionis was fulfilled by Q. Voconius Naso;34 the young Titus Attius, 
knight of Pisaurum acted on the side of the prosecution,35 the defence of Cluentius, who can 
be most probably considered guilty in the charges brought against him, was undertaken by 
Cicero, a praetor in 66, who attained that the accused was acquitted.36 The court of justice 
consisted of thirty-two jurors, made up, on the grounds of lex Aurelia iudiciaria of 70, of 
senators, knights and aerar tribunes each constituting one-third of the panel.37 
The defence followed a double path: it did not come to the main count of the indictment 
immediately; instead, it dealt with the issue of bribe first. In order to support his own 
narrative on bribe, to discuss the subject of bribe more extensively than the accuser: first, he 
details Oppianicus senior's guilty past record, and deals with two former lawsuits related to 
the assassination attempt against Cluentius. In the introduction Cicero announces that in his 
statement of the defence he will follow the double path indicated by the prosecution and 
will justify why he deals with the first point more profoundly than with the second one: the 
charge of poisoning is fully unfounded, therefore, it can be get done with briefly; the bribe 
case has been generally known for eight years already, and the joint effort of the counsel for 
the defence and the judges will be required to do away with it. The first part of the statement 
of the defence consists of three subchapters, which deal with Oppianicus senior's past 
record, the poisoning lawsuit of the year 74 and the bribe case. In the second part of the 
oration, which now covers the main count of the indictment, i.e. the issue of assassination 
committed by Cluentius against Oppianicus by poison, the orator passes over other 
purported acts of the accused and the crime of poisoning with lapidary conciseness and 
almost suspicious ease, and he spends more time only on the testimonies enforced from 
slaves brought up by the prosecution as evidence. 
II. Applicability of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis in Cluentius's lawsuit 
In the beginning of the speech, in the prooemium, Cicero strictly separates the charge of 
murder committed by poison and the charge of bribing the court of justice that passed 
sentence on Oppianicus senior eight years before, which was politically highly exploited by 
subscriptor Attius.38 The charge could be based (i) on assassination and mixing of poison, 
(ii) several poisoning attempts and bribing the court of justice, (iii) simply on assassination 
attempt.39 It makes it rather difficult to reconstruct the facts that Cicero both conceals facts 
Cloud, J. D.: The primary purpose of the lex Cornelia de sicariis. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fiir 
Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, 86 (1969), 258-268; Classen, С. J.: Cicero, Pro Cluentio 
1-11 im Licht der rhetorischen Theorie und Praxis. Rheinisches Museum, 108 (1965), 104—142; 
Humbert, J.: Comment Cicéron mystifia les juges de Cluentius. Latomus, 16 (1938), 275-296, 276. 
33
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39
 Classen, С. J.: Die Anklage gegen A. Cluentius Habitus (66 v. Chr. Geb.). Zeitschrift der 
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unpleasant to his defendant and dispenses with elements self-evident to the audience of the 
period but no longer known to the reader of the present day. It is clear that as counsel for 
the defence Cicero's task was to prove to the judges that his defendant had not committed 
the crime(s) he was charged with-that is, in accordance with the fundamental rhetorical 
principles he had to proceed in compliance with status coniecturalis. 
To a lawyer's eyes, one of the most interesting questions of Pro Cluentio is whether 
the charge brought by Oppianicus junior based on lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis 
against Cluentius applied to manslaughter committed by poison only or covered bribe of 
the court of justice too, which the accused committed, as claimed by the accuser, eight 
years before, in the lawsuit against Oppianicus senior. In clarifying the question, as a matter 
of fact, the problem of the reliability of the source base arises as Cicero's form of 
presentation and his references to the text of the law are most probably tendentious-even if 
he could not have modified or distorted the text of the law on the merits when citing it-and 
the form of Sulla's laws left to us is from a much later age;40 furthermore, it must be taken 
into account that the text effective at the time of the lawsuit is not necessarily identical with 
the text left to us.41 Although the later version of lex Cornelia de falsis sanctions active 
bribe in court of justice, it is not probable that the original lex Cornelia testament aria 
contained provisions to such effect. In the attempt to determine the counts of the indictment 
precisely, one should not forget about the circumstance that in the quaestio proceedings the 
accuser was allowed to present everything to the jurors that he could bring up against the 
accused since his aim was to declare guilt in general only and not to fix guilt that can be 
declared in specific counts of the indictment since punishment was not based on the 
discretion of the court of justice.42 We cannot know for sure if in delatio nominis it was 
mandatory to notify the law and if in addition to naming the law that provided grounds for 
the charge it was mandatory to specify its exact passage or if it was mandatory to name 
other counts of the indictment to be referred to in the scope of the charge and whether they 
were binding with respect to the continuation of the lawsuit in the event that they were 
determined.43 
There is a good chance of stating that in the introduction of the lawsuit it was 
mandatory to set the counts of the inducement in writing, as Cicero notes this in De 
inventione regarding the period before Sulla.44 It is worth looking at how much Cicero 
specifies statutory grounds of the charge of the given lawsuit in his speeches and to what 
extent he comments on the introductory part of the lawsuit (postulatio, delatio nominis, 
receptio nominis). References to the state of facts and charge of de pecuniis repetundis,45 de 
Proömientechnik in Ciceros Reden: Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von rhetorischer Theorie und 
rednerischer Praxis bei Cicero. Diss. Jena, 1968. 100—109; Pugliese, G.: Aspetti giuridici della Pro 
Cluentio di Cicerone. Iura, 21 (1970), 155-181. 
40
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maiestate,46 de am bit и?1 peculatus,4* inter sicarios and veneficii,49 iniuriarum,50 furti?1 de 
vi,52 de alea53 and de parricidio54 can be found item by item.55 Furthermore, in several 
cases he names the particular law, for example lex Plautia de vi,56 lex Iulia de pecuniis 
repetnndis,57 lex Papia,58 lex Acilia59 and lex Scantinia.60 In several orations he refers 
expressis verbis to the charge being in conformity with the facts of the case, for example, in 
Pro Roscio Amerino,61 In Verrem-among others regarding the statues erected62-/7/-« 
Scauro,63 Pro Rabirio Postumo64 and Pro Ligario.65 
In Pro Cluentio Cicero's form of presentation is twofold. On the one hand, it gives the 
impression that the court of justice is competent exclusively in the case of poisoning,66 and 
article six of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis on bribing the court of justice does not 
apply to Cluentius as the scope of persons is restricted to the order of senators;67 on the 
other hand, it deals with bribe continuously as crimen. The quaestio chaired by Q. Voconius 
Naso was undoubtedly competent primarily in cases of poisoning-which, as a matter of 
fact, does not exclude bringing up other counts of the indictment-at the same time it 
contained a section that sanctioned bribe.68 It is worth looking at the points referred to by 
Joachim Classen in order to clarify if the charge was in conformity with the facts of the 
case. In spite of incomplete source base it can be pointed out that in no other cases was a 
charge brought due to bribe in court of justice on the grounds of lex Cornelia de sicariis et 
veneficis as there were other opportunities for sanctioning bribe of the court of justice. 
Furthermore, it is not probable that iudex quaestionis would have sustained the charge 
contrary to the letter of the law, more specifically, that the prosecutor would extend the state 
of facts of Sulla's law to the order of knights, beyond the order of senators. Cicero asserts 
that Attius often referred to aequitas, by which he argued for the extensive interpretation of 
46
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the law, and Cicero-although he wants to protect Cluentius against the peril arising from 
the suspicion of bribe-does not refer to bribe even once as crimen in conformity with the 
charge, and quotes no testimony to refute it; instead, he underlines it much rather as a point 
brought up by the prosecution that can generate prejudice69 and bias.70 
III. Rhetorical tactics and double handling of facts of the case in Pro Cluentio 
Discussion of crimina veneficii, that is, actual, legally relevant counts of the indictment in 
the first place could give the impression to the judges that Cicero tries to evade the less 
considerable but highly effective part of the charge, indicium Iunianum, for this reason, he 
admittedly-in fact only apparently since he starts discussing the Oppianicus lawsuit on the 
merits much later only71-follows the system set up by Attius. Regarding the forced choice 
between status collectionis and status coniecturalis Cicero resolves to perform a stunt, a 
highly break-neck one, at that, which he, however, already used successfully in Pro Roscio 
Amerino:12 he separates his own intentions and his defendant's interests and claims by 
stating that for him as counsel for the defence it would have been absolutely sufficient to 
refer to the law itself,73 but at the request of Cluentius, who wanted not only to win the 
lawsuit but to restore his reputation74 he has chosen the more difficult way, specifically he 
wants to prove the innocence of the accused not only formally but also substantively.75 By 
that he can absolutely give the impression as if each of the two statuses represented proper 
weight for him to make a success of his case.76 
The double argument technique, at the same time, fits in with the "needs" of the 
members of the court of justice with brilliant accuracy since by applying status collectionis 
he defends the interests of the order of knights adhering to the words of the law, which take 
them out of the scope of culpability;77 at the same time, he arouses fear in them that in the 
event that the extensive interpretation gains ground, charge can be brought at will in the 
future due to bribe against knights too;78 on the other hand, he does not have to be afraid of 
drawing the anger of judges who come from the order of senators because having used 
status coniecturalis he can be sure of their sympathy since by proving bribe committed by 
Oppianicus and not by Cluentius and by having explored that only a few judges were bribed 
in the Oppianicus lawsuit and only Staienus was actually given money,79 through a kind of 
"washing the Moor white"-so kind to senators so much damaged by the events of the 
lawsuit in 74—he restores the honour of the judges in the present case by providing them 
with a scapegoat.80 With respect to the application of two status, in the dispositio of Pro 
Cluentio, together with Wilfried Stroh we can create the following system:81 in the 
69
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discussion of indicium Iuniamim,82 status coniecturalis (i.e. it was not Cluentius who 
committed bribe) was addressed to senators83 and status collectionis (i.e. Cluentius could 
not be punished pursuant to section six of lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis) to knights,84 
and it is followed by the discussion of crimina veneficii.85 
To counteract the sympathy shown towards Oppianicus junior, Cicero chooses a 
masterly tool: he enters in the picture Cluentius's mother (that is, the widow of Oppianicus 
senior and stepmother of Oppianicus junior), Sassia, who is fired by hostile odium and 
crudelitas against her son, and in whose hands-for she is moving the threads of the charge-
Oppianicus junior guided by a child's pietas is merely a tool for accomplishing her 
revenge.86 It is worth examining closer at what points and in what context Cicero mentions 
Sassia.87 
Directly after exordium/prooemium he names Sassia as a mother guided by cruelty and 
hatred and as the source of the charge.88 The question whether Sassia (as Joachim Classen 
argues) was personally present at the trial89 or (as Wilfried Stroh and Jules Humbert asserts) 
was absent90 cannot be settled, as Cicero does not address her directly at any point and it is 
not known if she testified or not, and perhaps it is not exceptionally relevant. He 
emphatically alludes to Sassia's significance in terms of the lawsuit,91 and states that for the 
sake of saving Cluentius he cannot show consideration for her,92 however, it is much later, 
in the discussion of crimina veneficii that we learn what this significance is.93 The minutes 
of the interrogation of the slave was read (caused to be read) by Attius before the court of 
justice,94 but it is doubtful if Sassia's name occurred in it;95 however, the most probably 
rather subjective reconstruction of the events imbued with rhetorical exaggerations enabled 
Cicero to make an attack against Cluentius's mother.96 The orator keeps the promise made 
earlier97 only after that, and he presents a stylised image of the mother as monstrum to the 
judges who probably had not known anything about the relation between mother and son 
before the trial. Accordingly, she was already part of the assassination attempt against 
Cluentius,98 she made her stepson her son-in-law in order to enter him as an accuser acting 
resolutely against her son;99 then, after brief summary of the interrogation of the slave100 the 
82
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orator creates the image of Sassia who manipulates witnesses, arrives to Rome to hasten her 
son's ruin, holds the threads in her hands in the background but hides from public.101 
As the prosecutor most probably did not mention Sassia, instead, tried to strengthen 
the "pius Oppianicus-impius Cluentius " opposition in the judges, Cicero, with good sense, 
using the tool of retorsio criminis let the characterisation set up by the prosecution fall 
back—if not on Oppianicus junior, of whom the orator could not speak much ill for he was 
young and gave a good impression to the judges-on Sassia purportedly manipulating the 
charge, who seemed to be suitable for this role all the more because the fact of her marriage 
entered into with her son-in-law102 around 86 offered the defence the opportunity to 
expound the topos of a female violating the order of nature and for this reason undoubtedly 
not shrinking back from other foul deeds either.103 Cicero achieves all that by brilliant 
regrouping of the events since it is just this ordo artificiosus that allows him to build the 
narratio divided into two into the argumentatio and to get from here straight to theperoratio 
that fulfils the function of invective against Sassia, in which the attention and effort of the 
judges should be aimed no longer at deliberating if Oppianicus junior was right or wrong in 
taking vengeance for the conviction and death of his stepfather but at saving the son from 
the revenge of the mother, who is treading under foot the laws of nature and wants to use 
administration of justice to achieve this goal.104 
In the part on iudicium Iunianumm Cicero handles the tools of narratio and 
argumentatio, traditionally and theoretically clearly separable and to be separated, with 
brilliant and deceptive ease. Although after the propostio106 and the interposed narrative on 
Sassia107 he starts the narratio that culminates later in confirmation its given parts,109 for 
example, the paragraphs on Oppianicus's foul deeds110 and those relating praeiudicia111  
actually fulfil the function of probabile e causa working towards the purpose to be proved112 
because they are meant to support that it was not Cluentius but Oppianicus who might have 
had and did have a reason for bribing the court of justice.113 Similarly, the argument on the 
amount of bribe as probabile e facto partly precedes,"4 partly follows,"5 that is, surrounds 
the narratio on this topic;"6 in other words, the argumentatio discussing these events, 
outlining an approximate chronology is of a narrative kind."7 
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This complicated procedure is indispensably necessary for Cicero to make the-lesser 
lifelike-train of thoughts believable to the judges which states that in the lawsuit in 74 it 
was not the winner Cluentius but Oppianicus declared guilty that bribed the court of justice 
and in such fashion, in fact, that the hired intermediary, Staienus promised to hand over the 
bribe to the judges but later he alleged that the accused was not willing to pay, thereby he 
turned the judges against him and made sure that Oppianicus would be convicted, and all 
that he did in order to keep the whole amount for himself. Cicero, however, did not shower 
this narrative on the audience without any preparation, therefore, he was compelled to give 
reasons for the reconstructive narratio by a preceding argumentatio claiming that 
Oppianicus-being aware of his numerous foul deeds and praeiudicia negatively influencing 
his case-must have had a serious motif to bribe the court of justice."8 Cicero, as a matter of 
fact, gets into conflict with his promise that in his speech he intends to follow the order set 
up by the opponent;"9 yet, he more or less keeps his promise during the actual narratio, 
although prior to it he speaks about the points not touched upon by the prosecutor. And in 
long preparatory passages he assures the judges several times that he wants to make it short 
what he has got to say,120 which he can do because right at the beginning of the oratio he 
states that he does not intend to conceal anything of the facts of the case and is willing to 
deal with every circumstance mentioned by Attius.121 
Breaking strict chronology can be clearly observed especially in discussing praeiudicia 
that are against Cluentius's case and the list of Oppianicus's crimes. The chairman of the 
Oppianicus lawsuit (iudex quaestionis), C. Iunius was convicted in 74, and in the same year 
the senate issued a resolution that made it possible to hold judges affected by iudicium 
Iunianum responsible for bribe.122 In 73, C. Fidiculanius Falcula was acquitted in two 
lawsuits;123 in 72, P. Septimius Scaevola was convicted for crimen repetundarum, between 
73 and 70 M. Atilius Bulbus was convicted for crimen maiestatis; in 70, on the occasion of 
census M. Aquilius, Ti. Gutta and P. Popilius-just as Cluentius himself-were reprimanded 
by the censors; in the following years Popilius and Gutta were convicted due to ambitus, 
Staienus was convicted on the grounds of other charges.124 The prosecutor presents each of 
these lawsuits and judgments as it were-independently of the nature of the particular 
charge-as the outcome of iudicium Iunianum?25 whereas Cicero, contrary to natural 
chronology, sets up an artificial chronology that suits his intentions as counsel for the 
defence, in which judgments appear as the consequence of the invidia stirred up by tribune 
Quinctius,126 furthermore, by anticlimactic editing, from cases with greater weight127 
through Septimius Severus's list is aestimatio,128 censorial measures considered weight-
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less,129 Egnatius's last will and testament130 and the senatus consultum131 he gets to his own 
opinion formulated in Verrine orations,132 thereby-by striking a tone ranging from pathetic 
to irony-he gives the impression of decrescendo of the invidia to the audience.133 
Similarly, with respect to Oppianicus's murders and foul deeds-real ones and those 
attributed to him134-a relative chronology suitable for rhetoric tactics set up by Cicero can 
be clearly observed. The first murder: Oppianicus poisons his wife, Cluentia, Cluentius's 
aunt with his own hands.135 The second and third murders: Oppianicus poisons the pregnant 
wife of his brother, C. Oppianicus and then his brother to get his inheritance.136 After that, 
following the death of his brother-in-law, Cn. Magius, who named Oppianicus junior as his 
inheritor, Oppianicus senior induces Magius's pregnant widow to abort the embryo then 
marries her.137 The fourth murder and counterfeiting of the last will and testament: by the 
assistance of a travelling pharmacist/poison mixer Oppianicus poisons his former mother-
in-law, Dinaea, who had named him as her inheritor in her last will and testament, then, he 
has the last will and testament, from which he had already deleted bequest orders, drafted 
again and has it sealed by a forged seal.138 The fifth murder: Oppianicus gives order to find 
and murder M. Aurius, Dinaea's son, of whom he learns-he bribes the messenger to provide 
false information for the relatives-that he was taken prisoner of war and lives in Gallia as a 
slave, and to whom his mother left four hundred thousand sestertiiJ39 The sixth, seventh, 
eighth and ninth murders: by creating the appearance of proscriptio Oppianicus has A. 
Aurius killed, who threatened to sue him due to the assassination of M. Aurius, and has 
three other citizens of Larinum killed under the pretext of the same legal title.140 The tenth 
and eleventh murders: Oppianicus wants to marry A. Aurius's widow, Sassia, but she does 
not want to be the stepmother of three male children, therefore, Oppianicus kills two of his 
sons and leaves only Oppianicus junior alive.141 Counterfeiting of the last will and testament 
and the twelfth murder: to indicate himself as inheritor Oppianicus forges the last will and 
testament of Asuvius from Larinum, then has Asuvius killed, and pays off Q. Manlius, 
triumvir capitalis who starts investigations in the case.142 
Changing this chronology Cicero gives account of Oppianicus's crimes in the following 
chronology: assassination of M. Aurius,143 A. Aurius and three citizens from Larinum,144 the 
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two male children,145 Cluentia,146 the sister-in-law and the brother, C. Oppianicus,147 
instigation for abortion,148 counterfeiting of the last will and testament and assassination of 
Asuvius,149 assassination of Dinaea and forging her last will and testament.150 Why was 
Cicero "compelled" to act like that?151 As the narratio is not directly linked to the Cluentius 
case, the orator cannot dwell on specific cases by supporting them by documentary evidence 
or testimonies, instead, he must content himself with flashing the appearance of 
demonstration from time to time.152 Furthermore, possible demonstration would be made 
difficult by the fact that the crime story like narrative is not lifelike because it would be 
hard to explain: why a Richard III like serial murderer Oppianicus, who gets his victims 
from his own family, who settles in their estate, who marries his victim's widow, was called 
to account for his deeds only one and a half decades after his first assassination; why he 
was named as their inheritor in their last will and testament by several persons during the 
times although they must have known that thereby they hastened their own death; why his 
brother, C. Oppianicus should have made the murderer of his wife his inheritor; why he 
killed his two sons only and left the third one alive; and why he had M. Aurius killed 
although earlier, when forging Dinaea's last will and testament he had already deleted the 
bequest ordered to be given to the son.153 
The orator does not even try to refute the counter-arguments listed above; much rather 
he makes efforts to avoid that they should occur to the audience at all, that is, to achieve his 
goal, instead of obvious lies, by delicately dislocating and concealing facts and arbitrarily 
determining the dramaturgical order of the cases-and that in doing so he meets success is 
proved by the sheer fact that the authors of later comments did not form a suspicion either, 
and only Wilfried Stroh made an attempt at reconstructing the actual order of events. 
Placing the assassination of M. Aurius first in the order proved to be a masterly trick 
since as "evidence" it was possible to bring up the idle talk about the case and the open 
threat by A. Aurius,154 and as the cause of failure to commence any trial it was possible to 
bring up the use of Sulla's proscriptions, that is, the assassination of A. Aurius by political 
machinations,155 which supported failure to call Oppianicus to account for his deeds 
regarding other cases by his political influence.156 Cicero eliminates questions that might 
arise regarding Dinaea's death and last will and testament by similar ingenuity. When 
Dinaea is mentioned for the first time, only her illness and death and the existence of her 
last will and testament is referred to but counterfeiting of the last will and testament is 
not,157 and only much later-once he has showered the stream of Oppianicus's crimes on the 
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audience, which as it were makes the new and umpteenth murder logical-does the orator 
bring up the fact of the assassination of Dinaea and forging of her last will and testament.158 
Cicero explains the momentum that Oppianicus was willing to murder also his own sons 
not from the character of Oppianicus but of Sassia, who agreed to marry him only under 
this condition, and the dark portrait depicted of Sassia who married the murderer of her 
husband159 does not rule out but definitely makes the double assassination probable.160 Lack 
of evidence does not prevent Cicero in his narrative at all, he turns necessity into a virtue 
and reminds the judges of the point that their indignation must be dwarfed by the indignation 
of the court of justice eight years before that examined proofs and heard witnesses in 
details.161 
Referring to shortage of time, Cicero gets down briefly with the assassination of the 
one-time wife, Cluentia and the sister-in-law and brother, C. Oppianicus, however, there are 
good chances that reference to Sassia after the former wife, Cluentia-of whom he does not 
state expressis verbis that she remained Oppianicus's wife until his death-might make the 
audience believe that Cluentia was Oppianicus's wife later, after Sassia; and suspicion that 
the orator speaks about events that occurred before 82 does not even arise. Undoubtedly: 
Cicero's aim must have been just to confuse the chronology and thereby the audience 
completely since he could not prove, only complain of the assassinations listed here.162 The 
gifts given by Oppianicus to the widow of his brother-in-law, Magius by themselves would 
make only the intention to marry probable, however, connecting them not with the marriage 
but with the abortion carried out by Magia upon Oppianicus's instigation presents them as 
merces abortionis,163 To make the assassination of Dinaea and especially counterfeiting of 
her last will and testament164 lifelike, Cicero inserts the assassination of Asuvius after the 
above-in whose last will and testament Oppianicus was indicated in the first place as 
inheritor-which is supported by the testimony of Oppianicus's accomplice, Avillius, and 
thereby inheriting through assassination is made the outstanding motivation of Oppianicus's 
deeds,165 and so poisoning of Dinaea and forging of her last will and testament are now 
nothing else than enhancement of the motives of the Asuvius case.166 
Cicero's narratio in Pro Cluentio is a beautiful example of the appearance of ordo 
artificialis-and mos Homericus]61-'m which perspicuitas considered a virtue is replaced by 
the strategy justified by utiiitas causae, based on which in the representation of both the 
chain and the internal structure of events elements that are more believable and better 
supported by proofs precede elements that can be proved with difficulties-or cannot be 
proved at ail-as it were creating credit and basis for having them accepted too.168 
To give a technical summary of the rhetorical virtuosity of Pro Cluentio: by discussing 
the charge of bribe and the charge of poisoning separately Cicero doubles narratio and 
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argumentatio; he inserts propositio, which usually follows narratio, directly after 
prooemiurrr, argumentatio in connection with both the first and second count of the 
indictment unnoticably and almost inseparably flows together with narratio; peroratio is a 
logical outcome of narratio inserted as conclusion; the narratives inserted extra causam, 
free handling of chronology and joint application of status collectionis and status 
coniecturalis built on each other strengthen the positions of the defence. This rhetorical 
tactics becomes astonishing just by the fact that the listener or the reader never feels that he 
is the victim of Cicero's knowing misleading, what is more, the links of the narrative are 
intertwined without spectacular jumps, seemingly integrated in a logical order, which is 
supported also by the fact that, except for Wilfried Stroh, modern commentators of the text 
mostly set out from the order of the events outlined by Cicero in order to reconstruct the 
historical facts of the case.169 
As exemplum of the exemplary combination of the three genres of style of rhetoric 
Cicero himself also referred to Pro Cluentio,170 in which extended introduction, soberly 
brief descriptions, precise argumentation, colourful narrative, reasons full of emotions, 
pathos and irony, linguistic humour and keywords hammered with passion, apposite 
characterisations, polemical statements not free from exaggerations, questions formulated 
with tormenting temper and invective like insertions are combined into a harmony not seen 
anywhere else.171 Thanks to Cicero, Cluentius was acquitted; however, as we can learn it 
from Quintilian's account, the orator himself admitted that he had achieved that by cleverly 
manipulating the judges.172 Perhaps for this reason, Cicero considered Pro Cluentio one of 
the maximum outputs of his orator's career,173 which both Quintilian174 and Pliny, who 
praised this oratio as Cicero's most excellent speech, agreed with.175 The oration can be 
indeed considered exemplary: the orator masterly changes elements of style; combines 
pathos, simple description and humour; represents situations and characters appropriate for 
a crime story with apt preciseness; palpably connects arguments and planes of time, except 
when he intends to make obscurity denser, without distorting lucid arrangement of facts. 
From first to last engaging the attention of the audience-since later he himself admitted that 
he had to throw dust in the judges' eyes during his speech176-and leading the judges 
qualified to decide the case, as a matter of fact, towards the direction he wanted to. 
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And just as with regards to Dostoyevsky it is almost always mentioned that he was to suffer 
the processes of the Russian criminal justice system, up until the last minute mitigation of 
his death sentence to one of forced labor, so the Kafka-reception's pieces don't fail to 
mention either that the author's days were filled with legal work performed as a functionary 
of the Worker's Accident Insurance Institute for the Kingdom of Bohemia in Prague. 
So many historical facts, biographical and sociographical details which might serve as 
starting points for drawing suspicions and assumptions with regards to the nature of the 
relationship between the texts and the worlds of literature and law (whatever these latter 
words might in fact mean), but in and of themselves are hardly capable of anything more: 
we cannot draw more audacious conclusions merely from these circumstances. Accordingly, 
the contemporary scholarships of both literature and law categorize the coincidences and 
overlaps between the author's literary work and his or her legal career, a given literary 
period and the same historical era of law and jurisprudence or-and let's draw our attention 
primarily to this for the purposes of the present writing-between innumerable pieces of 
literature and the texts of the law, as they appear in the codes, judicial decisions and other 
legal documents, merely as things of no real interest, curious facts that are not worthy of 
detailed academic analysis. 
1. What is wrong with these scholarships?-actually, nothing, just 
The aversion and distance of literary scholarship is understandable. Modem literary theory 
and criticism, as opposed to the positivist approach of comte-ian origin, championed by 
Hyppolite Taine, has, throughout the 20th century, gradually and ever so vigorously refused 
to apply the kind of interpretation of literary texts that have reference to the so-called 
'reality'. In today's literary discourse, any and all interpretations treating the text as a 
derivation of the author's biography or psychology (the taine-ian la race, le milieu et le 
moment3) or intention seem irredeemably obsolete. 
Nevertheless what is surprising: those approaches that insist on the suspension of 
referential interpretation and instead opt for a (close) textual analysis of literature, and the 
intertextual analyses fueled by the theoretical energies of these, seem to accept only in 
exceptional cases the validity of law's texts as intertexts in the course of the interpretation 
of literary works.4 On occasion postmodern literary scholarship may provide 
counterexamples-what's more, has even gone as far as asking the more general question of 
whether there is an irrelevant context in the course of the interpretation of literary texts5-, 
3
 Taine, H. A.: Introduction to the History of English Literature. In: Eliot, C. W. (ed.): Prefaces 
and Prologues to Famous Books. Charleston (SC), 2007. 412. 
4
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Helikon, 42 (1996) 1-2. Otherwise for a general overview see: Allen, G.: Intertextuality. London-
New York, 2000. 
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law a relevant context from a literary perspective?)] In: Miért engedjük át a: ácsnak az építkezés 
örömét [Why let the carpenter have the joy of building operations]. Budapest, 1994. 57-67. In this 
work Szilasi interprets the last poem of Bálint Balassi, the psalm translated on his death bed, starting 
with the words Ah Deus immensum clemens miserere perecantis, in a new light, using the context of 
the English legal custom-of which a central moment was the reading out aloud of this particular 
psalm-that provided for the possible avoidance of the execution of the death penalty in certain cases. 
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but despite this, the written and spoken (or put down as spoken: witness statements, victim 
reports, oral pleadings/requests etc.) language of the law usually stays outside the realms of 
intertextuality. In the background of this denial there stands the following conviction: the 
representatives of literary studies with regards to the interpretation of literary texts treat 
with suspicion-and often with good reason-any approach to the realm of literature that tries 
to apply "outside" viewpoints and the value judgments included therein. Opposing such 
types of analysis, Milan Kundera said that they tear away the studied texts (Kundera of 
course refers primarily to novels, but his statements can be applied to other types of literary 
genres as well) from the "large context of literary history" and thus degenerate the act of 
interpretation into cheap (biographical, psychological, political, theological and so on) 
explanation or in the words of the Czech author: "kafkology".6 
I find that this approach somewhat limits the range of intertextual research, as it 
hinders the recognition that literary and legal texts can often enter into a fruitful dialogue 
that is often laden with new meanings. 
With regards to Kundera's statement (and actually contrary to it), I believe not only 
that through intertextual investigation certain episodes of legal history may fit into the web 
of the grand connections of literary history, but also that this sort of dialogue's mutual-that 
is, it can be enjoyed both by literary and by legal scholarship-benefit appears where we 
don't expect it beforehand. Not only is this true of those works (and their interpretations) 
where the role of the interplay between legal and literary texts in the process of creating 
aesthetic experience and meaning is apparent right away (let's just recall Michel Foucault's 
remark that Greek drama can be read as the theatrical version of Greek legal history7), but 
also in the case of those where the mechanisms of text connections take more invisible 
forms; where the catharsis- and meaning-creation works in somewhat more mysterious 
textual ways. 
The presence of legal themes (the portrayal of the legal profession, the justice system 
and certain legal problems) or the unraveling of the possible opinions of the authors with 
regards to the law, the legal system and its questions should not signify the ending point of 
those interpretation possibilities that include a legal viewpoint. I find those types of analysis 
that try to show how a legal text may influence the formation of the text (the narrative 
structure, plotline, style, choice of words, sentence structure etc.) of a piece of literary 
As Szilasi says: "the guilty literate is saved from death through his ability to read that what is written". 
The more general question is similarly fundamental for law and literature studies as well, namely 
whether literary and legal texts can form an intelligent context for each other, whether the study of 
texts in one group can be of benefit to the interpretation of texts in the other group. 
6
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Forms. Trans. Robert Hurley et al. In: Power (The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Vol. 3.) 
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(2007) 2,71-93. 
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fiction, or in other words, how it becomes part of the poetical tools operating the text in 
question, and how and to what extent it determines the process of interpretation, an entire 
valid area of research. Solely for the purposes of illustration-without any sort of analysis-
let me mention a few obvious examples. 
On the stories of Heinrich von Kleist-both with regards to style and structure-a visible 
influence can be detected, formed by those Landrecht style handbooks that strictly 
determined the language use, formalities and structure of those judicial pre-decision 
materials the construction of which was among the tasks of Kleist as an employee of the 
chamber of treasury of Königsberg.8 Thus, the patterns of codified Prussian law often 
served as organizing principles in the stories of the oeuvre, from the relentless efforts at 
precision resulting in strict stylistic and editorial consequences to the kleistian sentence 
structures. 
The language use and formalities of the contemporary Russian criminal process (with 
regards to which Dostoyevsky talked directly of his opinion and ideas in A Writer s Diary4) 
have a central role in several novels of Dostoyevsky-especially in The Brothers Karamazov. 
In the trial act the narration becomes rather repetitive-thus evoking the repetition that is 
present with regards to the same events in the witness statements, trial records, and 
summaries prepared by the judge. Moreover, the structure and text of the novel presents the 
same problems-and thus forces the reader to face these-, which could and still cannot be 
solved satisfactorily by legal scholarship, namely the difficulties relating to the narration of 
past events (stories) and the possibilities of reconstruction with regards to the conscience of 
the free-willed subject in the modem era.10 
In Franz Katka's case-whose story. The Stoker can also be seen as a sort of Kleist-
paraphrase and therefore it is a remarkable piece of that "exciting intertextual tangle"" that 
becomes Péter Hajnóczy's The Stoker in Hungarian literature12—, not only his interest in the 
8
 See Ziolkowski, T.: The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of Legal Crisis. Princeton 
(NJ), 1997. 194-214. 
9
 See Murav, H.: Russia's Legal Fictions. Ann Arbor (MI), 1998. 125-155. 
10
 Did everything happen the way the novel originally narrates or in some other way, like how-
in the course of the trial-the lawyers approach it and record it, with their own perspectives and 
notions? As Richard Weisberg says "the lawyers 'create' Dmitri, they create the motives for the crime, 
they create the 'history of a family'". What is the relationship between the two stories, between 
"reality" and narrated reality, between a man and his intentions and the creature constructed by the 
lawyers' notions and his will or consciousness? Dostoyevsky's text foretells the questions of legal 
realism, contemporary cognitive psychological studies and narrative jurisprudence. See Weisberg, R.: 
The Codification of Western Law and The Poethics of Disclosure. Cardozo Studies in L. and 
Literature, 6 (1994) 157; Guthrie, C.-Rachlinski, J. J.-Wistrich, A. J.: Inside The Judicial Mind. 
Cornell Law1 Review, 86 (2001) 777; Nagy, T.: Narratív tematika a kortárs amerikai jogelméletben. 
[Narrativity in contemporary American jurisprudence.] Acta Universitatis Szegediensis, Acta Juridica 
et Politico, Tomus LXlll., Fasc. 15., Szeged, 2003. 
11
 Cserjés, K.: Da capo al fine. Hajnóczy Péter egy hátrahagyott novellájáról. [Da capo al fine. A 
short story by Péter Hajnóczy from the bequest.] Tiszatáj, 57 (2003) 5, 113-123. 
12
 It is my conviction that the impact of the textual world, the language use-its style, expressions, 
sentence structure, narrative techniques, structure etc.-of certain documents of the law and 
jurisprudence of Hungarian socialism on Hajnóczy's treatment of text is definitely more pronounced 
than what has been established by the secondary literature referring to the life-work so far. Perhaps it 
was János Marno, another writer, who had the most precise feeling with regard to the direct 
relationship between the texts. "A police report, a document relating to the author's first difficult 
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era's legal debates can be documented (and placed in the context of the penal reform 
debates of the dying monarchy present in In the Penal Colony or The Trial), but it is clear 
that one of the main points of reference and intertexts for The Trial is the Strafgesetz of 
1852.13 What's more: the fact that in a secular world the now not originally sinful man's 
anthropological status includes the presumption of innocence, and thus becomes a part of 
the contemporary reader's horizon of expectations, and how this fact in tum affects the 
aesthetic impact of the novel would deserve an independent analysis, just like the question 
as to how much the "threat that oozes from the kafkian sentence structure"14 could be lead 
back to the text and narrative technique of bureaucracy and law-and doing this without 
dislodging Kafka from the domain of aesthetics and without fulfilling the purpose of 
kafkology-'replacing Kafka with the Kafkologized Kafka" l5-under the burden of the curse 
of Kundera. 
In sum: the intertextual signs and references-direct or indirect, that is, through the 
works of other authors-found in literary texts often lead the reader to the textual world of 
the law. This of course does not mean that by reading a literary work read through the 
lenses of law-in the spirit of the "violent" nature and "meaning-killer" practice of law l6-we 
wish to exclusively concentrate on the meaning in terms of the law. The intention is just the 
opposite and aims to find such new interpretations that by reading together the legal and 
literary text-a synoptic approach, if you like-could enrich the number of possible 
interpretations as well as our literary and legal knowledge. 
The aversion and distance of the legal science can also be explained, nevertheless I do 
not find this approach of mainstream jurisprudence to literature neither wise, nor defendable. 
In the United States, ever since its birth with Langdell, the principle aim of legal 
science and legal theory, a discipline that became independent and thus respectable rather 
late and only following a lengthy struggle, has always been the connection to and possible 
influence of the professional legal practice, the actual jurisdiction: in other words, to 
establish a position, a framework, in which, as "the legislation of legislation and the court 
incident with the Kádár-regime, from 1964. Well, the 'language', concise 'style' of this official report 
describes, evokes the incident with an infernal humor against which reason basically cannot compete 
[...]. The heroic text formation of Hajnóczy [...] confronts with the 'psycho-social demons' of both the 
external nivellation and the internal deconstruction, destruction, by 'following' their strategy and 
playing on their tone. (Let me add that he could never surpass the 'level' of the police report)". 
Marno, J.: Amióta most már egyre inkább [Ever since it's been more indeed). Hitel, 3 (1990) 5, 56-
57. As-let me add yet another example-István Örkény never wrote anything "better" than the text of a 
police document that bears the title Jelentés Örkény István író gépkocsi vezetői engedélyéről [Report 
on writer István Örkény's driving license], dated 3rd November 1959, Budapest. Rubicon, 16 (2004) 
8-9, 76. Furthermore, I am also convinced that on the texts of countless literary works from the era of 
socialism in the former Soviet Bloc countries basicly the same impact could be detected. 
13
 See Ziolkowski, T.: op. cit. 214—240, and 'Franz Kafka: The Trial'. In: Dimensions of the 
Modern Novels: German Texts and European Contexts. Princeton (NJ), 1969. 37-67. Furthermore: 
Nagy, T.: "A per" mint burleszk, avagy releváns kontextus-e az Osztrák-Magyar büntetőjog? ['The 
Trial' as burlesque or is Austro-Hungarian criminal law a relevant context?] In: Mezey, B. (ed.): Jogi 
kultúrák, processzusok, rituálék és szimbólumok [Legal cultures, processes, rituals and symbols]. 
Budapest, 2006. 250-266. 
14
 Birnbaum, M. D.: Esterházy-Kalauz [Esterházy-Guide]. Budapest, 1991. 156. 
15
 Kundera: op. cit. 42. 
16
 See Cover, R.: The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative. Harvard 
Law Review, 97 (1983) 4. and Violence and the Word. Yale Law Journal, 95 (1985-1986) 1601. 
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of courts" the normative and-borrowing on the ideal of natural sciences-the predictive 
features of jurisprudence could succeed.17 Parallel to this endeavor, members of the 
American legal academia seemed to deny that tradition of the legal profession and way of 
thinking in which law and literature were inseparably intertwined and that was called by 
Robert A. Ferguson the "configuration of law and letters".18 The denial of the heritage of 
the American enlightenment-partly as a counter-effect of the tradition's strength-brought 
with itself the abandonment of the viewpoints of literature (and humanities in general) and 
the relevant theoretical reflection.19 The interdisciplinary turn20 of American legal theory in 
the 1960s did not change this scenario in any meaningful way: from among the numerous 
"/aw and . . . " trends-despite all their institutional popularity (meaning: within the academia 
and especially the elite universities)-only the economic analysis of the law ("law and 
economics"), with its quasi natural science-like and seemingly objective probings, could 
reach acceptance.21 But if we look at legal science as a whole, the dominance of the late 
19th century ideals and goals (autonomy and commitment to practice) and their tradition, 
together with a dominance of constitutional legal themes and doctrinal analysis, is still 
prevalent, despite the fact that a langdellian 'dream come t rue ' becomes more and more 
obviously illusory and impossible.22 
17
 See for example Schlag, P.: Normativity and the Politics of Form. In: Schlag, P.— Campos, P. 
F.- Smith, S. D.: Against the Law. Durham and London, 1996. 29-99. Richard Posner is even more 
stem in his criticism of the representatives of American jurisprudence, calling them a bunch of 
"kibitzers and scolds". Posner, R.: The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. Cambridge (MA), 
1999. 194. 
18
 Ferguson, R. A.: Law and Letters in American Culture. Cambridge (MA), 1984. Nagy, T.: Jog 
és irodalom: kezdetek és eszmények. [Law and literature: beginnings and ideals.] lustum Aequum 
Salutare, 3 (2007) 2, 57-69. 
19
 Certain exceptions aside. With a different emphasis and in different ways, but the following 
authors also establish a connection between law and literature-and with the same breath, between the 
American enlightenment and modem "law and literature" research: Wigmore, J.: List of Legal Novels. 
Illinois Law Review, 2 (1908), 574; Cardozo, B. N.: Law and Literature. In: Law and literature and 
other essays and addresses. New York, 1931. 3-52; Fuller, L. L.: The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers. Harvard Law Review, 62 (1949) 616. 
20
 See Posner, R: The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline. 1962-1987. Harvard Law 
Review, 100(1987), 761. 
21
 Moreover: the objectives of interdisciplinary approaches are not always that clear either. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the posnerian program of "law and literature", in which 
the author seemingly joins one movement, but in such a way that it is at the same time an attempt at a 
destructive criticism of the very same approach, and-as a latent function of his dissertation-he 
attempts to realize objectives that stand in clear opposition to the original intentions of these studies, 
namely the defense of the autonomy of law and legal science (and also the safeguarding of the 
hegemonic position of the economic analysis of law in the world of interdisciplinarity). See also 
Balkin, J. M.: The Domestication of Law and Literature. Law and Social Inquiry, 14 (1989), 787; 
Nagy, T.: Néhány eljárás: Kafka-olvasatok a jogirodalomban [A few processes. Kafka-readings in 
jurisprudence]. In: Josef K. nyomában (-jogról és irodalomról-) [The path of Josef K. (-on law and 
literature-)]. Máriabesnyö-Gödöllő, 2010. 85-121. 
22
 Schlag, P.: Normative and Nowhere to Go. in: Laying Down the Law: Mysticism, Fetishism, 
and the American Legal Mind. New York-London, 1996. 17-41, and The Evaluation Controversy. Id. 
at 60-76. 
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As for modern continental legal science-mainly as the result of the heritage of Roman 
law and German legal science- it has always been dominated by the dogmatic analysis of 
statutory law with special regards to the conceptual-analyst and concept-constructionist 
procedures that revive some of the 19th century traditions (and the inherent views about the 
aims of jurisprudence and the role of legal academics) of the pandectists.23 Neither these 
actions of the legal science, nor the major trends of contemporary European legal theory 
(legal positivism, the Anglosaxon analytical legal philosophy, or the socio-legal [system] 
theories) do not provide an adequate opportunity to explore the mutual relationship between 
legal and literary texts. The difference and separateness of law and literature (and the arts in 
general) is most heavily emphasized by those theories that build on a socio-theoretical basis 
and that distinguish functional difference as the primary feature of contemporary societies: 
they show two entirely separate field of social activity, and any relationship between the 
two can/should only be characterized by "presupposing their existential-functional 
difference".24 
To present such a relationship pattern as the "one and only" not only covers up the 
elementary mutual dependence of law and narrative(s), explored by Robert Cover in his 
influential essay,25 as well as the fact that legal activity—just like literary activity-is primarily 
an effort to create, explain, and often manipulate texts and the stories they tell, it also leaves 
in the shade that legal and literary texts—starting from the Bible and several other documents 
from antiquity, through Cicero, and then two thousand years later the orations of Daniel 
Webster and the decisions of the Supreme Court, the works of Kleist, Dostoyevsky, Kafka 
or Hajnóczy-are all parts of a text universe the pieces of which are in constant interaction 
and dialogue with each other.26 
23
 This is of course a simplification, but it does not touch the subject of this writing in substance. 
The same goes for defining "legal dogmatics" as a decidedly practical activity. For the problems with 
regards to the definition of the notion and territory of "legal dogmatics", see Szabó, M. (ed.): 
Jogdogmatika és jogelmélet [Legal dogmatics and legal theory], Miskolc, 2007. 
24
 This viewpoint-starting from the "reflected difference-experience"-is stated in: Cs. Kiss, L.: 
Megjegyzések a jog és a művészet viszonyához. [Notes on the connections between law and the arts]. 
Iustum Aequum Salutare, 3 (2007) 2, 13-18. I believe that Cs. Kiss' questions-reflecting his doubts-
do not touch the studies of the intertextual relations between law and literature. If to answer the 
question as to what kind of products can either law or literature provide through its own function-
specific operation for the other as a playing field of legitimate examination, then the answer is simple: 
texts. 
25
 Cover, R.: op. cit. 
26
 Not to mention that: the texts of the law and especially the texts of court decisions are 
evidently of an intertextual or more precisely, of an hypertextual nature: they become one from stories 
narrated by witness statements, the texts of high court decisions (themselves hypertextual) and the 
commentaries of statutes and relevant commentaries. The concept of hypertextuality is applied to 
literary works by Genette, but I do not see why it could not be used with regards to legal texts as well. 
He talks of a textual relationship in the framework of which the derivation from hypotext to hypertext 
is both forceful (an entire В work comes from an entire A work) and-more or less-officially admitted. 
What hypotext is in literature, the same is the text of the precedent and/or the statute in the textual 
universe of the law, and the decision later on is the hypertext. See Genette, G.: Transztextualitás 
[Transtextuality], Trans. Burján, M. Helikon, 42 (1996) 1-2, 82-90. Attila József was correct when he 
stated-the law: fabric. Whether it is "always bursting apart somewhere" or not. And this is how the 
poet becomes once again: the unacknowledged legislator of the world. 
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The analysis of this interaction and dialogue could mostly be the territory of law and 
literature studies, but it seems, first, that this has only been a partial success so far, and 
second, that they have not managed to break through the ideas regarding the disciplinary 
separation of jurisprudence-and to a large extent, they have themselves to blame. 
Besides struggling with the general problems of interdisciplinary studies, they are 
often stuck -as Jane B. Baron remarks27-with the same analytical scheme, which in most 
cases ends up being nothing more than a summary of the plot and the moral of literary 
works with a legal subject, providing a long line of obsolete or obsolete-prone 
interpretations. Moreover, not even these research efforts-despite the fact that the experience 
of marginalization is a constant reality for them in several forms-, are entirely devoid of a 
gesture of exclusion, generally described-when speaking of interdisciplinary approaches-as 
"colonization" by Jack M. Balkin. One discipline tries to use for its own purposes the 
perspectives, tools and methods of another, without showing real interest in commencing an 
actual dialogue.28 Even legal science and legal theory with an affinity for literature 
approaches the question with an eye to what it is that lawyers can hope from studying 
literature (and its theories),29 but this questioning does not work the other way around-
meaning, what it is that the study of legal texts and through them legal science and 
jurisprudence in general could offer to literary scholars. And I believe that this is one of the 
main reasons why there has been no creative dialogue between the representatives of the 
two fields of research so far,30 and this is also the basis of those viewpoints that-no more 
than three and a half decades after its birth (or renaissance)-talk of the "death of law and 
literature".31 
27
 Baron, J. В.: Law, Literature and the Problem of Interdisciplinarity. Yale Law Journal, 108 
(1998) 5, 1059. István H. Szilágyi also talks about this problem in his work on the result of law and 
literature studies. H. Szilágyi, I.: Jog - Irodalom [Law-Literature], In: Jog - Irodalom [Law-
Literature], Szeged, 2010. 89-120. 
28
 Balkin, J. M.: Interdisciplinarity as Colonization. Washington and Lee Law Review, 53 
(1996), 949. 
29
 See also the program-defining study of James Boyd White: White, J. В.: What Can a Lawyer 
Learn From Literature? Harvard Law Review, 102 (1989), 2014. 
30
 It is an entirely separate issue why most literary scholars-with the exception of Fish, 
Ferguson, James Boyd White and a few other great names-do not discover on their own the 
examination of the texts of the law as a possible area of interdisciplinary studies, but I believe that the 
dialogue should be commenced by lawyers, primarily because it seems that from this side of the field 
the evidence of the frequent contact between the two bodies of text is more visible, as the legal texts 
have always been more specific and aimed at a particular meaning, and especially in the era of 
modernity literary texts "absorb" the legal ones or play on them and it's not the other way around (as 
opposed to the Bible, for instance, where the religious-literary text included the legal one). 
31
 Heald, P. J.: The Death Of Law and Literature: An Optimistic Eulogy. The Comparalisl, 33 
(2009), 20. Adding that I deeply disagree with Heald's-in this part optimistic-final conclusion (as 
well as other conclusions he makes in his work) that law and literature studies can only have a future 
of any note if the main product of these studies is the application of their moral interpretations of 
literary works in real life legal decision-making. 
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2. So what?-a short program speech-
"He spoke. And drank rapidly a glass of water" 
E. E. Cummings3~ 
It could be different. There have been several initiatives-partly conceived as intertextual in 
their nature-that, if continued, could deepen the dialogue between the two disciplines. 
Besides the approaches applied by Robert Cover and Robert A. Ferguson-which explore 
the interaction and interdependence between law and narrated stories, and legal and literary 
activity and thought process-the research of Theodore Ziolkowski is one that manages to 
successfully combine the perspectives of the history of law and literature, sociology of law 
and literature and theory of law and literature, mixing it with observations of the history of 
ideas, thus opening the possibility for all the representatives of these research areas to get 
involved in the discourse. Ziolowski examines, in essence, how the connection between law 
and literature arches through historic times, with special regard to those in which law 
entered a crisis to some extent or reached a turning point, and how this reflects in the 
literary works of the era, from ancient tragedies and eposes through the Icelandic sagas, the 
medieval German and French fables and the Elizabethan English dramas to the 19th—20th 
century novel. What really matters from all this-with respect to the objectives of the present 
writing-is this: the process. Ziolkowski's interpretations are of a double nature: first, as the 
reality-referential interpretations of the literary works of a certain era, they show how 
contemporary literary works present the dilemmas of the legal life-its historic practice and 
theory-of the era in question; second, searching for textual proofs-and finding these-they 
prove that the era's legal texts did indeed shape the text of these works. So: on the one 
hand-in the spirit of referential ity-we can find the fundamentals of such historical legal and 
literary sociological examinations that can be built on by legal historians, legal sociologists 
and legal theorists; on the other hand we can witness such an intertextual investigation that 
may be practiced by literary scholars as well.33 
I find similarly double-natured those examinations-or more precisely: the possibilities 
therein-that form a part of socio-legal document-analysis executed by the sociology of law. 
Document-analysis-be it legal or non-legal documents, as in the case of the latter, literary 
works, press news and court reports, a product of the fine arts, films, or other products of 
popular culture34 (for instance, song lyrics)35-as a part of legal sociology examines primarily 
32
 E. E. Cummings: "next to of course god america i". In: Complete Poems 1904-1962. New 
York (NY), 1994. 267. 
33
 Ziolkowski does not detail this in the same way, but I find that his analysis follows a similar 
pattern. The German comparatist author finds his own research in subject-matter to be similar to "law 
and literature" studies, but with regards to emphasis and objectives (in part) to be different and uses 
the "literature and law" denomination for those. With regards to difference in emphasis, he remarks 
that his approach is much more historic than theoretical, and he does not wish to read the dilemmas of 
neither the modem legal practice, nor the contemporary theory of law into the works of long gone 
times. His objective is to reconstruct the original legal, legal and socio-historic context of the studied 
literary works. Thus: his interest is "more substantive than rhetoric" in nature, with special attention 
paid to the traces of confrontations and conflicts between contemporary law and morals. Ziolkowski, 
T.: The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of Legal Crisis. Note 8 above, xi-xii. 
34
 Sherwin, R. K.: When Law Goes Pop. Chicago-London, 2000. 
35
 For example: Armstrong, E. G.: Gangsta Misogyny: A Content Analysis of the Portrayals of 
Violence Against Women in Rap Music, 1987-1993. Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular 
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the reality-relevance of the above-mentioned, that is, what kind of image they broadcast of 
law, jurisprudence, the legal profession or the perceptions members of society harbor with 
regards to these.36 Nothing forecloses, however, the possibility that these analyses could 
from time to time become intertextual in nature: in other words-now applying the 
experiences of sociolinguistics and the sociology of language37-by reading together legal 
and literary texts they can study and show us how society affects language (analogously the 
legal and the literary language) and the language use of its members, or how language (in 
this case: the mutually influential legal and literary language) affects society. 
Conclusion-even shorter 
So: to establish mutual contact between the legal and literary sciences, the partial 
rehabilitation of the referential interpretations of relevant literary works is not the single 
option. The-for the moment-dominant trends of contemporary literary thinking seem 
capable of being in sync more easily with those jurisprudential examinations that start off 
on the path of intertextual ity, that is, consider as their primary task the exploration of the 
connections and specific forms of such connections of those legal and literary works that 
influence one another. The obvious purpose of these studies is to make sure that lawyers 
could also provide important lessons for literary scholars, and thus make the interest (once 
again) mutual and make the present dialogue more intensive between the advocates of the 
two fields. This would be the kind of dialogue that is well deserved by the historic 
connection between law and literature. 
Culture, 8 (2001) 2, 96-126. 
36
 Based on Jean Carbonnier's work, a summary in Hungarian language of these studies can be 
found in Zombor, F.: Dokumentumelemzés [Document-analysis], In: Badó, A. et al.: Bevezetés a 
jogszociológiába [Introduction to the sociology of law]. Miskolc, 1997. 99-112., and H. Szilágyi: op. 
cit. 99-100. 
37
 See Kiss, J.: Társadalom és nyelvhasználat. Szociolingvisztikai alapfogalmak [Society and 
Use of Language. Socio-linguistic premises]. Budapest, 2002; Wardhaugh, R.: Introduction to 
Sociolinguistics. Oxford, 1997. On an added note: for these types of socio-legal documentary analysis 
I find it important that they should dispose of a literary approach that is at least compatible with the 
perspectives of contemporary literary studies; and they should leave the magic circle of the romantic 
genius aesthetics, in which writers and poets are portrayed as seers and prophets, as geniuses, who 
grab the "matter at hand" with the "instinctiveness of poetic geniality". The origins of exceptional 
linguistic competencies are of course impossible to explain, but Dickens and Kafka (and the others as 
well) were professionals. See also Zombor, F.: op. cit. 110. 
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Abstract. This essay discusses Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago from the aspect of "law and 
literature". As a starting point, it argues that its "legal" reading is of a high relevance, since it helps us to better 
understand both the reality of Soviet law and the achievements of our legal systems. In order to illustrate this, it 
examines various legal layers embedded in the work: legal history, sociology of the punishment, criminal 
investigation, organizational sociology and psychology, and legal theory. In addition, the essay also focuses on the 
role of Western Law as a contrast in Solzhenitsyn's work, and analyzes its metaphorical language about law. To 
conclude, it argues that this book could caution lawyers of the consequences of a politically-oriented approach to 
law that disregards the fundamental values of Western law. 
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"La tâche de l'écrivain ne se borne pas á la propagation 
d'un système social. La tâche de l'écrivain est de traiter 
des sujets universel et éternels . . ." ' 
I. Preliminary thoughts 
This essay discusses a book which is of both a universal historical value and a manifest 
literary significance. In addition, its legal dimensions can also be viewed as important. 
Compared to this unambiguous "law and literature" relevance, it might be slightly surprising 
that Hungarian scholars, discussing legal questions from a literary point of view,2 have not 
taken into account Solzhenitsyn's3 Gulag Archipelago thus far, although it is full of legal 
problems and law related questions from the outset. 
The main aim of this paper is to recommend a law-oriented rereading of this classical 
book. The legal research of the Gulag Archipelago seems to be almost self-evident, as the 
titles of certain chapters suggest: The Law as a Child, The Law Becomes a Man, The Law 
Matures, The Supreme Measure (Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11 ). 
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1
 Excerpt from a speech of Solzhenitsyn in 1967. It was held in the Union of Soviet Writers. 
Source: Alexandre Soljénitsyne, un phénomène nouveau de la littérature soviétique. Documentation 
sur l'Europe Centrale, 11 (1973) 3, 249. 
2
 See: Nagy, T.: Jozef K. nyomában (Following Jozef К.). Máriabesenyő-Gödöllő, 2010.; H. 
Szilágyi, I.: Jog - irodalom (Law-Literature)., Szeged, 2010. 
3
 About Solzhenitsyn see the comprehensive work of Scammel. Scammell, M.: Solzhenitsyn, a 
biography. New York-London, 1984. From the aspect of the history of Soviet literature: Loupan, N.: 
La littérature soviétique d'après-guerre. Documentation sur l'Europe Centrale, 14 (1976) 1, 17-31. 
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What are the main legal points of Solzhenitsyn's book? This essay tries to answer the 
question by referring to specific sections, but it does not make an attempt at a comprehensive 
legal analysis. These selected sections can illustrate the richness of the legal elements 
contained within the entire novel. The reason for this impressionistic approach is rather 
simple: the abundance of legal elements in Solzhenitsyn's work would require a deeper 
analysis than this essay tries to achieve. This paper, therefore, does not strive for a general 
scope, but by analyzing certain excerpts it strives to foster future research. 
Furthermore, the author of this paper would like to pay tribute to one of the most 
important writers of the 20th century. His oeuvre states, in addition to other important 
things, what a human being can do if he undertakes to represent an elementarily important 
case, even if he has to work in a completely reticent manner from the very beginning.4 At 
this point it should also be emphasized that Solzhenitsyn and his oeuvre had a considerable 
role in the shading of romantic conceptions about Communism that existed in the public 
opinion of Western Europe in the fifties and sixties. Together, his documentary work and 
novels provided invaluable assistance to Western intellectuals who gradually realized a 
more precise view of the reality of the Soviet world.5 
II. Legal layers of the Gulag Archipelago 
The hypothesis of this essay is that this work of Solzhenitsyn, has numerous legal layers. 
Therefore, its main aim is to attract attention to the most important ones since their research 
could also be fascinating to the experts of other fields of study. For a legal analysis the most 
important part of the three volumes is the first twelve chapters of Part 1, where the reader 
can discover many associated legal elements. The remaining chapters, generally, have a 
more reminiscent and commemorative nature. 
/. Legal histoy-towards an unconventional history of Soviet law 
Perhaps the most evident choice, if one wants to learn the legal relevance of the Gulag 
Archipelago, is its analysis from the aspect of legal history. One can easily follow many 
aspects of Soviet legal history in Part 1 (The Prison Industry). For instance, the author 
presents and analyzes the history of Soviet fake trials from the very beginning by using the 
4
 The huge impact of the Gulag Archipelago on the Soviet regime can be illustrated with a tiny, 
however very telling fact. Following its publication (it was firstly published in the West in 1973) the 
Soviet authorities even deleted the word archipelago from the official Russian dictionary. So, they 
symbolically declared the non-existence of the entire work. See: La disparition de mot "archipel" du 
vocabulaire officiel. Documentation sur l'Europe Centrale, 14 (1976) 2, 140. 
5
 The Western view on Communism is analyzed by Stéphane Courtois, a well-known French 
historian of Communism, in detail. He also discusses the role of Solzhenitsyn: "In the 1960's and 
1980's, Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago and later the 'Red Wheel' cycle on the Russian Revolution 
produced a quantum shift in public opinion. Precisely, because it was literature, and from a master 
craftsman, the Gulag Archipelago captured the true nature of an unspeakable system". Courtois also 
mentions Variam Shalamov and Pin Yathay whose impact can be compared to that of Solzhenitsyn. 
Courtois, S.: Introduction: The Crimes of Communism. In: Courtois, S. et al.: The Black Book of 
Communism. Crimes, Terror, Repression. Cambridge-Massachusetts-London-England, 1999. 27. 
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metaphor of waves,6 furthermore, he also points out the emergence of a special and ordinary 
criminal justice system.7 In addition, he offers a complete picture of the practice of courts 
concernine Art. 58 of the Criminal Code, most usually used for Siberian deportations,8 as 
well describes the development of the death penalty.9 The most fascinating aspect in this 
legal historical layer, is that Solzhenitsyn presents these problems to the reader not only 
with an impressive legal and sociological accuracy but also with a scientific accuracy. 
Moreover, neither the analysis of statistical data nor the legal constructions were unknown 
fields to him. 
A good example of legal historical accuracy is the first part of the chapter which is 
devoted to the death penalty (11. The Supreme Measure). The author provides an overview 
of the history of the death penalty from the Code of Aleksei Mikhailovic Romanov to 1962. 
In these pages he also presents many efforts to abolish the death penalty and the crimes 
sanctioned by this measure. Within the references mentioned in the footnotes, one can even 
find a monograph dedicated to the death penalty from 1913. The author also cites the 
Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. from 1959 that discusses the bases of Soviet 
criminal justice. Additionally, and this might the most interesting point, Solzhenitsyn points 
out the lack of authentic printed information; and this is the reason why he uses the data 
provided by an "unwritten tradition" stemming from the slaves of the Gulag. Therefore, his 
analysis, contrary to all efforts, cannot meet all the scientific criteria and cannot be as 
comprehensive as it would be in the case of a legal monograph.10 
However, an absolutely different history of Soviet law takes shape, from the imperfect, 
but extensive data collected and analyzed by Solzhenitsyn, than a law student can get to 
know from the general manuals of modern legal history. It is a real question whether an 
interpretation of Soviet legal history based on Solzhenitsyn's data can overrule this 
"traditional" and still surviving approach mainly by presenting the "glorious" side of the 
evolution of Soviet law." It can, however, be an excellent addition to this heavily biased 
approach. This "unconventional and real Soviet legal history" is legitimized as well as 
justified by the personal experiences of the author and his fellows and by the sound data 
collection, contrary to the approach of legal history manuals that are distant to the 
sociological dimension of law and are also obviously ideologically biased even today. 
2. The sociology of the administration ofpunishment-transformation of the society of 
Russian prisoners 
It is more than evident that a legal interpretation of the Gulag Archipelago cannot stop at 
the presentation of legal historical dimensions, since Solzhenitsyn's work also implies 
countless references to the Soviet system of the administration of punishment. The first 
volume documents both the history of the Soviet prison system as well as its real 
6
 Solzhenitsyn, A.: The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956. An experiment in Literary Investigation. 
New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1974. 24-60 and 69-92. 
7
 Ibid. 281-286. 
8
 Ibid. 60-68. 
9
 Ibid. 432^140. 
10
 Ibid. 438. 
11
 See Kitekintés a szovjet állam és jog fejlődéstörténetére (An outlook on the development of 
the Soviet state and law). In: Gönczi, К. et al.: Egyetemes jogtörténet (General Legal History). 
Budapest, 2000. 559-588. 
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functioning, in detail.12 It is very interesting, sometimes striking, that Solzhenitsyn contrasts 
his findings on the everyday life and functioning of Soviets prisons to those of the age of 
the Tsars. This comparison of the world of Soviet and that of pre-Soviet prisons reveals that 
the whole prison system of the age of the Tsars, notwithstanding that Communist 
propaganda tried to depict this political system as fearful and oppressive, was functioning 
more humanely than the jails of the progressive Soviet system. 
The author was familiar with the functioning of this old, Tsarian system through the 
stories of those leftist prisoners who had personal experience of the reality of the prisons 
from both ages. Based on these memories Solzhenitsyn formulates an interesting conclusion 
about the sociology of prisons. During the Tsar regime, those prisoners who were 
condemned because of obvious political crimes, mainly Esers, Mensheviks, and 
Communiss-in one word: the politicas-, had many privileges making the whole prison life 
more suitable and easier.13 However, this privileged situation completely changed in the 
Soviet era. From the beginning of the twenties, politicals were deprived of all these 
privileges inherited from the earlier age, likewise the Soviet system also encouraged 
ordinary criminals to maltreat and misuse them. 
Solzhenitsyn's final conclusion is simple and sharp: the society of prisons completely 
changed in his age compared to the conditions of the Tsarist regimes. The politicals, who 
were on the top of prison hierarchy, suddenly became the most defenceless group, with 
whom even ordinary criminals, not only the inspectors of the NKVD, could mistreat at any 
time. If one accepts that the internal relationships within a prison inform about the given 
society, since they mirror a radical and polarized picture of the whole society and its 
mechanisms, then this transformation in which politicals basically lost their top position in 
the internal life of Russian prisons can infer many interesting features about the real Soviet 
world. These features may have remained unnoticed without this help. 
3. Criminal investigation-the psychology of the interrogator and the victim 
Besides the two earlier legal layers, the description of the Soviet criminal investigation 
procedure is also worthy of attention. These chapters are obviously the most shocking parts 
of the Gulag Archipelago. Solzhenitsyn prepared a broad documentation on the basis of 
personal memories of the techniques of the Soviet interrogators.14 Each of them had been 
designed to extract personal confessions, that is, the accused persons had to voluntarily 
acknowledge that they had committed the given crime. Or, at least, these practices had to 
force them to undersign their written confession prepared by the investigative authorities. 
The author discusses thirty-one techniques used by the interrogators by dividing them 
into two main categories: psychological and physical methods. However, he also indicates 
the relativity of this grouping since both overlap each other in many areas. Therefore, it is 
simply impossible to precisely distinguish them, as the psychological and physical divisions 
12
 Solzhenitsyn: op. cit. 456-485. 
13
 For example decent food, smoking, gardening, reading, regular walking, the free election of 
spokesmen, free movement among the cells, sending and receiving letters, and finally the option of 
hunger strike. About these "rights" the author writes: "They all returned to prison with a consciousness 
of their rights as convicts and a long-established tradition of how to stand up for them." Ibid. 460. 
14
 Solzhenitsyn lists thirty-one different techniques of interrogation from "persuasion in a 
sincere tone" to "bridling" and also indicates that this long list could even be continued. Ibid. 103-
117. 
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can only orientate us.15 The list provided by Solzhenitsyn is really appalling but also 
illuminating today. It can precisely show the outcome of a situation which exclusively 
stems from a powerful and strict hierarchy-the relationship of the prisoner and the 
interrogator and has no precise limits or these limits are only nominally defined and 
everyone, even the prisoner, disregards them. 
What is interesting about these inhuman and cruel interrogation methods, is that the 
author does not stop at their "externaf' and physical description, but he also discusses in 
detail the psychological effects on the victims. The reader can clearly see both the process 
of 'breaking down the victims' will and the sophisticated "psychological games" by which 
the interrogator extracts the personal confessions and their signature. On these pages 
Solzhenitsyn presents the human soul being under serious pressure and its refined 
maneuvers:16 what is a human being thinking when he first appear in front of the 
interrogator; how can someone attempt to lie in a logical order; how do the different 
techniques of torture affect the human will; how can someone alleviate his conscience when 
signing the obviously unfounded and false confession that creates serious trouble for others. 
The author familiarizes the reader with the psychological drama that is happening during 
interrogations and tortures. 
In these sensitive and many times very personal chapters, the author throws a light on 
the depths of the psychology of criminal investigation by empathically drafting the mental 
processes of an accused person as being in a hopeless situation. His final conclusion shows 
the full understanding of this mental state since he argues that, contrary to all, it is not 
allowed to condemn anyone who confessed or signed their confession since no one can 
precisely know what happened in the dark rooms of the interrogators. 
In addition, Solzhenitsyn also illuminates the psychological state of the interrogators by 
analyzing their motives in detail. He points out that even these fearless functionaries cannot 
be regarded as inviolable, since they "tremble" when meeting a prisoner who has absolutely 
nothing to lose. These kinds of prisoners only want to save their "spirit and conscience", 
therefore they are totally apathetic and indifferent to torture practices that break down 
human will.17 Indifference to violence and torture, be it mental or physical, is the weakest 
point of each officer of the NKVD. 
4. Organizational sociology and psychology—the "Organs" 
Following a swift overview of the first part of Gulag Archipelago it is obvious that one of 
the most infamous terms is the expression "organs". Solzhenitsyn practically used this term 
with a universal scope, each department and member of the secret police having very 
different names-only mentioning some of the well-known ones: cheka, GPU, OGPU, 
NKVD, KB-during the Soviet era. He implied that everyone included in this term "organs", 
had, as their main task, to fight against the internal political enemy. It is, indeed, a metaphor 
about those who had any role in Soviet internal affairs. 
Solzhenitsyn's relationship with this organization was deeply influenced by the fact that 
the Komsomol authorities wanted to send him to an NKVD school during his university 
years, but he refused to enter this school and his friends reacted the same way. He described 
his reasons for this decision when he wrote that he and his friends were intuitively worried 
15
 Ibid. 108. 
16
 For example Ibid. 117-121. 
17
 Ibid. 130. 
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about these men, and they rejected the idea of joining this organ due to irrational motives 
being contrary to their manifest interests. But "it was not our minds that resisted but 
something inside our breasts", explains Solzhenitsyn, the irrational element is their 
decision.18 This existential experience with its emotional background was obviously further 
deepened by both the personal "meetings" with the "organs" and the stories told by his 
fellows. 
In order to understand the functioning and behavior of the "organs", the author focused 
on a psychological explanation and he also discussed in detail how the "organs" selected 
their functionaries. The service in the secret police, it is argued by Solzhenitsyn, did not at 
all require a high level of education or training. In place of these the only thing the "organs" 
expected from the officers was the ability to carry out precisely the orders coming from 
their leaders. This was intensified by the fact that these, rather unqualified men, mainly the 
majority of investigators, were in an environment where their inhuman instincts, for 
instance, thirst for power or wealth, were reinforced and even encouraged. 
At this point the arguments of Solzhenitsyn perfectly meet those of István Bibó, the 
internationally known Hungarian political thinker, who formulated elementary important 
thoughts about the nature of power. Bibó convincingly argues that power is simply a poison, 
especially for those who have already broken their relation with the higher spheres of 
human existence.19 This situation in the "organs", the meeting of an artificially increased 
thirst for power with rather rudimentary personalities, was completed by a special "official" 
consciousness. The functionaries and officers of the "organs" understood perfectly that it 
was absolutely impossible to imagine a situation in which they were not right, that is, there 
was absolutely no control above them except the realization of orders coming from the 
higher levels. These orders outlined numbers of detentions, judgments or executions that 
had to be met. Only the orders and these "numbers" could be regarded as some kind of 
external pressure and "control" of their activities. 
The author also explains that there was only one law that could not be breached in the 
world of the "organs": no one could harm others in the organization. This was that very 
simple psychological and sociological "constitution" on which the administration and 
functioning of the secret police was based. However, and it must be stressed, this 
organization determined by such simple principles, ruled the whole Soviet society and the 
everyday life of the citizens. As a state within the state, it basically meant an independent 
world. 
Solzhenitsyn's analysis of the "organs" could also be important nowadays, since it helps 
in the understanding of those external factors that can influence the functioning of 
institutions created by law. In addition, it also explains how these can bias them and turn to 
a totally contradictory direction. Moreover, it also warns what will happen if an organization 
based on force, loses control, so it also attracts attention to the elementary importance of 
law, and, more specially, that of legal guarantees. Chiefly, this argument illustrates the 
theory of the separation of powers as formulated by Montesquieu. If the setting of 
Montesquieu cannot function, only the "organs" remain as a way of the administration of 
power. 
18
 Ibid. 161. 
19
 Cf. Bibó, I.: Az európai társadalomfejlődés értelme (The reason of European social 
development). In: Bibó, I.: Válogatott tanulmányok. 3. kötet (Selected Studies. Vol. 3). Budapest, 
1986. 7-18. and 44. 
7 8 BALÁZS FEKETE 
5. Legal theory—the relativity of truth 
It may be slightly strange at the beginning, but the author implies claims of a legal 
theoretical nature in the first part. From a different aspect it is not too difficult to understand 
this philosophical sensitivity. Solzhenitsyn, being a victim of the secret polie and the Gulag 
industry, would have reflected on the general questions of law with special regard to the 
social role of law and its internal mechanisms. 
The most fascinating element of this theoretical reflection is obviously his comment on 
Vyshinsky's theses about law. The infamous Soviet jurist, Prosecutor General in the darkest 
Soviet years, formulated crucial theses about the nature of truth stemming from his Marxist-
Leninist profession, and the author analyzes these while discussing the formation of the 
Soviet system of administration of justice.20 Vyshinsky argued, when he was analyzing the 
nature of truth, that absolute truth does not exist according to the principles of "flexible 
dialectics", but the functionaries had to be satisfied with establishing the relative truth. It 
logically follows from the conceptual impossibility of absolute truth that the courts are able 
only to establish the relative truth and, therefore, it is absolutely unnecessary to look for 
absolute evidence, for instance, witnesses or other factual things, during the criminal 
investigation. In a given case, following the earlier theoretical arguments, the investigator 
can establish the relative truth with the help of the personal confession or his political 
consciousness and moral view. 
Solzhenitsyn's brief Vyshinsky analysis is really important, because it perfectly points 
out how political interests are able to bias a theoretical argument in order to achieve their 
goals. As a final point, the author reminds us that political interests, if all the other conditions 
are given, can easily distort any philosophical idea even if they seem to be innocent and 
neutral. 
With these earlier theses developed by Vyshinsky the progressive Soviet administration 
of justice returned to the medieval system of divine ordeals and other irrational practices, 
argues Solzhenitsyn. So, the Soviet authorities created a premodern and atavistic system of 
justice which missed all the achievements of modern, formal law. In the eyes of the author 
only one absolute thing remained in this "unique" system based on political interests: the 
bullet they used for execution.21 In conclusion, this theoretical approach unambiguously 
points out that the Soviet system of administration of justice can be regarded as a brand 
new type since it established a totally irrational regime by rejecting the tradition of Western 
Law based on general human rights and procedural guarantees.22 
III. Two remarks 
Upon discussing these legal layers the essay wants to discuss some questions related to the 
general features of law. Basically, I aim to formulate certain general conclusions with the 
help of Solzhenitsyn's thoughts. 
20
 Solzhenitsyn: op. cit. 100-101. 
21 Ibid. 101. 
22
 For a psychological and sociopsychological analysis of the premodern and irrational elements 
of Communist thinking see: Ignatov, A.: Aspects de la psychologie de la ,, nouvelle classe". Louvain, 
1980. 
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I. Western Law as a contrast 
All the earlier presented legal layers could show that Solzhenitsyn had a solid legal 
knowledge since his thoughts and findings are consistently precise and they also reflect a 
sophisticated legal thinking. This considerable legal background is a bit unusual from the 
very first moment, since he mostly studied mathematics at Rostov State University, then he 
fought as a battery commander in World War II, and as such had no special relationship 
with the law or legal sciences. Conversely, his descriptions, analyses, and arguments show a 
high level of legal knowledge that cannot be compared to that of the ordinary Soviet citizen. 
The most fascinating and the most surprising at the same time, is his way of using 
contrasting-sometimes directly, in other cases indirectly-the Soviet Law to a qualitatively 
different type of law. That being said, he never discusses certain provisions and mechanisms 
of Soviet criminal law in itself, but in the analysis and assessment he always contrasts those 
with the relevant principles or institutions of Western Law. For instance, in discussing Art. 
58 he also adds that not only its formulation was very problematic, but its "broad 
interpretation" was also a source of trouble. Because of this "broad interpretation" this 
article was an instrument of clear arbitrariness. This statement implies that there are, or 
should be, such legal systems where the rules of criminal law cannot be "as broadly" 
interpreted. 
In another part he calls attention to the fact that prior to 1922 the judgments of deporting 
some one to labour camps were based on the "revolutionary legal consciousness" or on 
special decisions since there was no new Socialist criminal code in effect. One can infer 
from this remark that it is absurd in the eyes of the author that someone can be condemned 
without referring to codified legal rules-so the fundamental principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege appears in the background of this remark. Another example the author stresses are the 
so-called "troikas"23 an absolutely unique criminal law institution that united almost every 
phase of the criminal process:, detention, investigation, prosecution, judicature, review, and 
the execution of judgments. This solution, being obviously unconstitutional in a Western 
sense, could only appear since its creators did not adhere to certain "obsolete formalities of 
judicature and obsolete norms". In the term "obsolete formalities" one can easily discover 
certain critique and irony concerning the refusal of the principle of separation of powers, an 
underlying element of Western legal cultures, and the system of procedural guarantees 
being able to discipline the coercive power implied in law. There are other examples, but, 
the ones mentioned here are enough to illustrate that Solzhenitsyn had a broad and detailed 
legal knowledge. 
This special writing method stemming from the harsh contrast of these two conceptions 
of law-the Western and the Soviet-can have a twofold interpretation. On the one hand, it 
can be approached from the aspect of literature. This approach is highly efficient, as the 
direct or the foreshadowed contrast helps the reader to better understand the absurdity of 
the whole phenomenon, that is, the functioning of Soviet criminal justice in political cases, 
than the simple description or data collection. However, on the other hand, there is another 
explication from a legal point. It may also be inferred that the author had a proper view 
about what was the normal Western solution in a given case, and he felt that they were 
convicted because of the lack of rule-of-law and other traditional limits of arbitrariness. So, 
23
 Their official name was OSO (Special Board), a board consisting of three men and mostly 
concerned with counterrevolutionary cases. They were subordinated to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, therefore no appeal jurisdiction existed. Solzhenitsyn: op. cit. 285. 
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these contrasts express a certain state of mind in which they felt a strong deficiency in 
Western solutions and mechanisms. Solzhenitsyn and his fellows perhaps knew, or at least 
felt, that their cases could have had substantially different outcomes in other legal cultures-
and that could be a infuriating feeling for them.24 
In conclusion, Solzhenitsyn in these contrasts, by juxtaposing the abnormality of Soviet 
law to the normality implied in the concept of Western law, is capable of effectively 
showing it to Western readers, too. And, indeed, that might be one of the main reasons why 
Western readers really understand these chapters. 
How could a mathematician and engineer know so much about the principles of rule-of-
law and constitutionalism?-can the readers adequately formulate this question? For the 
answer this paper has only a hypothesis, and it could even be incorrect. However, only on 
the level of experiment, it is worthwhile discussing it. 
In the first part a secondary figure appears, an Estonian lawyer, Arnold Susi. Solzhenitsyn 
characterizes him as follows: 
"Thanks to his horn-rimmed glasses and straight lines above the eyes, his face became 
severe, perspicacious, exactly the face of an educated man of our century as we might 
picture it to ourselves. Back before the Revolution he had studied at the Faculty of 
History and Philology of the University of Petrograd [...]. Later, in Tartu, he had 
studied law. In addition to Estonian, he spoke English and German, and through all 
these years he continued to read the London Economist and the German scientific 
'Berichte ' summaries. He had studied the constitutions and codes of law of various 
countries-and in our cell he represented Europe worthily and with restraint. He had 
been a leading lawyer in Estonia and been known as 'kuldsuu'-meaning 'golden-
tongued'."23 
It can be easily imagined, however it cannot be exactly proved, that Solzhenitsyn leamt 
both the basics of criminal law and jurisprudence as well as the main features of Western 
legal culture from Susi during their discussions in the prison yard.26 The following quote 
may strengthen this idea: 
"And he would tell me passionately about his own interests, and these were Estonia 
and democracy. (...) 1 nevertheless kept listening and listening to his loving stories of 
the twenty free years (...). I listened to the principles of the Estonian constitution, 
which had been borrowed from the best European experience, and how their hundred-
member, one house Parliament worked. And, though, why of it wasn't clear, I began to 
like it all and store it all away in my experience." (emphasis made by the author).27 
24
 When Solzhenitsyn discusses that interrogators used the personal confessions of the accused 
persons as the chief proof of guilt he refers to the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution ordering: 
"Nor shall (any person" be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." Then he 
repeats "not to be compelled" in italics in order to emphasize the absurdity of the entire thing. 
(Moreover, he also mentions the Bill of Rights) Ibid. 101. Footnote 9. 
25
 Ibid. 205. 
26
 In his monograph Scammel mentions Arnold Susi and acknowledges his personal influence 
on him. Scammel argues that this was Solzhenitsyn's first "meeting" with an educated European that 
is with the European culture. Scammel: op. cit. 157. 
27
 Ibid. 213. 
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This legal knowledge, which he gradually learnt during these regular conversations, 
became for him much more unambiguous that their convictions and judgments were 
contrary to general legal principles and standards. So, he could also realize the scandalous 
nature of the whole process in Western terms not only in an intuitive way. In conclusion, 
Solzhenitsyn's contrasting method stems from his unusual knowledge of Western legal 
culture and its efficiency is related to his writing skills and personal Gulag experiences. 
2. Solzhenitsyn s language-access to the personal-psychological dimensions of law? 
The earlier analysis leads to the last piece of this essay. One should conceive that the author 
does not only simply describe the mechanisms and stories of the Gulag, but he also 
demonstrates these with such metaphors which go far beyond the framework of rational 
cognition.28 
The author's metaphorical pictures-for instance: 
"[the] great, powerful, abundant, highly ramified, multiform, wide-sweeping 58, which 
summed up the whole world [...] In all truth, there is no step, thought, action, or lack 
of action, under the heavens which could not be punished by the heavy hand of Art. 
58."29 
or 
"[you can be] one of the little links of in the Organs-that flexible, unitary organism 
inhabiting a nation as a tapeworm inhabits a human body."30 
and 
"It ought to have examined that glimmering light which, in time, the soul of the lonely 
prison begins to emit, like the halo of a saint. Torn from the hustle-bustle of everyday 
life in so absolute a degree that even counting the passing minutes puts him intimately 
in touch with the Universe, the lonely prisoner has to have been purged of every 
imperfection [...].31 
-affect emotions and other, mostly unconscious, dimensions of the human mind. These are 
able to exert influence upon human thinking beyond the frame of reason. That being said, 
by using these pictures, the author highlights the fundamentally non-logical and non-
rational dimensions of law being generally out of the scope of professional legal discourse. 
And, indeed, it must remind lawyers that law is not only a set of simple paragraphs framed 
in a comprehensive logical structure, but it also psychologically affects human beings. That 
is, the law can generate serious psychological reactions determining the entire future life of 
those who had some kind of access to the judiciary. In conclusion, it should be admitted 
that the law has a personal-psychological dimension besides its existence as a rule with a 
28
 In the contemporaiy literature of sociology Rudolf Rezsohazy argues that rational cognition 
cannot be regarded as an exclusive way of cognition. Besides science love, faith, art, and moral also 
offers many options for cognition, and these spheres have their own internal logic, too. Rezsohazy, R.: 
Sociologie des valeurs. Paris, 2006. 131-134. 
29
 Solzhenitsyn: op. cit. 60. 
30
 Ibid. 149. 
31
 Ibid. 483. 
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general scope and that these two dimensions are strongly interlinked and cannot be 
dissociated. 
From this aspect, one prominent value of the book is easily identifiable. The literary 
genius of Solzhenitsyn can produce such a picture of Soviet law and the administration of 
justice which does not lack this personal-psychological aspect, although the precise rules 
are also broadly discussed and analyzed. Therefore, his work presents those aspects of the 
reality of Soviet law that would simply be an impossible task by définition for professional 
legal literature.12 Subsequently, the merits of Solzhenitsyn cannot be denied in the 
description of the reality of law, since he puts together data and professional descriptions 
with this personal-psychological dimension of law. He also provided a much more complete 
picture of Soviet law than professional legal monographs and papers could have ever done. 
IV. One lesson 
As a closing remark, a general lesson can also be formulated concerning the Gulag 
Archipelago. This work of Solzhenitsyn should caution lawyers of the consequences of 
such a politically-oriented approach to law that denies the traditional material and procedural 
guarantees which emerged in Western law. If the sole standard for law is the accomplishment 
of political goals and the realization of narrow group interests, only one thing can happen: 
everything that happened to the people deported to the various "islands" of Gulag. 
This warning may further shade our picture about our own legal systems. Nowadays, 
there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the functioning of traditional legal institutions, 
and-one should also admit it-it has good reasons in the majority of the cases. However, 
having been familiarized with the legal layers of the Gulag Archipelago it seems obvious 
that the Western legal culture33 has manifest advantages compared to the alternatives that 
existed in 20th century. If one contrasts these two approaches to law, that of the Soviet and 
Western, the predictability and rationality of the Western one will gain predominance. 
Although, naturally, it cannot be regarded as a perfect one, it can even guarantee such a 
high level of security for the citizens that it would be impossible in legal systems solely 
based on the orders and the discretion of the political will. 
It highlights that our critiques about the imperfect functioning of our legal systems 
should endeavor to improve them. Those critical movements that tried swiftly to break 
down these traditional structures and also aimed to build up a totally new regime were 
misguided attempts, as the examples of Soviet and Nazi legal regimes show. These 
approaches turned law away from the generally accepted European values, that is, they 
made it a slave to political will and intentions. 
32
 A similar thesis is also argued by the French historian Stéphan Curtois. He asserts that 
Solzhenitsyn could describe the reality of Gulag by his literary genius and not by the precise 
intellectual, logical, and data-based argumentation. And, this literary description shocked mostly the 
Western public opinion in fact, the discussion of crimes had only a secondary place in the Western 
understanding of Gulag. Curtois: op. cit. 27. 
33
 René David, the famous French comparatist argues that the core of Western law is the idea of 
rule-of-law. See, David, R.: Existe-t-il un droit occidental? In: Nadelmann, К. H.-von Meheren, A. 
T.-Hazard, J. (eds): XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law. Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel 
E. Yntema. Leyden 1961. 56-64. 
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Introduction 
Patents can be obtained for Hungary in either a national grant procedure governed by Act 
XXXIII of 1995 on the protection of inventions by patents, or in a European grant procedure 
taking place before the European Patent Office (hereinafter: EPO) under the legal regime 
established by the European Patent Convention1 (hereinafter: EPC). The present paper 
focuses on the case law of the EPO which is directly only applicable in the European grant 
procedure, however legal harmonisation of the Hungarian patent law resulted in a very 
similar national system, which takes into account the legal practice of the EPO. 
The scope of legal protection conferred by a patent is defined by the so-called patent 
claims. In the patent system established by the EPC (hereinafter: EPC system) patent claims 
are assessed for establishing (i) whether the invention defined by the patent claim is novel 
and involves an inventive step; (ii) whether an amendment of a patent claim extends the 
subject matter beyond the contents of the original patent application; and (iii) whether a 
patent claim can benefit from the priority of an earlier patent application. 
In the present paper I propose a novel way of treating the aforementioned patent claim 
related questions based on my observation that the EPC system allows for a formal logical 
examination of the patent claims. 
Currently decision making in the EPC system relies partly on positive law (mainly the 
EPC) and partly on case-law (mainly the decisions of the Boards of Appeal and of the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal2 as well as customary law laid down in the Guidelines of the 
* Hungarian and European patent attorney, KACSUKPATENT European Patent and Trademark 
Attorneys Ltd., H-1139 Budapest, Üteg u. 11/a. 
E-mail: kacsuk@kacsukpatent.hu 
1
 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) of 5 October 
1973 as revised by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the 
EPC of 29 November 2000. 
2
 For case law decisions of the European Patent Office see: http://www.epo.org/patents/appeals/ 
search-decisions.htm! 
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European Patent Office3). There are currently no means for examining the logical 
consistency between the case law decisions relating to the above-mentioned three different 
fields of patent claim analysis. Inconsistencies are mostly remedied on a case-by-case basis 
thus causing case law to remain a divergent set of rules. 
The proposed logic model allows for examining the logical coherence of case-law as a 
whole by connecting the separate fields of patent claim assessment and by making it 
possible to examine the logical consistency between separate decisions. It further allows for 
the detection of any hidden logical inconsistency within a single decision and for predicting 
the situation in which it will surface. The logic model could also assist codification as it is 
suitable for clearly setting the logical constraints that the legal system must take into 
consideration. 
1. Related work 
Various attempts have been made to computerise legal reasoning and legal decision making 
by applying artificial intelligence to the field of law. Some of the most promising research 
projects are directed to providing case-based reasoning, expert systems and logic models 
such as neural networks or fuzzy logic. 
Case-based reasoning uses existing case law to provide or predict future decisions, for 
example Ashley's HYPO system4 comprises a knowledge base of over thirty judicial 
opinions in the field of trade secret law and allows for establishing similarities between a 
new case and the precedent cases forming the knowledge base with respect to given factors 
(e.g. whether plaintiff adopted security measures, whether plaintiff and defendant make 
competing products, etc.). HYPO compares the factors and determines the most helpful 
cases to the defendant's or plaintiff's position. This approach is particularly suitable for 
alleviating the work of legal practitioners operating in a common law system. 
Expert systems on the other hand aim to offer the skills of an expert by providing 
legally relevant questions for generating a legal opinion as Tyree's FINDER5 or by assisting 
the formulation of legal argumentation as McCarty's TAXMAN.6 Expert systems are often 
combined with knowledge based systems, for example deductive knowledge based systems 
are based on pre-defined IF-THEN rules for solving specific tasks in a limited legal field. 
Neural networks simulate the functioning of a biological network of neurons, in 
particular that of the human brain. The neural networks comprise a number of interconnected 
neurons (nodes) some of them serving as inputs and outputs the others forming hidden 
layers. The structure of the neural network is adaptive, the behaviour of the neurons is 
defined by mathematical functions and the interconnections can be modified whereby the 
network can be trained to produce a desired output in response to a given input. Once the 
learning phase has ended the neural network can be used to find an input pattern similar to 
3
 Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Published by the European Patent 
Office, Directorate Patent Law 5.2.1, D-80298 Munich (hereinafter: GL). 
4
 Ashley, K. D.: Modelling Legal Argument: Reasoning with Cases and Hypotheticals. 
Cambridge (MA), 1990. 
5
 Tyree, A. L.: FINDER: An Expert System <http://austlii.edu.au/~alan/aulsa85.html> (Last 
modified: 6 Sept. 2004). 
6
 McCarty, L. T.: Reflections on TAXMAN: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal 
Reasoning. Har\'ard Law Review, 90 (1997) 5. 837. 
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a completely new input and produce the learned output of the similar input. This is 
practically the scheme of reasoning by analogy.7 
Fuzzy logic is another mathematical model that can be used to obtain an exact value in 
situations characterised by a certain level of indeterminacy-this being often the case in 
legal decision making.8 For example the exact amount of compensation needs to be decided 
by a judge based on indeterminate terms such as the degree of negligence. 
Other Artificial Intelligence approaches seek only to assist the legal practitioner in 
argumentation. One of the applied tools is mathematical logic that has been reduced to 
practice in the form of argument assistants-software applications implementing the rules of 
logic for supporting argumentative tasks for lawyers. The classical logical argumentation 
model of Toulmin9 dates back to the 1950s and allows for drawing conclusions from given 
premises and warrants (inference licences) taking into account any counter argumentation 
in the form of a rebuttal. The possibility of rebuttals results in a defeasible argument, new 
information (counter-reasons, exceptions to a rule, etc.) can overturn a conclusion. Complex 
logical systems have been developed such as Verheij's Deflog10 to model further important 
phenomenon in legal argumentation such as reinstatement, which occurs when an overturned 
conclusion is held valid again on account of additional information. Argument support 
software traditionally involve graphical representation of arguments usually consisting of 
boxes corresponding to the propositional content of the arguments and of arrows expressing 
the relations between the arguments," while other argumentation management systems 
such as ArguGuide12 offer a content-oriented tool incorporating laws, precedents, facts and 
arguments for supporting legal argumentation tasks such as writing a plea. 
Turning to patent law, Nitta et al. have developed an expert system focusing on the 
procedural aspects of patent law.13 The KRIP system (Knowledge Representation System 
for Laws relating to Industrial Property) provides a tool for checking the legality of each 
patent procedure. In order to achieve this, the procedures defined by patent law need to be 
identified as well as the relationships between the procedures and the conditions for starting/ 
ending any such procedure. The KRIP system is designed for aiding formalities examination 
of a patent application, however, it is not adequate to tackle substantive examination of 
patentability which-for the most part-is linked to the patent claims defining the scope of 
legal protection. 
7
 For proposed application see, e.g. Hollatz, J.: Analogy making in legal reasoning with neural 
networks and fuzzy logic. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 7 (1999), 289-301. 
8
 See Philipps, L. et al.: Introduction: from legal theories to neural networks and fuzzy 
reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 1 (1999), 115-128. 
9
 Toulmin, S. E.: The uses of argument. Cambridge, 1958. 
10
 Verheij, В.: DefLog: on the logical interpretation of prima facie justified assumption. Journal 
of Logic and Computation, 13 (2003) 3, 319-346. 
11
 See Schweers, M. et al.: Beyond boxes and arrows: argumentation support in terms of the 
knowledge structure of a legal topic, Proceeding of the 2007 conference on Legal Knowledge and 
Information Systems: JURIX 2007: The Twentieth Annual Conference, Frontiers in Artificial 
Intelligence and Applications, 165 (2007), 109-118. 
12
 See Verheij, В.: Argumentation support software: boxes-and-arrows and beyond. Law, 
Probability and Risk, 6 (2007), 187-208. 
13
 See Nitta, K. et al.: KRIP: A knowledge representation system for laws relating to industrial 
property. Logic Programming '85. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 221 (1986), 276-286, DOI: 
10.1007/3-540-16479-0 27. 
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The complexity of patent claims has incited new approaches that are of a linguistic 
nature directed to simplifying patent claim sentences in order to paraphrase and summarise 
its contents. A single claim sentence is segmented into clausal discourse units, transformed 
into complete sentences, co-reference relations are established and a discourse structure is 
built between the discourse units.14 Paraphrasing and multilingual summarisation of patent 
claims are but a few aspects of semantics-based patent processing techniques. These and 
other applications are incorporated in PATExpert15 which, as an overall scientific objective, 
strives to change the current patent processing paradigm of textual processing to semantic 
processing.16 
The present paper offers a new approach to assisting legal decision making and legal 
argumentation in the field of patent law. The proposed model differs from existing models 
both in substance and form. It relies on conventional, human argumentation and judgement 
in deciding basic factual questions related to the patent claims. The legal questions, on the 
other hand, are incorporated in the model itself whereby a complex legal finding can be 
obtained from the basic decisions. 
2. The "patent claim feature" approach of the EPO 
It is important to understand that over the years the EPO has established an approach that is 
best described as "patent claim feature" approach. The invention is seen essentially as a set 
of technical features. The "spirit" of the invention, the "underlying overall concept", the 
"inventive recognition" bear but little significance in proceedings before the EPO. Instead 
the patent claims are examined on a feature-by-feature basis on a purely formal level. The 
applicant or patentee must succeed in formally limiting the claims from any prior art 
material, otherwise the EPO will reject the application or revoke the patent. Any such 
limitation is strongly restricted as the EPO also examines the allowability of amendments 
on a formal basis. 
2.1. "Patent claim feature " approach in examining novelty and inventive step 
The patent claim feature approach is best illustrated by the EPO's methodology of 
performing the examination of patentability. The process can be divided into two clear 
stages: (1) examination of novelty and (2) examination of inventive step.17 
A technical invention can only be patented if it is novel (does not form part of the state 
of the art) and if it involves an inventive step (meaning that it is not obvious to a person 
skilled in the art having regard to the state of the art). The invention for which protection is 
sought is defined in a single complex sentence, called patent claim. Such a patent claim 
14
 See Bouayad-Agha, N. et al.: Simplification of Patent Claim Sentences for their Paraphrasing 
and Summarization. Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Florida Artificial Intelligence 
Research Society Conference, May 19-21, 2009, Sanibel Island, Florida, USA, 2009. 
15
 See website of the PATExpert project: http://recerca.upf.edu/patexpert/ 
16
 Bouayad-Agha, N. et al.: Improving the comprehension of legal documentation: the case of 
patent claims. The 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law. Proceedings of 
the Conference, June 8-12, 2007, Barcelona, Spain, 2009. 
17
 See Palágyi, T.: Assessment of patentability in the official practice of the European Patent 
Office. Industrial Property and Copyright Review, 107 (2002) 2, 43^48. 
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sentence is treated by the European Patent Office (hereinafter: EPO) as the set of technical 
features defining the invention. 
To illustrate the denotation of patent claim features let us take a simple example: the 
inventor recognizes that certain materials, called magnets, interact with the Earth's magnetic 
field, whereby needles made of magnetic materials can be used as a navigation tool. The 
inventor files a patent application with the following patent claim: 
Claim 1 : Navigation tool comprising a needle made of magnetic material. 
In the present example the EPO would consider the navigation tool, the needle and 
magnetic (as the material of the needle) to be features of the patent claim: 
A = navigation tool 
В = needle 
С = magnetic (as the material of the needle) 
When comparing the invention (Claim 1) with a prior art solution the EPO would 
consider whether the object of comparison is used for navigation, whether it comprises a 
needle, and whether this needle is made of a magnetic material. If all three questions are 
answered in the affirmative then the patent claim is said to "read onto" the given prior art 
solution. In this case the EPO will find that the patent claim is not novel. If however at least 
one of the features is not disclosed in the prior art, then the patent claim is said to be novel. 
Hence, in the first stage of examination the EPO will compare the features of a given 
claim with every relevant state of the art disclosure revealed in the search (or presented by 
an opposed party) and determine whether or not any of the claim features are novel over the 
given prior solution. The examined claim need not differ from all the relevant prior art in 
the same feature; one feature may establish novelty over one prior art document, while 
another feature may serve to distinguish the invention from another piece of prior art. 
If the claim passes the first stage of examination, i.e. the claim is found to be novel 
over all relevant prior art, the EPO's examiner will move onto assessing inventive step. 
According to the Guidelines of the EPO the examiner should normally apply the so-called 
problem-and-solution approach, which consists of three main stages: 
(i) determining the "closest prior art",18 
(ii) establishing the "objective technical problem" to be solved by determining the 
distinguishing feature(s) of the examined patent claim over the closest prior art, determining 
the technical effect of any such distinguishing feature, and formulating the objective 
technical problem as the aim and task of modifying or adapting the closest prior art to 
provide the established technical effect, 
(iii) considering whether or not starting from the closest prior art it would have been 
obvious to a person skilled in the art solve the objective technical problem. 
The last step is the least formal in the sense that there is no real objective measure for 
deciding obviousness. The Guidelines give exemplifying indicators of non-obviousness, 
such as an unexpected technical advantage, bonus effect; long felt need, commercial 
success; overcoming a technical prejudice; etc. The various considerations applied in the 
course of examining inventive step are not discussed here (although a decision support 
18
 "The closest prior art is that combination of features, disclosed in one single reference, which 
constitutes the most promising starting point for an obvious development leading to the invention. " 
(GL C-IV, 11.7.1, T 606/89). 
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system could be envisage), but the resulting binary decision as to inventive step (inventive/ 
not inventive) can be fitted into the present model.19 
2.2. "Patent claim feature " approach in examining infringement 
Infringement is not regulated in the EPC system instead it is left to national law. However, 
the scope of protection is defined by the EPC, which is the most important requisite to 
dealing with infringement.20 According to Art. 69 EPC the scope of protection is determined 
by the claims. This is a rather vague definition and the EPO has no proceedings in which it 
were required or entitled to interpret the scope of protection (not even when giving a 
technical opinion upon request of a competent national court under Art. 25 EPC), hence 
there is no uniform case law to be followed by the authorities of the Contracting States. 
Article 69 EPC does not state clearly whether all the claim features need to be 
embodied in a solution to infringe the patent or if making use of the inventive concept 
expressed by the claim as a whole could also constitute infringement. A clear example of 
the interpretational freedom provided for by the EPC is the EPILADY21 case where the 
same product was found to be infringing an EPC patent in Gennany but not in England. 
Although the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC aims to restrict the 
interpretational freedom of the Contracting States, still, national authorities are more or less 
free to apply their own national standards as to how the claims determine the scope of 
protection. 
The present paper aims to show that the patent scope must be assessed on a feature-by-
feature basis as well if the conferred protection is to be coherent with the EPO's case law on 
the requirements of patentability. 
2.3. "Patent claim feature" approach in examining amendments 
The EPC system is based on the first-to-file principle, from which it follows, that once the 
patent application is filed the applicant may not improve his position by adding subject-
matter that is not disclosed in the original application as filed. This is the underlying idea of 
Art. 123 EPC prohibiting any amendment to the patent claims, description or drawings that 
may in any way extend the subject-matter beyond the content of the application as filed. 
This paper only focuses on the assessment of patent claims; however, the same 
considerations apply to examining amendments of the specification or drawings. 
The EPC does not define "subject-matter", nor is there an interpretation of "extension". 
The case law of the Boards of Appeal explains these terms and lays down the criteria for an 
allowable amendment. According to decision T194/84 the amendment extends the subject-
matter if as a result of the amendment the person skilled in the art is presented with new 
information which is not directly and unambiguously derivable from the content of the 
patent application as filed, even when account is taken of the information implicit to the 
skilled person. This is the so-called disclosure test, according to which the "subject-matter" 
19
 See Kacsuk, Zs.: Role of the patent claims in patent law (Part I.)-Certain questions of 
patentability-state of the art, novelty and inventive step. Industrial Property and Copyright Review, 5 
(115) (2010) 1, 55-83. 
20
 Kacsuk, Zs.: Role of the patent claims in patent law (Part IV.)-Scope of protection, 
infringement and the doctrine of equivalents. Industrial Property and Copyright Review, 5 (115) 
(2010) 4, 5-20. 
21
 European patent EP 0 706 376 Bl. 
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of a patent or patent application is none other than all information, which is either explicitly 
or implicitly contained in the patent application or patent as a whole, although implicit 
information content is very rarely accepted as the basis of an allowable amendment (see 
Visser, 2010). Where the amendment is in the form of replacement or removal of a feature 
from a patent claim the disclosure test is supplemented by decision T331/87, which reflects 
the same strict patent claim feature approach as discussed in connection with novelty.22 
2.4. "Patent claim feature" approach in examining a claim to priority 
A prerequisite of assessing novelty and inventive step is to determine what forms the state of 
the art. The general rule is that everything made available to the public before the filing date 
of the examined patent (or patent application) constitutes state of the art (prior art). However, 
a patent application may benefit from the priority of an earlier patent application filed by the 
same applicant in any WTO member state not later then 12 months earlier. In such cases the 
state of the art is determined by the filing date of the earlier patent application, called the 
priority date. Hence anything made available to the public after the priority date cannot be 
held against the later patent application claiming priority of the earlier patent application. 
A patent application may benefit from any number of priorities as long as all the earlier 
applications are filed within 12 months of the filing date of the patent application in 
question. However, only those inventions may enjoy the priority of one or more earlier 
patent applications which are fully disclosed in the earlier patent application. 
The EPC system applies two kinds of priorities. One is defined by a complete, self-
contained code of rules laid down in the EPC, while the other system is regulated by the 
Patent Corporation Treaty (PCT).23 The former priority system will be referred to as the 
EPC priority system. The EPC priority system is applicable in respect of Euro-direct 
application, i.e. patent applications filed directly with the EPO as opposed to the Euro-PCT 
applications, which designate or elect the EPO as a regional patent office within the 
meaning of the PCT.24 The priority of the Euro-PCT applications is regulated by Art. 8 PCT 
which adopts the priority rules of Art. 4 of the Paris Convention.25 The EPC priority system 
has also taken over the priority rules of the Paris Convention,26 albeit not the exact wording, 
which could, theoretically, result in different interpretation of the priority rules for Euro-
22
 For an overview of the criteria for an allowable amendment see Kacsuk, Zs.: Role of the 
patent claims in patent law (Part Il.)-Judgement of amendments extending the scope of protection in 
the European and the Hungarian patent system. Industrial Property and Copyright Review, 5 (115) 
(2010) 2, 5-15. 
23
 Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), Done at Washington on June 19, 1970, amended on 
September 28, 1979, modified on February 3, 1984, and on October 3, 2001. 
24
 Article 2 (iv) PCT: "regional patent" means a patent granted by a national or an 
intergovernmental authority having the power to grant patents effective in more than one State. 
25
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised at 
Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, 
at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as 
amended on September 28, 1979. 
26
 The main difference between the priority system of the EPC and the Paris Convention is that 
while the EPC allows for internal priority (claiming the priority of European patent application), the 
Paris Convention only provides for external priority (claiming the priority of a foreign patent 
application). See also Visser, D.: The Annotated European Patent Convention. 18th revised ed., 
Veldhoven, 2010. 
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direct and Euro-PCT applications. However, case law has established uniform interpretation 
for both regimes.27 
In the past decades the EPO has adopted the aforementioned strict patent claim feature 
approach in respect of the validity of a priority claim as well. The keyword to the application 
of this approach is the term "same invention" as introduced in Art. 87(1) EPC: priority may 
only be claimed in respect of the same invention. The case law has been somewhat 
ambiguous on the interpretation of "same invention" until first decision G3/93 then decision 
G2/98 clarified that in order for a patent claim to qualify as defining the same invention, the 
patent claim features-separately as well as in combination-must find direct support in the 
priority application as a whole.28 G2/98 made it clear that if the patent claim introduces a 
new feature, removes or replaces a feature as compared to the disclosure of the priority 
application the claim may not benefit from the priority of the first application. G2/98 also 
points out that multiple priorities as provided for by Art. 88(2) EPC and Art. 4F(1) of the 
Paris Convention are only conceivable in respect of OR-claims (disclosing alternative 
embodiments), whereas AND-claims (requiring the presence of all the claim features 
simultaneously) may only be entitled to a single priority. 
3. Logic model of the patent claims 
3.1. Defining the features of a patent claim 
As we have seen in the previous chapter the EPO's patent claim feature approach involves 
identifying the features of the patent claim and assessing novelty, infringement, amendments 
and priority by reading the claim features onto the prior art, the allegedly infringing 
solution, the content of the patent application as filed or the priority application, respectively. 
Starting from the exemplary patent claim of section 2, I will now introduce a logic 
approach to modelling patent claim features. 
As we have seen the EPO treats "navigation tool", "needle" and "ferromagnet" as 
patent claim features of the patent claim: "Navigation tool comprising a needle made of a 
magnetic material". Such an approach is a good starting point; however, in my model I 
propose to define the features of a patent claim as logical statements.29 Accordingly, the 
patent claim in the example can be broken down into the following logical statements, 
which will be regarded as the features of the claim: 
A = The subject is a navigation tool. 
27
 "The EPC-according to its Preamble-constitutes a special agreement within the meaning of 
Article 19 of the Paris Convention, the EPC is clearly intended not to contravene the basic principles 
concerning priority laid down in the Paris Convention" (cf. decision T 301/87, reasons point 7.5). 
Affirmed by G3/93 and G2/98. Thus the priority rules of the Paris Convention are to be interpreted 
the same way as the priority rules of the EPC. See also Kacsuk, Zs.: Role of the patent claims in 
patent law (Part lII.)-Comparing the Hungarian, European, International and Paris Convention 
priority systems. Industrial Property and Copyright Review, 5 (115) (2010) 3, 5-27. 
28
 See Svingor, A.: Claiming of priority according to EPC in the light of two decisions of the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal, Industrial Property and Copyright Review, 108 (2003) 1, 45^49. 
29
 For solving an exemplary case with logical statements see Kacsuk, Zs.: The analysis of the 
European priority law in the practice of the European patent office-or how should we claim the 
priority of a cooking pan for a plastic glass? Industrial Property and Copyright Review, 3 (113) 
(2008) 6, 69-87. 
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В = The navigation tool has a needle. 
С = The needle is made of a magnetic material. 
Ideally, the logical statements should be atomic in the sense that they cannot be broken 
down into more basic statements. In reality the patent claim features as statements can 
never be "atomic" because the patent claims are formulated in a natural language and the 
words of any natural language have a field of meaning rather than a precise (singular) 
meaning. For example the meaning of "magnetic material" will embrace various different 
materials such as steel, iron, cobalt, rare-earth magnets, etc. Even the sub-categories of 
magnets will incorporate a range of further materials, e.g. "rare-earth magnet" covers 
gadolinium, dysprosium, etc.. Instead of the expression atomic I will refer to such statements 
as "basic", knowing that depending on the circumstances the basic statements may be 
broken down to even more basic sub-statements just like "magnetic material" covers steel, 
iron, cobalt, etc. 
In this approach reading a claim feature on the prior art, on an allegedly infringing 
solution, etc. is carried out by deciding whether the statement is true or false in respect of 
the object of comparison (prior art solution, allegedly infringing solution, etc.). From the 
point of view of adjudication the statement is either true or false, there is no third 
possibility-in grant proceedings, opposition proceedings, revocation proceedings, or 
infringement law suits the competent authority is compelled to take a decision on whether 
the claim defines a novel invention, whether any amendments were allowable, whether 
priority can be acknowledged, whether there is an infringement of the patent. 
In logic when two or more criteria need to be satisfied simultaneously the statements 
describing such criteria are connected by an AND connective. Similarly, if the features of a 
patent claim are regarded as statements, and the claims are to cover solutions embodying all 
of the claim features, this should be expressed by connecting the statements with the AND 
connective. In the example of the navigation tool: 
Claim 1 = (the subject is a navigation tool) AND (the navigation tool has a needle) 
AND (the needle is made of a magnetic material) = A & В & С. 
3.2. Structure of the claims 
In order to decide on the nature of the logical connectives that should be applied between 
the basic statements we need to examine the legal areas where we hope to introduce the 
formal patent claim model. As I have stated in the introduction, patent claim assessment 
plays a key role in the examination of (i) patentability, in particular novelty; (ii) 
infringement; (iii) amendments; and (iv) priority. 
In each patent claim assessment category a distinction should be made between 
questions of law and questions of fact although the latter is often influenced by case law as 
well. Questions of fact are related principally to the truth evaluation of the basic statements 
expressing the claim features-the basic statements are either true or false in connection with 
a prior art solution, the allegedly infringing solution, the content of the application as filed, 
or that of the priority application. On the other hand questions of law are a matter of positive 
law (statute-principally the EPC) and case law (principally the case law of the Boards of 
Appeal and Enlarged Board of Appeal as well as the customary law expressed in the 
Guidelines). 
The EPO's patent claim feature approach illustrated in the previous chapter implies 
that the basic statements expressing the claim features must be taken into account in an 
AND-combination in the formal model: 
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(i) as regards novelty the patent claim is not novel over a prior art reference if the 
latter discloses all the claim features in combination (A & В & С); 
(ii) as regards infringement, a solution infringes the patent if all the patent claim 
features (A & В & С) can be read onto it; 
(iii) as regards amendments, an amendment of a patent claim is allowable if the 
subject-matter determined by all the features of the amended patent claim (A & В & С) is 
directly derivable from the contents of the original application as filed; and 
(iv) as regards priority, the priority claim is valid only if the invention defined by the 
combination of all the patent claim features (A & В & С) is directly derivable from the 
content of the priority application. 
Determining the structure of a patent claim also requires semantic interpretation of the 
claim as the EPC system allows OR-claims, i.e. claims in which closely related but distinct 
inventions are claimed at the same time. For example: 
Claim 1 : Navigation tool comprising a needle made of iron or steel. 
(Iron and steel being two types of permanent magnetic materials.) In this case there are 
four basic statements expressing the claim features: 
A = The subject is a navigation tool. 
В = The navigation tool has a needle. 
С = The needle is made of a iron. 
D = The needle is made of a steel. 
The OR-type conjunctive particles ("or", "either", etc.) of the claims have been 
interpreted by case law as indicators that the claim embraces more than one inventions the 
features of which are generally alternatives not to be combined. Thus in the present case the 
firs invention claimed is A & В & С (navigation tool comprising a iron needle), while the 
second invention is A & В & D (navigation tool comprising steel needle). The whole claim 
should be expressed as the OR-combination of two distinct claim variants: 
Claim = (A & В & С) or (A & В & D). 
3.3. A logic model of patent claims 
In view of the above legal and non-legal considerations and in particular the EPO's patent 
claim feature approach I propose to introduce a logic model for describing patent claims, 
which treats patent claim features as basic statements and allows true/false interpretation of 
the basic statements as well as the possibility of connecting the basic statements by logical 
connectives.30 As we have seen, the structure of the claims (i.e. the logical connectives 
connecting the basic statements) is determined by positive law and case law, while the truth 
assessment of the basic statements is primarily a matter of fact to be decided by the 
competent authority. 
The basic statements corresponding to the patent claim features will be denoted with 
capital letters of the alphabet (А, В, C, etc.). Each basic statement has a truth evaluation-
the basic statement is either true or false in respect of the object of comparison (prior art, 
infringing solution, original patent application, priority application). 
The logic model uses three types of logical connectives: the AND connective (&), the 
OR connective ( V ) and the NOT connective (—1 ) as negation. 
30
 For a more strict mathematical formalism see Kacsuk Zs.: The mathematics of patent claim 
analysis. Artificial Intelligence and Law, DOI 10.1007/sl0506-011-9107-2, 2011. 
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The logical connectives are used to connect the basic statements the same way the 
AND-connectives and OR-connectives were used in the previous chapter to express the 
relationship between the claim features and thereby define the structure of the patent claim. 
It should be noted that the OR-connective of the patent claim language is generally an 
exclusive disjunction, i.e. either one feature or the other, but not both. In the patent claim 
language the non-exclusive (potentially inclusive) disjunction is nearly always emphasized 
by writing "and/or" in order to ensure that no court or authority will interpret the claim 
more strictly by excluding the possibility of the features being present simultaneously. 
The patent claim is modelled by a compound statement which is made up of the basic 
statements corresponding to the claim features (A, B, C) and the logical connectives (&, or, 
not) defining the relationship between the claim features. 
The truth evaluation of the basic statements is used to model the decision of the 
competent authority who examines whether a claim feature reads onto the object of 
examination, which is a factual question. The overall legal finding (novel/not novel, 
infringing/not infringing, etc.) follows from the truth evaluation of the basic statements. For 
example a compound statement P formed of two basic statements connected by an AND 
connective is true if and only if both basic statements are true, i.e. P = A & В = true if and 
only if A = true and В = true at the same time. A compound statement formed of two basic 
statements connected by an exclusive OR connective is true if one of the statements is true: 
P = A V В = true if either A = true and В = false or if A = false and В = true. 
4. Application of the logic model 
In the following sections I will demonstrate the application of the introduced logic model 
by way of examples. 
4.1. Novelty 
A patent claim may exhibit four differences with respect to a prior art disclosure: 
(i) a new feature (i.e. a feature not disclosed in any form in the prior art solution); 
(ii) a generic feature (i.e. a general feature of which a specific example is disclosed in 
the prior art); 
(iii) a specific feature (i.e. a feature, which is a specific example of a more general 
feature disclosed in the prior art); 
(iv) a substituting feature (i.e. a feature replacing a prior art feature but not having a 
generic-specific relation thereto) 
(v) an omitted feature (i.e. the omission of a prior art feature). 
I recall that a patent claim determines a novel invention if the claim does not read onto 
the prior art. Hence, in the present logic model a claim is held novel over a prior art 
disclosure if the evaluation of the claim as a whole is false. 
4.1.1. New feature 
In the present example the examined EPC patent claim is: 
Claim P: Navigation tool comprising a needle made of a magnetic material. 
The basic statements of the examined patent claim P are: 
A = The subject is a navigation tool. 
В = The navigation tool has a needle. 
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С = The needle is made of a magnet. 
Hence the examined claim P can be modelled as: P = A & В & С. 
The patent claim will be compared with prior art material (PRA) disclosing a prior 
solution which can be modelled by the basic statements: 
A = The subject is a navigation tool. 
В = The navigation tool has a needle. 
Hence the prior art solution can be modelled as: PRA = A & B. 
The question to be decided for the purpose of examining novelty is whether prior art 
PRA teaches А, В and С features, i.e. whether all three basic statements are true in respect 
to PRA. As postulated PRA only teaches features A and B, thus these basic statements are 
true, while basic statement С is false in respect to PRA: 
A = true 
В = true 
С = false 
In logic a composite statement made up of basic statements connected by AND 
connectives is true if and only if all basic statements are true. Hence, in the present situation, 
since basic statement С is false the logical model renders as result that the patent claim as a 
whole is false: 
P = A & B & C = false 
In accordance with our expectations the evaluation of claim P comprising the novel 
feature С is false (it does not read onto the prior art) thus claim P is considered to be novel 
over the prior art disclosure PRA. 
Conclusion: In decision T411/98 the Board interpreted the requirement of novelty 
such that an invention is lacking novelty if all its features are known from the prior art. This 
practice is consistent with the logical model, which renders the claim novel if at least one of 
the basic statements is evaluated as false (i.e. if at least one of the features does not read 
onto the prior art). 
4.1.2. Generic feature 
As a second example let us consider the same patent claim (P = A & В & С) as in the 
previous section, which is compared with a specific prior art solution (PRA) modelled by 
the basic statements: 
A = The subject is a navigation tool. 
В = The navigation tool has a needle. 
CI = The needle is made of steel. 
In the present example patent claim feature С (The needle is made of a magnetic 
material) is a generalisation of the prior art feature CI. Accordingly, in the logic model С 
can be written as С = Cl ^ (С & ~1 Cl). This would translate back to English as 
The needle is made of steel OR the needle is made of a magnetic material but NOT 
steel. 
The above logic transformation is thus none other than the artificial division of 
"magnetic materials" into two groups: 
1. the group containing steel 
2. the group containing all magnetic materials but NOT steel. 
A LOGIC MODEL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 9 5 
The patent claim P is thus broken down to two mutually exclusive claim variants as 
illustrated in Fig 1. Claim variant PI comprises the features (basic statements) А, В and CI, 
while the second claim variant P2 comprises the features А, В, С and ~~1 CI (not CI). 
P 
A 
В 
Cl V (С & Cl) = С 
£ 1 
A = true 
В = true 
Cl = true  
—> true 
£ 2 
A = true 
В = true 
С = ? 
' C l = false  
—> false 
Fig. Í 
The basic statements representing the claim features are written under the letters 
representing the claim and the two claim variants. The statements arranged vertically within 
the same column are understood to be connected by the AND connective, while the 
statements connected by any other connective are arranged horizontally with respect to 
each other and the connective is explicitly indicated. The logic evaluation of the statements 
reflecting the authority's evaluation of the corresponding claim feature is indicated next to 
the statement. The evaluation of the first claim variant PI is very simple, the authority will 
establish that the basic statements А, В and CI clearly read onto the prior art (all three 
features are disclosed in PRA), thus the logic evaluation of all three statements is "true". As 
a consequence the evaluation of the first claim variant PI is also true, meaning that the first 
claim variant PI is not novel over the prior art PRA. 
In the case of the second claim variant P2 the evaluation of the compound statement С 
remains undecided, however since feature CI is evaluated as "true", the evaluation of the 
negation of С1 ( ~1С1 ) is necessarily false (the negation of a true statement is false). Since 
one of the basic statements forming P2 is false the evaluation of the second claim variant 
P2 as a whole is also false regardless of the evaluation of C. Hence the second claim variant 
P2 is novel over prior art material PRA. 
It rests to decide whether or not patent claim P comprising as alternatives patent claim 
variant P2 that is novel and a patent claim variant PI that is lacking novelty over prior art 
PRA is novel. 
The patent claim P is composed of the two claim variants such that: P = PI or P2. As 
we have seen in the previous section the evaluation of a compound statement formed by an 
OR-connective is true if one and only one of the two statements is true. In the present case 
PI = true while P2 = false, which results in the patent claim as a whole being true (P = 
9 6 ZSÓFIA KACSUK 
true). When translated back to the legal language this means that the patent claim P reads 
onto the prior art PRA. Thus it is not novel in view of PRA. 
Conclusion: The EPO would make the same finding by applying the "specific vs. 
generic" rule (see Guidelines C-IV, 9.5): a specific disclosure takes away the novelty of a 
generic claim embracing that disclosure. Hence, it can be established the "specific vs. 
generic" rule is not an arbitrary interpretation adopted by the EPO but rather a logically 
consistent rule which can be fitted into the proposed logic model. 
4.2. Infringement 
As mentioned before the EPC system leaves the interpretation of the scope of protection of 
an EPC patent up to national law. However, legal certainty of third parties has to be 
guaranteed by making sure that the intellectual property right does not affect the public 
domain or third party's existing intellectual property rights. Hence, if the scope of protection 
of a patent embraces an allegedly infringing solution (product, method or use) this solution 
should give rise to revocation (or limitation) of the patent whenever it can be proven that 
the solution belonged to the state of the art at the time of filing the patent application 
(having regard to its priority as well). 
If we apply the EPO's patent claim feature approach to decide upon infringement, this 
criteria is readily fulfilled, which can be easily demonstrated by the present logic model. 
When deciding upon infringement, similarly to the assessment of novelty, the authority 
evaluates whether the basic statements representing the claim features read onto the 
allegedly infringing solution. The true or false evaluation of the basic statements allow for 
the logic evaluation of the compound statement representing the patent claim as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter. If the evaluation is true, the patent claim reads onto 
the examined solution, thus it infringes the patent protection. If the evaluation is false, the 
patent claim does not read onto the examined solution, meaning that it lies outside of the 
scope of protection. 
4.2.1. Extra feature 
When examining infringement the patent claim may exhibit five differences with respect to 
the allegedly infringing solution (product, method or use): (i) an extra feature; (ii) a more 
generic feature; (iii) a more specific feature; (iv) a substituting feature; and (v) a feature not 
embodied in the solution. These five cases correspond to the five cases of the novelty 
examination. 
The first case (an extra patent claim feature) corresponds to the situation examined in 
section 4.1.1, whereby a similar finding can be made: if the patent claim (P = A & В & С) 
contains an extra feature (C) with respect to the allegedly infringing solution (A & B) the 
logic evaluation of this feature (C) will be false, whereby the evaluation of the patent claim 
as whole will be false as well: 
A = true 
В = true 
С = false 
Resulting in: 
P = A & B & C = false 
Conclusion: It can be established from the logic model that in the patent claim feature 
approach if a claim feature is not present in the allegedly infringing solution this suffices to 
come clear of the scope of protection. If this were not the case, the user of a prior art 
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solution would be found liable for infringement, while at the same time the above prior art 
solution (A & B) could not occasion revocation of the patent claim (A & В & С) based on 
lack of novelty. 
4.2.2. Generic feature 
The second case relates to the situation wherein a generic feature of a patent claim is 
embodied in the form of a specific feature in an allegedly infringing solution. Again the 
same example can be used as for the assessment of novelty in section 4.1.2. The evaluation 
of claim P = A & В & С with respect to the allegedly infringing solution defined by A & В 
& С1 is performed in the same way and yields the same result as indicated in Fig n. 1 of 
section 4.1.2. 
As established in section 4.1.2 the claim variant P I reads onto the allegedly infringing 
solution, while claim variant P2 does not. Patent protection would have no value if the 
patent claims had to be as detailed as to encompass only one embodiment, instead it is 
allowed to claim an invention in more general terms, e.g. in the present example С stands 
for "magnetic material" encompassing "steel" as a possible embodiment of magnetic 
material. Hence, infringement should be established in the present situation. 
Conclusion: If the scope of protection is interpreted in line with the EPO's patent 
feature approach it embraces all the specific embodiments of a generic feature. This is 
counterbalanced by the fact that if any such specific embodiment belonged to the state of 
the art it could constitute a ground for revocation based on lack of novelty. For example in 
the present situation, if the allegedly infringing solution (A & В & CI) belonged to the state 
of the art, it would take away the novelty of the patent claim as we have seen in section 
4.1.2. 
4.3. Amendments and priority 
In the European patent system amendments and the validity of a priority claim is treated 
very much the same way.31 Both questions require the same analysis: on the one hand it has 
to be asserted that all the patent features find a direct basis in the original application/ 
priority application (i.e. the patent feature may not be novel over the original application/ 
priority application), on the other hand it has to be made sure that all the features are present 
in the patent claim which have been disclosed in the original application/priority application 
as an essential feature. 
When examining amendment of a patent claim or validity of a priority claim the patent 
claim features are compared to the content of the original application/priority application as 
a whole including information implicit to a person skilled in the art. 
Again, five types of differences may be distinguished with respect to the original 
application/priority application (a new feature; a generic feature; a specific feature; a 
substituting feature; and an omitted feature) of which only the case of a generic feature will 
be discussed here to illustrate the application of the present logic model. The patent claim 
features are expressed by the same basic statements as in section 4.1.2. 
31
 See e.g. Gl/03, G2/03, Reasons for the decision, 4. point: "In order to avoid any 
inconsistencies, the disclosure as the basis for the right to priority under Article 87(1) EPC and as 
the basis for amendments in an application under Article 123(2) EPC has to be interpreted in the 
same way. " 
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The logic model is applied in the same way as in the case of examining novelty. The 
invention disclosed in the original/priority application is indicated by P, while the amended 
patent claim and the patent claim claiming priority of invention P, as the case may be, are 
indicated by P'. 
The results are recapitulated in Table 1. As can be seen patent claim P' embraces two 
claim variants P I ' and P2' (relating to "a navigation tool comprising a needle made of 
steel" and "a navigation tool comprising a needle made of any magnetic material but not 
steel"). The same logic evaluation can be performed as in the previous sections, the result 
of which is that the first claim variant P I ' reads onto the disclosed invention while the 
second claim variant P2' does not. 
Table 1. Comparison of examination of amendments and priority 
Amendment Priority 
2. Generic feature P' = А л В л С compared to P = A Л в Л
 C 1 
Graphical representation: EI 
A 
В 
Cl v ( C & - C l ) = C 
P l ' 
A = true 
В = true 
С1 = true 
—> true 
P 2 ' 
A = true 
В = true 
С = ? 
- C l = false 
—* false 
Evaluation: first claim variant: P 1 ' = A & B & C 1 = true 
second claim variant: P2' = A & В & С & ' CI = false 
Conclusion: unallowable amendment priority of РГ is valid 
priority of P2' is invalid 
Legal background: T194/84 (disclosure test) G2/98 
4.3.1. Amendment 
The legal requirement of an allowable amendment is that it does not extend the subject-
matter with respect to the original application. In the present example only the specific 
feature CI (steel) is disclosed in the original application, hence the evaluation of patent 
claim variant P2' comprising the more generic feature С (magnetic material) is false, which 
is interpreted in the legal language such that the subject-matter covered by claim variant 
P2' consists an unallowable extension of the original patent application contravening Art. 
123 EPC. 
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Turning to current case law, according to decision T194/84 an amendment extends the 
subject-matter if as a result of the amendment the person skilled in the art is presented with 
new information which is not directly and unambiguously derivable from the content of the 
patent application as filed (so-called disclosure test). In the present example the same result 
is reached by applying the disclosure test of decisions T194/84 as with the logic model: the 
general teaching implies additional information with respect to the original specific teaching. 
Former case law applied the so-called novelty test of decision T201/83 for determining 
the allowability of an amendment. According to the novelty test the amendment is 
unallowable only if the amended patent claim is novel over the original patent application. 
The novelty test would be unable to detect extension of the subject-matter in the present 
example as the generic invention is not novel over a specific disclosure as we have seen in 
section 4.1.2. 
Conclusion: This is a clear example of how the logic model would have been able to 
predict a situation in which the former case law decision T201/83 would have proved 
inadequate. It can also be established that current case law decision T194/84 is consistent 
with the logic model. 
4.3.2. Priority 
In the case of examining priority, the first thing to be noted is that Art. 88(2) EPC explicitly 
allows for claiming multiple priorities in respect of a single patent claim. Accordingly, the 
validity of the priority claim in respect of each patent claim variant should be examined 
independently. 
The first claim variant PI' corresponds to the invention P disclosed in the priority 
application, it may thus benefit from the date of priority. However, the second claim variant 
P2' does not read onto the priority application, and the priority claim is invalid in respect of 
P2'. This is reflected by the evaluation of the two claim variants: PI' = true while P2' = 
false. 
In former case law decision T828/93 the Board of Appeal found that the possibility of 
claiming multiple priorities for a single patent claim is only available in respect of OR-
claims (claims containing explicit alternatives). Thus T828/93 is unable to handle the 
present situation where the patent claim feature С takes the form of a generalisation with 
respect to the specific feature CI disclosed in the priority application. 
In decision G2/98 the Board expanding the concept of OR-claims and drew the 
conclusion that a generic term or formula encompassing specific features may also benefit 
from different priorities in respect of the different specific embodiments falling within the 
scope of the generic patent claim.32 
Conclusions: The logic model makes it clear that a generic claim describes alternatives 
in the same way as OR-claims do. The present model could have helped recognise the 
inadequacy of the guidelines given in T828/93 and could have pointed to the more complete 
rule of G2/98. 
32
 "(...) where a first priority document discloses a feature A, and a second priority document 
discloses a feature В for use as an alternative to feature A, then a claim directed to A or В can enjoy 
the first priority for part A of the claim and the second priority for part В of the claim. It is further 
suggested that these two priorities may also be claimed for a claim directed to C, if the feature C, 
either in the form of a generic term or formula, or otherwise, encompasses feature A as well as feature 
B" (G2/98, Reasons of the decision, point 6.7). 
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5. The hidden logic behind the EPO's case law 
The EPO established the patent claim feature approach as an objective method for assessing 
the patent claims in a self-consistent way. Former divergent interpretations, which would 
not fit into the present logic model, were found to be logically inconsistent (see all the non-
uniform case law calling for the decisions of the Enlarged Board of Appeal) or to be 
unsatisfactory for regulating all aspects of a certain question (e.g. the novelty test was 
inadequate for screening out all types of amendments that would extend the subject-matter). 
Over the past decades the EPO's case law has gradually turned to the presently applied 
patent claim feature approach, the logical consistency of which is apparent from the fact 
that it can be modelled by a logic model. Albeit, minor inconsistencies may remain, but the 
trend indicates that the EPC system is self-regulating in the sense that it allows for over 
turning logically inconsistent decisions. 
Although the EPO's patent claim feature approach can be regarded as a product of the 
grant procedure dealing with practical issues related to the patentability of an invention, I 
am going to demonstrate that this approach is equivalent to stipulating that the scope of 
protection should be interpreted on a feature-by-feature basis. 
A patent is a right in rem, i.e. a right competent, or available, against all persons. 
Accordingly, when granting a patent, when examining the validity of a patent and its 
priority claim, as well as when enforcing a patent the central issue is always the legal 
position of the patentee with respect to third parties. The legal position is defined by the 
scope of protection, hence 
(i) the purpose of examination as to novelty is to ensure that the scope of protection 
does not encompass the state of the art (which either belongs to the public domain or to 
somebody's private intellectual property); 
(ii) the purpose of deciding on infringement is to enforce the patentee's intellectual 
property rights against unauthorized use of any embodiment of the invention (and possibly 
equivalent variations thereof) falling within the scope of protection; 
(iii) the purpose of examining any amendment of a patent application is to ensure that 
the scope of protection is not broadened beyond the subject-matter disclosed in the original 
application as filed in order not to give unwarranted advantage to the applicant, while the 
purpose of examining any amendment of a granted patent is to ensure that the scope of 
protection is not broadened in an absolute sense for the legal certainty of third parties; 
(iv) the purpose of examining priority is to draw a clear line between what constitutes 
the state of the art which may not be encompassed by the scope of protection, and any later 
disclosure or intellectual property right, which should not invalidate the applicant's/ 
patentee's claim to patent protection. 
It is interesting to note that all four aspects of patent claim assessment relate to the 
scope of protection, the interpretation of which, however, is not within the EPO's 
jurisdiction. I will now demonstrate that the EPO's patent claim feature approach applied 
for the examination of novelty, amendments and priority amounts to the postulation that the 
scope of protection is assessed on a feature-by-feature basis as well in accordance with the 
EPO's patent claim feature approach. 
When assessing novelty the competent authority must ensure that any solution 
belonging to the state of the art will not fall within the scope of protection. In the feature-
by-feature patent scope approach the prior solution is covered by the examined patent claim 
if each and every claim feature reads onto the solution. In the latter case the authority must 
declare the patent claim non-novel in order to bar the intellectual property right from 
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coming into force as that would lead to privatization of the public domain or to collision 
with a third party's prior rights. Hence assessment of novelty means assessing whether or 
not the prior solution falls within the scope of protection of the examined patent claim. If 
the scope of protection is determined by the EPO's patent claim feature approach, so must 
novelty be. 
As regards amendments, an amendment must not result in the scope of protection 
modified so as to encompass embodiments potentially belonging to the public domain or to 
a third party's property rights. The EPC system does not bar the applicant from altering the 
desired scope of protection, consequently, up to grant all embodiments disclosed in the 
patent application (and not already belonging to the state of the art) may potentially form 
the basis for a claim to patent right-third parties are expected to respect this and refrain 
from exploiting any such embodiments before grant. When the patent is granted the limits 
of the associated intellectual property right are also set. Rights associated with embodiments 
falling within the scope of protection form part of the patentee's intellectual property rights, 
whereas all embodiments lying outside of the scope of protection become part of the public 
domain. Hence the requirement in respect of amendments is twofold. Before grant the scope 
of protection may not be altered so as to encompass anything lying outside of the subject-
matter disclosed in the original application as filed, since any undisclosed embodiments 
may have become part of the public domain or of a third party's property rights since the 
filing date. The grant has for effect that the public domain is expanded by any subject-
matter disclosed in the original application as filed but not encompassed by the scope of 
protection of the claims as granted, hence on the one hand an amendment of a granted 
patent may not extend the scope of protection to any such subject-matter originally disclosed 
but having been abandoned to the public domain and on the other hand to undisclosed 
subject-matter. In order to ascertain the allowability of an amendment the authority is 
required to examine whether as a result of the amendment the scope of protection extends 
to new subject-matter (originally not disclosed) or subject-matter abandoned to the public 
domain by virtue of the grant. If the scope of protection is determined based on the patent 
claim feature approach, consequently the examination of pre-grant or post-grant 
amendments should be carried out in the same spirit. 
Validity of a priority claim is a preliminary question to defining the state of the art for 
the purpose of examining novelty of the patent claim. An invalid priority claim leads to the 
patent claim being refused or revoked only if there is relevant prior art or prior right falling 
within the intermediate period between the priority date and the filing date. If the scope of 
protection of a patent claim embraces embodiments that were not present in the priority 
application it may occur that such an embodiment became part of the public domain or a 
third party's intellectual property before the filing date of the examined patent application. 
The embodiment having become prior art or prior right may no longer be monopolized as a 
result of a subsequent filing. Thus priority can only be acknowledged in respect of patent 
claims the scope of which only embraces embodiments that were already disclosed in the 
priority document. Since we postulated that the scope of protection should be assessed 
based on the patent claim feature approach, the same approach must be applied for assessing 
the validity of the priority claim, too. 
In view of the legal role of the patent claims, the true meaning of the EPO's patent 
claim feature approach is the assumption that the scope of protection should be interpreted 
on a feature-by-feature basis. The EPO has no direct influence on the interpretation of the 
scope of protection, however, by imposing the application of the patent claim feature 
approach in assessing the validity of a patent consistency of the EPC system requires that 
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the scope of protection be assessed on a feature-by-feature basis in patent infringement law 
suits as well. In other words, whatever standards are applied in the grant phase these should 
be taken into account when enforcing the resulting intellectual property right. 
6. Conclusion 
In the present paper I have introduced a logic model for the legal examination of European 
patent claims and shown its application in four different fields (assessment of novelty, 
infringement, allowability of amendments, and validity of a priority claim). I have shown 
that while findings based on case-law require the application of various decisions of the 
Boards of Appeal and Enlarged Board of Appeal, the proposed logic model provides for a 
common approach in all three fields of patent claim examination. 
The logic model is based on mathematical logic and yields-in the illustrated situations-
the same result as case-law would dictate. This indicates that current case-law has evolved 
into a logically highly coherent system. There are however, particular situations (not 
discussed here) wherein the logic model is in conflict with the current case-law. In such 
situations the results obtained from the logic model can help detect hidden inconsistencies 
of the case-law. I have shown a few specific examples where earlier case-law has been 
overturned by more recent decisions reflecting the logical requirements that could have 
been revealed by the logic model in advance. 
This paper cannot endeavour to discuss every possible situation that may arise under 
each field of patent claim examination; however, I have applied the logic model to other 
situations as well obtaining various interesting results. In my view a logic approach to 
patent claim assessment would be desirable for reviewing current case-law as well as for 
assisting future decision making possibly in the form of a computerised expert system based 
on the logic model. The logic model is not designed to substitute the patent professionals 
nor will it eliminate subjective considerations, it is merely a supporting tool as is 
mathematics in all fields of technology and natural sciences. 
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The Hungarian EU Presidency-
A Newcomer's Experience in a Novel Institutional 
Framework 
I. Introduction 
In the first half of 2011 Hungary held the rotating Presidency' on top of the Council for the 
first time since joining the EU. The exercise of the presidential functions was influenced by 
the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon significantly reshaped the position of the rotating 
Presidency in the architecture of the European Union. The Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Trio 
Presidency has been already carried out within the revised institutional framework which 
required a new style to accomplish the proper function of the Presidency. That means an 
entirely different approach which enables the successful cooperation of the country holding 
the presidency with the new leaders on the floor, namely with the permanent President of 
the European Council and with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (HR). 
These institutional changes effectuated by the Treaty of Lisbon as well as the 
Hungarian Presidency itself make sense of an analysis with respect to the new institutional 
model; moreover to the challenges and achievements of the Hungarian Presidency. For that 
reason the following article describes the institutional background along with the most 
important functions of the presidency, which is followed by an overview of the Hungarian 
Presidency's work and the main conclusions. 
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1
 The institution in question was called initially as "Presidency of Council of Ministers", 
nowadays the Treaty of Lisbon applies the term "The Presidency of Council configurations". The 
unofficial wording uses also other forms, e.g. "rotating Presidency", "Council Presidency", "EU 
Presidency" etc. Even if the informal terminology do not reflect on the new institutional framework 
set down by the Treaty of Lisbon and can lead to misunderstandings because of its easily confusable 
character with the European Council's permanent President, we apply the before mentioned 
formulations as synonyms. 
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II. The EU Presidency model after the Treaty of Lisbon 
I. in general sense, the EU presidency serves to carry out the leadership model of the 
European Union,2 but it is noteworthy that the EU as a "sui generis" organisation is standing 
out from the traditional models of international organisations regarding leadership functions. 
In the traditional organisations the leadership and the management functions are completed 
within separate institutional frameworks, however in the Community model designed by 
Jean Monnet these functions institutionally could not be detached from each other. Both 
leadership and management functions-as classic and general political leadership tasks-have 
fallen into the competence of the Member State holding the actual rotating Presidency. 
Thanks to this unique institutional approach the centre of these functions was the Council 
of Ministers as well as the European Council which were led by the rotating Presidency for 
decades. 
But the tasks and competences of the Presidency were quite larger than the general 
leadership and management over the Community institutions. As a result of the Community's 
development, the expansion of its activity as well as the enlargement of its competences to 
new domains, the rotating Presidencies should take progressively more and more 
administrative and managerial tasks in hand, as a consequence of which the Presidency 
became a general "administrator" whilst it should also take responsibility for determining 
the political agenda of the EC (later of the EU). This "double undertaken", i.e. the 
administrative as well as the political overload of the Member State chairing the Council 
brought to surface several problems which could not be tackled by adequate institutional 
solutions until the Treaty of Lisbon. This Treaty reform has changed fundamentally the role 
of the rotating Presidency in view of the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced new 
players on top of the European Union. 
2. In this perspective the most substantial amendment of the Lisbon Treaty was the 
setting up of a permanent President of the European Council.3 The President has been 
appointed for a two and a half year term in a qualified majority vote of the European 
Council. The President's work is mostly administrative, as she or he is responsible for 
coordinating the work of the European Council, hosting its meetings and reporting its 
activities to the European Parliament after each meeting and at the beginning and end of his 
or her term.4 In other words most of the tasks relating to the European Council which was 
exercised earlier by the Member States holding the Presidency, came under the influence of 
the permanent President. Therefore the rotating Presidency obviously lost its power in that 
level. The most significant and visible change concerned the role of the Prime Minister or 
Head of the Member State holding the rotating Presidency. It is because, till the Treaty 
reform she or he was entitled to prepare and to lead the meetings as well as to coordinate 
the activities of the European Council but all these competences were undertaken by the 
new permanent President of the European Council following the Lisbon amendments. 
2
 In general, see: Hayes-Renshaw, F.-Wallace, H.: The Council of Ministers. London, 1997; 
Tallberg, J.: Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union. Cambridge, New York etc., 2006; 
Vörös, I. (ed.): Az EU-elnökség [The EU-Presidency]. Budapest, 2010; Westlake, M.: The Council of 
the European Union. London, 1999. 
3
 Article 15 Para. 5 of Treaty on European Union (TEU). For this position, Herman van Rompuy 
has been appointed in 2009. 
4
 Cf. with Art. 15 Para. 6 TEU 
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The other essential change has occurred in the position of the rotating Presidency 
regarding the foreign and security policy matters. The power of the Council Presidency in 
this field of external policies was already touched upon by the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) introduced in the '70s and as a result, the Presidency came to give the 
common voice for the EC/EU at international level until the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force. Under the modified Treaty, the permanent President-not the rotating Presidency-is to 
provide general external representation to the Union, although these tasks and functions are 
shared with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR).5 This "new-old" position which has been commonly likened to a "foreign minister" 
for the EU,6 gives the power in hand of a strong player. The HR is appointed by the 
European Council acting by qualified majority and it may end his term of office by the 
same procedure. Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the HL conducts the Union's common 
foreign and security policy and contributes by his or her proposals to the development of 
that policy. The position is assisted by the European External Action Service7 and the HR 
plays also important role within the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. 
Namely, she or he presides over the Foreign Affairs Council and sits in the Commission as 
one of its Vice-Presidents. 
That "double hat" arrangement arising from the Lisbon amendments serves the 
institutional fusion of the foreign policy which helps to ensure the consistency of the 
external action at the whole Union level. At first sight, an institutional model which is able 
to bring the Commission's operation into line with the activity of the Council, makes a 
definite contribution to ensure more efficiency in the field of the external policies. However, 
it cannot be overlooked, that linking personally the Commission and Council together can 
be a point of great nicety from the legal perspective. It can be said that the High 
Representative has the right to propose in the field of external relations, and as the HR 
chairs also the Foreign Affairs Council, apart from certain exceptions, has also influence on 
deciding about these proposals, and finally, the Council may empower the HR in order to 
implement these decision. In other words, some aspect of preparation, deliberation or 
decision and implementation is concentrated in HR's hand. It is difficult to deny that the 
operation of the HR is determined by not only legal, but dominantly by political factors, 
and the personal association of these institutions can make the EU's political decision-
making in the field of external policy fields more efficient. Even if it would have positive 
effect from the point of efficiency, the power concentration in the hands of HR can be 
detrimental to the normative legitimacy of EU's external action. 
As regards the organizational background, it can be stated that neither the Treaty of 
Lisbon gives the status of "Union institution" to the presidency. The TEU refers to the 
5
 Article 18 TEU. The position is currently held by Catherine Ashton. 
6
 The predecessor for this position-frequently called as "Mrs/Mr CFSP"-was introduced by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. Javier Solana held the post for ten years until he was replaced with Catherine 
Ashton within the new institutional framework. The term "foreign minister" can be derived from the 
draft European Constitution under which this position was titled "Union Minister for Foreign Affairs". 
The Treaty of Lisbon shaped out the institutional face identical to the rules of the European 
Constitution, but its title, on British initiative, has been changed. 
7
 The setting up of the Service was launched in December 2010. 
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presidency among the rules on the Council only with laconism. According to the Treaty, the 
"Presidency of Council configurations", other than that of Foreign Affairs, shall be held by 
Member State representatives in the Council on the basis of equal rotation.8 
III. Main Functions of the EU Presidency 
1. Leadership function: governing the Council 
As it was set out above, the Member State holding the Presidency has suffered the major 
power loss in relation to the role of an EU wide political leader. In this respect the 
Presidency is obliged to cooperate with the above-mentioned permanent President of the 
European Council as well as with the High Representative. Consequently, the scope of the 
Presidency's leadership function is already limited to the Council of Ministers. 
The EU Presidency conducts and organises the operation-including the day-to-day 
business-of the Council. The Council configurations, Coreper and preparatory bodies of the 
Council are chaired by the delegate of the Member States holding the Presidency, except in 
cases where the leading of the body in issue falls within the competence of the HR. Among 
the directed bodies, the General Affairs Council is highly important for the reason that this 
organ is responsible for coordinating the efforts made by the Council configurations. The 
General Affairs Council has to deal with the horizontal questions regarding the EU 
institutions as well as horizontal policy matters which extend over more Council 
configurations' competences. Besides the General Affairs Council, also the Coreper is a 
crucial forum responsible for the preparation of the decisions. The Coreper is lead by the 
permanent representative or her/his deputy of the Member State holding the rotating 
Presidency. The realising of the leadership function requires the Presidency's sophisticated 
abilities to trouble-shooting, problem-solving, as well as consensus-making. 
2. Function of proposing: setting out the priority objectives and drawing up the agenda 
In line with the function of proposing, the Presidency is capable of influencing the main 
direction of the Council's work as well as the developing tendency of the whole European 
Union. On account of the specific institutional structure of EU, the function of proposing 
can be interpreted in this term rather political capacity than legal competence, because the 
function of proposing, from legal perspective, lies within the competence of the European 
Commission. The Member State holding the rotating presidency is able to determine the 
half year programme, to set down the chief priorities. And more concretely, the Presidency 
decides on the agenda of Council meetings and in cooperation with the permanent president, 
it may have influence on establishing the political agenda of the European Council. 
In a broad view, the specification of the EU's main objectives is framed with a three 
level programming which sets a limit to the Presidency's playing field. The highest level is 
the Union's multiannual programme which establishes the fundamental tendencies. The 
General Affairs Council should ensure consistency and continuity in the work of the 
different Council configurations in the framework of this long-tenn multiannual 
programmes.9 
8
 Article 16 para. 9 TEU. 
9
 Cf. Art. 3 of European Council 2009/881/EU decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the 
Council. 
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The 18 months programme of the Presidency "trio" marks the next level of the 
programming. According to the present practice, the Trio Presidency programme is worked 
out by the Member States of the trio, and they should present it in consolidated document at 
latest one month to the term of the actual trio presidency. As a final point, the half year term 
programme of the Member States holding the rotating presidency should fit in these before 
mentioned framework, i.e. in the multiannual as well as in the Trio Presidency programme. 
Practically, it means that the Presidency which is to hold office in the relevant period should 
establish draft agendas for Council meetings, for each Council configuration, scheduled for 
the next six-month period, showing the legislative work and operational decisions 
envisaged.10 These draft agendas shall be established at the latest one week before the 
beginning of the relevant six-month period. 
In line with these general programming frameworks, the Presidency is able to exercise 
its capacity directly in order to determine the concrete, daily agenda of the Council, and, 
only implicitly, can put pressure on setting up of the agenda of the European Council. 
Regarding the Council's agenda, the function of proposing becomes visible in the 
preparation of the Council's meetings, consequently this function manifests in the activity, 
operation of the ministers and their staff responsible for preparing and chairing the meetings 
of the Council configurations. As a result of the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty, however, 
the Presidency's ability to put items on the agenda of the European Council has become 
indirect. The permanent President is responsible for setting up the agenda of the European 
Council, but it is required to enter into negotiation with the General Affairs Council on this 
issue. In other terms, the Member State holding the EU presidency can practise influence on 
the agenda only within these negotiations, but the content of the provisional agenda is to be 
finalized by the permanent President of the European Council. Nevertheless, this influence 
capacity of the EU presidency should not be underestimated. If the Council of Ministers 
cannot bring certain legislative proposal to decision, the disputed topic can be referred to 
the European Council in the expectation that the head of states and governments will be 
able to reconcile the questionable points and make a consensus at higher political level. 
That is why the permanent President should always take into consideration the impulses 
arising from the Council, namely the proposals made by the General Affairs Council which 
is in fact chaired by the Member State holding the actual rotating presidency. Consequently, 
the obligation to initiate negotiation with the General Affairs Council is not only a formal 
rule. 
3. Function of representation : mediation of the Council s position 
The function of representation implies tasks with internal as well as external aspects. This 
function means in a general approach that the EU presidency speaks for the Council in 
internal relations within the Union's organisation and on the other hand, the Presidency 
should practise also certain competences for representing at international level within the 
external relations. 
As regards the internal side, it can be stated that the highest responsibility is undertaken 
by the Presidency for the co-operation with other institutions. Accordingly, the Presidency 
is involved in the decision-making procedures in which the Council is obliged to co-operate 
and consult with other institutions; moreover the daily work of the Council demands certain 
formal as well as informal negotiation with other bodies of the EU. More concretely, the 
10
 Article 2 para. 7 of Council's Rules of Procedure. Adopted by Council 2009/937/EU decision. 
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Council is responsible for preparing and ensuring the follow-up to meetings of the European 
Council and for this reason it should confer with the Commission (besides the permanent 
President). Moreover, the Council bears the same consultative obligation with the 
Commission regarding the preparation of its six month draft agenda.11 Concerning the 
external representation, the Treaty of Lisbon resulted in substantial loss of power of the 
Member State holding the six-month long Presidency. Prior to that, the external 
representation on the field of foreign and security policy matters fell within the competence 
of the rotating EU Presidency. Contrary to that, after the Treaty reform the Member States 
have been relegated to background in this respect. The High Representative became the 
most dominant player of the foreign policy and the Member State chairing the Council is 
bound to close co-operation with the person holding this post. 
4. Administrative function: managing and operating the Council's work 
The administrative function refers to the most general and widest administrative tasks of 
the Presidency, but in all probability, the workload caused by administering the day-to-day 
work of the Council remains quite unknown to the publicity. 
This function can be taken to mean the administrative tool behind the above described 
main functions. In other words the administrative function is linked subsidiarily to the other 
main functions, it ensures the administrative background of managerial, proposing and 
representative duties of the Presidency, from preparation of decisions through deliberations 
to their publication. It can be mentioned that the configurations of the Council meet when 
convened by the President (and also its members as well as the Commission may propose 
the meeting of the Council).12 In this respect the Presidency should synchronise the 
Council's schedule also with the meetings of the preparatory bodies and the Coreper. The 
chairing of the Council meetings includes also administrative tasks. The president of the 
Council configuration-in fact the minister of the Member State holding the Presidency-
initiates the voting as well as the president is required to open a voting procedure on the 
initiative of a member of the Council or of the Commission, if it is backed by the a majority 
of the Council's members.13 Among the organisational tasks of the president it can be 
mentioned that he or she has to check that there is a quorum when the vote is taken. In this 
regard the president can rely on the assistance of the General Secretariat none the worse for 
the complexity of the voting rules laid down by the Treaties.14 
But in addition, as a consequence of the Presidency's growing administrative workload, 
it is generally essential to establish a harmonious cooperation between the Presidency staff 
and the General Secretary, because the Secretary as a neutral, professional background 
institution can give security for the smooth continuity of the subsequent rotating 
Presidencies. The Council's Rules of Procedure lays down general obligation to cooperation, 
since the Council shall be assisted by a General Secretariat.15 Besides that, the Secretary 
should undertake several technical tasks as well, for example, the Secretary organises the 
written decisions making procedures; it issues the passes to admission to meetings of the 
11
 Article 2 para. 7 of Council's Rules of Procedure. 
12
 Cf. with Art. 217 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
13
 Article 11 para. 1 of Council's Rules of Procedure. 
14
 Article 11 para. 4 of Council's Rules of Procedure. 
15
 Article 23 para. 1 of Council's Rules of Procedure. 
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Council; or the minutes of meetings should be signed by the Secretary-General (or in case 
of delegation, by the Directors-General of the General Secretariat); etc. 
It can be concluded that the General Secretariat is closely involved in organising, 
coordinating and ensuring the coherence of the Council's work. Furthermore, it is also in 
Council Presidency's own interest because as the experiences from the previous 
Presidencies' terms show, the excellent teamwork with the staff of the Secretary can give 
partly the clue to a successful Presidency term. 
IV. The Council Presidency in Practice: the Hungarian EU Presidency 
The Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Presidencies made "Trio Presidency" become the first 
"institutionalized" presidency by the Treaty of Lisbon, and which since the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon at the end of 2009 not only had to provide a kind of continuity for 
the Union, but also the Spain-Belgium-Hungary formed group had to perform next to new 
institutional actors, as mentioned and analysed before. As a member of the trio, Hungary's 
first Presidency faced challenges, which represented the largest European risk of the first 
half year: the indebtedness problem of the EU Member States, the unprecedented difficulties 
in economic situation,16 the weakening of the euro-zone and the efforts for strengthening 
the economic governance. Furthermore, almost as an answer to the Presidency's "Strong 
Europe" motto, the events regarding the "African Spring" and the Japanese earthquake had 
to be faced as well, not to mention the criticism and debates in the European Parliament 
about Hungarian internal affairs, namely about the new media law and the new constitution. 
1. Preparation of the Hungarian Presidency and the priority of the program 
The three Presidency Bureau established the so-called "EU Trio" Committee, which 
organized the eighteen-month-long European agenda under the direction of the presiding 
state. The 18 months-long cooperation of the Trio Presidency was detailed in a Trio 
Presidency program17: the first part of the program, the strategic framework, consisted of 
main priorities and long-term goals, while the second part, the operative program gave full 
particulars about the first part.18 In the frame of the Hungarian Presidency, the successful 
arrangement of the nearly 260 Hungarian events19 was organized with the help of about 800 
officials under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, to ensure the 
background and the close cooperation with other EU institutions, the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels has been strengthened and the personnel of the ministries have 
been increased by 225 people. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible to 
coordinate the EU related work, it has grown the most. 
Other changes made were that the EU State Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has been enlarged by three new temporary departments, and the government 
16
 Jose Manuel Barroso about the challenges of the Hungarian EU Presidency. In: Az EP 
elfogadta a magyar elnökségi programot [The EP approved the presidency-program]. Brüsszel, 
2011. január 19. http://bruxinfo.hu/cikk/20110119-az-ep-elfogadta-a-magyar-elnoksegi-programot. 
html (10.10.2011) 
17
 See Friedery, R.: Spanyol elnökség [Spanish Presidency]. In: Vörös (ed.): op. cit. 183. 
18
 http://www.eu2010.es/en/presidencia/trio/ (10.10.2011) 
19
 The Presidency's budget totaled HUF 23,78 billion, which is around EUR 85 million, http:// 
www.eu2011 .hu/hu/az-elnokseg-koltsegvetese ( 10.10.2011 ) 
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appointed two government commissioners, one for the operational management and another 
one for coordinating Hungarian government activities in connection with the EU Strategy 
for the Danube Region.20 
2. Main targets-main achievements 
The Hungarian Presidency put a variety of economic issues, common policies, enlargement 
targets into its program which was built around top four priorities: 
1. growth and employment for preserving the European social model, 
2. stronger Europe, 
3. citizen friendly Union, 
4. enlargement and neighbourhood policy.21"2 
1. The first above-mentioned priority of the ambitious program had the important task 
to make steps in the reinforcement of the economic policy co-ordination, and in connection 
with this Hungary launched the first European Semester, a new economic policy co-
ordination. Already during the Belgian Presidency, a Council working group has been set 
up for the coordination of the Member States' economic policy, which started the discussions 
on creating the legal bases, the so-called six pack of the EU economic governance. The 
Hungarian Presidency had the main part of the work, the lion share in the negotiations, and 
though agreement was reached in the March Ecofin23, the Parliament postponed the vote 
because they could not agree about an important voting technique until the end of the 
Hungarian presidency. 
Still in this priority-group, the presidency introduced a new issue, namely to start EU 
discussion about European-level measures in the field of integration of the around 12 
million Roma-people of the EU. It was not all without reason because Hungary has 
significant number of Roma people, too. The success was reached thanks to the integration 
of the sometimes quite diverse positions of the Member States. Thus, the Council of Social 
Ministers adopted a final document about the Framework for Roma Strategy, which was 
based on the Commission's Communication "An EU Framework for National Roma 
Integration Strategies up to 2020" of 5 April 2011. Council conclusions have been reached 
about the EU-framework of national Roma integration strategies until 2020, where Member 
States work out their action programmes that will be monitored annually by the Commission 
and the results reported to the Parliament and the Council. 
A major step could be made regarding competition policy, in the issue of the unitary 
patent. After decades-long debates, again with the help of intense negotiation, the Presidency 
could find thirteen more Member States next to the original twelve who had initially 
requested for the enhanced cooperation. With twenty-five members, an agreement could be 
sealed on allowing in the future (from 2014) the use of a new European patent system. 
2. One of the main issues of the "Stronger Europe" priority, and personally important 
to Hungary, was the European strategy on the development of the Danube-region, whose 
model was the successful Baltic Sea Strategy. As it could be finished in time according to 
the preliminary program negotiations, the result of several years of preparatory work and 
20
 http://www.eu2011 .hu/hu/magyar-elnokseg-strukturaja (10.10.2011.) 
21
 Program-Az Európai Elnökség Tanácsának Magyar Elnöksége [Program-The Hungarian 
Council Presidency). 2011. január 1-június 30. A Magyar Köztársaság Külügyminisztériuma, 2011. 
22
 http://www.eu2011.hu/hu/magyar-elnokseg-prioritasai (2011.10.10.) 
23
 Economic and Financial Affairs Council, see more Vörös (ed.): op. cit. 226. 
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consultations paid off, hence it has been approved at the closing summit meeting. Obviously, 
the adoption strengthens the future role of the macro-regional approach, too: the Council 
conclusion approving the strategy called on the Member States to work with the Commission 
to continue the improvement of the macro-regional co-operation, specifically referring to 
the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea region as the future target area of next macro-regional 
cooperation.24 
In the field of energy policy, it was the first time that during a Presidency energy debate 
on the level of heads of states and governments took place. The Energy Council adopted 
conclusions on energy infrastructure priorities, on the overview of energy efficiency 
directive, on the realization of internal market completed by 2014. In June, Member States 
approved a draft compromise proposal presented by the Hungarian Presidency, aiming to 
close the negotiations with the European Parliament on the Regulation on energy market 
integrity and transparency. The Council also started negotiations on the EU External Energy 
Policy thus for the better coordination of EU and Member States' external energy policies. 
Also, an extraordinary Energy Council meeting was held in March, where the 
challenges of the Japanese nuclear developments, and as its consequences the issue of 
energy security, global energy sector, as well nuclear energy was discussed. Thanks to the 
flexible reaction of the Presidency, after two months work the adoption of nuclear stress test 
criteria for the European nuclear plants could be agreed. 
3. Regarding citizen-friendly Union, the Council approved the regulation on the 
European Citizens' Initiative, with detailed conditions under which citizens can take the 
initiative at the European Commission to make legislative proposal towards a joint EU 
action. 
Another issue was the Schengen membership of Romania and Bulgaria. For Hungary, 
it was another personally very important target to reach. However, some Member States 
were not convinced, and hesitated about their preparedness of joining the Schengen-area, 
therefore only (or at least) a political declaration could be achieved about the technical 
preparedness of these two states. 
We should mention the important steps made during this Presidency toward the 
Common European Asylum System, with the amendment of the long-term residence 
directive, which extended the scope of the directive to beneficiaries of international 
protection and with the compromise achieved with the European Parliament regarding the 
qualification directive (except for one horizontal political question, the correlation tables).25 
4. As for enlargement and neighbourhood policy, next to holding the chair on the 
Western Balkans Forum, the other main priority, the closing of the accession negotiation 
with Croatia was successful. Also, steps were made in the accession negotiations with 
Iceland, namely four chapters were opened and two were already temporarily closed. In 
connection with the North-African events, after the Lisbon Treaty the Hungarian presidency 
was the first Presidency when the European Foreign Service as the foreign policy decision-
making body of the EU has come into action: on this ground the foreign minister of the 
24
 See Horváthy, В.: A Duna Régió Stratégia a magyar uniós elnökség liikrében [The Danube 
Strategy in the Light of the Hungarian EU Presidency]. Jogi iránytű, 2011/3. on http://www.mta-ius. 
hu/jogi_iranytu/iranytu.html (2011.10.10.) 
25
 See more Friedery, R.: A huzamos tartózkodási jogállásról szóló 2003/109/EK irányelv 
hatályának kiterjesztése a nemzetközi védelmet élvező személyekre [Amending Council Directive 
2003/109/EC to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection]. Jogi Iránytű, 2011/2. on 
http://www.mta-ius.hu/jogi_iranytu/iranytu.html 
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actual Presidency has only a complementary and supporting role. Besides this, the 
Presidency has activated, on Member States' request, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism 
in co-operation with the Commission for Libya and for Japan, which supports and facilitates 
the mobilisation of emergency services to meet the immediate needs of countries.26 
Thus, as we can observe, one must conclude that in every top four declared priorities a 
very important issue could be achieved.27 
Conclusion 
At first sight, the presentation of the institutional background and the functions of the 
Presidency suggests that with the Lisbon Treaty generated reform the Presidency loses its 
influence in the leading role for the benefit of the permanent president and the High 
Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
There is no doubt that during the exercise of specific functions, for example in the case 
of the external representation tasks, the loss of role of the Presidency towards the direction 
of the Foreign Service is perceptible, but on the whole the overall change in the position of 
the Presidency should rather be evaluated more as a shift in emphasis. 
The realization of the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Trio Presidency clearly showed that 
this requires a new kind of role-perception from the Member States holding the Presidency 
which is based-and thus is a key to success-on the effective co-operation of the new 
institutional actors. 
Regarding the concrete results of the Hungarian presidency, as objective standards, the 
completed cases, the legislation adopted can be mentioned. In this regard, it can be stated 
that in the difficult period of the EU, in total 103 files have been solved, out of these 43 
OLP legislative files with the European Parliament (20 in 1st reading, 6 in 2nd reading and 
1 in 3rd reading) and 60 Council or Presidency conclusions have been adopted.28 
Although because of the European Parliament's summer break the sealing of the 
legislative six-pack and the vote shifted to the Polish Presidency, but can be mostly regarded 
as one of the largest Hungarian results, because a large part of the Council agreement as 
well the Parliament agreement was achieved during the Hungarian Presidency. 
Another big success was that despite some anti-enlargement Member States, the 
accession of Croatia has been completed which is, regarding the stability of the Western 
Balkans, a major step forward strengthening the future European role of Western Balkans. 
Although being important for the Presidency, in the issue of the Schengen enlargement no 
political decision was taken, but the completion of the technical preparations could be 
recorded. Other success of great importance was that a new important issue appeared on the 
European agenda, namely the economic and social integration of the significant number of 
Roma living in Europe. 
It should be pointed out that diplomatically it has been seen as a great success when 
only the Hungarian Embassy operating in Tripoli represented the European Union, and co-
26
 N. Rózsa, E.: Libya and the Hungarian EU Presidency. Gyorselemzés, 2011/14. on http:// 
www.hiia.hu/pub/displ.asp?id=TVYBGH (2011.10.10.) 
27
 ht tp: / /www.consi l ium.europa.eu/moresearchresultsregistry?search=council%20 
conclusion&lang=en 
28
 http://www.eu2011 .hu/fiIes/bveu/documents/HunPR_49 -_27_06_201 l_-_Summing-up_ 
the_Hungarian_Presideney_0.pdf 
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ordinated between the Member States during the Libya events. We should add that the 
Presidency put great emphasis on portraying cultural diversity, to this end, it organized 
many high-quality cultural programs, setting an example for future presidencies, because 
before no other presidency organized so much events during a half-year period. 
Next to the positive achievements it should be also noted that the postponement of the 
second Eastern Partnership summit (the EU with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, Armenia, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan), which was scheduled as the main foreign-policy event of the 
Presidency, is seen by many as a failure. An explanation for this can be that around the time 
a culmination of other unexpected events such as the African ones with their effects were in 
the centre of the EU attention. We can add to this that it cannot be regarded as a 
disappointment, because the emphasis was on other events with worldwide importance 
(including the G8 or the OECD summit). In addition, another failure seen was the common 
agricultural policy, where no agreement could be achieved in contrast to the cohesion 
policy, where Presidency conclusions set up the future principles of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
Of course, every first-time Presidency's plan is to show off some impressive results at 
the end of its half-year period. In this case, the first Hungarian presidency responded well to 
the unexpected events and managed to reach some personally important targets, too. 
However, not only the Hungarian but the first Trio Presidency performed well, too: 
often the preparatory work made by one Presidency resulted the success of the following 
presidency's (as in the case of the regulation on the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) 
where the major part of the preparatory work was done during the Belgian Presidency, but 
the Hungarian Presidency signed it, or in the case of the six-pack, which was closed during 
the Polish presidency and also the vote took place thanks to the work of the Hungarian 
Presidency), thereby ensuring for which the Trio Presidency was established: continuity for 
the EU. 
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ISTVÁN BALÁZS* 
Eastern Europe in Transition, the Case of Hungary 
The Readjustment of Public Administration,1  
Programs and Aspects of the Transformation 
of Public Administration in Hungary between 1990-2002 
Abstract. The result of circumspect and considerate preliminary work, by 1990, the system of public administration 
characteristic of bourgeois, democratic and constitutional states was established in Hungary. The transformation of 
public administration is still far from complete, since fundamental reforms encompassing both structural and 
functional measures, and also the unified regulation of public sector human resources, urgently need to be 
effectuated. The continuous and rapid transformation exhausted public administration after a period and the reform 
programs with low efficiency discredited the ideas promoting the necessity of reforms themselves. Public 
administration weary of the reforms itself became gradually not supportive of, but passively resistant to the cause 
of the reforms, which merely reinforced the philosophy of NPM based on a neoliberal conception of the state 
implying that public administration cannot be reformed from within. In certain cases Hungary was under an 
excessive illusion concerning both NPM and EAS, it was more responsive to them than the other countries 
concerned. Today, however, as a party both to the European Union and EAS, Hungary with its specific experiences 
can contribute to the development of European public administration. 
Currently running complex program of the development of public administration alludes to a more considerate and 
subtle approach, which related to the consideration of international experiences sets forth that "any solution 
originating abroad or in the market may be applied exclusively with proper criticism and the examination of its 
effects." 
Keywords: transformation of public administration, European public administration, European Administrative 
Space, the reforms of public administration, regulation of public sector human resources 
1. The First Phase 
In a summary of the above-mentioned facts, we must establish that despite undeniable 
achievements, an unbalanced system evolved in Hungarian public administration by 1992, 
in which a complex and reformed, co-ordinately functioning system of local government 
was accompanied by an under-regulated, hierarchically organised system of state 
administration, the latter of which, furthermore, developed in an unsystematic manner and 
overgrew in some areas. By the mid-session of the first post-transformation government, it 
became evident that the efficient public administration indispensable for a well-functioning 
constitutional state required that both major sub-divisions of public administration, in order 
that they can provide democratic and professional services for citizens, should develop 
comparatively and coherently, since neither division can function self-sufficiently. In the 
interest of the accomplishment of this purpose, Government adopted the complex program 
Senior research fellow, Institute for Legal Studies, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, H-1250 Budapest, P.O.Box. 25. 
E-mail: balazsi24@gmail.com 
1
 See Lamm,V. (ed.): Transformation in Hungarian Law. Budapest, 2007. 
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of the development of public administration under Decree no. 1026 of 1992 (V. 12.), the 
complete implementation of which, however, was unfeasible by reason of the expiration of 
the government session. 
1.1. The subsequent Government attached great importance to the modernisation of public 
administration, for the realisation of which, it appointed a Government Commissioner who 
was put in charge of the elaboration of the medium-range reform program of modernisation 
within the framework of the "Bokros Scheme", which radically limited involvement on the 
part of the state. The elaborated program adopted under Government Decree no. 1100 of 
1996 (X. 2.) was forwarded to all organs of public administration as a special edition and it 
was published in professional / scientific journals as well. The before-mentioned law, 
however, did not include the program in its normative part specifying the due assignments 
for 1996, whereas, in its Addendum, it provided the main guidelines of medium-range 
reform duties under 21 points, which were specially scheduled for the government session 
under Government Decree no. 2039 of 1997 (II. 12.). 
1.2. The objectives of the medium-range reform were formulated under Government Decree 
no. 1100 of 1996 (X. 2.). The fundamental objective of the main guidelines specified under 
the Addendum was to promote 
A) the consolidation of the framework and of the basic institutions of the new system 
of public administration established in 1990, which necessitated 
a) the recodification of the rules of administrative procedures, 
b) the reform of the system of regional organs of state administration, 
c) the elaboration of the legality supervision mechanism of local governments, etc. 
These constitute elements of the stabilisation of the structure for anefficiently and 
professionally functioning public administration, so that it can provide high-quality services. 
B) streamlining and modernising the functioning of public administration via 
a) increasing efficiency 
b) improvement of the quality of work, 
c) elaboration of the servicing character of functioning. 
The stabilisation of the structure and the modernisation of functioning were designed 
to promote the establishment of a properly supervised system, which proceeds more 
lawfully and is capable of the enforcement of its administrative decisions by adequate 
sanctions. 
C) the establishment of the prerequisites of 
a) contingent intervention by leading officials in cases of manifestations of 
bureaucratism, 
b) the employment of a dependable and professional personnel, which, as to its 
number, is proportionate with its duties and utilises state and local government monetary 
assets (public funds) austerely. 
The attainment of these objectives was deemed adequate to form the basis of the 
upgraded system of public administration. 
1.3. Government that entered office in 1998 consistently affirmed that the preparation of 
schedules for the promotion of the purposeful development of public administration was 
necessary, consequently, it formulated the main duties for the years 1999-2000 under 
Government Decree no. 1052 of 1999 (V. 2.) and under Government Decree no. 1057 of 
2001 (VI. 21.) for the years 2001-2002. Whilst, new priorities, duties and measures were 
also stipulated under the Commentaries of the latter laws, the projected, multifaceted 
concrete measures were in the main encompassed by the main guidelines formerly specified 
under the Addendum of Government Decree no. 1100 of 1996 (X. 2.). 
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1.3.1. The public administrative strategy of Government for the years 1999-2000 was 
defined by the priorities included in the Government Program, by the experiences of public 
administration since the political transformation and by the obligations deriving from the 
envisaged accession to the EU. The relevant prospective and concrete duties for the years 
1999-2000 were formulated under Government Decree no. 1052 of 1999 (V. 21.) 
(hereinafter: GD), according to which, the strategic objectives of the development of public 
administration were as follows: 
a) Reinforcement of the servicing character of state and local administrative organs, 
b) Establishment of a citizen-friendly, efficient and transparent system of civil service, 
c) Establishment of an achievement-oriented, firm and politically-neutral system of 
civil service based on professional expertise, 
d) Establishment of the basic conditions of a system of public administration, which is 
more apt to enforce the points of views and interests of Government, and, 
e) Guaranteeing constitutional, transparent, expeditious and professional public 
administrative procedures. 
As the above indicate, in this period, besides the scheduled continuation of structural 
reforms, the necessity of the gradual upgrade of the functioning of public administration 
was again prioritised, which, however, also required the improvement of the strategic 
preparation of government decisions, the co-ordination of the implementation of decisions 
and of the supervision of implementation. In the following, we will itemise the major 
guidelines stipulated under GD: 
A) Restructuration of state administration, which necessitated the systematic review 
of the scopes of duties and powers of state administrative organs. 
a) In the scope of deregulation, in areas where intervention by the state was deemed 
unnecessary or could be effectuated by other, non-administrative instruments, the authority 
of state administration should be abrogated. 
b) As to further maintained state administrative duties, in the scope of decentralisation, 
their accomplishment should be so far as possible transferred to a level closer to the relevant 
clients, to be administered by regional or local administrative organs or by public public as 
local organs of central administration. State administrative duties and powers, whenever 
possible, should be transferred to local governments. 
c) Ministries should be exempt from the administration of concrete, specific matters of 
state administration, instead, they were designated to focus on strategic planning, co-
ordination, provision of information, control and legal regulation. 
d) The review of the barely understandable, very differently functioning and 
disproportionate system of the 54 central administrative organs functioning in non-
ministerial form mainly as authorities, should be continued. The reinforcement of the 
autonomy and professional functioning of the organs in this scope was deemed necessary, 
whereas, their control was assigned to a Minister or to the Prime Minister in the interest of 
the potential effective enforcement of personal liability. (N.B., these organs gained 
importance in the process of accession to the EU and subsequently became clearly defined.) 
e) The number of regional organs of state administration, the most important organs of 
the authority of state administration, decreased by a third by 1998, however, superfluous 
parallelisms could not be eliminated and their spheres of activity were not harmonised. 
Therefore, the improvement of the control and harmonisation of the functioning of regional 
organs of state administration by county (metropolitan) administrative offices, and thereby, 
the establishment of the conditions of the integrated functioning of regional state 
administration, were formulated as objectives. 
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B) In compliance with the demands of a market economy and modern public 
administration, the major procedural rules of the functioning of state administration needed 
to be revised and re-codified, so that they could supersede AGRSAP which at that time had 
been effective for more than forty years. The objective was to attach an adequately regulated 
system of legal redress to the transparent, expeditious and professional basic procedure, 
through a new regulation with the purpose of proper and effective sanctioning of those who 
infringe laws enforcing community interests. 
C) A further objective consisted of the development of information and customer care 
systems necessary for the reinforcement of a service-oriented style of public administration, 
as well as in the programmatic and unified management of the information technology 
involved in public administration. 
D) The role of the human factor in implementing public administration was deemed 
decisive, therefore, the array of diverse legal regulations for the legal status of the more, 
than 800,000 employees of the public sector was designated to be revised and potentially 
unified. The development of the requirements concerning the employees of the civil service 
was projected, so that expertise and efficiency determined the promotional system and 
employment security, furthermore, it was envisaged that the program for life-long civil 
service would be elaborated. For the purposes of guaranteeing elegant and high-standard 
work and intervention against corruption, it was planned that an Ethical Code of Civil 
Service and the institutional system required for its enforcement would be elaborated. 
Thereby, the establishment of such a system was envisaged that relied on a personnel in 
number proportionate with its duties, capable of professionally implementing its duties. 
E) Further steps were intended to be taken to ensure the efficient functioning, further 
decentralisation and proper control (in the public interest) of the time-honoured system of 
local government. 
a) Within that disintegrated system consisting of more than 3,100 local governments, a 
more efficient and professional system for the performance of duties within reasonable 
bounds was projected to be elaborated by way of adequate legal regulation, organisational 
and financial incentives. These objectives were envisaged to be attained without the 
infringement of the basic rights of local government via the differentiated assignment of 
powers and duties dependent on their respective capacities and via the encouragement of 
the establishment of small regional partnerships. Accordingly, the performance of state 
administrative duties were envisaged to be concentrated in district centres, which were to 
be established on the basis of the districts of public guardianship authorities (harmonised 
with record office centres). 
b) By way of the transformation of the system of financing local government, duty and 
program financing was intended to be instituted, thereby, the ratio of local revenues in the 
total revenues of local government ought to have been increased. The compensatory support 
of disadvantaged local governments was envisaged to be more emphatic. 
F) Finally, the elaboration of the concept of a regional system of public administration 
was formulated as an objective, in the framework of which, the potential future roles of 
county governments were to be determined with a view to the unified development of state 
administrative and self-governmental regions. 
Since the ambitious objectives outlined above could not be implemented, they needed 
to be reformulated in the program for the development of public administration elaborated 
for the years 2001-2002, which was adopted under Government Decree no. 1057 of 2001 
(VI. 21.). 
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2. The Second Phase 
2.1. Government that took office in June, 2002 committed to further the cause of a regional 
administration relying on small-regions,2 also affirmed under Government Decree no. 2305 
of 2002 (X. 10.) on the Actual Tasks of Regional Development, pursuant to which, 
preliminarily elaborated regional and county development programs were adopted as the 
basis of further planning. Under Government Decree no. 1113 of 2003 (XI. 11.) on the 
Program of Modernisation of Public Administrative Services, the major objectives of 
Government Decree no. 1100 of 1996 (X. 2.) and of GD were mostly reformulated. 
Within the purview of Government Decree no. 2198 of 2003 (IX. 1.) on the Tasks of 
Modernisation of the System of Public Administration. 
2.2. In compliance with the reform conceptions, the legal regulation pertaining to multi-
purpose small-regional partnerships of local government was adopted in 2004.3 Whereas, in 
the absence of a political consensus, attempts made to establish regional governments were 
destined to failure. 
2.3. Further pertinent law adopted during government session 2002-2006, with the objective 
of compliance with the requirements of the modern Rechtsstaat, was Act 140 of 2004 on 
Public Administrative Procedures and Services, which replaced the former legal regulation 
that had been valid for nearly 50 years. As a consequence of its coming into effect, public 
administrative procedures are now regulated in an even more transparent manner than under 
the former legal regulation, and exemplary in a European context since it more powerfully 
underlines the function of the executive power to provide services, considerably relieves the 
procedural burdens of clients and facilitates expeditious and unproblematic administration 
of public matters. Due to the new regulation, functioning according to EU standards can be 
ensured, thereby, it promotes direct co-operation with foreign authorities and the extension 
of international co-operation. Experiences of the first year of the application of the act, 
which took effect as of 1st November, 2005, are encouraging, but further correction is likely 
to be necessary. 
2.3.1. Within the purview of the act, new institutions guaranteeing the protection of clients' 
rights are specified, such as 
a) notification of the commencement of the procedure, extension of the scope of 
administrative decisions that can be subject to judicial review, e.g. taking action against 
interim decisions, 
b) electronic management of procedures, 
c) admissibility of the use of native language, 
d) exemption of clients from most procedural obligations. 
a) According to former rules, the client did not have to be notified of the institution of 
the procedure in the majority of cases, therefore, it could not exercise its rights specified by 
law in the initial phase of the procedure. Since the particular procedural rules prescribed the 
obligation of notification very rarely and only exceptionally, the client was notified of the 
commencement of the procedure exclusively in cases specified by law. Therefore, to 
safeguard clients' rights, mandatory notification was stipulated under the newly effective 
law. Obviously, this institution has rational limitations, i.e. the notification of the client is 
2
 See Lamperth, M.: Az önkormányzati rendszer továbbfejlesztése (Further Development of the 
System of Local Governments). Magyar Közigazgatás, (2002) 11. 
3
 Cf., Act 107 of 2004 on Multi-Purpose Small Regional Partnerships of Local Governments. 
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unnecessary, if a decision on the merits is promptly made in an unproblematic case, or, if 
notification would endanger the efficiency of the procedure. 
b) Since all administrative decisions may be judicially contested, former exceptions 
were revoked under the act. Two new forms of legal redress are specified, such as reopening 
and equity procedures. In the scope of reopening the procedure, the client is permitted to 
initiate reopening the procedure, if, within 6 months of reaching the final detrimental 
decision, the client has learnt a new fact, datum or evidence, as a result of which, a more 
favourable decision could have been passed. A major prerequisite is that the new fact, 
datum or evidence had existed before the specific administrative decision was passed (but 
the client learnt about it subsequently). Equity procedures may be instituted, if the 
enforcement of the decision for a reason that occurred after passing the decision would 
incur grave drawbacks for the obligor. Such a reason may be the considerable deterioration 
of the social situation of the client. 
c) The challenges of the 21st century require the insurance of a modern, adaptable and 
appropriately flexible system for the management of procedures. Therefore, the institution 
of electronic procedures and electronic communication within authorities, as well as the 
operation of electronic client information-systems, are admitted under the act. Accordingly, 
citizens may proceed electronically from their homes; however, in consistence with a non-
discriminative policy, traditional, paper-based administration is sustained without imposing 
extra charges on the parties concerned. In fact, two options of electronic procedures are 
positively provided, that is, making appointments electronically with the authority and the 
provision of electronic information services. For that purpose, administrative organs shall 
operate Internet web-sites for the information of citizens about their pending affairs subject 
to the competence of the administrative authority. 
d) In view of our EU-membership, re-grounding the rules of the use of language in 
procedures is a prominent element under the law. Therefore, authorities shall guarantee ex 
officio that foreign clients will not be disadvantaged by reason of the non-comprehension of 
Hungarian language. Hungarian citizens belonging to a national or ethnic minority as well 
as citizens of EU member states settled in Hungary shall be privileged, since they will be 
entitled to use their native language in administrative procedures. 
e) It is stipulated that the client may not be obligated to obtain permission issued by 
other authority or the statement of the special authority for the purpose of the conduct of 
procedure. These obligations shall lie with the authority proceeding the basic case. Pursuant 
to the act, the proceeding authority may not request the verification of data not registered by 
the specific authority, and, for the purpose of relieving clients' procedural expenses, it is 
further set forth that the client may not be obligated to verify data stored in the legally 
prescribed register of any administrative organ functioning in Hungary. 
2.3.2. Optional new institutions and binding rules pertaining to procedures by administrative 
authorities 
Administrative procedures can be considered efficient, if the decisions of the authority 
are enforceable, and, if they take effect within a proportionate lapse of time. The objectives 
of framing the act included the increase of the efficiency of the enforcement procedure, 
however, its attainment is considerably curtailed by the limited number of experts 
specialised in enforcement, and occasionally, by the reluctance of the apparatus to apply 
force vis-à-vis the local population. For the purpose of increasing efficiency, enforcement 
services were prescribed to be established, in which expertise and public financial resources 
are concentrated. As a further solution, the admissibility of the establishment of authority 
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partnerships by local governments for the effectuation of enforcement is also stipulated 
under the act. 
According to the general practice applied in the public administrative systems of 
developed Western-European democratic states, the authority does not negotiate with clients 
from a power position, but they mutually attempt to find a joint solution in a specific case. 
Conventionally, several European states successfully resort to the legal institution of 
authority agreement based on joint benefits, which is more efficient than an enforceable 
authority decision. The advantages of an authority agreement is that it is both implementable 
and judicially challengeable. 
The admissibility of recourse to an intermediary provided by the authority is specified 
in compliance with the relevant recommendations of the Council of Europe and with the 
solutions effective in France, Sweden and Germany. Intermediaries shall perform mediation 
among clients, the applicant and the authority in procedures involving several parties by 
way of seeking the most adequate solution, provision of authentic information for clients 
and making proposals for the applicant and the authority for the optimal implementation of 
investment with due regard to the interest of the population. In most cases, the expertise of 
intermediaries is drawn in on matters related to environmental protection and industrial 
investments. Of course, the intermediary from the authority qualifies neither as a client, nor 
as an attorney of the clients, therefore, it shall not exercise the rights of clients or the 
procedural rights of attorneys and shall not be conferred the powers of the authority. 
Recourse to the intermediary is not mandatory, since the proceeding authority may freely 
adjudge its necessity in each specific case, if it is permitted under the regulations of the 
specific branch of law. 
The observance of the terms of procedures is stipulated as an emphatic element, since 
legal consequences shall be attached to repeated default by the authority. Measures by 
reason of default are applicable vis-à-vis the head official of the administrative organ, 
grounded on the liability of the head official for the organisation and the effective 
completion of duties on schedule. 
As opposed to prevailing practice in most EU member states, where administrative 
courts adjudge competence disputes, these shall be adjudged by the Metropolitan Court of 
Appeal departing from the former regulation. Thereby, the competence of special authorities 
is upheld and further reinforced. 
2.4. In the two phases surveyed above, eleven government decrees pertaining to the reform 
of public administration were framed; however, no major breakthrough was achieved in 
areas apart from the above-mentioned ones.4 According to these programs and the 
conception elaborated in 2003,5 the projected transformation of Hungarian public 
administration should have been completed by 2006 on the basis of the system of legal 
conditions to be determined in 2004. 
3. The Third Phase 
3.1. In compliance with the conception adopted in 2003, the Government that took office in 
June, 2006 endeavoured even more firmly to conclude the reform of public administration. 
Therefore, it submitted bills on the establishment of regional governments thus amending 
4
 Cf., Act 107 of 2004 on Multi-Purpose Small Regional Partnerships of Local Governments. 
5
 Cf., Act 107 of 2004 on Multi-Purpose Small Regional Partnerships of Local Governments. 
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the Constitution, and also on the amendment of the Act on Local Governments (ALG), 
however, Parliament did not pass these in void of the required qualified majority. 
Framing the bills was motivated by the intention to establish regions for local 
government, which could have realised decentralisation by the transfer of a significant 
scope of duties and powers and of assigned resources from central organs to that level of 
public administration. Simultaneously, currently functioning county governments aligned 
with towns of county rank would have been abrogated. The latter one would have been 
replaced by cities as a prior settlement category. Albeit, while both the parties in Government 
and in opposition agreed with the principles of decentralisation, the opposition would 
endeavour to realise these on the basis of county governments with millennial tradition, 
rather than by way of new regional governments to be established on the basis of seven 
statistically planned regions. 
Nonetheless, according to the government, professional and political negotiations 
necessary for the establishment of regional governments will recommence in 2007 on the 
basis of the rejected bills. For the interim period, Government Decree no. 2118 of 2006 
(VI. 30.) on Organisational Transformation Promoting the Effective Administration of 
Public Revenues and Substantiating Measures, among its various provisions, ordered the 
establishment of bases of regional state administration, since its adoption did not require a 
qualified majority in Parliament. In this scope, the general areas of competence of the 
regional administrative organs (with the exception of agricultural special administrative 
organs) will be divided into seven statistically planned regions, and each of those regional 
offices shall also have an area branch office in every county seat of their region. 
3.2. Act 57 of 2006 on Central Organs of State Administration and the Legal Status of 
Members of Government and Secretaries of State was adopted on the basis of decisions 
reached during the preceding government session,6 and accordingly, the Constitution was 
accordingly amended under Act 64 of 2006. 
3.3. Furthermore, Government has also set up a State Reform Committee, which is assigned 
the task of the elaboration of the coordinated reform of state and public administration, 
including the preparation and implementation of necessary decisions. The comprehensive 
reform of public sector human resources will also be accomplished by this committee, as 
prepared under Act 72 of 2006 amending the Statutes on Employment Relations in the 
Public Sector. Intended measures encompass the reform of extensive funding systems and 
of the administration of public revenues. 
3.4. Overview of the 1990-2006 period 
In a summary of the above-mentioned facts, we can assert that as a result of circumspect 
and considerate preliminary work, by 1990, the system of public administration 
characteristic of bourgeois, democratic and constitutional states was established in Hungary, 
constituted, on the one hand, by hierarchic state administration, and on the other hand, by 
co-ordinately functioning local administrative organs of local government controlled by 
locally elected bodies. Nonetheless, in the scope of the purposeful work targeting 
transformation, the attention devoted to specific areas was unbalanced, that is, state 
administrative organs, and also the functioning and human resources of public 
administration, were sketchily regulated, whilst the system of local government was 
grounded on meticulous regulation. The establishment of local government as the basic 
6
 See Sárközy, T.: Gondolattöredékek a kormányzás modernizálásáról (Fragments on the 
Modernisation of Government). Magyar Közigazgatás, (2006) 3-4. 
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institution of local democracy was reasonably granted priority by politics, since the 
replacement of the previous local administration based on the council-system, a peculiarity 
of the functioning of the socialist state, was imperative. This was also formulated as a 
requirement by the Council of Europe under its Charter of Local Self-Government, the 
rules of which were almost entirely transplanted into the effective ALG. As to state 
administration, the political variant and professional standard structure were established in 
the central administration and Ministries, while ALSCS, instituting civil service based on a 
career-structure, was adopted by 1992 and as a consequence of deregulation the prevailing 
law governing public administration crystallised and became more transparent by the end of 
the foundational period of 1990-1992. 
As we have seen, the direction of the further development of the new system has been 
determined by the reform programs elaborated by the successive governments. The work of 
Government in session between 1994—98 was marked by corrective work demarcated by 
the Home Office and based on operational experience. In this period, the necessity for the 
reform of the functioning of state administration was emphatic and related to the medium-
range reform of local government administration (pursuant to the amendment of ALG in 
1996, public administrative offices were transformed into regional organs of central 
administration). It was the establishment of this system of institutions for regional 
development, the development of information technology for public administration and the 
adoption of the medium-range reform program of local government administration that 
supervened in this period.7 In comparison, the following Government in session between 
1998-2002, did not effectuate major reforms of public administration, whereas in the most 
recent period between 2002-2006, the reform of the system of administrative procedures 
was remarkable. 
We must conclude, though, that the transformation of public administration is still far 
from complete, since fundamental reforms encompassing both structural and functional 
measures, and also the unified regulation of public sector human resources, urgently need to 
be effectuated. 
4. The Features of the Changes in Hungarian Public Administration 
from 2006 to Our Days 
4.1. The Trends of the Changes 
Since mid-2006 the trends of the development of public administration have been shaped 
highly peculiarly in Hungary. Namely, following our accession to the European Union the 
enforcement of the very disputable requirements-especially those related to regionalisation-
of the European Administrative Space (hereinafter: EA8) wouldn't have been coerced 
externally, however, this became one of the major trends. 
On the other hand, by this period the application of New Public Management 
(hereinafter: NPM) had been considerably abandoned in the developed countries of the 
world, whereas, in Hungary it was reinforced and became almost exclusive at that time. 
7
 See Verebélyi, I.: A magyar közigazgatás reformjának programja (The Program of the Reform 
of Public Administration.). Magyar Közigazgatás, (1996) 11. 
8
 Verebélyi, 1.: Válságban a magyar középszintű közigazgatás - hogyan tovább? (The Hungarian 
Medium-Level Administration in Crisis-How to Go On?) In: Jobb közigazgatás (Better Public 
Administration). Budapest, 2009. 96-122. 
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Therefore, it may be a principal aspect of our examination why this phase delay in 
comparison with other countries ensued? It is easier to explain the insistence on 
régionalisation with reference to EAS, since it was primarily motivated by political, not by 
professional administrative considerations. This issue was principally determined by the 
elective basis of large parliamentary parties and its prospective evolution, which was 
directed at the territorial transformation of the division of powers. 
Regional governments did not have antecedents in Hungary either in a political or 
economic sense. The formation of regions can be principally connected to the EU 
nomenclature of regional development, which targeted the administrative adjustment to the 
level of NUTS-II. However, the economic and political decentralisation would have 
primarily limited the central power of the state, which would have created a decent space 
for withdrawal of the then governing parties to be forced into opposition, which was 
distinctly anticipated following the two government sessions. Therefore, it was not 
supported by the parties in opposition at that time and rising to power in 2010. 
The professional rationality of the régionalisation of state administration was higher, 
since the scope of action of the majority of regional state administrative organs operating 
then overreached the boundaries of the general territorial administrative division of the 
country, scilicet, of the counties. It is also true that the most frequent cases requiring 
administration close to the clients were managed by state administrative organs operating in 
smaller territories than the regions. Therefore, a situation emerged in which regional 
development and state administration would have required regional operation, whereas, 
local governments would have required counties by reason of the maintenance of institutions 
providing public services. 
Nevertheless, regional identity had not developed among the population, therefore, this 
did not enjoy great social support. As regards the belated but all the more radical application 
of NPM, it was substantiated by political reasons rather than by administrative development. 
Namely, the then social-liberal government had a mere narrow majority in Parliament, in 
which the intention of the smaller, liberal governing party was overrated. One of the main 
objectives of the governing party professing a neo-liberal conception of the state was 
denationalisation and the constraint of the power of the state in public administration. The 
already aggravated economic situation in Hungary substantiated these endeavours as means 
to discharge the budget, the rational contestation of which was difficult. It turned out only 
later that privatisation and outsourcing served individual and party interests in many cases 
and led to corrupt procedures still underway. This logic was perceivable in every respect, 
but it was seemingly less manifest in the dissolution of the traditional framework of civil 
service based on career structure. 
However, the resistance of the qualified civil service with vocation in public 
administration was considerable in the face of the implementation of objectives extraneous 
to the system, therefore, it needed to be announced that the transformation of public 
administration from within was not possible, but it had to be updated by external elements. 
To achieve this, the regulation based on closed career-structure had to be amended, whereas, 
it became necessary to focus on performance assessment and measurement, which was 
promoted by the economic associations of the competitive sector via orders financed from 
the budget. Therefore, it is not accidental that the application of NPM was especially 
manifest in the transformation of the civil service system. 
4.2. The Changes in Civil Service 
In Hungary, the Government taking office in 2006 changed direction radically in re the 
reform of civil service, as well. While before 2006 the objectives consisted in the 
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modernisation of the closed civil service based on career structure and the unification of the 
ramified regulation pertaining to the public sector, after 2006 the decentralisation of the 
closed system of civil service under labour law took place. 
In the spirit of the considerate domestic application of NPM, the conceptions until 
2006 would have narrowed down the performance-based scope besides the reinforcement 
of the elements connected to guarantee, but later the efforts with an effect until 2008 
targeted the complete liberalisation of the system of fees and connected it to performance. 
The radical relief of the regulation pertaining to the closed system of civil service was 
commenced at the beginning of the 2006 government session via the rapid amendment of 
the act on the legal status of public servants. 
Great steps were taken towards a regulation affected by labour law via the relaxation 
of the controls over discharge, the aggravation of the rules pertaining to work during the 
period of discharge, to the payment of salaries and severance pay, via the extension of the 
withdrawal of the assignment to management to the termination of the legal relation of civil 
service. 
The institutional background of the transformation of civil service also changed since 
besides the competent State Reform Committee a separate under-secretary of state from the 
competitive sector was also appointed for the tasks related to civil service. For the purpose 
of the reinforcement of the reform, the governmental duties related to civil service and the 
competent office was transferred to the Prime Minister's Office from the dissolving Ministry 
of the Interior. The objectives formulated in the governmental program related to the 
transformation of civil service were the following: "Higher performance requirements shall 
be posed to employees working in civil service and the rules of their application will be 
more flexible. High-standard performance will be rewarded by more appreciation, human 
resource management will be modernised and the employment of young, competent experts 
will be encouraged." By this and the guarantee of the person of the under-secretary arriving 
from the competitive sector attempts were made at the belated, but all the more radical 
application of NPM in civil service. 
Upon the motion of the Government taking office in May 2010, Parliament adopted 
new law (Act 58 of 2010) pertaining to civil servants working in state administration and 
converted this group into government officials. This concerned the majority of 116,000 civil 
servants, i.e. 70,000 persons. In the new regulation, we must highlight the institution of the 
discharge of public servants without justification and the attachment of the nomination of 
ministerial management to the approval of the administrative under-secretary of the ministry 
for governmental coordination, which in line with other similar modifications constituted a 
shift towards civil service with a more open system of positions, what is more, with a spoils 
system. 
Although, the institution of discharge without justification was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court, "the reason of the loss of confidence" in replacement made the shift 
towards the spoils system even more emphatic. 
The so-called Magyary Program containing the medium-range reform of Hungarian 
public administration determines a peculiar direction of development for civil service by 
stipulating that "The most important issue is the determination of the values according to 
which the new civil service career-model should be shaped... The choice of values should 
be based on the mixture of a career-principle representing stability and predictability and of 
the values of efficiency and performance presuming flexible adjustment to changes ... Such 
a career-model is needed which maintains the advantages of the career-structure, but at the 
same time facilitates flexible adjustment to changes. Flexible adjustment can be achieved 
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by focusing the thinking of human resource management gradually on the sphere of 
activity." 
Of course, this duality is not a Hungarian peculiarity, since we can find its signs among 
the conceptions of development in other countries, as well, with the exception of the 
institution of the discharge of public servants subject to discretion. 
4.3. The Effects of New Public Management and Régionalisation 
It is clear from the above that among the international trends of the development of public 
administration in recent years mainly "New Public Management" and régionalisation have 
had the greatest effect on Hungarian public administration in the spirit of EAS. 
These, however, were erroneous reference points already at the outset. Namely, in our 
view EAS as a point of reference has never marked out unequivocal trends of development, 
but it endeavoured to enforce requirements according to the shared values of the public 
administration of EU member states for the purpose of the establishment of the 
administrative capacity necessary for the operation of the countries concerned by the 
Eastern expansion as member states. Admittedly, once there were cautious attempts at the 
application of certain elements of NPM in the EU in this framework, but the result was 
essentially restricted to the modest application of the CAF system, i.e. the evaluation 
framework applied in the area of quality management at an EU level. 
Apart from this, it is undeniable that in Europe the application of the NPM guideline 
was offered the largest scope in civil service, which began to undermine besides the systems 
of appraisal and remuneration, the complete traditional regulation of civil service based on 
career-structure. Furthermore, the almost halting, what is more, regressing process of NPM 
was put in new light by the impact of the financial-economic depression discernible since 
2008 on the public sector. 
According to our standpoint, the major cause of this was the persuasive rhetoric of 
NPM. Namely, in our view one of the causes of its evolution was the growth of the 
organisation, personnel and budget of public administration in every developed country, the 
increasing burdens of which the competitive sector did not intend to and couldn't finance in 
the interest of the maintenance of its competitiveness. Therefore, the objective was set that 
public administration should function at least with the same efficiency, performance and at 
the same standard as the competitive sector. In view of that, it should constrain its activity 
via the elimination of the superfluous elements, via the involvement of the civil or the 
competitive sector in the performance of the necessary tasks, via the measurement and 
accountability of the performance of the invariably remaining administrative tasks and via 
making them more transparent in the interest of efficiency and quality. 
These endeavours affected the organisation, activity and personnel of public 
administration equally. In this scope, human resource management as the most expensive 
element of the system of public administration has been distinctly highlighted. In the 
developed countries, the distinctively prevalent civil services based on career-structure 
were artificially raised from the labour market and they operate according to the comparative 
advantages guaranteed by law, i.e. not at the market value of the accomplished work, but on 
the basis of the social recognition of work carried out during the entire professional career 
in the interest of the public. These firm, predictable and guaranteed elements could jointly 
secure a balance in the labour market in the long term, on the basis of which the choice 
between the competitive and public sectors presented a real alternative. 
With reference to EAS, the other international trend of the development of public 
administration affecting Hungarian public administration most was régionalisation. In the 
post-millennial years, the problems of medium-level public administration in Europe were 
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determined by the questions whether régionalisation can be a general trend or other 
solutions are also available for decentralisation and the shift of the spatial structure of 
public administration meeting economic demands? Several disciplines deal in-depth with 
régionalisation and/or the problems of regionalism applying diverse approaches, as a result 
of which we abound in both international and Hungarian scientific technical literature. 
At the same time, we are short of concrete analyses based on genuine empirical data, 
especially of those which examine the results and changes of legal regulations and factual 
operation in process broken down by countries. The Council of Europe has dealt with the 
subject-matter of régionalisation for a long time and the concept of regional autonomy has 
been defined under the "Helsinki Principles" of the Council of Europe. According to the 
respective report of the Council of Europe, we need to differentiate régionalisation from 
regionalism in order to assess the regionalising processes underway in Europe. 
Régionalisation is a method of the territorial organisation of the state, while regionalism is 
political philosophy decentralising state power to a regional level. The various 
manifestations of regionalism conform to diverse inner content and sets of values including 
the principles of separatism and democratism as well as those promoting political principles 
colliding with human rights. The relation between territoriality and identity needs to be 
treated very carefully. It may occur that the same person bears strong regional and national 
identities at the same time. Régionalisation as a form of the organisation of the state is 
actually widespread in Europe and it can take very different forms in its different countries. 
The European debate about régionalisation clearly demonstrates that the phenomenon is not 
one-directional in the specific countries and does not occur with the same intensity. We can 
infer from the analysis of the practice of Council of Europe member states that the 
transformation of medium-level governments and of other elements of public administration 
is continuous, but its concrete manifestation is so diverse that we cannot claim the existence 
of a determining European regional tendency in our days. 
Nevertheless, we can assert that at least at the level of endeavours the demand for the 
revision of the territory of the existing medium-level governments in the spirit of the 
formation of larger units has prevailed even in European unitary states since the mid-1990s. 
In the federal states the respective attempts have been forestalled by the fact that the 
member states are generally historical formations, the territories of which are protected 
constitutionally. 
The other distinct tendency is shuffling tasks between the central level and medium-
level governments: in this case not only the one-directional decentralisation, but 
recentralisation also prevail (e.g. Denmark). 
On the basis of the surveys and documents of the Council of Europe we can set forth 
that régionalisation is not an objective, but a potential instrument in the development of the 
public administration of the democratic Rechtsstaat in most countries. The specific 
circumstances of a certain country and the opinion of the concerned population determine 
its concrete form and its schedule. Consequently, directives such as "The Europe of 
Regions" was a favoured instrument applied by the Committee of Regions as to the 
distributional and operational system of structural funds in the functioning of the EU, 
however, it did not expand to become a movement towards a federal Europe based on 
regions. Therefore, it is not accidental that based on the Helsinki Recommendation of the 
Council of Europe framed as a result of compromises almost all traditional democracies 
accommodate medium-level governments between the central and local governments, 
which fit the concept of region regardless of their denominations. In this broad scope, any 
regional government classified under six categories included in the Recommendation can be 
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defined as region. Nevertheless, neither the document nor current European thought settles 
the case when several levels of regional governments obtain in a country: the relation 
among the levels shall be settled by domestic legislation and the document refers merely to 
the observance of the European Charter of Local Self-Government and the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
According to the above, we may infer that the management of the complex process of 
régionalisation at the medium level is a task to be solved on a national level with regard to 
local governments and we cannot allude to an explicit international tendency in this 
direction. The situation is slightly different as to state administration and the regional state 
administrative organ of the government. 
Namely, in this respect we can set forth that the representation of the state and the 
governments is reinforced in the regions under area development but not via the 
centralisation of former general administrative powers (e.g. authority matters, legal 
supervision), but the reinforcement is rather due to new roles based on social-economic real 
processes. Nevertheless, this role is motivated by the current government policy, which as 
an expectation is more and more reflected in the assignment mechanism of the heads of 
offices leading towards political discretionary assignments. 
As a matter of course, the traditional administrative roles are still important in the 
regional representation of governments, the attendance to which mostly remains the task of 
public servants and they are invariably administered at a regional level closer to the clients 
where multiple regional levels obtain. On the basis of the new scopes of tasks, a new 
regional partnership is emerging between the regional organs of governments and local 
governments and in this partnership the regional representatives of governments play an 
increasingly important role. 
The newly evolving sphere of action consists frequently in operative organisational 
work based on partnership affecting regional social and economic processes. The role of the 
regional representatives of governments is changing and increasing in the long run in re EU 
relations, since the progressive role in the regional social and economic real processes 
cannot be operative without EU connections. The central power has commenced to curtail 
or reinforce its regional economic and social role. 
These new activities are integral to the evolving multi-level government proclaimed by 
the EU. This essentially concerns what the new assignment of the organs involved in the 
performance of administrative tasks will be (state administration, local governments etc.) 
under the circumstances changed by the financial and economic crisis, i.e. what the new 
division of labour will be like with a view to the accomplishment of common European and 
national objectives. 
In June 2006 the Government formed in Hungary under the conditions described above 
targeted the reform of public administration based essentially on the new trends of 
régionalisation and NPM more firmly than before. In favour of the reforms, the Constitution 
was amended and at the beginning of the government session. Parliament adopted new law 
on Parliament and central organs of administration, a decision was made on the radical 
régionalisation of state administration and on the introduction of market methods into the 
regulation of civil service. The Hungarian Government tabled draft law on the amendment 
of the Constitution and of the Act on Local Governments required for the foundation of 
regional governments in the absence of adequate political and parliamentary support, 
therefore, the motion was rejected by Parliament for lack of the required two-thirds majority. 
The tabled motions targeted the establishment of governmental regions effectuating 
decentralisation so that significant scopes of duties and powers and eannarked resources 
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would have been transferred to this level of administration from central organs. In parallel, 
current county governments as well as the towns of county rank would have dissolved. The 
latter one would have been replaced by the large city as a privileged settlement category. 
The governing parties and the opposition agreed on the principles of decentralisation, 
but the then opposition would have implemented that on the basis of the millennial county 
governments, not via the new regional governments to be established in the 7 statistically 
planned regions. According to the purposes, the measures of the state reform would have 
encompassed the revision of state duties and the reform of the large service providing 
systems and state finances. Two most controversial measures of the reform conceptions 
manifest in the amendment of pertinent law were the régionalisation of the regional level of 
state administration and the transformation of the system of civil service to be implemented 
in the spirit of the application of NPM. 
Although, it can be appreciated that the central administrative organs were 
comprehensively regulated by law for the first time, its actual provisions (especially the 
termination of the office of the administrative under-secretary) were vaguely considered 
and not elaborated according to scientific requirements. Namely, these measures such as the 
general régionalisation of regional state administration were not preceded by systematic 
scientific preparation at all or if they were (such as the proposals of the codification 
committee established for the regulation of central administrative organs and in re the 
régionalisation of metropolitan and county administrative offices), these were finally 
disregarded by Government upon its decisions. The restructuration of the administrative 
spatial structure into small areal and regional levels in the absence of professional, political 
and social consensus could not be implemented in the administration at local level and it 
was only partially successful in state administration managed by Government. 
Furthermore, the régionalisation of metropolitan and county administrative offices 
performing the legal supervision of local governments was adjudged unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Court. The correction of the unconstitutional failure in void of proper 
consensus was not effected until the change of government in 2010, therefore, the legal 
supervision of local governments was suspended for one and a half years in the absence of 
operative administrative offices as regional organs of government. 
Since the spatial-structural changes remained in torso, the functioning of regional 
administration became non-transparent and wearisome, its efficiency and quality 
deteriorated and local civil service became unreliable. Meanwhile, with the involvement of 
the competitive sector and EU funds, Government deployed great forces in order to radically 
revise the duties performed by the state and local governments constituting the state and to 
transform the system of the performance of duties. Nevertheless, the intentions to change 
were not supported by social or professional consensus, consequently, the political 
resolutions were not followed by implementation. 
Following the second half of 2006, the external, professional and scientific system of 
the preparation of governmental decisions changed fundamentally. The resources available 
were utilised centrally by the State Reform Committee, which endeavoured to integrate 
primarily the competitive sector into the elaboration of reforms, therefore, the professional 
staff of the portfolios could participate exclusively if they were related to these programs. 
However, the work done by organisations less familiar with the closed system of public 
administration (including the before-mentioned so-called revision of public duties) did not 
lead to appreciable results. 
From 2006, the conception that public administration cannot be reformed from within 
prevailed invariably. Whereas, the measures based on extraneous proposals and producing 
1 3 0 ISTVÁN BALÁZS 
conflicting effects many times did not improve either the efficiency, effectiveness or the 
quality of public administration discernably, but usually further impaired them. At the same 
time, the reform endeavours made great demands on social resources and the uncritical and 
coerced application of the instruments of NPM destroyed the institutions functioning well 
previously (e.g. the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration) and subverted the 
traditional set of values of public administration and civil service, while it could not create 
anything new. 
At the same time, the professional capacity of the prestigious representatives of the 
domestic and foreign science of public administration was not utilised for the reforms, or if 
it was, that was rare and unilateral (the supporters of the current political conceptions). The 
changes supervening in the world (the continuous expansion of the neo-Weberian state and 
public administration, loss of the importance of régionalisation etc.) were not regarded upon 
decision-making, although they had been elaborated in the Hungarian science of public 
administration. The "results" were that public administration became thoroughly 
destabilised, its set of values was subverted, its efficiency regressed, which challenged even 
the achievements of the previous one and a half decades after the change of regime 
expounded in parts 4.1^4.3. 
4.4. Current Changes 
Following from the above it may not be surprising that subsequently to the change of 
government in Hungary in 2010 we could almost instantly discern the intention to change 
public administration radically. The main trend consisted in the reinforcement of the spheres 
of action of the state and of public administration. Instead of régionalisation, the government 
program targeted the reintroduction of integrated state administration on the basis of county 
governmental offices. This implies the peculiar application of the ideology of NPM 
otherwise not favoured by the new government, according to which county governmental 
offices with several thousands of staff as mega organisations will be established on the basis 
of the large and inevitably fused offices. 
These conceptions are supplemented by centralisation efforts affecting the system of 
local governments besides the nationalisation of a significant part of the tasks performed 
and powers exercised formerly on this level, the aggravation of the financing system and 
the completion of the instruments of legal supervision. 
These reform endeavours are expanded by the changes affecting civil service outlined 
above as continuity of doubtful value between the bashful approach of former governments 
to civil service shifted towards a plunder-system and the radical and explicit assumption of 
these endeavours. These have been substantiated by the Basic Law functioning as a new 
Constitution, which in comparison with the former one as a skeleton law provides great 
flexibility for the implementing fundamental laws for the transformation of not only public 
administration, but also of the complete state organisation. 
The efforts expounded so far also indicate the difficulties related to the termination of 
the confusion of the set of values of public administration established formerly. The 
diversely motivated and not properly harmonised conceptions of development may give 
rise to or reinforce conflicting processes, therefore, in our view exclusively the acceptance 
and consistent implementation of a complex medium-range program elaborated and 
supported on an extensive basis similarly to the program of 1996 could provide real solution 
in our unstable public administration and civil service. 
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The "Magyary Zoltán Program for the Development of Public Administration", 
elaborated during the functioning of the current Government in June 2011, provides 
theoretical opportunity for the solution, but its content is unfolding merely gradually, so any 
judgement concerning its adequacy would be premature. 
5. Conclusions 
5.1. Determinations and National Peculiarities in the Former Two Decades of the 
Development of Public Administration in Hungary. The changes in public administration 
described in the previous chapters rightly raise the question whether they mark a peculiar 
"Hungarian way" or that is the common fate of Central-Eastern-European countries in 
transition. At any rate, the framework for development was the same, namely, the outset 
with the Soviet-type public administration before the change of regime as well as the 
international programs, especially the EU PHARE and the OECD SIGMA Programs 
promoting its transformation were common. The concept of the European Administrative 
Space directed at the determination of a common European set of values in public 
administration also derived from the Eastern expansion of the EU. 
Hungary was at the cutting edge of the transformation of public administration in the 
Central-Eastern-European region at the beginning of the 1990s. This manifested itself 
primarily in the rapid establishment of the local governments system and in laying the 
foundations of a career civil service system. Nevertheless, urgency led to a lack of balance 
among the various areas of public administration and the structural reforms were not 
followed up rapidly by a change in functioning. It was a recurrent question whether we 
adapt the administrative solutions prompted by EAS adequately and how they can be 
enforced under particular Hungarian conditions.9 
The experiences of more than two decades and current problems may jointly justify 
the answer, which must be inevitably differentiated. In the period directly preceding the 
change of regime the requirements of EAS had not been formulated yet. Therefore, we 
applied the convention of the Council of Europe to the local government system, which was 
a kind of skeleton law, so we needed to draw primarily on the former experiences of our 
public administration upon the detailed regulation. The bilateral development programs-in-
aid originating principally in traditional European democracies arrived subsequently to the 
entry into effect of the new regulation, therefore, they could provide assistance merely to 
the perfection of its functioning, furthermore, they contributed to retraining the staff of 
public administration, which was very important. 
The OECD PUMA and SIGMA Programs promoted primarily the development of the 
system of civil service as well as deregulation. However, what prevailed in the approach of 
the programs was NPM as an alternative to former classical public administration, the 
domestic application of which caused not only trouble but also a confusion of values in the 
absence of adequate conditions. 
In other Central-Eastern-European countries in transition the reforms generally 
commenced later and were implemented more carefully than in Hungary. In this respect it 
was a positive feature that we took the lead, nevertheless, the downside of this was that we 
could not rely on the experiences of other countries, whereas, the governments of the 
9
 Balázs, I.: A XXI. század közigazgatásának kihívásai (The Challenges of Public Administration 
in the 21st Century). Magyar Közigazgatás, (2000) 7. 
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countries concerned were edified both by our achievements and failures. The continuous 
and rapid transformation exhausted public administration after a period and the reform 
programs with low efficiency discredited the ideas promoting the necessity of reforms 
themselves. Public administration weary of the reforms itself became gradually not 
supportive of, but passively resistant to the cause of the reforms, which merely reinforced 
the philosophy of NPM based on a neoliberal conception of the state implying that public 
administration cannot be reformed from within. 
Meanwhile, the European Union in need of OECD support in the development of 
public administration was obliged to frame the requirements concerning public 
administration for the countries intending to accede, i.e. the shared values of the public 
administration of member states, which had not been sought for institutionally previously. 
However, the document of the European Administrative Space was conceived already in the 
spirit of NPM, which was reflected in its content and its development.10 Since the subject-
matter of this work does not include the examination of the development of EAS, we will 
disregard its detailed elucidation, whereas, we cannot contest its impact on the development 
of the public administration of Hungary and the countries of the Eastern region. This 
impact, however, is not unambiguously positive, since under its auspices we could find 
abundant examples and especially grounds for reference for the uncritical and coerced 
application (in the absence of the necessary conditions) of the principles of NPM supported 
by underlying European principles. 
Although, this process emerged as a framework of conditions attached to the Eastern 
expansion, it obliged the EU before the 2004 expansion to deal with the shared values and 
development of European public administration even if public administration was a 
domestic issue of the member states overreaching the scope of EU regulations. Nevertheless, 
the capacity of public administration is a determining element of social and economic 
development, the expansion of which has absolute priority. 
In certain cases Hungary was under an excessive illusion concerning both NPM and 
EAS, it was more responsive to them than the other countries concerned. Today, however, 
as a party both to the European Union and EAS, Hungary with its specific experiences can 
contribute to the development of European public administration. Whereas, the above-
mentioned, currently running complex program of the development of public administration 
alludes to a more considerate and subtle approach, which related to the consideration of 
international experiences sets forth that "any solution originating abroad or in the market 
may be applied exclusively with proper criticism and the examination of its effects."1' 
10
 Orta, C.: Quel avenir pour l'Espace Administrative Européenne? Maastricht, 2003. 
11
 Magyary Zoltán Program for the Development of Public Administration (MPI 1.0). Ministry 
of Public Administration and Justice. Budapest, June 2011. 
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A Realistic Perspective on International Legislation 
Abstract. The status of "international law" is examined critically. In the first section, the basis of (national) 
legislation is described. This consists of an inquiry into a credible meaning of "natural law". It is focused on the 
question whether universal principles exist and, if so, of what kind. Section 2 deals with the issue of enforcement. 
National legislation invariably realizes this, but this is not obvious at the international level. Section 3 deals with 
human rights. It is discussed whether their presence points to the existence of "international law". To this end, a 
possible reason for these rights to have developed is expounded. 
Keywords: natural law, enforceability, international legislation, international politics, human rights 
Introduction 
The political developments over the period after World War II have led to a considerable 
number of rules and views at the international level, the complex of which is now recognized 
as "international law". In this article, the domain as such, rather than a specific part of this 
whole, is inquired from a meta-legal perspective. The meaning of "international law" is 
concerned here; how should this be qualified? 
In order to ascertain this, a general analysis of the basis of positive law (i.e. the law as 
it is established) is useful. To that end, I will indicate in section 1 how "natural law" may be 
interpreted. The ideas of "natural law" and "international law" are, after all, often connected. 
In section 2, the way in which rules at the international level operate is dealt with; it will be 
shown how these are observed and whether they may be enforced. Finally, in section 3, the 
topic of human rights is discussed, because of its connection with cross-border legal issues. 
The question comes to the fore to what extent human rights are relevant to this subject 
matter. 
1. The legal basis at the national level 
It is important to determine which elements are constantly (implicitly) present in national 
law. In this way, a possible contrast with the rules at the international level can come to 
light. Because of the general theme of this article, I cannot treat any possible perspective on 
natural law; I will merely deal with the most important positions for the present discussion. 
I mention the term "natural law"; the approaches of two philosophers in particular, 
Herbert Hart and Thomas Hobbes, are clarifying with regard to this matter. A familiar 
interpretation of "natural law" is the "classical" approach; it consists of a standard indicating 
that a natural law exists in an absolute, immutable sense and should (morally) be 
M.A., J.D., lecturer in Jurisprudence, Leiden University, Rapenburg 70, 2311 EZ, Leiden, 
Netherlands. 
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1 3 4 JASPER DOOMEN 
acknowledged as the directive for actual legislation,1 the truth or rectitude being the same 
for all and equally known to all insofar as the collective principles of reason are involved.2 
It may accordingly be said that "every posited human law contains the rationale of the 
law to the degree in which it is derived from the law of nature. If it, however, in any way, 
discords with the natural law, it will no longer be a law, but a corruption of law."3 The right 
to a fair trial, e.g. could in this perspective be taken to exist before it is laid down by a 
(human) legislator. 
This perspective differs from Hart's. He argues that any social organization must 
contain a "[...] minimum content of Natural Law [...]",4 consisting of "[...] universally 
recognized principles of conduct which have a basis in elementary truths concerning human 
beings, their natural environment, and aims [...]."s 
This means that basic rules (according to Hart even "truisms") have to be present in 
order for human coexistence to be possible. There has to be "approximate equality", for 
example: people must be approximately equally strong, since some exceptionally powerful 
individual might easily dominate the others, without observing the law.6 "Natural law" is 
clearly given a different meaning from the usual one mentioned above; Hart connects this 
with the laws of nature, such as the law of gravity.7 
The second philosopher who should be mentioned here is Hobbes. For him, "natural 
law" means no more or less than the way in which one acts, on the basis of reason.8 In this 
sense, there are natural laws, such as the most important one that one should attempt to live 
together peacefully with others as far as possible, and can resort to war if this should turn 
out to be unattainable.9 Hence, there is a significant agreement between Hobbes's viewpoint 
and Hart's. 
Although Hart's minimum content of natural law regards circumstances which apply 
independently of agents whereas Hobbes focuses on reason and, consequently, the agent, 
both make it clear that actual circumstances are the issue. Natural law is transposed into 
positive law; the contents are even alike: "The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain 
each other, and are of equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature [...] are not properly Lawes, 
1
 Aquinas, Th.: Summa Theologiae. [1274]. Complete Works, vol. 7: la2ae Summae Theologiae 
a quaestione 71 ad quaestionem 114. Rome, 1892. Ia2ae, q. 90, art. 2 (p. 150); q. 93, art. 3 (p. 164); q. 
94, art. 2 (pp. 169, 170); q. 94, art. 5 (pp. 172, 173). 
2
 Ibid. Ia2ae, q. 94, art. 4 (p. 171). 
3
 "[...] omnis lex humantitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae 
derivatur. Si vero in aliquo a lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex, sed legis corruptio." Ibid. Ia2ae, 
q. 95, art. 2 (p. 175). 
4
 Hart, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law. Oxford, 1961, 189. 
5
 Ibid 189. 
6
 Ibid. 190, 191. 
7
 Ibid. 184. 
8
 The (subjective) "right of nature" is not specified (as, e.g. the right to life) as Hobbes defines 
the liberty that is part of this right negatively as "the absence of extemall Impediments" [Leviathan, 
91 (Chapter 14); cf. 145 (Chapter 21)|. 
9
 Hobbes, Th.: Leviathan [1651]. Ed. by R. Tuck. Cambridge, 2007. 91, 92 (Chapter 14). His 
premise in this respect is similar to Hart's when he emphasizes the (approximate) equality between 
people [Hobbes: Leviathan, op. cit. 86, 87 (Chapter 13)]. 
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but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. When a Common-wealth is once 
settled, then are they actually Lawes, and not before [...]."10 
Both thinkers provide an important contribution to determining the basic elements in 
law. If someone should, e.g. be capable to subject all others to himself, it may be argued 
that the existence of legislation would be irrelevant to him. After all, it would not be in his 
interest to submit to rules which impede him. 
Is this approach to natural law the most credible one? As I said, the treatment of this 
topic must be summary, but it is in order to pay some attention to an alternative. This 
consists in positive law being ideally modelled after "classical" natural law, or natural law 
in the narrow sense, as it may be called. This alternative is adhered to by many, amongst 
whom Hugo Grotius is an important exponent. He argues that natural law follows from 
human nature," but specifies this differently than (for example) Hobbes, by indicating that 
it is inherent to natural law to keep one's promises12 and that people would also have sought 
out each other if a mutual dependence weren't the case.13 It is important that not merely 
reason is involved here, but "right reason".14 
It is difficult to make it clear how natural law would compel in this case, as Hobbes 
observes15-who doesn't, incidentally, oppose Grotius but Aristotle, who exhibits a similar 
account of human nature16 (people can, in Hobbes's view, only live together firmly if the 
state of nature is abolished and a sovereign is present17), and, so, a specific part of the latter's 
political philosophy. In section 2, this topic, the enforceability of law, will receive attention. 
As for the question whether this opinion is tenable, it is difficult to ascertain how the 
existence of natural law in the narrow sense may be maintained. Natural law in Hart's and 
Hobbes's sense can be defended empirically, but the alternative's claims exceed the means 
of its proponents to justify them. It is at least possible to describe a system of law without 
involving this sort of natural law. Even if this isn't criticized on its contents, an important 
criticism can thus be exercised18 of positions that argue its existence. It cannot be refuted, 
but its presence can be shown to be redundant. 
10
 Ibid. 185 (Chapter 26). 
11
 Grotius, H.: De lure Belli ac Pacis. [1625] (On the right of war and peace). Aalen, 1993, 9 
(Prolegomena, § 8). 
12
 Ibid. 11 (Prolegomena, § 15). Hobbes also promulgates this [Leviathan. 100 (Chapter 15)], 
but not in the same way as Grotius, namely on the basis of a "social appetite" [Grotius: De lure Belli 
ac Pacis. 8 (Prolegomena, § 7)]-since without a sovereign to preserve the peace, people don't (stably) 
unite [Leviathan. 88 (Chapter 13)]—but on the basis of self-interest [e.g. Leviathan, 93 (Chapter 14)]. 
13
 Grotius: De lure Belli ac Pacis. op. cit. 12 (Prolegomena, § 16). 
14
 "Natural law is the dictate of right reason." ("lus naturale est dictatum rectae rationis [...].") 
(Grotius: De lure Belli ac Pacis. op. cit. 34 [Book 1, Chapter 1, § 10]). The phrase "right reason" is 
also used by Hobbes (Leviathan, 32 (Chapter 5), for whom the notion lacks the moral connotation it 
has with Grotius. 
15
 Hobbes: Leviathan, op. cit. 471 (Chapter 46). 
16
 Aristotle: Politica. [± 350 ВСЕ]. Opera, vol. 2. Ed. by I. Bekker. Darmstadt, I960. 1253a. 
17
 Hobbes: Leviathan, op. cit. 88 (Chapter 13) (cf. supra, note 12). 
18
 By means of the approach known as Occam's razor, after an interpretation of part of William 
of Occam's epistemology [de Ockham, G.: Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio [± 
1319]: Distinctiones 19-48. Opera Philosophica et Theologica: Opera Theologica, vol. 4. Ed. by G. 
Etzkom and F. Kelley. St. Bonaventure University, (NY) 1979, Distinctio 30, Quaestio 1 (p. 317), 
Quaestio 2 (p. 322); cf. Distinctio 27, Quaestio 2 (p. 202)]. 
1 3 6 JASPER DOOMEN 
The situation Hart and Hobbes describe is a valuable starting-point to qualify the 
national domain. The question arises whether this applies to the international domain as 
well. With respect to the "approximate equality", e.g. it is obvious that this is not found 
between states. In section 2, the consequences of this state of affairs are expounded. 
2. Enforceability as a necessary element in a system of law 
In the previous section, some problems with natural law in the narrow sense were pointed 
out. Accordingly, it does not seem to provide a viable basis to argue the existence of 
"international law". In this section, the issue is approached from a different perspective, by 
inquiring into the relevance of enforceability. I will start again with the analysis at the 
national level; this time, the contrast with "international law" will receive more attention 
than it did in the first section. 
It is characteristic, among other things, for national legislation that it can be enforced. 
To provide an example at that level: art. 310 of the Dutch Penal Code, which makes theft 
punishable, has no value if a perpetrator of this felony cannot be tried before a court of law. 
How is this settled internationally? If one wants to summon a state before the International 
Court of Justice, this state must itself have recognized the jurisdiction of the Court (art. 36, 
section 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice). The same rule applies to a 
situation in which parties appear before the International Criminal Court (art. 12, section 2 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). 
The International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court lack, in this 
way, the unconditional authority of national courts of law, whose decisions can actually be 
executed, irrespective of the will of the parties involved (cf., e.g. art. 553 of the Dutch 
Criminal Proceedings Act for the Dutch situation). A sovereign at the international level is 
lacking, the consequences of which are evident: there is no instance to which parties have 
transferred their competences and the judge, accordingly, merely rules in the cases that are 
willingly submitted to his discretion. One may wonder whether this state of affairs may be 
deemed a practice of law. 
In this case, of course, it is not the (supposed) basic contract on the basis of which, in 
Hobbes's model, the contracting parties appoint a sovereign19 which is involved but the fact 
that rules must be enforceable. Hart distinguishes between primary and secondary rules; the 
first sort of rules indicate what one must do or is forbidden to do, while rules of the second 
sort determine, besides the coming about and changing of the primary rules, in the form of 
"rules of adjudication", that judges are given the power to judge.20 This has no merit without 
the additional possibility of imposing sanctions. 
Hart resists the idea that the sovereign is above the law.21 In his model, moreover, the 
position of a sovereign is not a central issue, because of the following: "There are [...] two 
minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the 
one hand those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria 
of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition 
19
 Hobbes: Leviathan, op. cit. 120 (Chapter 17). 
20
 Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 94. 
21
 Ibid. 218. 
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specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be 
effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials."22 
If these conditions are indeed met, a sovereign may not be required (although it should 
still be possible to sanction a transgression of the rules). At the international level, this 
situation doesn't apply, as appears from the behavior of some (powerful) states. There, the 
lack of a sovereign is severe: there is license. It turns out that there is only a conditional 
relation at this level: parties agree on something and accept that a judge may render a 
verdict. 
The fact that there is a judge seems nonetheless to imply the presence of law. Still, 
how should this be appraised? The following from the Charter of the United Nations is 
illustrative: "If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under 
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council 
[...]." (art. 94, section 2 of the UN Charter). Since the permanent members have the right of 
veto (art. 27, section 3 of the UN Charter), in a number of cases there will be no legal 
enforcement.23 
This also applies to possible sanctions imposed by the Security Council: members of 
the United Nations "[...] may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of 
membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." 
(art. 5 of the UN Charter) and "[...] may be expelled from the Organization by the General 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." if they haven't acted in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter (art. 6 of the UN Charter). Those who are 
permanent members may prevent sanctions issued against them. This already points to an 
important given: some states being more powerful than others, which is, as described in the 
previous section, not a decisive factor at the national level, impedes the enforcement of 
decisions or renders these impossible.24 It is not without reason that countries such as Japan 
attempt to acquire permanent membership, while it would at the moment probably be 
unrealistic to expect countries such as Belgium, Finland and Estonia to fulfill this role. 
The status of the member states appears to be decisive for the position they occupy. 
Similar issues may present themselves at the national level, but in those cases they are 
excesses. If a national court of law punished a successful businessman differently than a 
beggar {ceteris paribus), this would be considered unacceptable. At the international level, 
by contrast, the perspective that one state is more powerful than another is not only 
accepted, but evidently one of the (established) principles. 
As for disputes about judgments by the International Criminal Court: these are, insofar 
as they don't concern the judicial functions of the Court, if states cannot come to an 
understanding amongst themselves, referred to the International Court of Justice (art. 119, 
section 2 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court), so that the problem just 
observed occurs here as well. 
This is also apparent at the European level. If a Member State doesn't adhere to an 
obligation which is incumbent on it on the basis of the Consolidated version of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission may, having summoned the 
Member State to take the appropriate measures, bring the case before the Court of Justice 
(art. 258 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
22
 Ibid. 113. 
23
 Hart considers this to be an important objection (The Concept of Law. op. cit. 227). 
24
 Cf. Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 191,214. 
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Union). If the Court rules in favour of the Commission, the Member State in question is to 
take the necessary measures to comply with the Court's judgment (art. 260, first section of 
the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). 
This is still a straightforward practice. Should the Member State, however, subsequently 
fail to comply with the Court's judgment, nor pay the "lump sum or penalty payment" the 
Court can impose on it (art. 260, second section of the Consolidated version of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union), there are no further legal means to induce the 
Member State. There are, of course, political ways through which to maneuver, but these 
already exist, irrespective of the rules, so that an appeal to them doesn't enhance the status 
of European legislation. The provisions in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union directed at the Member States may be invoked by 
individuals before a national court of law, but this shifts the crucial element to a nation, so 
that, via a detour, national law is concerned: European legislation is there accepted and 
applied. 
It is not just the position of the judge that is illustrative for the dubious position of 
international legislation. An organ of the executive of the United Nations, the Security 
Council (mentioned above), appears not to be able to operate on its own. This is clear from 
the fact that five of the fifteen members had to be given the status of permanent member 
(art. 23, section 1 of the UN Charter) (which, moreover, as was remarked above, acquired 
the veto right), apparently because they would not have adhered to decisions that contravene 
their interests. This pragmatic solution is commendable, but in this way politics are decisive 
and there seems to be no room for a (separate) domain of law. 
It is. then, difficult to demonstrate that international law exists. Agreements have been 
made, but it cannot consistently be inferred from the behavior of states that they 
acknowledge these as legal. Problems don't often ensue since issues are involved in which 
it is to states' advantage that the agreements are met, or since one wants to prevent political 
difficulties to arise,25 but that doesn't indicate a recognition of international rules as law. 
Hegel points to the problems at the international level as a result of a lack of 
enforceability: "There is no magistrate; there are at best arbitrators and mediators between 
states, and these merely coincidentally, i.e. according to specific wishes."26 Although many 
supranational organizations have been erected, this observation still seems to be correct. In 
Hegel's view, there can only be a command ("Sollen") to obey the rules;27 the problems 
might be resolved through moral standards.28 For Hegel, moreover, positive law and natural 
law coincide.29 
25
 The latter situation may account for behavior which seems to be at odds with the thesis that 
international law is observed by states if this seems to conflict with their interests [Scott, S. V.: 
International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and 
International Politics. European Journal of International Law, 5 (1994) 1, 314.] 
26
 "Es giebt keinen Prätor, höchstens Schiedsrichter und Vermittler zwischen Staaten, und auch 
diese nur zufälligerweise, d.i. nach besondern Willen." Hegel, G. W. F.: Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse [1821]. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 
1964, § 333, Anmerkung (p. 443). 
27
 Ibid. § 333 (p. 443). 
28
 Such a way out doesn't suffice, in my opinion, but I won't elaborate on that here. 
29
 There is, in Hegel's perspective, only positive law [Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 
§ 3 (p. 42)], but this merely follows from the fact that there is no difference between positive law and 
natural law [Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 3, Anmerkung (pp. 42, 43)]. 
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Similar characteristics pertain to the current situation: "A clear weakness of 
international law [...] is that the enforcement mechanisms of international law continue to 
be unsatisfactory and the Security Council does not offer an adequate substitute."30 This is 
not all there is to say on this issue; international law may originate in the same manner as 
national law. Once international law is realized, it is abided by because the enforceability is 
a given. Accordingly, it is not in the nature of international law that it could not exist; it 
would be more apt to say that it must follow the same course as national law in order to 
function. Franck rightly points out that incidental noncompliance is not decisive; even at 
the national level, this is manifested;31 a crucial difference, however, is that actors at the 
national level that do not observe the law can be punished against their will.32 
It may be objected that in the preceding no definition was given of "law" or of "right". 
This is not only difficult but perhaps even impossible. To this predicament one may add that 
"[...] there is no such thing as an intrinsically 'proper' or 'improper' meaning of a word.",33 
and that "[...] the idea of a true definition is a superstition",34 so that the matter whether 
"international law" is law is merely verbal35 and needs to be abjured36 (no pun intended). 
These observations have merit. A definition is in many cases an inadequate tool in setting 
up an argumentation, viz., if one coins a definition and subsequently inquires what follows 
from it. Various lines of thought may thus arise that are not mutually compatible or 
consistent; they may even conflict. Alternatively, a definition may be used (in common) if it 
is justified, such as that of a triangle. 
The question is, then, which of these two situations (one starts with a definition and 
constructs a line of thought on this basis, or uses a definition justifiedly) applies. In my 
opinion, it is the second, so that Williams's remarks are enervated, at least with regard to 
this issue. To illustrate this, I point to the way the word "law" is used. If someone were to 
say that the Corpus Iuris Civilis is law at present, he would have a hard time explaining 
why, whereas it would be easy to argue that (part of) it was law during the 6th century 
A.D.37 
This approach does not entirely entail that "international law" is not law, of course: 
there are people who use the word "law" to refer to "international law" (indeed, otherwise 
30
 Carty, A.: Philosophy of International Law. Edinburgh, 2007. 81. 
31
 Franck, Th. M.: The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in 
an Age of Power Disequilibrium. American Journal of International Law, 100 (2006) 1, 91; cf. 
D'Amato, A.: Internationa! Law: Process and Prospect. 9. Irvington (NY), 1995. 
32
 As Hobbes puts it: "[...] if any man had so farre exceeded the rest in power, that all of them 
with joyned forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that 
Right which nature had given him [...]." Hobbes, Th.: De Cive [1651] (the English version), entitled 
in the first edition Philosophical/ Rudiments Concerning Government and Society. Ed. by H. 
Warrender. Oxford, 1983, Chapter 15, § 5 (p. 186). 
33
 Williams, G. L.: International Law and the Controversy concerning the Word "Law". British 
Yearbook of International Law, 22 (1945), 148. 
34
 Ibid. 159. 
35
 Ibid. 157. 
36
 Ibid. 163. 
37
 The legislation was initially limited to the Eastern Roman Empire; upon the recapture of the 
provinces of the Western Roman Empire that had fallen to the Ostrogoths, it was introduced there as 
well. The restored unity did not last, however, as the empire was invaded by the Lombards in 568 
A.D. It is doubtful whether the legislation was predominant even before 568 A.D., inter alia since it 
did not compose a systematic whole. 
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the present article would largely be moot). This usage appears to result from an unwarranted 
expansion of the domain to which "law" may be said to refer. One easily introduces the 
political process to the discussion when referring to the international domain, thus 
confounding politics and law: "[...] assurances for securing compliance with [customs, 
principles, and norms that function as rules to regulate conduct by persons in their mutual 
relations as members of a political community] need not be predicated on the assertion of 
force or the promise of swift, certain punishment of wrongdoers. In the international 
dimension, guarantees of law for regulating states remain primarily couched in international 
public opinion and the political will of governments to make the law work in their national 
interest."38 If such a position is opted for, the discussion comes to an end prematurely, since 
"international law" is then supposed to include international politics, which evidently do 
exist. 
In any event, it seems to be clear that the obligations that the law imposes need to be 
enforceable; its lack of permissiveness is characteristic for the law. D'Amato presents an 
admirably nuanced view in dealing with the matter with regard to the international level, 
but his interpretation of "enforcement" seems too broad; pointing out that not all 
punishments are physical (e.g. a monetary fine), it is concluded that "[...] when we think of 
legal enforcement, we need not imagine the use of physical force against the person of the 
law violator, although, of course, in some cases physical force is appropriate."39 Yet 
(physical) force is invariably needed if the initial punishment is not effective (if a monetary 
fine is not paid, enforcement will still be necessary). So even if force is not always 
immediately required, its presence in the form of a back-up is needed. 
Does this mean that the state of nature, for the time being at least, continues to exist 
between states? Hobbes affirms this.40 This doesn't entail, according to his line of thought, 
that actual battle need arise, for he distinguishes between war and battle: "[...] WARRE, 
consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will 
to contend by Battell is sufficiently known [,..]."41 
The objection that the differences between states are greater than those between 
individuals, which is sometimes offered as evidence that Hobbes's depiction of the state of 
nature doesn't apply to the international level,42 is not decisive as various reasons may exist 
why countries don't attack other countries, e.g. because of the danger that they will, in tum, 
be attacked themselves by countries that have a special interest in retaliatory measures, or 
because they value the economic interests that can be satisfied peacefully more than the 
gains that may result from an act of aggression. 
Here, Grotius's position is no realistic alternative, either. He, too, emphasizes the role 
of enforcement: it is the law that enforces.43 The power to sanction flows, in his opinion, 
from natural law itself;44 sovereigns impose sanctions, but this is rather a result of natural 
law than of their positions as rulers;45 natural law itself lacks force, but is still effective 
38
 Joyner, C. C.: International Law in the 21st century. Lanham (MD), 2005. 5, 6. 
39
 D'Amato, A.: International Law: Process and Prospect, op. cit. 14, 15. 
40
 Hobbes: Leviathan, op. cit. 90 (Chapter 13); 163 (Chapter 22). 
41
 Ibid. 88 (Chapter 13). 
42
 Yurdusev, A. N.: Thomas Hobbes and international Relations: From Realism to Rationalism. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60 ( 1996) 2, 316. 
43
 Grotius: De lure Belli ac Pacis. op. cit. 34 (Book 1, Chapter 1, § 9). 
44
 Ibid. 511 (Book 2, Chapter 20, § 40). 
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 Ibid. 509 (Book 2, Chapter 20, § 40). 
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("Neque [...] quamvis a vi destitution ius omni caret effectu.").46 Natural law would then, 
in the absence of an authority to take action, have to "force", which is difficult to make 
insightful without an appeal to a (presupposed) human nature (cf. supra, note 11 ). 
Hart points out that the law can't be reduced to "[...] general orders backed by threats 
given by one generally obeyed [...]",47 but the enforceability which, as was indicated, is 
characteristic for the national level is a necessary condition to distinguish between rules of 
law and requests or commandments48 as long as the law has not been internalized by the 
subjects of law (or rather prospective subjects of law). Hart does not want to infer that 
international law doesn't exist from the fact that there is no enforceability at the international 
level,49 but he doesn't make it clear what this would mean. A reference to the fact that states 
actually keep to the rules is not sufficient here, since they do this on the basis of self-
interest. 
In this regard, one may argue that states, acting only if gains are to be expected,50 are 
not bound in the same way individuals are at the national level. The conclusion that "[tjhere 
is no easy or clear way to distinguish international law from either politics or mere norms."51 
seems justified, with the caveat that this implies the conceptual existence of separate 
domains of "international law" and "norms". The difficulty of the former 1 have attempted 
to expound above; the problems with the latter requires a treatment that would lead to too 
great a digression. Still, in the last section a relevant issue will be discussed that borders on 
this. 
3. The import of human rights 
In the foregoing, it was shown that it is difficult demonstrate the existence of international 
law owing to a lack of enforceability at the international level. Yet the existence of universal 
human rights seems to point to international law. Many treaties have been signed to protect 
human rights, among which the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Should 
the presence of international law, even if one grants the enforceability issue, not be 
concluded on this given? 
Those who contend that international law has been settled in these documents seem to 
overlook an important factor. They are indeed universal treaties, in that they focus on the 
rights of human beings around the entire world. On the other hand, the universality is 
obviously limited: they are universal treaties on human rights. There are principles which 
transcend the systems of law of countries, such as the principle that a punishable fact should 
be legally laid down, which is established in both national legislation and in international 
treaties, e.g. in art. 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
46
 Ibid. 13 (Prolegomena, § 20). 
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 Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 24. 
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Does this imply the presence of an international domain of principles, to be codified by 
legislators, or is there another basis of law than the universal human rights? 
In virtually every society there seems to be a basic set of standards (cf. section 1 ). One 
may even call this into question.52 (I won't deal with the opinions of those who argue a 
fundamental relativism in this respect. This can't be refuted a priori, but is more radical 
than what I put forward here. If such a position is accepted, it will only have even more 
extensive consequences for the appraisal of law.) 
There seem to be (or to have been) primitive societies where certain fundamental 
norms are (or were) not maintained, but what is the relevance of this? It is unclear whether 
one may really call this a society. This depends on the scope of one's definition of "society". 
To what extent does a bond justify utilizing the idea of society? If one merely associates at 
times of mutual dependence, an atomic whole (one does not consider oneself, or at least not 
primarily, to be a part of a greater whole) remains the background for each relation. 
At any rate, the fact that societies acknowledge basic standards independently of each 
other is no proof for the existence of natural law in the narrow sense. One can point to-
besides the minimum content of natural law (Hart; cf. supra, note 4) or the laws of nature 
(Hobbes; cf. supra, note 7), in which the domain for positive law to have a breeding ground 
at all is made explicit (cf. section 1 )—a number of values, such as the right to life (art. 6 of 
the 1CCPR) and a fair trial (art. 14 of the ICCPR), which are indeed necessary conditions. If 
one should, e.g. not deem one's life protected properly by (the enforcers of) the law, anarchy 
might be imminent. From this it may be concluded that the basic rights and laws which 
appear in each system of law owe their existence to their being required for a system of law 
to be possible at all. 
This can be illustrated by a (global) description of the development of the rights of 
individuals. Those who could exert the greatest power in society could, once rights had 
been established, determine which rights would be concerned and to whom they would be 
allotted. It may be argued that gender and race were pivotal factors in this development, 
which is clear from, e.g. the respective moments women received suffrage in Europe and 
the U.S.A. and the subordinate position of minorities in various places. 
At some time (various moments) the rights of women and minorities were 
acknowledged. One may wonder whether universal principles were then transmitted into 
positive law. This would mean that it was recognized that these groups of people should not 
be disfavoured, which is difficult to uphold. It seems more likely that the position of these 
groups could no longer be ignored as they gained power, partly because of their ability to 
unite. To deny them their rights would undermine the system of law. 
This is, of course, not the only possibility to explain the rise of these rights. One may, 
alternatively, appeal to human life as being "of intrinsic importance"53 or it may be advanced 
that in some cases reason was acknowledged as a criterion. As to the first possibility: it will 
be difficult, if not impossible, to make it clear what this means,54 and, apart from that, why, 
even if it is acknowledged to be correct, it does not extend to other beings than human 
52
 Cf. Winch, P.: Ethics and Action. London, 1972. 57; Winch himself doesn't deny, incidentally, 
that a pattern can be discerned (Ethics and Action. 58). 
53
 Dworkin, R.: Is Democracy Possible Here? Princeton (NJ)-Oxford, 2006. 35. 
54
 Dworkin does not, in any case, succeed in doing this, appealing merely to a principle (the 
"principle of intrinsic value") that "almost all of us" are said to share (Ibid. 9). This does not seem to 
be more than an appeal to common sense, which cannot, in my opinion, serve as a basis. 
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beings. In the second case (an appeal to reason), one may grant reason as the criterion, but 
maintain that this is only the case because certain rights could no longer be withheld. If a 
being apparently endowed with reason were not granted the basic rights, the grounds for the 
rights of those already in possession of them would come under discussion. Reason would 
no longer serve as a standard and would have to be replaced by another one. This is, 
however, lacking, which is why this issue was brought up in the first place. It is reasonable 
beings who maintain reason as a criterion,55 since this is an element shared by them (and 
through which they can distinguish themselves in relevant aspects from other beings), a 
factor that continually serves as a minimum condition in order to claim a particular right. In 
this case it is important to discern being able to use one's reason in establishing rights on 
the one hand and acknowledging reason as a criterion for attributing certain rights on the 
other. That this distinction is not always made doesn't detract from its merit. 
It is decisive that reasonable creatures are the ones formulating the rights and norms. 
They separate a specific domain for themselves and those like them, where more rights can 
be appealed to than elsewhere. Only they, by the way, are of course able to accomplish this. 
Animals (apparently) not only lack the intelligence to reach the level of abstraction required 
to draft laws, but are even unable to realize the systematic organization that serves as a 
prerequisite for a forum to produce laws. As far as they are concerned, it seems, there is 
merely a community. This may be quite large, as seems to be the case in a number of 
species of bees. There is no need, then, to realize legislation: the mutual competition which 
is characteristic for humans is absent, for one reason because these creatures don't (or even 
can't) observe a difference between private and public interests.56 
At any rate, what is at stake is not that it is acknowledged that the rights of reasonable 
beings ought to be respected, in accordance with natural law in the narrow sense, but that a 
minimum domain can be isolated, where one is safe; the beings that don't have access to 
this domain can't appeal to these rights. In this way, one may, if one, moreover, in fact also 
acts on this basis (and doesn't oneself act from the conviction that natural law in the narrow 
sense applies, which is also possible, though I would not, as said, concur with this view), 
withhold basic rights to beings deemed not to dispose of reason. 
The difficult matter what reason is and which beings may be said to dispose of it is not 
explicated here; this is not necessary as only the factual situation is considered (i.e. what 
"reason" has been taken-roughly-to be), although what it has been thought to be may have 
been prompted (perhaps indeliberately) by a desire to find a distinguishing feature. The 
need for a specific domain mentioned above would in that case have an even more 
fundamental precursor here. 
Animal rights have been laid down in legislation rudimentarily.57 Fundamental rights 
are in some places recognized-the German Constitution contains these, for instance (in art. 
20a)-but in these cases only very general rights are concerned. Many rights are irrelevant to 
animals, such as the freedom of expression. The most important ones, such as the right to 
55
 Schopenhauer already points to this (Schopenhauer, A.: Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik 
[1840]. Sämtliche Werke, Band 4. Wiesbaden, 1950. 162). 
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[An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]. The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 
vol. 1. Ed. by J. Bowring. New York (NY), 1962. 143 (note)], decisive, animals' suffering is to be 
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life, however, are of importance. Perhaps some animal rights will eventually be established 
structurally. 
An ever greater number of rights may in this way be laid down, so that the domain of 
subjects of law gradually expands from white men to human beings to sentient beings. It 
cannot be inferred from this that universal principles would function as a driving force as it 
is unclear how the process in which an increasing number of rights are acknowledged 
develops and why. If the way in which an insight into this process is possible is not clear, 
only the actual development can be observed. 
The same consideration as the one mentioned in section 1 is relevant here. It was 
argued there that the absence of natural law in the narrow sense cannot be demonstrated, 
which did not prove to be a decisive objection. The present section adds that it can't be 
proved that universal principles exist. Of course, this is not the challenge; on the contrary, it 
is up to those who maintain natural law in the narrow sense to demonstrate to what extent 
these would exist. Accordingly, the issue revolves around the question whether it is more 
credible for such principles to serve as a basis in establishing human rights, or whether 
these should rather be considered to be generalizations made in hindsight; a top-down-
versus a bottom-up-approach. 1 have indicated above that the second approach seems to me 
to be the more persuasive. 
What does this entail for the matter whether international principles are decisive for 
law? Rules at the international level are no indication for the existence of natural law in the 
narrow sense. In international relations, one does not suppose that certain principles of 
natural law in the narrow sense should be transposed into positive law. If this plays any 
role, it merely points to a possible justification of natural law in the narrow sense, but if it 
doesn / play any role, the debate is concluded even sooner. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have outlined a number of aspects of the domain referred to as "international 
law" and on that basis problematized the idea that "international law" exists. In the first 
section, it was indicated which are the minimal conditions for a system of law to be 
considered as such. I pointed out the characteristics that can be found in any system of law. 
Especially the fact that none of the subjects of law is able to ignore the rules is important. 
In section 2 this was elaborated upon; it was also described what this means at the 
international level. It turned out that hard questions issue from the fact that a great number 
of rules can't be enforced at that level. If a state can simply ignore certain rules, it is difficult 
to maintain that there is law, particularly if this situation is compared with the one at the 
national level, where a relatively clear process of law can be discerned. 
Human rights, finally, which were discussed in section 3, exhibit international patterns. 
It doesn't follow from this, however, that international principles are concerned. It is more 
credible to argue that one is motivated by one's own needs; people appear to want to 
optimize their position and can only realize this (seemingly) credibly by respecting the 
rights they want to have bestowed upon themselves of others as well. 
This article's purport is primarily academic: problems at the international level are 
often-pragmatically-resolved by means to which many parties can assent. That this is 
nevertheless not a merely theoretical issue is clear from the fact that those solutions are 
invariably of a political nature. If a relatively powerful state acknowledges the authority of 
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the International Court of Justice, e.g. it does so because this renders more favourable 
results (economically or politically) than the alternative of not acknowledging its authority. 
In order to resolve this state of affairs, conglomerates were formed, such as Europe, 
but this doesn't produce a consistent solution and leads to ad /loc-approaches. This 
situation-international politics are decisive instead of alleged 'international law'-will 
remain until a supranational system of law emerges modeled after those in developed 
countries. Whether this will in fact appear is difficult to predict. 
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Abstrac t . Trafficking in humans has been described as the third most lucrative criminal enterprise in the world after 
trade in illict arms and drugs with an estimated profits between US $7-10 billion annually. The main aim of this 
paper is to discuss how Nigerian women and children are tafficked to Italy for prostitution with the impression that 
they will make a living through effortless earnings in Europe. Though no society is immune from trafficking but 
studies have shown that most Nigerian women and children who are trafficked to Italy for the purpose of prostitution 
is as a result of their gullibility to make easy life in Europe and they end up being trapped in a trafficking ring of 
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Trafficking of Nigeria Women and Children" by taking into consideration the factors responsible for the trafficking 
and the legal approaches adopted by the government of Nigeria to address the problem over the years. 
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Introduction 
Trafficking in Nigerian Women and Children started in the mid-1980s expanding into a 
multi-billion industry in the early 1990s with new trafficking crime gang joining the 
network, which has made prostitution deeply embedded in everyday life of some states in 
the country due to the huge and easy money being derived from the industry.1 Nigeria is a 
country of origin, transit and destination. As a country of origin, Nigerian women and 
children are trafficked to Europe, Middle East, North African and West and Central African 
countries, too. It is a transit country for West African women and children to Central African 
Countries, Europe particularly Italy and United Kingdom which are the most common 
destination of Nigerian women and children. Furthermore, internal trafficking takes place in 
Nigeria. Nigeria has been reported by the United Nations (UN) to be one of the top 10 
countries of origin for trafficking in the world.2 Though for the pupose of this research 
Nigeria will be considered as a country of origin and Italy as the destination. 
1. Definition of Trafficking in Persons 
The Nigerian Trafficking in Person (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 
2003 defines trafficking as including "all acts and attempted acts involved in the recruitment, 
transportation within or across Nigerian borders, purchase, sale, transfer, receipt, or 
Ph.D., Lecturer, Department of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, Lead City University, 
Lagos-Ibadan Expressway Toll Gate Area, P.O. Box 30678 Secretariat, Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria. 
E-mail: ogwezzym@yahoo.com 
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 Uzoma, K.: Hand-Out on the Smuggling in Nigerian Women and Girls (Kenny Uzoma, Social 
Communication Expert). Available online http://www.update.dk/cfjeWidBase.nsf/ID/VB01731407 
visited on 16 February, 2012, 1. 
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 "UN Maps Human Trafficking", Associated Press, 14 October, 2011. 
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harboring of a person involving the use of deception, coercion, or debt bondage for the 
purpose of placing or holding the person, whether for or not in involuntary servitude 
(domestic, sexual, or reproductive) in forced or bonded labour, or in slavery-like 
conditions."3 The Palermo Protocol defined "trafficking in persons" to mean "the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat 
or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse 
of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs".4 This is the first 
internationally agreed upon definition of human trafficking. 
2. Trafficking of Women and Children Within Nigeria Boarders 
Nigerian children are trafficked internally from areas such as the states of Akwa Ibom, 
Cross River, Ebonyi, Imo, and Kwara to big cities such as Abuja, Lagos, Kano, and Kaduna, 
where their labour is exploited. Children from Ekori and Nko in Cross River state in 
southern Nigeria are trafficked to the western states of Ondo and Ogun. According to Police 
report, in 2001, about 50,000 Nigerian girls engaging in the sex trade have been stranded in 
the streets of Europe and Asia, most of who come from Nigeria's southern states of Edo, 
Delta and Lagos. This excludes thousands of those girls scattered across the world neither 
do they include the dead or those wasted by diseases such as HIV/AIDS.5 
The Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) discovered new trafficking routes in the 
northwest region of the country. Traffickers and smugglers have changed their route from 
the traditional Lagos-Ogun axis to the northern fringes of the country in order to reach 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Niger en route to Italy, Spain, and other European countries.6 
In March 2002 at a seminar organized in Lagos by the International Federation of 
Women Lawyers (FIDA), WOTCLEF reported that there are about 20,000 Nigerian women 
involved in the sex industry in Italy. Again the Daily Champion of 12 July, 2002 reported 
that 80% of foreign prostitutes in Italy were Nigerian women.7 
3
 Trafficking in Person (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003, Section 50. 
4
 United Nations: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational and Organized 
Crime. Palermo-Italy. UN/General Assembly [UN. Doc. A/55/383 (2000) Annex II]. Eleventh Session, 
adopted by Resolution 55/25, 12-15 December, 2000. Article 3(a) 
5
 "40 Nigerian Girls Deported from Guinea", Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, China. August 19, 
2001. 
6
 "Nigeria Intensifies Crackdown on Human Trafficking", Xinhua General News Service, 
Beijing, China. 23 March, 2003. 
7
 Osita, A.: Corruption and Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Case. West African Review, 4 
(2003) 1, 7. Available online at http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/agbu_2003 corruption and t. 
pdf Visited on 18 February 2012. See also Oyagbola, H.: Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Woman 
an Endangered Species. Available online at http://beliefassembly.com/papers2005/oyagbola_eng. 
htm Visited on 18 February 2012, 4. 
1 4 8 MICHAEL С. OGWEZZY 
3. A Panoramic View of Trafficking in Nigerian Women 
and Girls to Italy for Prostitution 
The trafficking of Nigerian women and young girls into Italy for prostitution began in the 
second half of the 1980s following the increasing economic problems caused by structural 
adjustment programmes (SAP) imposed at the time by the Nigerian government on orders 
of the International Monetary Fund.8 Women and girls started leaving Nigeria for Europe 
on promises of fantastic well-paying jobs to be obtained in factories, offices, and farms. 
They arrived in Italy only to find them lured into prostitution and sold into sexual slavery to 
pay off debts, which they were told they incurred in being "helped" to come to Europe. 
A number of those who came to Italy during the 1980s ended up as madams who later 
perpetuated the sex trade by becoming exploiters of their countrywomen. 
Beginning from 1995 and 1996, many women and girls trafficked to Italy were often 
aware that they were unlikely to work in a regular job and might be involved in the sex 
industry. However, most of these Nigerian women had no idea what prostitution really 
meant because the majority of them had never been in prostitution in Nigeria. Most of them 
had no understanding of the conditions under which they would have to work, nor the 
violence that prostitution entails. However, because many of the women knew that they 
might have to engage in prostitution, traffickers claim that they were approached by their 
victims, therefore they did not force or coerce the women into prostitution.9 
Most victims are induced to travel abroad by the promise of high effortless earnings in 
a short time period. Most Nigerian victims of trafficking are illiterate and have never had 
any experience of urban life before they find themselves in the enormous city centres of 
Turin, Milan, and Rome. When they arrive at their destinations, they are told what they are 
expected to do and how much money they must pay to regain their freedom. Only then do 
they realize they are in some form of bondage to their traffickers when it is usually too late 
and almost impossible to refuse or run away. They find themselves having to cope with a 
new situation, country, language, and social context without any friendly or family support 
network. They are subjected to violence, exploitation, and an existence that they never 
imagined. Nigerian women and girls are made to believe that they have been sponsored to 
come to Italy to work. They are told that the "madam" who paid for the trip is in Nigeria, 
whereas the person they are to stay with in Italy is an acquaintance of the madam who is 
giving them hospitality. The reality is that the "madam" in Nigeria and the hostess in Italy 
are accomplices in trafficking and prostitution. Most "madams" are women once enslaved 
as victims of trafficking who, when they succeed in paying their debt, continue in 
prostitution and earn enough to buy a girl who becomes their slave. The girl or young 
woman is obliged to prostitute and pay the "madam" a fixed amount of money exactly as 
the "madams" themselves were made to do. However, the Nigerian victims believe that 
their exploiters are extending a helping hand to take them out of the misery in which they 
had been living. Only when they are subjected to violence and degrading acts, stripped of 
their clothing, money, and dignity, and made to endure physical hardship and beatings do 
they realize that the deprivation they had lived with in Nigeria was better than the violence, 
humiliation, and misery they are subjected to on a daily basis in Italy. 
8
 Aghatise, E.: Trafficking for Prostitution in Italy: Possible Effects of Government Proposals 
for Legitimization of Brothels. VIOLENCE AGAINST IFOAffiV/October 2004, 1129, Available online 
at www.prostitutionresearch.com/pdl7AghatiseVAW.pdf visited on 16 February 2012. 
9
 Ibid. 1129. 
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4. Modus Operendi of the Traffickers 
4.1. Oath Taking and Jnju Rites as a Tool to obtain Psychological Submission, 
to the Traffickers 
The traffickers, usually men who transport women and girls on commission for the 
"madams", or who traffic their own set of women and girls, sell them to the highest bidder. 
When the girls and women are sold, they are made to undergo specific magic juju rites, 
during which they swear never to reveal the identity of their traffickers and madams to the 
police and to pay their debts without creating problems. Juju practices are black magic rites 
in which intimate clothing, body tissue, fragments, or fluids of the women (e.g. pubic or 
head hair, finger nails, or menstrual blood) are taken and placed before traditional shrines. 
Sometimes, prostitution is induced by magic rites and potions in which women and girls are 
forced to drink the water used to wash a dead person's body as part of the ritual. The young 
women are made to swear an oath not to disclose the origin of their trip abroad, pay their 
debts (usually not stated at the moment of stipulating the blood contract), and never to 
report to the police. These rites have great significance for the victims because they strongly 
believe that harm would come after them or their families if they do not repay their debts. 
The Italian police have noted that Nigerian women and girls require much less physical 
control from their exploiters compared with other foreign women and girls trafficked into 
prostitution because the rites they are made to undergo impose psychological control on 
them.10 
4.2. Debt Pondage by Traffickers as a Tool for Continued Exploitation of Victims 
The debts, imposed by the traffickers when victims arrive in Italy, are large amounts that 
range from about €31,000 to €62,000. In recent times, these sums have doubled. Trafficked 
victims are now required, in most cases, to pay between €62,000 and €124,000 to obtain 
their freedom. The debts have to be paid in a matter of a few months, at the risk of violence 
being used against them or their families in Nigeria. It should be noted that men who buy 
women for sex pay an average of €10.00 to €15.00 per session and at times, as little as 
€5.00 Moreover, victims are also required to make an advance payment each month of 
minimally €516.00 to rent the roadside spot where they work. Victims must also pay a 
weekly sum of €36.00 for food, purchase expensive provocative clothing for prostituting 
that is usually sold to them by the madam or by her friends, and buy regular and expensive 
gifts for their madams each month." Another source stated that the madam handles the girls 
and keeps them in almost slavelike conditions. They are held until they can pay off their 
debt of €40,000 to €50,000 plus costs for their room and board and any other fees the 
traffickers tack onto the debt. Girls are usually housed under direct control of the "mama", 
who keeps in touch with the criminal organizations and passes on a percentage of the 
earnings to those organizations. Girls brought into the sex industry often earn up to €3,000 
(Euros) a month for their bosses in Italy.12 
10
 Ibid. 1130-1131. See also Aghatise, E.: Research and Case Studies on the International 
Trafficking of Nigerian Women and Girls for Prostitution in Italy (La prostituzione Nigeriana in 
Italia). Unpublished Report, Turin, Italy, 2001, 43. 
11
 Ibid. 1131. 
12
 "Nigeria: Agreement Signed with Italy to Combat Human Trafficking", Africa News, Nairobi, 
Kenya, 13 November 2003. 
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5. Factors Contributing to the Growth of Trafficking in Nigeria 
The factors responsible for the growth of trafficking in women and children in Nigeria are 
economic, social, cultural, gender discrimination and marginalization, corruption and 
organized criminal networks. 
(a) Economic Factors: Causes of trafficking in Nigeria include economic hardship, a 
weakening of family networks, low levels of education, few employment opportunities, a 
strong desire to emigrate in search of economic and social betterment, a high demand for 
trafficked persons in Europe, involvement of international organized criminal groups, 
limited border control, and poor reporting and monitoring of trafficking cases by law 
enforcement.13 According to Uzoma, "a young woman prostituting in Europe can earn in 
few months with less efforts what she would make in twelve years working in a farm, 
private or public entities in Nigeria".14 
(b) Social Factors: Due to the high cost of education since the mid-1980s occassioned 
by the Nigeria's adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) it became 
increasingly difficult for poor families to sponsor their children especially in tertiary 
institution.15 Thus, there is a strong correlation between the trafficking of women and girls 
for prostitution and low levels of education, inadequate training and educational 
opportunities. For instance, in Nigeria a considerable number of trafficked victims for 
prostitution have only completed primary school or have dropped out of secondary school. 
In addition to having low-level qualifications, they do not have access to vocational training. 
Hence they cannot be absorbed by the formal economy because of the economic down turn 
in this country and their educational limitations. Most of them do not have access to capital 
and so they become easy prey to traffickers who entice them with the possibility of a better 
life.16 
Given the patriarchal nature of the Nigerian Society, girls normally become victims as 
they drop out of school because their families can no longer afford to pay their fees. Many 
of these girls that drop out of school are trafficked to destination countries for prostitution. 
(c) Cultural Factors: The magnitude of the problem of child trafficking and labour 
exploitation in a given geographic area also depends on family and community hierarchies 
and cultural traditions and values that encourage gender discrimination17 and a disregard for 
children's rights. The demand for particular types of children which is also often related to 
cultural, ethnic, and/or socio-economic status find expression in trafficking. Children 
belonging to marginalized ethnic groups, subservient castes or dysfunctional families (war 
or disaster affected, for example) are often target for trafficking. Again many cultures have 
a long tradition of children labouring to help their families at home or in the fields. This 
traditional attitude that children should work, to help their families sometimes result in the 
inadvertent placement of a child in a situation of exploitative labour from which it is then 
very difficult to escape. 
13
 Ume-Ezeoke, J.: Desk Review for the Programme of Action against Trafficking in Minors 
and Young Women from Nigerian to Italy for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation. Rome, United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, February 2003, 24. 
14
 Uzoma, op. cit. 1. 
15
 Ibid. 1. 
16
 ILO: Combating the Child Trafficking: At the Heart of the ILO Values. Geneva, 2002, 26. 
17
 Section 42(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic ofNigerian 1999. 
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In many African countries like Nigeria, for instance, sending children to work in 
faraway places is seen as socially acceptable and often occurs in the context of family 
dysfunction related to large family size or an inability to care for a child (or children) because 
of a death in the family, displacement, severe economic stress or other factors. Associated 
with this wide acceptance of children leaving home for work, is the admissibility of payments 
to families, intermediaries, agents and other middlemen who can "make a cut". This practice 
underlies the widespread interchange of children among African countries, with the result 
that they easily disappear from parental or other view and are more easily exploitable.18 
Polygamy is still being practiced in most parts of the country, furthermore, given the 
patriarchal nature of the Nigerian ethnic groups, boys are valued more than girls and this 
leads to girls who believe that they have nothing to offer but to sell their bodies so they 
easily become victims of trafficking. When the head of a household dies the inheritance 
passes to the male child, who should support the females but often does not do so.19 
(d) Marginalisation and Discrimination on the Basis of Gender: Gender is an issue in 
trafficking on both the supply and demand sides of the equation. Girls are often seen as 
expendable, and laws and law enforcement not to mention some cultural and traditional 
contexts provide them unequal protection. Girls in many societies are expected to sacrifice 
their education and security and take on responsibilities towards parents and siblings. It is 
also recognized that one day they would marry and leave, bringing little or no money to the 
parental home. In such situations, girls are seen as a relatively "poor investment", and 
sending them away to work may seem a viable option. The placement of girls in domestic 
service is often linked to perceptions that domestic service is a good preparation for 
marriage, and that girls' families might raise their dowries by putting them to work. General 
ignorance of the exploitative nature of much of the work is common since many families 
are illiterate and exposed only to hearsay evidence from recruiters or returnees.20 
(e) Corruption: Nigeria, has witnessed the development of a vast system of 
institutionalized political corruption sometimes emanating from the very top and pervading 
all governmental institutions with perverse influence on the rest of society. Systemic 
corruption, sometimes also referred to as entrenched corruption, occurs where bribery, on a 
large or small scale is routine. However, it is in terms of the effects of corruption on a 
society that a clearer link is established between corruption and human trafficking.21 Thus 
corruption and bad governance, severely restricted economic growth and development, 
thereby creating a supply of needy women and children vulnerable to traffickers.22 Again, 
corruption among officers at European and other African consulates is said to facilitate 
obtaining transit visas for trafficking victims. Visas are often obtained through brokers, who 
are Nigerian citizens with "good" connections in diplomatic missions.23 
18
 ILO, op. cit. 27. 
19
 Uzoma, op. cit. 1. 
20
 ILO, op. cit., 28. 
21
 Osita: op. cit. 4-5. See also Osita, A.: Re-visiting Corruption and Human Trafficking in 
Nigeria: Any Progress? Available online at www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/vf/.../OsitaAgbul.pdf 
visited 17 February, 2012, 3. 
22
 Ayua, I. (ed.): Proceedings of the National Conference on the Problems of Corruption in 
Nigeria. 26-29 March 2001, Abuja. 15. 
23
 di Cartemiglia, L.: Programme of Actions against Trafficking in Minors and Young Women 
from Nigeria into Italy for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation. Desk Review, United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Institute, Rome, January 2003, 5. 
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( f ) Organised Criminal Network: Organized criminal networks from Nigeria manage 
trafficking rings throughout Africa.24 Nigerian criminals maintain a strong presence in Italy, 
especially in Turin. They are involved in the commercial sex industry, clandestine 
immigration, counterfeiting of documents and money, illegal currency export transactions, 
and trafficking of drugs and persons. The absence of clashes between Nigerian and Italian 
criminal groups indicates the existence of complicity. For example, there is evidence that an 
Italian criminal group will rent out prostitution areas to a Nigerian group. 
Most Nigerian trafficked victims for sexual exploitation come primarily from the 
southern part of the country and belong to the Bini, Edo, Igbo, and Yoruba tribes. They are 
usually between 17 and 30 years of age, although they are getting younger, and the number 
of trafficked minors appears to be increasing.25 
6. Psychological Consequences of Being Trafficked 
Victims suffer many psychological consequences from being trafficked and prostituted. 
Many of them end up having serious psychological problems as a consequence of the magic 
juju rites and the mental and physical violence to which they are subjected. Because they 
believe that they are being helped by those who traffic them, the realization that their 
helpers are exploiting them in vicious ways is often the cause of great psychological 
suffering. Exploiters use various and cruel forms of violence: verbal and physical abuse; 
rape; burning women and girls with hot irons if they refuse to prostitute; making them 
continue prostituting on the road even when they are ill, menstruating, or pregnant; forcing 
them to undergo abortions without anaesthetics; forcing them to risk their lives by having 
unprotected intercourse; taking away their children as leverage to make them submissive; 
and attacking their families in Nigeria as a way of pressuring them to continue prostituting. 
As part of the psychological pressure, victims are told lies, such as stories of how the Italian 
police shoot at girls without residence permits. The list of humiliations and violence is 
endless. 
Records have shown that there are about 19,000 to 25,000 foreign prostitutes in Italy 
and approximately 2000 of them have been trafficked.26 Rome is the concentrated region 
for trafficked Nigerian women brought for the purpose of prostituion.27 Between 25 October 
and 12 November, 1999, eighty-four young Nigerian girls were deported from Italy to 
Nigeria. Seventy-one were from Edo State, nine from Delta, two from Ondo State and one 
from Enugu and Imo States each. Between December 3rd and 8th another eighty-seven 
predominantly female deportees arrived Nigeria from Italy. In all, well over 180 Nigerian 
girls aged between 16 and 25 years have been deported from Italy within a period of three 
months (October to December 1999) and 90 percent of them are from Edo State Nigera. 
This deportation has been a source of embarrasment to both the Federal and Edo, State 
24
 "Sex-Slave Trade in Kids' Thriving", South African Press Association, 5 September 2000. 
See also Southern Africa: Organized Gangs Lead Wave of Child Sex Trafficking. United Nations 
Integrated Regional Information Network, Nairobi, Kenya, 22 November, 2000. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 International Organization for Migration (IOM) Migrant Information Programme: Trafficking 
in Women for sexual exploitation in Italy. Rome, June, 1996. 
27
 European Race Audit Bulletin, No. 25, London, 25 November 1997. 
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governments.28 It should be noted that deportation of Nigerian women and girls who are 
trafficked for the purpose of prostitution to Europe is a regular phenomenon though Italy is 
a destination country for almost 90 percent of them and that is why records deportations 
there are more accessible as there make news in Nigeria. A Rome study stated that nine 
million Italian men regularly use prostitues.29 But as clients get tired of the same woman, 
gangs often trade slaves to neighbouring countries at knockdown prices. In extreme cases 
slaves are murdered, especially if gangs suspect that a woman is going to escape. In the 
early 1990s the number of foreign women murdered in Italy mainly, Albanian and Nigerians 
accounted for six percent of all murders. By the year 2000 till recent, the figure have risen 
to twenty-three percent.30 
7. Legal Efforts at Curbing Trafficking in Nigerian Women and Children 
Nigeran governments have made positive legal efforts to curb trafficking in women and 
children especially through legislation and prosecution and conviction of traffickers. These 
legislation are as follows: Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and 
Administration Act 2003; Criminal Code as Amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) 
Law 2000; Penal Code; the Immigration Act, the Nigerian Labour Act, Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 
7.1. Trafficking in Person (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003 
In 2003, Nigeria passed the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and 
Administration Act. Section 1(1) of the Act established the National Agency for Prohibition 
of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters.31 
The National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) was 
established by an Act in 2003, (amended in 2005), partly in fulfillment of Nigeria's 
international obligations under the Trafficking in Persons Protocol Supplementing the 
United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention, to address the scourge of 
trafficking in persons and its attendant human rights abuses. The functions of NAPTIP 
include (a) the coordination of all laws on trafficking in persons, (b) the adoption of 
measures to increase the effectiveness of eradication of trafficking in persons, (c) the 
enhancement of the effectiveness of law enforcement agents to suppress trafficking, (d) the 
strengthening and enhancement of effective legal means for international cooperation in 
criminal matters for suppressing the international activities of traffic in persons, and (e) 
counseling and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking, etc.32 
The Act provides that "anyone who exports from Nigeria or imports into Nigeria a 
person less than 18 years of age", "with intent that such person, or knowing it to be likely 
28
 Bolaji, T.: "Afro-Nets", Guardian on Saturday, 18 December 1999, 14-15. 
29
 Simon, M.: "Perspective-Slavery in Our Times", Australia Vews-Future-Survivors of the Sale 
Yard. 4 June 2001. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Trafficking in Person (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003, Section 
1(1). 
32
 United Nations General Assembly: National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 
15 (a) of the annex to human rights council resolution 5/1 Nigeria. Human Rights Council Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review, fourth session, Geneva, 2-13 February 2009, 9. 
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that such person, will be forced or seduced to prostitution" is subject to punishment of 
imprisonment for life.33 Section 12, provides that "inducing a person less than 18 years of 
age by means of deception, coercion, or debt bondage into prostitution is punishable by 
imprisonment for 10 years. The same punishment applies to leading away such a person, 
even with the person's consent",34 and Section 13(1) states that "anyone who, having the 
custody of a person less than 18 years of age, causes or encourages prostitution of such a 
person, commits a crime punishable by imprisonment for 10 years."35 
The Act also states that, "procuring a person less than 18 years of age to have unlawful 
carnal knowledge with other person or persons in or outside Nigeria is an offence punishable 
by imprisonment for 10 years". The same punishment applies to anyone who procures such 
a person to become a prostitute in or outside Nigeria, to leave Nigeria to become a prostitute, 
and to leave such a person's place of abode with the intent to engage in prostitution.36 
The Act punishes procuring, using, or offering a person for the production of 
pornography or pornographic performance by imprisonment for 14 years. The same 
punishment applies to anyone who "traffics in persons for the purpose of forced or 
compulsory recruitment use in armed conflict."37 
The Act criminalises sex tourism by providing for a punishment of imprisonment for 
10 years for "any person who organizes or promotes foreign travel which promotes 
prostitution of any person or encourages such activity."38 
Under the Act, "the detaining of a person less than 18 years of age for the purposes of 
being unlawfully carnally known by any man is punishable by imprisonment for 10 years".39 
Section 18 provides punishment that; "procuring a person less than 18 years of age by 
threats, intimidation, or false pretenses to have carnal connection in or outside Nigeria is 
punishable by imprisonment for 14 years or a fine". The same punishment applies to anyone 
who administers any drug to stupefy or overpower such a person to enable any man to 
"have a carnal knowledge of such a person"40 while section 19(a) and (e), provides that, 
"anyone who unlawfully takes or entices a person less than 18 years of age out of the 
custody of the lawful guardian, unlawfully conveys such a person outside Nigeria,41 forcibly 
or fraudulently takes away or detains such a person, or receives or harbours a child knowing 
that a child has been detained or taken away42 is subject to punishment of imprisonment for 
14 years".43 
33
 Section 11. 
34
 Section 12. 
35
 Section 13(1). 
36
 Section 14. 
37
 Section 15. 
38
 Section 16. 
39
 Section 17(2). 
40
 Section 18. 
41
 Section 19(l)(a). 
42
 Section 19(l)(e). According to Section 19(2), a person is deemed to detain any person under 
section 19(l)(e) when "the person is in or brought upon any such premises with a view to such person 
being so carnally known, or to detain such person in such premises with intent to compel or induce 
such person to remain in or upon the premises, he withholds from such person any wearing apparels, 
other property belonging to such person, or the person's traveling documents". 
43
 Section 19(1 )(a) and (e). 
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Under the Act; "compelling any person to go from any place by force or by any 
deceitful means is punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or a fine.44 The same 
punishment, without the option of a fine, is applied to anyone who unlawfully takes an 
unmarried person less than 18 years of age out of the custody or protection of parents".45 
The Act states that; punishment or imprisonment for 5 years, a fine, or both can be 
imposed on anyone who "confines or detains another person in any place against his or her 
will or otherwise unlawfully deprives another person of his or her liberty."46 It is an offense 
to buy, sell, hire, let, or otherwise obtain possession or dispose of any person less than 18 
years of age with intent of employing or using such a person for immoral purposes. 
Punishment is imprisonment for 14 years".47 Again, "using a person for forced labour is 
punishable by imprisonment for five years, a fine not exceeding N100,000.00, or both fine 
and imprisonment. The same punishment is imposed on anyone who permits "any place 
outside of Nigeria to be used for forced labour".48 While Section 23 provides that, 
"importing, exporting, removing, buying, selling, disposing, trafficking, or dealing in any 
person as a slave, as well as accepting, receiving, or detaining a person as a slave is 
punishable by imprisonment for life".49 
The Act provides that any person who deals or trades in, purchase sells, transfers or 
takes any person in order that such person should be held or treated as a slave,50 places or 
receives a person in servitude as a debt whether due or owing, or to be incurred or contigent 
whether under the name of a pawn or by whether other name such person may be called or 
known,51 conveys or induces any person to come within the limits of Nigeria in order or so 
that such a person should be held, possessed, dealt with or treated in, purchased, sold or 
transferred as a slave or be placed in servitude as a pledge or security for debt52 and holding 
or possessing a person as a slave,53 are punishable by imprisonment for life.54 In addition, 
imprisonment for life is imposed on anyone who enters into a contract or agreement to 
perform any of those offences.55 
The Act states that, "any person, after serving a sentence outside Nigeria for an offense 
related to trafficking, is liable to be tried in Nigeria for bringing the image of Nigeria into 
disrepute," and if convicted, he "forfeits his assets to the Federal Government in addition to 
serving a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years".56 
Under the Act, any resident of Nigeria who encourages prostitution of a person less 
than 18 years of age,57 keeps a brothel,58 permits a defilement of person less than 18 years 
44
 Section 19(l)(b). 
45
 Section 19(l)(d). 
46
 Section 19(l)(c). 
47
 Section 21. 
48
 Section 22. 
49
 Section 23. 
50
 Section 24(a). 
51
 Section 24(b). 
52
 Section 23(c). 
53
 Section 24(d). 
54
 Section 24. 
55
 Section 24(e). 
56
 Section 25. 
57
 Section 26(1 )(a). 
58
 Section 26(1 )(b). 
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of age on his premises,59 allows such a person to be in a brothel,60 or trades in prostitution61 
and is subject to punishment of imprisonment for ten years62. The same punishment applies 
to any resident of Nigeria who "procures, uses, or offers a person for the production of 
pornography or for pornographic performance."63 An alien who commits any of these 
offences is subject to deportation after serving a term of imprisonment in Nigeria.64 Any 
person who attempts to commit any of the crimes under the act is subject to punishment of 
imprisonment for 12 months or a fine of N50,000.00 or both.65 
The Act provides that, "If a corporate body commits an offence under the Act, the Act 
makes a distinction as to criminal liability".66 First, the Act imposes a punishment of 
imprisonment for 3 years, a fine, or both on a director, manager, secretary, or anyone 
claiming to act in his or her capacity if it is proven that an offence has "been committed on 
the instigation or with the connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part o f ' any 
one of them.67 Secondly, "where a corporate body is convicted of a crime under the Act, the 
corporate body itself is subject to a fine of N2 million naira in addition, the court may issue 
an order to wind up the body and have its assets and properties forfeited to the Victims of 
Trafficking Trust Fund."68 
The Act punishes a commercial carrier69 that knowingly carry a person in violation of 
the Act by imprisonment for 2 years or a fine of N2,000.000.00 instead thereof, in addition 
to any other penalty under any other laws.70 The Act imposes a specific obligation on tour 
operators, travel agents,71 and airline companies72 to combat trafficking in persons. The Act 
provides for forfeiture of a passport to the Federal Government of Nigeria of anybody 
convicted of an offence under the act.73 
The Act provides for criminal immunity for victims of trafficking; it states, "Where the 
circumstances so justify, trafficked persons shall not be detained, imprisoned, or prosecuted 
59
 Section 26(1 )(c). 
60
 Section 26(1 )(d). 
61
 Section 26(1 )(d). 
62
 Section 26(1). 
63
 Section 26(1 )(e). 
64
 Section 26(2). 
65
 Section 27. 
66
 Section 28. 
67
 Section 28(1). 
68
 Section 28(2). 
69
 Section 29. Note that Section 50 defines a commercial carrier as "any person or any public, 
private, or other entity engaged in transporting persons, goods, or mails for remuneration, hire, or any 
other benefit." 
70
 Section 29( 1 ). 
71
 Section 30. 
72
 Trafficking in Person (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003 (Section 
31 ). These obligations are to "promote through every possible means public awareness of the guiding 
principles of this Act in-flight magazines, ticket jackets, internet units and video on long lane flights." 
73
 Section 35. This Article reads, "The passport of any person convicted of an offence involving 
traffic in persons under this Act shall be forfeited to the Federal Government and shall not be returned 
to that person unless or until the President directs otherwise, after the grant of a pardon or on exercise 
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria." 
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for offences relating to being a victim of trafficking, including non-possession of valid 
travel stay or use of false travel or other documents."74 
The Act establishes a trafficking victim's right "to institute civil action against a 
trafficker and any other person, including a public officer, who have exploited or abused 
him".75 Also, a victim of trafficking "is entitled to compensation, restitution, and recovery 
for economic, physical, and psychological damages, to be met from the assets of the 
convicted trafficker".76 
7.2. Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration 
(Amendment) Act, 2005 
This Act is an Amendment of the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (of 
7 December, 2005). It provides sundry amendments to the Trafficking in Persons 
(Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003, No. 14 to expand its scope 
from investigation to prosecution of traffickers, seizure of properties and forfeiture of 
proceeds to the Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund.77 
The Act deals with forfeitures after conviction in certain cases and provides that, "(1) 
A person convicted of an offence under the Act shall forfeit to the Victims of Trafficking 
Trust Fund; (a) all the properties and Assets and properties which may or are the subject of 
an interim order of the court after an attachment by the Agency as specified in Section 40 of 
this Act.78 The Act further addressed the issue of Forfeiture of Property and provides that; 
"All properties of a person convicted of an offence under this Act and shows to be derived 
or acquired from such illegal act which are already the subject of an interim order shall be 
forfeited to the Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund".79 
In dealing with foreign Assets of the traffickers the Act states that; "(1) Where it is 
established that any convicted person has assets or properties in a foreign country, acquired 
as a result of such criminal activity, such assets or property subject to any treaty or 
agreement with such foreign country, shall be forfeited to the Victims of Trafficking Trust 
Fund."80 
74
 Section 37. 
75
 Section 38(a). 
76
 Section 38(b). 
77
 Section 14 of the Act deals with insertion of new Sections and provides that the Principal Act 
is amended- (a) by inserting immediately after the existing Section 34, to be numbered as Sections 35 
to 48. 
78
 Section 35 (1), (2)and(3). 
79
 Section 36. 
80
 Section 37(1) and (2). See Section 39 (a), (b) and (c) for types of forfeitable assets under the 
amended Act viz: "(a) all means of conveyance including vehicles or vessels which are used or are 
intended for use to transport or in any manner, facilitate trafficking or any person", (b) All monies, 
negotiable instruments, securities, (c) all real property, including any right, title, interest (including 
any leasehold interest) in the whole or any piece or parcel of land appurtenances which is used or 
intended to be used under this Act...". 
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7.3. Criminal Code and Penal Code Provisions Prohibiting Trafficking in Persons 
(a) Criminal Code as Amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act 2000 
Several provisions of the "Criminal Code" and the "Penal Code" apply to trafficking, this is 
because Nigeria operates two codes of criminal law.81 Under Section 222 (A) of the 
Criminal Code, anyone who having lawful custody of a girl less than 13 years of age, 
"causes or encourages the seduction, unlawful carnal knowledge or prostitution of, or the 
commission of an indecent assault upon such a girl" is subject to imprisonment for seven 
years or a fine.82 
The Criminal Code prohibits procuration,83 which includes procurement of a girl who 
is less than 18 years of age for the purpose of unlawful carnal knowledge with another 
person.84 It also includes procurement of a woman or girl with the intent that she become a 
common prostitute either in Nigeria or elsewhere,85 that she leaves Nigeria and possibly 
become an inmate of a brothel elsewhere,86 or that she leaves her usual place of abode for 
the purpose of prostitution.87 The punishment is imprisonment for 14 years.88 
The Code provides that "anyone who procures a woman or a girl by threats, 
intimidation, or false pretences is subject to punishment by imprisonment for 2 years. The 
same punishment applies to anyone who with the intent to facilitate unlawful sexual 
relations in or outside of Nigeria, administers stupefying or overpowering drugs on a 
woman or a girl".89 It criminalises trading in prostitution, which includes living on the 
earnings of prostitution, soliciting, or importing for immoral purposes in a public place.90 
The punishment for an offence of living on the earnings from prostitution of others is 
imprisonment for 2 years and a tine.91 
The Criminal Code provides that conspiracy to induce a woman or a girl by fraudulent 
means to have unlawful sexual intercourse is punishable by imprisonment for 3 years.92 
Unlawful deprivation of liberty by confinement or detention is an offence punishable by 
imprisonment for 2 years under Section 365.93 The Code prohibits keeping a brothel94 and 
the unlawful detention of a woman or girl against her will in a brothel.95 It also prohibits a 
person who has the custody or care of a girl who is less than 16 years of age from causing 
or encouraging the seduction or prostitution of that girl. Punishment is imprisonment for 7 
81
 Nigeria has two codes of criminal law. The Criminal Code governs all States in the Southern 
part of Nigeria. The Penal Code governs all the States in the Northern part of Nigeria. The Criminal 
Code was first promulgated as an ordinance on 1 June 1916. 
82
 Criminal Code, Cap. С 38 Vol. 4, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004; Section 
222(a). 
83
 Section 223. 
84
 Criminal Code, Cap. C38 Vol. 4, LFN 2004 (Section 223(1)). 
85
 Section 223(2). 
86
 Section 223(3). 
87
 Section 223(4). 
88
 Section 223(4). 
89
 Section 224. 
90
 Section 225(A). 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Section 227. 
93
 Section 365. 
94
 Section 225(B). 
95
 Section 226. 
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years.96 Similarly, the Code prohibits such a person from allowing a child or young person 
to reside in or frequent a brothel.97 Punishment for the offense is a fine or imprisonment for 
up to one year or both.98 
The Code penalises any person who "sponsors a girl or woman by giving her any 
financial, physical, or material assistance to enable her to travel out of Nigeria for the 
purpose of becoming a prostitute or to carry out any immoral act".99 It also penalises any 
person who "administers any oath on a woman or girl or performs any fetish ritual in order 
to enable her to travel out of Nigeria for the purpose of becoming a prostitute or to have 
unlawful carnal knowledge with any person".100 Punishment for the offense is a fine, 
imprisonment for 10 years, or both.101 Any man who patronises prostitutes is subject to 
punishment by imprisonment for 2 years and a fine.102 The Criminal Code provides that a 
person cannot be convicted of any of the procuration offenses on the uncorroborated 
testimony of one witness.103 It also prohibits slave trading. The punishment is imprisonment 
for 14 years.104 
(b) Penal Code: Sections 271 and 272 of the Nigerian Penal Code imposes a 
punishment of imprisonment for up to 10 years and a fine for kidnapping105 and abduction106 
of a minor. While Section 277 provides that, any person who induces a girl less than 18 
years of age "to go from any place or to do an act with the intent that such girl would be or 
is likely to be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse" is subject to punishment by 
imprisonment for up to 10 years.107 
The Penal Code imposes a punishment of up to 10 years and a fine on anyone who 
"buys, sells, hires, lets to hire, or otherwise obtains possession" of a person less than 18 years 
of age with the intent of using such a person for "prostitution or other unlawful or immoral 
purposes."108 It also imposes a punishment of imprisonment for up to 14 years and a fine for 
an offense of slave dealing109 and Section 280 of the Code further punishes forced labour with 
a fine and imprisonment for one year.110 The Code provides that, procurement of a woman or 
a girl for immoral purposes is punishable by imprisonment for up to 7 years and a fine.111 
The Penal Code specified the punishment for slave trading and forced labour. While 
the Criminal Code imposes a fine and punishment of one year imprisonment for forced 
96
 Section 222. 
97
 Section 222(B). 
98
 Ibid. 
99
 Criminal Code Act, Cap. C38 Vol. 4, LFN 2004. Section 223(A), as Amended by the 
Criminal Code (Amendment) Act 2000. 
100
 Section 223(A). 
101
 Ibid. 
102
 Section 223(C). 
103
 See Sections 223 and 224 of the Criminal Code. 
104
 Section 369. 
105
 Penal Code (Northern States) Federal Provision Act, Cap. P3, Punishment of Offences 
Committed in Northern States, Vol. 13, LFN 2004. 
106
 Section 272. 
107
 Section 277. 
108
 Section 278. 
109
 Section 279. 
110
 Section 280. 
111
 Section 281. 
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labour, the Nigerian Labour Act provides that such persons shall be guilty of an offence and 
on conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand naira or to imprisonment 
for up to 2 years, or both. The Penal Code did not provide punishment for actions committed 
by associations or companies with respect to forced labour but the Nigerian Labour Act 
provides for a fine of not exceeding two hundred naira or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding six months, or both. While the provisions of the Penal Code are applicable in the 
northern parts of Nigeria, the provisions of the Criminal Code is applicable in the southern 
parts of Nigeria. 
7.4. Immigration Act No. 6 of 1963 (Now Cap. I I , Vol. 7. Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria 2004) 
The Immigration Act112 deems the following persons under Section 18(1) to (3) to be 
"prohibited immigrants" persons who may not be admitted into Nigeria and are subject to 
deportation: any prostitute,"3 any person w h o is or has been a brothel keeper ," 4 a 
householder permitting the defilement of a young girl on his or her premises,"5 a person 
allowing a child less than 13 years of age to be in a brothel ," 6 a person causing or 
encouraging the seduction or prostitution of a girl less than 13 years of age ," 7 a person 
trading in prosti tution,"8 or a procurer."9 
112
 Immigration Act of Nigeria, Law No. 6 of 1 st August, 1963. (Cap. 11, Vol. 7 LFN, 2004). 
113
 Section 18(1 )(g). 
114
 Section 18(l)(h)(i). According to section 18(3)(a), a brothel keeper includes "any person 
who appears, acts, or behaves himself as the owner of or the person having the care, government, or 
management of any premises or room or set of rooms in premises, kept for the purposes of 
prostitution". 
115
 Section 18(l)(h)(ii). According to section 18(3)(b), for such purposes such a householder is 
"any person who, being the owner or occupier of any premises or having or acting or assisting in the 
management or control thereof, inducing or knowingly suffers any girl under the age of 13 years to 
resort to or be in or upon such premises for the purpose of being unlawfully and carnally known by 
any man for any lewd purpose". 
116
 Sectionl 8( 1 )(h)(iii). According to section 18(3)(c), a person allowing another under 13 years 
of age to be in a brothel is "any person having the custody, charge, or care or a child or young person 
who has attained the age of 4 years and is under the age of 13 years, who allows that child or young 
person to reside in or frequent a brothel". 
117
 Penal Code Laws of Northern Nigeria, Cap. P3, Vol. 13, LFN 2004. Section 18(l)(h)(iv). 
According to section 18(3)(d), a person causing or encouraging the seduction or prostitution of a girl 
under 13 years of age is "any person having the custody, charge, or care of a girl under the age of 13 
years who causes or encourages the seduction, unlawful carnal knowledge, or prostitution of or 
commission of an indecent assault upon that girl". 
118
 Section 18(l)(h)(iv). According to section 18(3)(e), a person trading in prostitution is "(i) a 
male person who knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution or who, in any 
public place persistently solicits or importunes for immoral purposes, or (ii) a female who, for the 
purpose of gain, exercises control, direction, or influence over the movements of a prostitute in such a 
manner as to show that such female is aiding, abetting, or compelling her prostitution with any other 
person or generally." Section 18(3)(2) states that prostitution includes "the offering by a female of her 
body commonly for acts of lewdness for payment although there is no act, or offer of an act, of 
ordinary sexual connection". 
119
 Section 18( 1 )(h)(vi). The term procurer refers to the trafficker. As defined in section 18(3) 
(f), it includes any person "who (i) procures or attempts to procure any female under 21 years of age, 
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7.5. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
The Constitution of Nigeria, 1999; provides that "Every individual is entitled to respect for 
the dignity of his person and accordingly: (a) no person shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment; (b) no one shall be held in slavery or servitude"120 and "no 
person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour."121 
7.6. Labour Act 1971 (Now Cap. LI, Vol. 8. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004) 
Forced Labour: Under Section 73(1) of the Labour Act, any person who requires or permits 
any other person to perform forced labour in contravention to the prohibition of forced or 
compulsory labour under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria122 shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction shall be liable to a fine not 
exceeding one thousand naira or to imprisonment for up to 2 years, or both.123 
Young Persons: Section 59(a) of the Labour Act prohibits child labour.124 The Act 
specifies that a child younger than 14 years of age may be employed only on "a daily wage, 
on a day-to-day basis and so long as he returns each night to the place of residence of his 
parents of his legal guardian."125 The Act prohibits employment of a child less than 15 years 
of age in any industrial undertaking: provided that this subsection shall not apply to work 
done by the young person in technical schools or similar institutions, if the work is approved 
or supervised by the Ministry of Education or (a corresponding department of government) 
not being a common prostitute or of knowing immoral character, to have unlawful carnal connection 
either within or without Nigeria with any other person, or (ii) procures or attempts to procure any 
female to become either within or without Nigeria a common prostitute, or (iii) procures or attempts 
to procure any female to leave her usual place of abode (such place not being a brothel), with the 
intent that she may, for the purpose of prostitution, become an inmate of a brothel, either within or 
without Nigeria". 
120
 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Chapter IV, Section 34(1) (a) and (b) 
Cap. C38, Vol. 3, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. 
121
 Chapter IV, Section 34(1 )(c). 
122
 The Constitution referred to under the Labour Act, (Section 31(1) (c) is the defunct 1963 
Republican Constitution which was the Constitution Nigeria was operating at the time of the 
enactment of the Labour Act but the new position now is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999. Chapter IV, Section 34(1 )(c). 
123
 Labour Act of Nigeria (1st August, 1971). (Cap. LI, Vol. 8, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 2004). 
124
 Section 59(a): "No child shall be employed in any capacity except were he his employed by 
a member of his family in light work of an agricultural, horticultural, or domestic character approved 
by the Minister or, (b) be requires in any case to lift, carry or move anything so heavy as to be likely 
to injure his physical development." 
125
 Section 59(3) provided that, save as may be otherwise provided by regulations made under 
Section 65 of this Act, this subsection shall not apply to young persons employed in domestic service. 
Section 65 provides that the Minister may make regulations providing for: (a) the engagement, 
repatriation or supervision of domestic servants; (b) the employment of young women and young 
persons as domestic servants, and (c) the housing accommodation and sanitary arrangements of 
domestic servants; and (d) the conditions of domestic service generally. 
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of a state.126 In addition, no child younger than 16 years of age is allowed to work 
underground,127 or on machine work,128 or on a public holiday.129 
The Labour Act provides that no young person shall be employed in any employment 
which is injurious to his health dangerous or immoral; and where an employer is notified in 
writing by the Minister (either generally or in any particular case) that the kind of work 
upon which a young person is employed is injurious to the young person's health; 
dangerous; immoral or otherwise unsuitable, the employer shall discontinue the employment 
without prejudice to the right of the young person to be paid such wages as he might have 
earned unto the date of discontinuance.130 It further provides that no young person under the 
age of sixteen years shall be required to work for a longer period than four consecutive 
hours or permitted to work for more than eight hours in any one day: provided that they are 
safe as may be otherwise provided by any regulation made under Section 65 of this Act. 
This subsection shall not apply to persons employed in domestic services. 
The Act demands every employer of young persons in an industrial undertaking to 
keep a register of all young persons in his employment with particulars of their ages, the 
date of employment and such other particulars as may be prescribed and shall produce the 
register for inspection when required by an authorised labour officer. 
The Labour Act provides for punishment and states that "any person who employs a 
child in contravention of these provisions, as well as any "owner and manager of any 
undertaking in which a child is employed" and any parent or legal guardian of a child who 
allows the child to be employed in contravention of these provisions, commits an offence 
and is subject to a fine".131 
7.7. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
Nigeria is a signatory to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights132 and the 
African Charter gurantees the same right in Article 5 as follows; "Every individual shall 
have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition 
of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, 
slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited". 
126
 Section 59(2). 
127
 Section 59(5)(a). 
128
 Section 59(5)(b). 
129
 Section 59 (5)(c). 
130
 Section 59(6) Subsection (7) provides that no person shall continue to employ any person 
under the age of sixteen after receiving the notice either orally or in writing from the parent or 
guardian of the young person, that the young person is employed against the wishes of the parent or 
guardian. Section 59(7) provides that this subsection shall not apply to a young person employed 
under a written contract entered into with the approval of an authorised labour officer. 
131
 Section 64. 
132
 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct 21, 1986. (Article 5). 
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8. Recommendations on Curbing the Menace of Trafficking in Nigeria 
1. Nigeria should effectively implement the international legal instruments already ratified 
with the aim of protecting human rights and combating human trafficking, these include the 
following: Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families (1990), the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography (2000) and there should be effectively implement all of 
the ratified international laws and regulations, in particular the Palermo protocol (2000), the 
UNCRC, the ILO Convention No. 182 and the CEDAW, in order to provide an environment 
conducive to the elimination of human trafficking in Nigeria. The focus must be on all 
forms of trafficking including trafficking in children, and not limited to trafficking for 
prostitution and sexual exploitation.133 
2. Implement the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Federal Government 
of Nigeria and transit and destination countries. Continue regional and international 
cooperation between NGOs and government institutions and honour the existing bilateral 
agreements to uphold international human rights. 
3. Adoption and implementation of the Child Rights Act of 2003 in all Nigerian States. 
Revise anti-trafficking measures and laws so as to address all forms of trafficking as well as 
the protection of trafficked persons. Replace anti-migratory policies with policies that 
inform and empower citizens migrate safely.134 
4. There should be security collaborations between Nigeria law enforcement agencies and 
Interpol when dealing with the more complex problems associated with human trafficking 
so that the culprits can be apprehended even if there have absconded from Nigeria. 
5. Nigerian government should carry out more policy-oriented research on the various 
manifestations of human trafficking in Nigeria, in particular on socio-cultural factors 
increasing vulnerability. 
6. There should be developed concerted and clearly articulated strategies to combat human 
trafficking in Nigeria along with a national plan of action and reliable information from 
data base on trafficking with the active collaboration of all strategic stakeholders such as 
the government, NGOs, international agencies, as well as representatives from urban and 
rural communities. 
7. Government has to create anti-trafficking watchdog committees in rural areas across 
Nigeria. Such efforts should require the cooperation of community based organizations 
(CBOs) and law enforcement agents such as the Police and Immigration Departments. 
8. Adequate funds should be given to all anti-trafficking agencies including NAPTIP, the 
Police and Immigration Department to support their actions and improve efficiency, this 
measure would enable NAPTIP to ensure speedy prosecution of trafficking cases. 
9. Government should establish witness protection programmes to encourage and protect 
trafficked persons who act as witnesses. Set up policies to create jobs for young graduates 
and school dropouts in Nigeria. Resource centers should also be created by different states 
in Nigeria for skills acquisition of rescued trafficked persons. Develop facilities and social 
services for the reception, protection and reintegration of trafficked persons to prevent as 
much as possible the re-trafficking of the trafficked persons. 
133
 Olagbegi, B. A. et al.: Human Trafficking in Nigeria: Root Causes and Recommendations. 
UNESCO Policy Paper Poverty Series, No. 14.2 (E) Paris 2006, 56-60. 
134
 Ibid. 
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10. Governments should invest in education and provide alternative economic opportunities 
for children and the youth. This will greatly reduce the number of those that will be 
available for trafficking. A collaborative approach that brings together anti-corruption and 
anti-human trafficking measures should be devised. 
Conclusion 
Nigerian as a nation with over 150 million people, the most populus country in Africa, no 
doubt is a major supply chain for trafficing in women and children for prostitution 
worldwide. It has been discovered that economic, social, cultural, gender discrimination 
and marginal ization, corruption and organized criminal networks are factors promoting 
trafficking of Nigerian Women and Children to Itay for sexual exploitation. This research 
work shows that Nigerian government over time has put a number of legal mechinaries in 
place to curb the menace of trafficking in Nigerian women and children for prostitution 
whether in Nigeria or abroad. This climaxed in 2003, with the enactment by the National 
Assembly of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration 
Act, 2003 and the amendment of 2005. 
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Abstract. The Atlantic civilisation has over the past centuries been composed of two definitely diverging ethoses 
and social philosophical inspirations, differing also by their very foundations. The contrasts are perhaps most 
conspicuous today as to be seen in the difference between approaches to life as a struggle and to law as a game 
within it. No doubt, on the one hand, there prevails the rest of (1 ) a European Christian tradition, characterised by 
communal ethos, with provision of rights as counter-balanced by obligations, in which priority is given to the 
peace of society and a traditional culture of virtues is promoted to both circumvent excesses and acknowledge 
human rights, with a focus on prevention of and remedy to actual harms. It is such an environment within which 
homo ludens as a type of the playful human who is at the same time dutiful and careffee-entirely joy fill-constitutes 
a limiting value. If and insofar as struggle appears at all on the scene, it is mostly recognised as a fight for 
excellence. As a pathologic version, the loneliness of those staying away from participation may lead to psychical 
disorders which require subconscious re-compensation, the symbolic sanctioning of which was once accomplished 
by the psycho-analysis. On the other, there has also evolved (2) an Americanised individualistic atomisation of 
society, expecting order out of chaos, with absolutisation of rights ascribed to individuals, all closed back in 
loneliness. As an outcome, obligations are circumvented by entitlements, and unrestrained struggle becomes a part 
of any normal course of life with the deployment of human rights just to neutralise (if not disintegrate) community-
centred standards. "Life is struggle"-the hero of our brave new world enunciates the words as a commonplace 
with teeth clenched, convinced that life is barely anything but fight against anybody else (as an improved version, 
hailed as civilisatory advancement as re-actualising-under the pretext of maximising the chances of-the ominous 
bellum omnium contra omnes, formulated once in early modern England). Starting from the common deployment 
of some symbolical "cynical acid" in foundation of modern formal law but developing through differentiated ways 
of how to search for reason and systemicity in law, the conceptual and methodical effect of this very division is 
shown in the paper within the perspectives for curing malpractice in law and also in the role of ethics in economy. 
Keywords: modern formal law, Europeanism, Américanisation, malpractice, ethics in economy, tendential unity 
1. The Formalism of Law in Modernity 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the 
classics of the formative years of American legal realism, defined his programmatic stand 
almost one hundred and fifteen years ago as follows: legal notions have to be washed with 
"cynical acid" so that they can serve as genuinely legal concepts, stripped of theological 
and moral (etc.) overtones.1 Because, as he saw it, "[m]oral predilections must not be 
allowed to influence our minds in settling legal distinctions".2 Thus the question arises: is 
someone calling for cynicism inevitably cynical himself? 
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1
 Holmes, O. W.: The Path of the Law [1897]. In Holmes, O. W.: Collected Legal Papers. New 
York, 1920. 167-202 on 174. 
2
 Holmes, O. W.: The Common Law. London-Cambridge, Mass., 1882. 148. 
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We know that such approach was called functionalism at that time. It held as a basic 
tenet that each and every component of the social complex has to serve with full strength in 
its own place, as it is just its specific particularity as distinguished from anything else that 
may have motivated its coming into a separate existence. 
It is the ideal of functionalism in law, which modern formal law was invented and 
developed to institutionalise. Historically, this was the product of the European 
bureaucratism (which gained strength from the early 19th century) that began to assimilate 
the state structure to its organisatory needs with a previously unheard-of efficiency.3 As its 
first step, law was thoroughly formalised to develop its particular homogeneity. In return, 
law became autonomous', with distinguished particularity;4 to function in a specific way. 
This necessitated its own responsibility in overall co-operation, with interactions in any 
direction regarding any complex.5 
Thereby, functionalism is also expressive of an instrumental tendency, which is a 
theoretical conclusion of the fact that, from now on, modern social existence can only be 
explained as the self-realisation of straightforward co-operation of partial totalities, 
relatively separated yet thoroughly connected on the plane of the whole totality. This is 
what George Lukács and his circle once described as the domination of homogeneous 
autonomies developed on the terrain of undivided heterogeneity emerging in everyday 
existence, in which each and every complex (which has separated out from the total 
complex by advancing its particularities) becomes both specified and, operating according 
to its own criteria as one given homogeneity, relatively independent from the total complex 
(while facing the risk of confrontation).6 On the field of macro-sociological theory-building, 
Niklas Luhmann, too, arrived at a similar conclusion one decade later, formulating the 
category of Ausdifferenzierung as a theoretical foundation stone, to indicate separation and 
isolation, in the course of which the specific operation of law would appear with a binary 
code, responding with the exclusive alternative of either "lawful" or "unlawful".7 
All this anticipated the chance of dysfunctionality in actual operation, running against 
the values originally designed to be implemented. For, as has been long known, scholarship 
has considered such occurrences to be mere mistakes, marginal in practice.8 At the same 
3
 Cf., e.g. Gladden, E. N.: A History of Public Administration. I—II. London, 1972. and Finer, 
S. E.: The History of Government. I—III. Oxford, 1997. 
4
 For the qualifying term "distinctively legal", see Selznick, Ph.: The Sociology of Law. In Sills, 
D. L. (ed.): International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York, 1968. 51. 
5
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Moderne Staatlichkeit und modemes formales Recht. Acta Juridica Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungaricae, 26 (1984), 235-241. 
6
 In philosophical elaboration of an initially aesthetical origin, see, by Lukács, G.: Über die 
Besonderheit als Kategorie der Ästhetik. Neuwied am Rhein-Berlin, 1967, Über die Besonderheit als 
Kategorie der Ästhetik [1957]. In Lukács, G.: Probleme der Ästhetik. Neuwied-Berlin, 1969. 537 et 
seq., Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. 1-2. Neuwied am Rhein-Berlin-Spandau, 1963. as well as Zur 
Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins (ed.: Benseier, F.). Darmstadt, 1984-1986. From the circle of 
disciples, see also Heller, A.: Everyday Life. London, 1984. 
7
 From Niklas Luhmann, e.g. Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts. Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und 
Rechtstheorie. Frankfurt am Main, 1981. 
8
 It is by far not a mere chance that Marxism was the first in the modem age to develop a theory 
of alienation, addressing it as a core issue of social scientific thought. Cf., among others, Israel, J.: 
Alienation. From Marx to Modern Sociology: A Macrosociological Analysis. Atlantic Highlands, New 
Jersey, 1979, as well as, by Varga, Cs.: Chose juridique et réification en droit. Archives de Philosophie 
THE LAW'S HOMOGENEITY 1 6 7 
time, however, theoretical description has defined the ontological result by some mutuality 
in operation, forming a "tendential unity", which is a sine qua non of the operability o f -
and, as such, will at any time determine-the total whole. This Lukácsian recognition is also 
expressed by the fact that in his social ontology, language and law are from the outset 
distinguished from the rest of the complexes of social being (taken as the total operation of 
the total complex consisting of partial complexes). Or, language and law are held to be 
mere intermediators that do not operate with their own values, for they exclusively mediate 
among values taken from other (non-mediatory) complexes. By the help of instrumental 
values, they may operate as wedged in the process, at most strengthening the efficiency of 
their mediatory role. Of course, inspired by historical materialism rooted in economic 
determinism, Lukács presumed a component able to play an over-dominant role in the total 
process hie et nunc. But having arrived at social ontology from Bolshevik revolutionism, 
the aged Lukács had already realised that hegemonic determination through any complex 
becoming totally dominant (e.g. the economy in general, or politics in transitory or 
pathological states, in the shadow of which no further partial complex could any longer 
play the proper role to be played) would inevitably harm and distort the whole totality,9 
with lasting effect on most of its occurrences.10 
2. Intertwining: A Case Study 
Let us raise the question: what practices may arise in our day from such and similar 
recognitions? If we consider only the alternatives of medical law, i.e. of making malpractice 
a subject of civil action, one of the three solutions that follow may emerge in principle: no 
responsibility and no justiciability in practice (as was once practised under the aegis of the 
"actually existing system of socialism" in Hungary and the entire region); or responsibility 
made almost absolute (as evolved as a result of the self-assertion of lawyering in the United 
States of America); or personal or institutional responsibility enforceable via specific media 
made up by the medico-legal profession (idealised as a perspective for Hungary after the 
fall of Communism). 
Well, assessing the field from such extreme poles (with some sensitivity to our 
domestic traditions") within such a threefold perspective of past, present, and possible 
du Droit, 25 (1980), 385-411. and »Thing« and Reification in Law. In Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in 
Lukács' World Concept. Budapest, 1985 (1998). Appendix, 160-184. 
9
 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: Towards the Ontological Foundation of Law (Some Theses on the Basis of 
Lukács' Ontology). Rivista Internationale di Filosofia del Diritto, 60 (1983), 127-142 and in: 
Filosofia del Derecho y Problémás de Filosofia Social. X. México, 1984. 203-216 and <http://www. 
bibliojuridica.org/libros/3/1051/20.pdf>, as well as Autonomy and Instrumentality of Law in a 
Superstructural Perspective. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 40 (1999), 213-235. 
10
 Cf., e.g. by Varga, Cs.: Transition to Rule of Law. On the Democratic Transformation in 
Hungary. Budapest, 1995. and <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/24/transition-to-rule-of-
law-on-the-democratic-transformation-in-hungary-1995/> and Transition? To Rule of Law? 
Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice Challenged in Central and Eastern Europe. Pomáz, 2008. 
and <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/varga-transition-to-rule-of-law-%E2%80%93-
constitutionalism-and-transitional-justice-challenged-in-central-and-eastem-europe-2008/>. 
11
 A balanced middle-of-the-road stand is presented by, e.g. Kapocsi, E.: Az orvosi hivatás 
autonómiájának etikai vonatkozásai [Ethical aspects of the autonomy of the medical profession]. Lege 
Artis Medicinae, 10 (2000), 358-364. Cf. also Kövesi, E.: Orvosi etika és gazdaságosság -
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future, we can take the following consequences into account in light of today's procedures 
and of prospects they will become further Americanised:12 (1) the assumption of 
responsibility enforced by lawsuits will be built as an auxiliary cost into the expenses of 
health care, which must result in the overall rise in its budget; (2) the actual accrual of 
health costs will be taken from the proper field of health care, only to be divided among 
suing clients and the lawyerly caste; in response to which (3) on the part of both the health 
supplier and the client, further juridifying mechanisms (mediations and formalisations) 
alien to the original ethos and inherent rationality of health care will be subsequently 
wedged in the previously purely health-centred processes, a condition that may shake its 
very foundations through a parasitical intrusion. With legal safety becoming a consideration 
in focus, new practices (eliminating procedures and risky choices once generally accepted 
in practice) may be introduced. Finally, all this (4) further professionalises the practices of 
the medical profession, cutting up traditional treatment processes into artificially isolated 
partial processes. That is, the medical profession will reduce both frustration and predictable 
damages by deploying additional (cost-increasing) staff with professional "mind-healing" 
(psychological) specialisations in the process (as the paradoxical after-effect of the sheer 
artificiality and exaggerated bureaucratisation that arises from the depersonalisation of the 
entire procedure while in fact worsening the patient's prospects to heal)-while needless to 
say, having no genuinely positive effect as to the overall destination of the whole 
undertaking in question. 
In the final analysis, all this will not in the slightest degree increase the actual (and 
morally reasonable) responsibility to be bome by social healthcare for actions that are 
achievable within the given society's tolerance and funding limits. 
Or, all it equals to saying that this is probably the most costly outcome both financially 
and also regarding its erosive effect on the medical ethos, and will result in an external 
control of health care, alien to it and unduly overcoming it, driven solely by lawyerly 
arrivism and profiteering as guided by professional imperialism. Yet, at the same time this 
proves to be the least effective solution. All that notwithstanding, it still seems to step by 
step subdue the entire medical organisation, whereas this course has by no means been 
necessary. Two decades ago, at the beginning of our transition from communism, its 
feasibility and acceptability was still an open issue in Hungary, at a time when external 
pressure by a professional push-accompanied by an internal agitation to introduce and 
tolerate an American-type lawyerly rule-first became perceptible in the country.13 
összefüggés-e vagy ellentmondás? [Medical ethics and economicalness: are they in correlation or 
contradiction?] Valóság, 39 (1996) 9, 26-29; Dósa, Á.: Felelősség vagy biztosítás? [Liability or 
insurance?] Lege Artis Medicinae, 6 (1996), 262-265 as well as Balázs, P.: Orvosi etika és gazdasági 
realitások [Medical ethics and economic facts]. Valóság, 40 (1997) 4, 16-28. For an international 
background, see also Hennekeuser, H.-H.: Zwischen Ethik und Wirtschaftlichkeitsgebot: Der leitende 
Krankenhausarzt im Spannungsfeld von Patientenbetreuung und Ökonomie. In: Jahrbuch für 
Wissenschaft und Ethik, 3. Berlin-New York, 1998. 141-147. As a Hungarian legal and medical 
specialist's stand, see Dósa, A.: Az orvos kártérítési felelőssége [The doctor's liability for damages]. 
Budapest, 2004. 
12
 Cf. Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 45: »L'américanisation du droit«. Paris, 2001. and 
L'américanisation des droits suisse et continentaux. Zürich, 2006. 
13
 As a member of the Prime Minister's Advisory Board in the administration of József Antall, I 
initiated repeated informal debates about the issue, while our legal experts from academies and 
universities, including American advisors and Hungarian scholars of American studies, all kept quiet 
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With homogeneity heterogenised, external intervention dissipates the well-balanced 
configuration and very substance of the structure and systemically self-reproducing 
framework of the profession it touches upon. 
3. Diversity of Approaches 
Considering all this both as a danger and warning14-when research is so exhaustive as to 
have a call even to devoting attention to cultural anthropological investigations of tribal 
communities of a few hundred members surviving sporadically15-, we might at last take 
notice of the fact that Atlantic civilisation, so clearly determining our near future, has been 
composed over the past centuries of two definitely diverging ethoses and social philosophical 
inspirations, which differ by their very foundations. The contrasts are perhaps most 
conspicuous today in the difference between the approaches to life as a struggle and to law 
as a game within it. 
No doubt, on the one hand, there prevails a European Christian tradition, characterised 
by a communal ethos, with the provision of rights as counter-balanced by obligations, in 
which priority is given to the peace of society, and a traditional culture of virtues is 
promoted to both circumvent excesses and acknowledge human rights, with a focus on 
prevention and remedy of actual harms. It is in such an environment that homo Indens as a 
type of playful human who is both dutiful and carefree, i.e. entirely joyful, constitutes a 
limiting value.16 If, and in so far as, struggle appears on the scene at all, it is mostly 
recognised as a fight for excellence. As a pathological version, the loneliness of those who 
avoid participation may lead to disorders of the psyche that require subconscious re-
compensation, the symbolic sanctioning of which (typically in the stale and excited Vienna 
of the turn of 19th and 20th centuries and by a psychologist of middle-class women shut 
into self-consuming idleness) Sigmund Freud accomplished. On the other hand, there has 
also evolved an Americanised individualistic atomisation of society, expecting order out of 
about the risks. Examining the spirit of those days with the easy wisdom of hindsight, C. Dupré-
Importing the Law in Post-communist Transitions. The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right 
to Human Dignity. Oxford-Portland Oregon, 2003. 57.-characterised the image of the West formed 
by the domestic Left (having turned to libertinism [next to nihilistic anarchism] after the fall of 
Communism) by concluding that there was "a glorified and idealised vision of the West and of liberal 
law" also referring to the writing of the Lukácsian Budapest-school in-exile-representative, Fehér, F.: 
imagining the West. Thesis Eleven, ( 1995) 42, 52-68, which "did not correspond much to the reality". 
14
 Not by chance, there are intermediary proposals for solution today. Cf. the initiatives by 
Nagy, L.-Kahler, F.: Közvetítő (mediátor) felállításának szükségességéről az állampolgárok és a 
gyógyító intézmények (orvosok) közötti vitás kérdések peren kívüli megoldására [On the necessity of 
involving a mediator for the extra-judicial solution of conflicts between citizens and medical 
institutions], Magyar Jog, 42 (1995), 229-231 and Heuer, О.: Konfliktuskezelés a betegjogi 
sérelmeknél: Az egészségügyi közvetítő eljárásokról [Conflict management in cases of the violation 
of patients' rights: on mediatory processes in health care]. Lege Artis Medicinae, 11 (2000), 80-83 
and <http://www.lam.hu/folyoiratok/lam/0101/ll.htm>. 
15
 See, e.g. as the field work of a tribal legal anthropologist, deceased at an early age, Akalu, A.: 
The Nuer View of Biological Life. Nature and Sexuality in the Experience of the Ethiopian Nuer. 
Stockholm, 1989. 
16
 Huizinga, J.: Homo Indens. A Study of the Play-element in Culture [Proeve eener bepaling 
van het spel-element der cultuur, 1938]. London, 1949. 
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chaos, with absolutisation of rights ascribed to individuals, all closed back in loneliness. As 
an outcome, obligations are circumvented by entitlements, and unrestrained struggle 
becomes a normal course of life with human rights deployed to neutralise and disintegrate 
community-centred standards. "Life is struggle"-the hero of our brave new world enunciates 
it as a commonplace with teeth clenched, convinced that life is hardly anything but a fight 
against anybody else (in an improved version, hailed-under the pretext of maximising 
chances-as civilisatory advancement by re-actualising the ominous bellum omnium contra 
ornnes, formulated by Thomas Hobbes in early modern England). Following such examples, 
feminist self-reliance may stand for a contemporary pathological ideal type, struggling 
herself back into unhappy loneliness by engaging in the fight with her jaw and the further 
abilities she has targeted. 
It is mostly such and similar stimuli that nourish our uneasy experience of the 
globalised present, with ideals of order, standards and cultural patterns that transform status 
struggles (based on gender, colour, etc.) into struggles in law, and which, under the aegis of 
law, support disproportionate financial indemnification for alleged psychological injuries so 
as to gain material fortune, and which thereby replace collective solidarity by individual 
arrivism and disintegrate cohesive forces by growing societal atomisation. 
Is it really such an outcome that we have wanted in our nation building through the 
centuries? Is it really this that is worth searching for now, when we are freed to shape our 
fate, given the chance to change the past regime? 
For want of other points of reference in our spiritually emptying world (almost without 
unconditional respect for, and adherence to, values), let me recall a few lessons taught by 
historical legal anthropology17 and the millennial message of legal philosophy,18 while 
referring uniformly to the significance of the moment of trust in the mechanisms of feedback 
and the necessity of complexity in social existence. Well, both in early Jewish, Islamic 
(etc.) traditions and even nowadays in surviving autochthonous cultures (which lack in 
resources and, therefore, stipulate maximum efficiency as the condition for survival), we 
can observe the compulsion through two sorts of axiomatism with clearly ideological 
operation, which organise human choices into a framework unquestionably ready-made 
from the outset.19 One of these perspectival optima is the idea of proportionality with self-
moderation, based on the priority of public good. This spread first as shalom, or the 
precedence for public peace to protect societal integrity, which, later in Roman development, 
was formulated as the dilemma of formalism expressed by the adage of summum ins. 
17
 Cf., e.g. Varga, Cs.: Anthropological Jurisprudence? Leopold Pospisil and the Comparative 
Study of Legal Cultures. In: Law in East and West. On the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the 
Institute of Comparative Law. Tokyo, 1988. 265-285 and »Law«, or »More or Less Legal«? Acta 
Juridica Hitngarica, 34 (1992), 139-146. As a thoroughly theoretical outline, cf. also Lampe, J.: 
Grenzen des Rechtspositivismus. Eine rechtsanthropologische Untersuchung. Berlin, 1988. 
18
 Cf., as a call to natural law, e.g. Varga, Cs.: Legal Philosophy, Legal Theory-and the Future 
of Theoretical Legal Thought. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 50 (2009), 237-252 and in <http://akademiai. 
om.hu/content/0318830q86810656/fulltext.pdf>. 
19
 Cf., e.g. with some of the papers collected in Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot and New York, 1992, as well as H. Szilágyi, I. (ed.): Jog és antropológia [Law and 
anthropology], Budapest, 2000. 
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summa iniuria,20 which was recognised from the Middle Ages on as the virtue of 
temperantiaP The other is the ideal of natural law. 
As to the latter, it has presumed human responsibility (in forms developed in East-Asia 
and Latin America, as well as in Christianity and Islam) for our environment as inherited 
exclusively for our temporary use, to be handed down to following generations safely in 
toto\ defined (in its Christianised Greek-Roman version) minimum conditions (suitable to a 
formulation in sets of principles, rules, and exceptions from rules) as a comprehensive 
framework for social life in a symbolic expression of the created (or, profanely, the 
somehow organised) order: first, representing the whole cosmos; then, the humanly 
observable world; later on, society; and finally, the individual (with responses echoed by 
both theology and politics, aetiology and cultural anthropology). 
Eventually, in our secularised age, this ideal was first replaced by endowing the ideal 
of natural law, unchanged in principle as transcendent to human existence, with changing 
(i.e. developing) contents [Naturrecht mit wechselndem Inhalte] at the end of the 19th 
century,22 then, by its institutionalisation as "the nature of things themselves" [Natur der 
Sache; nature des choses] by the jurisprudence of continental European countries with 
Latin or German roots after World War II,23 in order to provide guidance for the desirable 
harmony among functions in conflict, as derivable through pondering upon all circumstances 
of the issue in question. 
4. Ideal Models and Mixed Reality 
Returning to the foundations of the philosophy of science, the first and primary task of 
human thinking is to delineate the frameworks, boundaries and limits within which human 
action may have a context, which prompted our ancestors to search for methodological 
ways of thought. In fact, from the age of René Descartes, European civilisation reduced that 
which may be thought of at all to that which can be deduced from some unquestionable 
truths through logical (re)construction. This has led to a kind of naturalism, reminiscent of 
20
 In a fictional elaboration, see, e.g. von Kleist, H.: Michael Kohlhaas. Aus einer alten Chronik 
[1810]. Hollfeld, 1998 and in English translation Gearey, J. (ed.) New York, 1967. For its theoretical 
treatment. Varga, Cs.: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. para. 2.3.1.8. 
21
 At Cicero (Tusculanes. Ill, 16-18), sôphrosunê may be equally realised as temperantia, 
moderatio and modestia, which he sums up as frugalitas. Cf. Labarrière, J.-L.: Sagesse et tempérance. 
In: Canto-Sperber, M. (dir.) Dictionnaire d'éthique et de philosophie morale. Paris, 1996. especially 
at 1325. 
22
 Stammler, R.: Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung. Eine 
sozialphilosophische Untersuchung. Leipzig, 1896, 184-188. 
23
 As first outlines, see, above all, Villey, M.: La nature des choses. In Villey, M.: Seize essais de 
philosophie du droit. Paris, 1969. 38-59; Larenz, K.: Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft. 6. neu 
bearb. Aufl. Berlin, etc., 1991. para. 5.4.b ["Rechtsfortbildung mit Rücksicht auf die »Natur der 
Sache«"], 417. et seq.; and Coing, H.: Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie. 5. Aufl. Berlin-New York, 
1993. para. IV. 1; as well as La »nature des choses« et le droit. Separate issue of Annales de la Faculté 
de Droit de Toulouse, 12 (1964) l;Noguchi, H.: Die Natur der Sache in der juristischen Argumentation. 
In: Yasaki, M. (ed.): Law in East and West. Legal Philosophies in Japan. Stuttgart, 1987. 139-147; 
and Tzitzis, St.: Controverses autour de l'idée de nature des choses et de droit naturel. Rechtstheorie, 
24 (1993), 469^183. 
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naive realism patterned on the wisdom of lex mentis est lex entis,24 presuming parallelism, 
as well as correspondence, between thought and reality. Conversely, in early times, even the 
created nature of the world was conceived of in a geometrical order according to a 
mathematical ideal, inspired by the Biblical exposition "[b]ut you have disposed all things 
by measure and number and weight".25 As a result, human thought was also confined to a 
mathesis universalis, posited as mere conceptual arithmetic within the presumption of an 
all-pervasive natural systemicity that could be notionalised. Through the Enlightenment's 
combatant materialism, modelling cognition upon the pattern of reflection was developed in 
depth, which survived, among other things, as the central epistemo-ontological pre-
supposition of Marxism, summarised and simplified as the notorious Leninist theory of 
reflection.26 Most of the unconditional hegemony of rationalism survived from all of this 
until today, haunting and questioning otherwise normal thought processes all through, up to 
pushing them to their self-dissolving extremities.27 This is the dogma according to which 
only that which is rationally justifiable can become the subject of theoretical reconstruction-
ignoring the brutal fact that, as a side-effect of modern scientific revolution, such a mind-set 
can only contribute to depriving man of his further qualities; for man, with his inborn 
facultas^s, is significantly richer in emotional, intuitive, transcendent (etc.) life than is 
claimed by the idea that reduces his complexity (when assessing his self-positioning in the 
world) to one single, exclusive quality, that of alleged-and necessarily apparent-
rationality.28 
This is the pattern with which the very concept of "social science" complies: in its 
origins, it is a typically American leftist idea (originating from the same source as Marxism, 
namely, the longing for scientific positivism), according to which science regarding society 
can be built on thoroughly factual foundations with empirical methodology, enabling social 
engineers to draw necessary conclusions by measuring given attitudes (etc.) to predict 
future behaviour (etc.). Well, using "sterile morphology" (which flourished from the 
interwar period up to the 1950s, as marked by Talcott Parsons' a-historically universalised 
analytical system of concepts) has today proved to be a dead end,29 re-admitting the old 
24
 Patsch, F.: Dogmatikai kijelentések hermeneutikai fejlődése. (Egy »fundamentál-
hermeneutikai dogmatika« vázlata) [Hermeneutical development of dogmatic statements: outlines of 
a »fundamental-hermeneutical dogmatics«]. In: Rokay, Z. (ed.): Egység a különbözőségben. A 60 éves 
Bolberitz Pál köszöntése [Unity in diversity: Essays in honour of Pál Bolberitz on the occasion of his 
60th birthday]. Budapest, 2002. 117. et seq., especially para. 1. 
25
 The Book of Wisdom. 11:20. In: The New American Bible, see <http://www.vatican.va/ 
archive/ENG0839/ PLS.HTM>. 
26
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Cultivating Scholarship under Communism. (A Case Study on Marxism and 
Law.) Central European Political Science Review, 13 (2011) 44. {Forthcoming}. 
27
 As a distorted outcome in law, cf. Varga, Cs.: Rule of Law? Mania of Law? On the Boundary 
between Rationality and Anarchy in America. In: Nótári, T.-Török, G. (eds): Prudentia Iuris Gentium 
Potestate. Ünnepi tanulmányok Lamm Vanda tiszteletére [Prudentia Iuris Gentium Potestate - Studies 
in Honor of Vanda Latum]. Budapest, 2010. 492-504. 
28
 In overview, cf. Varga, Cs.: Önmagát felemelő ember? Korunk racionalizmusának dilemmái 
[Man elevating himself? Dilemmas of rationalism in our age]. In: Mezey, K. (ed.): Sodródó emberiség. 
Tanulmányok Várkonyi Nándor »Az ötödik ember« című művéről [Mankind adrift: on the work of 
Nándor Várkonyi's »The Fifth Man«]. Budapest, 2000. 61-93. 
29
 Bell, D. In: Bullock, A.-Woodkings, R. B. (eds): The Fontana Dictionary of Modern 
Thinkers. London, 1983. 580. Cf. also Andreski, St.: Social Sciences as Sorcery. London, 1972. 
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ideal of the Humanities, while admitting that when we approach the specifically human, 
something more is at stake than rational codifiability alone. 
Obviously, even more is at stake when we encounter the claim (rejuvenated after the 
failure of the one-time attempt to axiomatise ethics)30 that we should negotiate moral and 
social psychological issues on the pattern of classical analysis taken as conceptual 
mathematics, absolutising a methodology according to which-of course, for the sake and 
within the bounds of the given conceptual system-only that which can be rationally 
concluded and justified is thinkable at all, while forgetting that human reflection is by far 
more complex than that.31 
Therefore, as against a mechanical world-concept symbolised by the ancient 
clockwork's metaphor,32 our existence is nonetheless a total whole throughout: a totality 
resulting from the constant competition of interactions by practically unlimited sets of 
uninterrupted processes, (re)generated in autopoiesis, which inseparably closes its 
ontological and epistemological determinations and partial processes back into its total 
process. If we do not raise the issue as a theologically founded query (or if we reject, in the 
spirit of Occam's classical methodological razor, the teleological moment that could be 
raised from the outset), then it remains an insoluble enigma whether or not that which we 
think of as a limit in terms of values in such processes can at the same time also be regarded 
as objective. Or, formulated as a paradox, is "objectivity" available at all when one insists 
on "pure" scholarship?33 
5. The Ontological Necessity of Heterogeneity in Action 
Returning again to economy, we have to conclude that without a vision of man in his entire 
complexity (including the theological, anthropological, ethical and psychological aspects as 
well), not even economy can be fully explained. Obviously, ethics is also necessary for 
economy as a desideratum in order to construct mentally and posit ontologically it. In other 
words, economic rationality is certainly at its proper place in previous calculation when we 
consider probabilities or take it into account as one of the criteria in managing conflicting 
situations, but it certainly cannot be the exclusive motivation to rely on in the operation of 
the overall complex. Or, ethics is by far not just a corrective, complementary factor in 
economy. This is of a foundational significance, giving it a framework so that the issue of 
economic rationality itself can be raised at all. 
As we have already remarked, in legal regulation the concept of a system (formulated 
by, e.g. Hugo Grotius at the dawn of the modern age), built up exhaustively and seamlessly 
in (natural) law and formed according to the ideal of mos geometricus as broken down into 
individual positivations according to logical necessity, was later replaced by the mere 
definition of basic principles and (somewhat as an added exemplification) their arrangement 
30
 Moore, G. E.: Principia Ethica. Cambridge, 1903. 
31
 Such a methodology can indeed be approved of in fields depending upon positivation that is, 
aimed at some strictly delimited and exclusively theoretical modelling that selects from the whole 
arbitrarily, but according to human purposes. If over-extended or extrapolated, then it also becomes 
problematic on its own terms. 
32
 Cf. Varga: Lectures... [note 17]. 84-85. Note 109. 
33
 See Hermerén, G. (ed.): Proceedings of the Symposium on Scientific Objectivity. Copenhagen: 
Munksgaard 1978. = Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 14 (1977). 
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in rules and exceptions from rules, so that the various situations in life can be judged 
according to principles in a patterned but individualised way, bearing their total complexity 
in mind. Likewise in economy, morality serves as an ethos defining a general direction, 
while in individual situations it helps in balancing conflicts of values by mediating amongst 
diverging interests mutually considered, leading finally to compromise solutions. 
Consequently in economy, at the level of macro-processes, morality is an ontic component 
to serve as a foundation that makes economic rationality reasonable and also socially 
interpretable; while in micro-processes, it has also to be taken cognisance of in the 
background, aware of the fact that it almost never makes recourse directly and one-sidedly 
but through reconciliatory processes, in order to solve conflicts and reach compromises by 
balancing, mediating, and mutual consideration. 
It is exactly such a duality that opens up to both further requirements and additional 
wide-ranging prospects that may prove to be useful in our procedures at any time, for in 
macro-relations (e.g. in patterns proposed by medical law), it is exactly ethical 
considerations that generate the alternative models that we can endow, through strategic 
planning and a series of tactical decisions, with a definite patterning function, standardised 
as comprehensive social policies, after their harmonisation with prevailing economic and 
legal policies is accomplished; while in micro-relations, we have to provide for its 
exemplary operations through education, socialisation, and case analysis, caring for the 
diverse particularity of individual situations with proper empathy, after our ultimate goals 
are also taken into account. 
With this, we have opted for the demand for human entirety, encouraged to avail 
ourselves of the potentialities offered by specialisation and homogenisation in our complex 
age with good conscience, but at all times in such a way as not to miss the ultimate goal, 
the intention-desirably a guide for all our human actions-of effectively implementing 
fundamental values in practice.34 
34
 For earlier attempts at outlining a theoretical framework, see Varga, Cs.: Doctrine and 
Technique in Law. Iustum Aequum Salutare IV (2008), 23-37 and <http://www.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ 
ias/20081 sz/02.pdf> and <www. univie.ac.at/RI/I RI S2004/Arbeitspapierln/Publikationsfreigabe/ 
Csaba_Phil/Csaba_Phil.doc> as well as Varga, Cs.: Buts et moyens en droit. In: Loiodice, A.-Vari, M. 
(eds): Giovanni Paolo II. Le vie délia giustizia: Itinerari per il terzo millennio. (Omaggio dei giuristi 
a Sua Santità ne! XXV anno di pontificate.) Roma, 2003. 71-75 and Goals and Means in Law: or 
Janus-faced Abstract Rights. [Tikslai ir priemonés teisèje.] Jurisprudencija [Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio 
Universitetas] (2005) 68(60), 5-10 and <http://www.mruni.lt/padaliniai/leidyba/jurisprudencija/ 
juris60.pdf>. 
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Why International Oil Companies Choose to Enter 
into Joint Operating Agreement 
Introduction 
This essay brings forth the nature of Joint Operating Agreement's (JOA) and its key 
features. The key features of JOA answer the question so as to why do powerful players as 
international oil companies choose to enter into such agreements. JOA's are used in capital 
intensive resource industries by those companies who want to restrict their exposure, 
particularly in limiting cost or liability. Investmental forethought necessitates a mix of 
participants who contributes towards financing, intelligence, access to market and access to 
project itself. 
The usual form of association establishing the framework within which exploration 
for, and exploitation of, resources takes place is the JOA which is often considered to be a 
form of joint venture. The JOA can be considered the joint venture par excellence as its 
structure is found in most contractual joint ventures.1 
Joint ownership of an oil and gas interest can be created through several factual 
scenarios.2 The most common is when owners of respective oil and gas leases pool their 
interests3 to meet a standard spacing unit that is legislatively prescribed.4 Furthermore, 
another common reason for joint ownership is the economic risk of an unprofitable well.5 
Mineral depletion has required investors to drill deeper than ever before to obtain 
production.6 This type of drilling operation is an expensive undertaking.7 As a result of 
these costs even the largest companies will seek a joint investor to share the risk and cost of 
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1
 Bean, G. M. D.: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures. Oxford, 1995. 3-4. 
2
 Kuntz, E. O. et al.: Oil and Gas Law: Cases and Materials. St. Paul (MN.), 3rd ed., 1999. 622. 
(providing a basic overview of joint ownership and the issues created as a result of multiple 
ownership). 
3
 Lowe, J. S.: Oil and Gas Law. Eagan (MN), 3rd ed., 1995. 437^438. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law... op. cit. 622. 
6
 Hazlett, G. W.: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute, 3 (1957), 277. 
7
 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law... op. cit. 
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drilling.8 These risks are often leveraged by sharing them through joint development 
agreements, the most common being the JOA.9 When investors or operators are considering 
entering into a JOA there are numerous issues to be considered.10 A well designed JOA will 
clearly define each of these issues and will cater to the individual needs of the parties." 
Examples of issues that need to be addressed include: who will act as the operator, what 
acreage will be covered by the agreement, the distribution of production profits, and how 
the costs of exploration will be divided among the parties.12 Failure to properly address any 
of these important issues could mire the parties of the JOA in expensive and lengthy 
litigation.13 One oil and gas author has cautioned drafters by stating that the cost of correctly 
drafting "a thousand different agreements may be nominal in comparison to the cost to their 
client of a major deficiency" leading to litigation.14 
JOAs are commonly created on a standardized form that the parties modify.15 The 
American Association of Petroleum Landmen (A.A.P.L.) first developed a model form 
operating agreement in 1956.16 This standardized form was created in an attempt to give 
basic guidance to the attorneys that are involved in negotiation of the development 
agreements between operators and non-operators.17 Generally, the operator will be 
responsible for the day-to-day production duties and the non-operator will only share in the 
costs and profits from the production.18 The operator traditionally is a sophisticated party 
with extensive experience in the oil and gas industry. Therefore, the JOA will generally 
grant the operator broad rights in production decisions.19 Typically, operators have a large 
financial investment in the development and production process.20 Thus, they will 
commonly make decisions that will benefit both parties.21 It is when the interests of the 
operator and the non-operator diverge that the issue of duty arises between the parties. 
1. Scope of the JOA 
JOA typically involves two or more legal persons combining property and expertise to carry 
out a single business enterprise in which they have a joint proprietary interest a joint right 
to control and share profits and losses.22 Conceptually, a JOA comprises the "constitution" 
8
 Hazlett: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements, op. cit. at 277. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law... op. cit. at 622. 
11
 Hazlett: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements, op. cit. at 279-280. 
12
 Eyring, H. J.: Comment, The Oil and Gas Unit Operator's Duty to Nonoperating Working 
Interest Owners. Brigham Young University Law Review, (1987), 1293, 1294-1297. 
13
 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Wilson, 976 P. 2d 941, 941 (Kan. 1999). When one considers the attorney 
fees and legitimate costs that were expended by all of the parties to this litigation, it readily shows the 
importance of properly drafting a joint operating agreement. 
14
 Hazlett: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements, op. cit. at 279-281. 
15
 Ibid, at 278. 
16
 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law... op. cit. at 623. 
17
 Hazlett: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements, op. cit. at 278-280. 
18
 Eyring: Comment, The Oil and Gas Unit Operator's Duty... op. cit. 1293. 
19
 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law... op. cit. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Maliss v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F 2d 683 (1983). 
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which governs the joint venture, akin to partnership or to the "Memorandum and Article of 
Association" of a company.23 JOA's is typically specific that among the parties the 
relationship is one of tenants in common and not one of partnership.24 JOA is a specified 
project hence it is clearly defined and limited in scope.25 A JOA is often preceded by a joint 
binding agreement or an area of mutual interest agreement (AMI) such agreement seeks to 
facilitate co-operation between oil companies and prevents them from undertaking activities 
with others. The area of mutual interest is often incorporated as a term of JOA.26 Moreover, 
the limited scope of a JOA is vital in setting limits to the co-ventures' potential fiduciary 
duties.27 
2. The parties to a JOA 
JOA can only fully exist when there is a degree of surrendering of control. For that reason 
the choice of co-ventures' is very vital. The free choice of a partner is important because it 
involves the trust and confidence of other parties; this is called delectus personae.2i This 
free choice of associates in JOA is very significant as it involves a longterm relationship 
and enormous amount of financial contributions by each member. Pertinently, JOA's places 
restrictions on the sale of interests in the venture to outsiders. This type of delectus personae 
forms the basis of mutual trust which in turn gives rise to the collaborative fiduciary 
relationship and corresponding fiduciary responsibilities on the co-venture.29 Furthermore, 
this kind of participation in management of the venture brings to light the abilities and 
performance of each co-venturer. Moreover, under JOA it is the percentage of interests 
which determines each party's entitlements to ownership and benefits, liability to cost, 
expenses and risks.30 
3. Property Interest 
Common ownership of assets is a feature of joint venture, it amplifies the sharing of risk, 
makes the relationship more intimate. In an incorporated joint venture, corporation is owned 
by the co-ventures' and they own the assets indirectly whereas in a contractual joint venture 
the assets are owned as tenants in common.31 A co-venturer has different proportional 
interest in the assets and they arrange separate funding of its interest in the JOA, and also 
23
 Taylor, M. P. G.-Winsor, P. P.: The Joint Operating Agreement: Oil and Gas Law. London, 
1989. 
24
 Model Clause 42 (5) Petroleum (Production) (seaward Areas) Regulations 1976 (S.I 
1976/1129). 
25
 Harding Boulton, A.: Finance in the "single venture" Consortium. Journal of Business Law, 
1961,368. 
26
 Great Northern Petroleum and Mines Ltd. v. Merland Explorations Ltd. (1983) 43 AR 128, 
130 (Alta. Sc). 
27
 Bean: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures, op. cit. at 12. 
28
 Shaw, S.: Joint Operating Agreements. In: David, M. R. (ed.): Upstream Oil and Gas 
Agreements. 1996. chapter 2, 16. 
29
 Bean: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures, op. cit. 11. 
30
 Maliss v. Bankers Trust Co. op. cit. 
31
 BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt) (No. 2) (1982) 1WLR 925. 
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give security to its lender over its interest in the assets.32 Pursuant to JOA, co-venturers' 
have interest in the mutual undertakings which form choose in action.33 Under jurisdictions 
where co-venturers' agree not to partition their interest strengthens the ties between the co-
venturers' and the delectus personae.34 A joint venture entails common ownership where in 
the parties contribute to the venture both in terms of services and finances which are used 
for production purposes, which creates mutual reliance and keeps the contribution 
forthcoming.35 
4. The Operator 
The Operator is in regard to other joint ventures than joint operating agreements often 
known as the manager. In a JOA, the parties will appoint an Operator to act on the behalf of 
the joint venture. Efficiency demands that one person conducts the operations rather than 
each exercise its separate rights.36 The Operator plays a key role in taking the work forward 
by proposing budgets and plans and running meetings. Also it acts as the agent of the parties 
in relation to third parties, including government liaison with the consent of the other 
parties.37 As a party to the JOA, the Operator has the liabilities as the other parties; i.e. its 
percentage interest share of joint obligations.38 
5. The Operating Committee 
The committee exercises over all control of, the joint operations in four stages: exploration, 
appraisal, development and production.39 It is composed of co-venturers or their 
representatives.40 Decisions are usually made on the bases of majority votes, the percentage 
is specified in the JOA.41 A co-venturers voting right is in proportion to its interest. The 
Authorization for Expenditure (AFE) is granted by the committee. The collaborative 
fiduciary relationship levy's fiduciary constrains on co-venturers in voting, thus where such 
constrains apply co-venturers are to act honestly and in best interest of the venture. The 
courts determine this requirement by taking into consideration the motivations of the co-
venturers'.42 
32
 Willoughby, G. D. M.: Financing the Development of the North Sea Oil Fields. Law Society 
Gazette, 72 (1975), 10. 
33
 Bean: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures, op. cit. at 13. 
34
 Forbes, J. R. S.-Lang, A. G.: Australian Mining and Petroleum Laws. 2nd ed., Sydney, 1987. 
para. 1907. 
35
 Page One Records Ltd. v. Britten (1968) 1 WLR 157. 
36
 Jefferys v. Smith (1820) 1 Jac. and W 298, 302-3:37 ER 389, 390-391. 
37
 Maliss v. Bankers Trust Co. op. cit. 
38
 Ibid. 17. 
39
 Taylor, M. P. G.-Tyne, S. M.: Taylor and Winsor on Joint Operating Agreements. 2nd ed., 
London, 1992. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Bean: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures, op. cit. 
42
 Ibid, at 17. 
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6. Fiduciary Duties 
When the operator in trust for the parties makes profit for the parties or performs a job, the 
operator shall be subject to fiduciary obligation.43 It is pertinent to note that a fiduciary 
relationship affects the relationship of that other person in a legal or practical sense.44 
Consequently under the JOA the operator has the following obligations:45 to disclose any 
personal interest that he may have in the property, account for the money invested, to 
exercise the account procedure in accordance with the principles of JOA, to protect and 
maintain the property without misuse and finally not to misuse the information imparted. 
7. Default Clause 
In a JOA a project is funded by the operator making calls upon the co-venturers to advance 
their respective shares of the expenditure in accordance with the terms of their agreements.46 
Where a party fails to meet a call and causes a default, JOA provides that non-defaulting 
parties take up the short fall pro rata.47 Various sanctions can be applied on the defaulter 
including loss of voting rights or of product rights and ultimate abetment or more drastically, 
forfeiture of its interest.48 
8. Sole Risk and Non-Consent provisions 
Joint ventures are seldom an association of equals.49 Therefore leaves enough room for 
diverging opinions. In order to avoid such conflicts "Sole Risk" and "Non-Consent" clauses 
are included in the JOA. A participant who has voted for a program but has been overruled 
by the majority and still wishes to proceed with the program represents the classic "Sole 
Risk" situation. The second situation where a dissenting participant does not wish to 
participate in the majority approved program-is generally referred to as "Non-Consent". 
The function of these clauses is to allow those со—venturers' who wish to proceed with 
certain work to do so without dissenters. Effectively, a sole risk project redefines the scope 
of the venture. The wells developed under this clause fall into the ambit of a sub-venture, 
the venture consist of those who join in it. So, also a non-consent operation can be treated 
as a sub-venture of a larger kind. The sole risk parties share the risk, costs and rewards of 
the operation between themselves in proportion to their interest in the sole risk venture. On 
occasions when such a venture is successful others can join upon paying a substantial 
premium, whereas under a non-consent venture late participation is possible with or without 
the payment of premium, depending on the provisions of the JOA. 
43
 Reading v. R, 2KB 232 (1949). 
44
 Hospital Products Ltd v. United states Surgical Corporation and others, 55 ACR 417, 454. 
(HighCt. Australia 1984.) 
45
 Boulting v. Actat, 2QB 606 I All.E.R 716 (1963). 
46
 Smith, E. E.: International Petroleum Development Agreements. Journal of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Law, 8. (1993), 62. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Mosaic Oil NL v. Angari Pty Ltd. (No. 2) (1990) 20 NSWLR 280 (NSW SC). 
49
 See Black, A. J.-Dundas, H. R.: Joint Operating Agreements: An International Comparison 
from Petroleum Law. Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law, 8 (1992). 
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Conclusion 
Joint venture embodies an agreement between the parties for an enterprise created for a 
single project, involving a sharing of project risk. Together with the participation in the 
management and control of the venture, the co-venturers' contribution creates a common 
interest in the success of the project. The JOA is widely used as a legal structure for natural 
resource exploration and development.50 There is co-ownership of property of the venture 
and input in its management. The fact that the venture is limited to a defined geographic 
area as it sets the boundaries of relationship between the co-venturers'. The JOA's main 
difference from the joint venture is the possibility of sub-ventures being formed through the 
sole risk and non-consent operations. JOA's are the contractual nexus balancing exploration 
and production expectation interests against conflict with a particular regulatory regime. 
JOA is a flexible document that can be moulded to meet expectations and desires of parties. 
It encourages exploration and development, while neither forcing a party to participate 
inexpensive risk venture non-prohibiting a party from prospering and conducting ventures 
when the requisite operating committee pass mark vote is not attained. JOA offers the oil 
and gas industry a flexible, well written document to govern international oil and gas 
operations. 
50
 Reagan, P. W. O.-Taylor, T. W.: Joint Ventures and Operating Agreements. Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review, 14 (1984), 85, 87. 
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A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
53, No 3, pp. 181-192 (2012) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur.53.2012.3.1 
Observations on the Definition of Public Policy 
(Ordre Public) in Swiss Arbitration Law 
Motto: „Ein Schiedsgericht thront nicht 
über der Erde, schwebt nicht in der Luft, 
es muss irgendwo landen, 
irgendwo erden. " (Raape) 
Abstract. This study deals with the notion of public policy (ordre public) in Swiss international arbitration. The 
paper analyzes the relevant paragraphs of 1PRG, the Swiss Act on Private International Law. Based on legal 
authorities one can read about the distinction between procedural and substantive public policy in Swiss law. The 
paper describes several cases, in which the awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (Tribunal Arbitral du 
Sport) were challenged at the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland based on the alleged breach of public policy. The 
author discusses the question whether there can be a supra-national, universal interpretation of the notion of public 
policy in Swiss law, which is based on the fundamental legal and moral values of the civilized nations. 
Keywords: international commercial arbitration, challenge of award, public policy, Switzerland 
It is a well-known fact that one of the main advantages of arbitral dispute resolution is 
speed, expedition, the single instance nature of the procedure and the exclusion of an 
appeal, as a result only the challenge of the arbitral award may be initiated, exclusively 
under special conditions.1 In many cases the arbitral award may bring significant drawbacks 
for the unsuccessful party, which makes it likely that one may want to seize every 
opportunity in order to initiate the challenge of the arbitral award.2 
One of the possible ways to challenge an arbitral award is on the grounds of public 
policy.3 In the present study we wish to examine how the Swiss arbitration law defines, 
interprets the definition of public policy, and what positions have been developed by the 
* Research fellow, Institute for Legal Studies, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30; Lecturer, Department of Civil and Roman Law, 
Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Károli Gáspár University, H-1042 Budapest, Viola u. 2—4. 
E-mail: adambooc@gmail.com 
1
 For this see Gellért, Gy.: Új törvény a választottbíráskodásról (New Law on Arbitration). 
Magyar Jog, 45 (1995), 451—452; Boóc, Á.-Hegyi, A.-Sándor, l.-Szűcs, B.-Török, G.: A követelések 
érvényesítésének jogi eszközei (The legal means of enforcing claims). Budapest, 2005. 260; Boóc, A.: 
A kereskedelmi választottbíráskodás egyes kérdései (Certain dilemmas of commercial arbitration). In 
Balogh, M.: Diszciplínák határain innen és túl. Fiatat Kutatók Fóruma 2. (Beyond and above the 
borders of Disciplines. Forum ofYoung Researchers 2). Budapest, 2007. 111-112. 
2
 in relation to the invalidation of an arbitration verdict, Hungarian language summary, see 
Horváth, F.-Kálmán, Gy.: A nemzetközi eljárások joga, különös tekintettel a választoltbiráskodásra 
(The procedures of international law, particularly with regard to arbitration). Budapest, 2003. 121-126. 
3
 For this summary see Kiss, K.. A Választottbíróság ítéletének érvénytelenítése közrendbe 
ütközésre való hivatkozással. A hazai és a nemzetközi gyakorlat összehasonlítása (The invalidation of 
the arbitral tribunal judgments with reference to public policy conflict. A comparison of domestic and 
international law). Gazdaság és Jog, 13 (2005), 10-14. 
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judicature in connection with this notion. As is well known, Switzerland is a popular venue 
for international arbitration procedures, which can be explained by numerous historical and 
legal historical reasons.4 In light of this the explanation of the definition of public policy is 
likely to result as useful experience for both domestic and international arbitration. 
Our investigation in the present study shall be limiting its review to how the Swiss law 
on international commercial arbitration proceedings makes it possible for the arbitral award 
to be revoked on the legal basis of collision with public policy.5 Apart from this-briefly-
refer to the international private law interpretation of public policy in Swiss law.6 
It signifies the intense relationship between the Swiss international arbitration and the Swiss 
international private law that the basic rules applying to them are found in the same statute 
accepted on 18 December 1987 Federal Statute on Swiss international private law 
(Bundesgesetz über das internationale Privatrecht vom 18. Dezember 1987, hereinafter 
referred to as: IPRG). International commercial arbitration rules can be found in the 20th 
chapter of the IPRG. With reference to the work of French Yves Derains on the correlation 
of applicable law during public policy and arbitration process, it is important to highlight 
that throughout international commerce certain collision problems may arise during the 
arbitration procedure, therefore the rules of international private law may play an important 
role in arbitration procedures.7 
It is essential to stress that the current form of the IPRG is a result of an approximately 
ten-year long process, after review of many drafts and amendments.8 
The IPRG-neither in the private international law or international commercial 
arbitration part-does not define the concept of public policy, leaving it to a large extent to 
jurisprudence or case law to determine. In Arts 17, 18 and 19 of the IPRG we shall see the 
concept of public policy accepted in international private law, whereas in Art. 190 Para. 2 e) 
it is used as a phrase for grounds of revoking the arbitral award. 
4
 Swiss arbitration law in Hungarian language summary, see Boóc, Á.: Nemzetközi kereskedelmi 
választottbíráskodás. A választottbíró megválasztása és kizárása (The international commercial 
arbitration. The voting and exclusion of a judge). Budapest, 2009. 51-60. For the development of 
Swiss private law see Hamza, G.: Entstehung und Entwicklung der modernen Privatrechtsordnungen 
und die römischrechtliche Tradition. Budapest, 2009. 236-256. 
5
 With regard to the Swiss national arbitration-which is primarily ruled by the accepted 
intercantonal convention on 27th of August 1969, named Interkantonale Konkordat vom 27. März 
1969 über die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit-we do not address. In relation to the Intercantonal Convention 
in detail see Bratschi, P-Briner, R.: Bemerkungen zum Konkordat über die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. 
Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung, 72 (1976), 101. 
6
 The public policy in private international law and arbitration proceedings established the 
concept of the new Hungarian literature summary see: Burián, L.: Gondolatok a közrend szerepéről 
(Thoughts on the function of public order). In: Kiss, D.-Varga, I. (eds): Magister artis boni et aequi. 
Studio in Honorem Németh János. Budapest, 2003. 99-122. 
7
 See Derains, Y.: Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International 
Arbitration. In: Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration. ICCA Congress 
Series, No. 3. New York, 1986. 227-256. 
8
 For this in detail see Blessing, M.: Introduction to Arbitration-Swiss and International 
Perspectives. Basel, 1999. 170-180. 
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Article 17 of the IPRG states that the application of foreign law is excluded ifit would 
lead to the outcome of incompatibility with Swiss public policy (ordre public).9 According 
to the provisions of Art. 18, the provisions of Swiss law must be applied in case specific 
goals make it necessary, regardless of the fact that the rules of the IPRG would impose the 
application of other laws, therefore here the present Article is capable of overwriting the 
law-prescribing function of collision laws. Art. 19 provides that provisions of another act 
may be considered if according to the Swiss legal mentality a party deserves to be protected 
and his clear interest requires so, provided that the case is closely linked to another legal 
field. 
These provisions are primarily considering the meaning and functions of public policy 
from the viewpoint of international private law, but- as it will be shown in detail later on-
are in close relation with the meaning of public policy that relates to the invalidation of 
arbitral awards. In connection with this we must refer to Art. 190 of the IPRG, which 
contains the rules for revoking of the arbitral award and which-having regard to our topic-
it seems appropriate to quote verbatim: 
Art. 190. IX. Endgültigkeit, Anfechtung 
1. Grundsatz 
1. Mit der Eröffnung ist der Entscheid endgültig. 
2. Der Entscheid kann nur angefochten werden: 
a. wenn der Einzelschiedsrichter vorschriftswidrig ernannt oder das Schiedsgericht 
vorschriftswidrig zusammengesetzt wurde; 
b. wenn sich das Schiedsgericht zu Unrecht fiir zuständig oder unzuständig erklärt 
hat: 
c. wenn das Schiedsgericht über Streitpunkte entschieden hat, die ihm nicht unterbreitet 
wurden oder wenn es Rechtsbegehren unbeurteilt gelassen hat; 
d. wenn der Grundsatz der Gleichbehandlung der Parteien oder der Grundsatz des 
rechtlichen Gehörs verletzt wurde; 
e. wenn der Entscheid mit dem Ordre public unvereinbar ist. 
3. Vorentscheide können nur aus den in Absatz 2, Buchstaben a und b genannten 
Gründen angefochten werden; die Beschwerdefrist beginnt mit der Zustellung des 
Vorentscheides. 
According to Art. 190 of the IPRG the enactment of the arbitral award shall be of 
legally binding and final. The arbitral award may be invalidated in the event of: 
a) if the single judge or the selection of the arbitration panel was not drawn up 
according to the applicable rules; 
b) if the tribunal was mistaken in finding it's jurisdiction or the refusal of it's 
jurisdiction; 
9
 „Die Abwendung von Bestimmungen eines ausländischen Rechts ist ausgeschlossen, wenn sie 
zu einem Ergebnis führen würde, das mit dem schweizerischen Ordre public vereinbar ist." This 
Clause shows similarity with The Hungarian International Private Law Codex, Decree Law 13 of 
1979 like force Clause 7. subpara. 1. In connection with this see Burián, L.-Kecskés, L.-Vörös, I.: 
Magyar nemzetközi kolliziós magánjog (Hungarian International Private Law). Budapest, 1997. 137— 
143. 
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c) if the content of the tribunal's award went beyond the request provided, or failed to 
decide on issues that were included in the application; 
d) if the principle of equal treatment of parties, or the principle of hearing of the Parties 
was injured; 
e) where the award of the tribunal was incompatible with public policy (in German 
and French text: ordre public, the Italian text: ordine pubblico). 
It is essential to note that the invalidation of the interim arbitral award may only be 
applied for in the case of a) and b) cited above. In case of Art. 191 the Swiss Federal Court 
(Schweizerische Bundesgericht) is competent to invalidate a foreign arbitral award. There is 
a 30-day long deadline for the submitting of the invalidation petition starting on the day of 
the conveyance of the award. In the international arbitration proceedings, the arbitration 
award may be considered conveyed if it has been delivered to the parties, except if the 
given arbitration rules require otherwise. However, in the Swiss domestic arbitration 
proceedings-unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties -the arbitration award shall be 
deposited with the competent court according to the seat of the arbitration court, which will 
notify the parties of the award.10 
Although this study does not deal with the Swiss domestic arbitration, it is essential to 
emphasize that the Swiss domestic arbitration unlike the international commercial 
arbitration provides further opportunities to invalidate the arbitration award since 
invalidation is possible to be sought on the grounds that the award is arbitrary, based on 
obviously incorrect facts or on the clear breach of the law.11 
The details of the IPRG that are found in separate places in relation to public policy are in 
close contact with each other in case we examine the role of public policy played in the 
arbitration proceedings. Although Art. 190 of the IPRG mentions conflict with public policy, 
in relations with the revoking of the arbitration award and the New York Convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards signed on the 10th of June 1958 (The 
New York Convention) mentions public policy in the second paragraph of subparagraph b) 
of the V. Article in relation with the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, the 
concept of public policy-as it is also pointed out by Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel-starts long 
before the arbitration proceedings begin, for example, because it serves as a limit of the 
parties self autonomy to which cases are judged via arbitration, and therefore the lack of 
settling disputes via arbitration (lack of arbitrability) can often play a large role in the 
public policy clause.12 
10
 See Segesser, G. V.-Jolies, A.: Switzerland. In: Rowley, J. W.-Mendelsohn, Mc. B. (eds): 
Arbitration World. Jurisdictional Comparisons. London, 20062. 3 72. 
11
 Article 33 of the Intercantonal Convention pays attention to the question of invalidation of a 
domestic arbitration award. The comparison of this with international arbitration proceedings see in 
specific Walter, G.-Bosch, W.-Brönnimann, J.: Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz. 
Kommentar zu Kapitel 12 des IPR-Gesetzes. Bern, 1991. 225. 
12
 See Böckstiegel, К. H.: Public Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its Enforcement. In: IBA 
Journal of Dispute Resolution. Special Issue, 2008. The New York Convention-50 years. 123. 
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(Taking account of public policy-and the international private law meaning ascribed to 
it-during the arbitration process is of the utmost importance, because failure to provide it 
may serve as a very good argument that the substantive part of the award shall be invalidated 
by reference to a conflict with public policy.) 
The established view in the case law is that this is an exceptional provision to be used, 
which may be relevant in cases where the violation of law and justice exceeds a level, 
which is contrary to law in its Swiss concept. 
For example, the negative public policy clause contained in Art. 17 of the IPRG shall 
not prevent the application of Saudi Arabian law, which prohibits the imposition of 
interest.13 
It is essential to point out-as Francesco Tezzini does-that while the Art. 17 of the 
IPRG uses the concept of Swiss public policy (schweizerische Ordre public) while reading 
the concept of public policy contained in Art. 190 of the IPRG on invalidation of arbitration 
awards we come across "merely" the concept of public policy without any reference to 
Switzerland.14 This will have particular importance during the interpretation of Art. 190 
Para. 2 e) of the IPRG. 
By contrast Arts 18 and 19 of the IPRG shall be considered as a kind of positive public 
policy clause, since in this case we can find an essential a public policy interest that requires 
a particular application of the law, as opposed to the public policy exclusion clause in Art. 
17 of the IPRG. This is particularly important in the Swiss case law in case of the application 
of prevailing legal standards of a state are cogent. In the case of Switzerland, this clearly 
occurs in cases where any of the European Community law would be applied. 
The Swiss Federal Court in a famous decision made in the Gamma vs SA. Sigma SA 
case on the 28th of 1992 defined important criteria in this issue. In this case, the parties 
stipulated Belgian law ruling in their contract and by that included European Community 
antitrust laws as they are a part of Belgian law. The Federal Court held that it would be a 
violation of public policy of the European Community if an arbitration award would be 
inconsistent with Art. 81 (ex-Art. 85) of the Treaty of Rome. Accordingly it is an obligation 
of the arbitrators to examine the agreements before them in order to avoid the decisions 
made that are incompatible with community law.15 The position established in this case by 
the Federal Court has been further refined in a decision made on the 13th of November 
1998. According to the facts of the case the parties entered into a licensing agreement, in 
which Swiss law was governing, but under the contract some of the deliverables were to be 
accomplished in the territory of the European Community. 
During the arbitration proceedings neither party referred to a possible breach of the 
EU's competition rules-Art. 81 of the Treaty of Rome-the arbitrators themselves did not 
investigate this aspect of the matter. The Federal Court held that it is an obligation of the 
arbitrators to examine the contract under Art. 81 of the Treaty of Rome-even if the parties 
deemed Swiss law goveming-in case when at least one of the parties referred to the contract 
13
 See Vischer, F.: IPRG Kommentar. (Heini, A.-Keller, M.-Siehr, K.-Vischer, F.-Volken, P. 
eds), Zürich, 1993. Art. 17, N. 1, 7. 
14
 See Trezzini, F.: The Challenge of Arbitral Awards for Breach of Public Policy according to 
Art. 190 para. 2 lit e) of the Swiss Private International Law. In: Three Essays on International 
Commercial Arbitration. Lugano, 2003. 127. 
15
 See: DFT 118. II. 193. In relation with the decision seeTrezzini: op. cit. 135—136. See further 
Blessing: op. cit. 247-248. 
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being invalid during the judicial or arbitral proceedings.16 According to this perception in 
case if the arbitrators cannot do that, then the decision may be invalidated based on Art. 190 
Para. 2 e) of the IPRG, according to which the tribunal erred in finding or denying 
jurisdiction. A specific trait of this decision is that such a strong standpoint wad drawn up 
by the supreme court of a non-EU member state. 
The interpretation of the above-quoted Arts 17 and 18 of the IPRG was raised in the 
Federal Court decision made in Lausanne on the 28th of March 2001, too. Here, the 
question was whether a treaty condemning the Swiss law governing, that breaches foreign 
mandatory rules-the UN resolution on a weapons embargo in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia-, may be contrary to Art. 20 of the Swiss OR on good faith.17 The decision held 
the contract was in breach of good faith, but by no means by the direct application of the 
UN resolution, but by the breach of public policy. As you can see, that in this decision Arts 
17 to 19 and Art. 190 Para. 2 e) of the IPRG are jointly applied. 
The following is an overview of the interpretation which the Swiss arbitration practice has 
developed of Art. 190 Para. 2 e) of of the IPRG that is the basis on which the invalidation 
of an arbitration award may be claimed if the judgment is contrary to public policy. With 
regard to the fact that this provision—as it has been mentioned previously-concerns 
international commercial arbitration, it is essential to compare this rule with the New York 
Convention cited above, of which subparagraph Art. V. paragraph 2 b) states the following: 
2. The recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award may also be refused if the 
competent authorities of the country in which recognition and enforcement is sought finds 
that: b) The recognition or enforcement would be contrary to public policy in this country:18 
In comparison of the provisions of the New York Convention and the IPRG, a striking 
difference is that the IPRG makes the invalidation of the award possible if it is contrary to 
public policy while the New York Convention allows the invalidation of the award on the 
grounds of it being contrary to the public policy of the state recognizing and implementing 
the award.19 The question is instantly raised what the difference is between the concept of a 
country's public policy and the international concept of public policy. 
16
 See DFT 13.11.1998. See further Trezzini: op. cit. 138. Trezzini emphasizes that according to 
some authors the members of the tribunal should take into consideration Art. 81 of the Treaty of 
Rome if neither party referred to the cases relations with competition law. See further Blessing: op. 
cit. 247-248. 
17
 The first paragraph of Art. 20 of the Swiss OR defines the breach of good faith by contracts as 
such: „Ein Vertrag, der einen unmöglichen oder widerrechtlichen Inhalt hat oder gegen die guten 
Sitten verstösst, ist nichtig. " 
18
 The New York convention was implemented into Hungarian law by Decree-Law No. 
25/1962. 
19
 It is an important part of the cited article of the New York Convention that recognition for 
states is not compulsory and that the question of denial of enforcement on grounds of violation of 
public policy is at the discretion of the court. 
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Although the wording of the New York Convention is clear about the public order of 
the country given, due to the international nature of the arbitration proceeding it—the 
concept of international aspects of the subject-makes it essential to be aware of the 
international aspects of public policy.20 In some countries the case law also places great 
emphasis on the investigation of this issue. The manual of Martin Hunter-Alan Redfern 
refers to a specific case in India. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Renusagar 
Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. made the following stance: 
"This raises the question of whether the narrower concept of public policy as 
applicable in the field ofpublic international law should be applied or the wider concept of 
public policy as applicable in the field of municipal law. The Court held that the narrower 
view should prevail and that enforcement would be refused on the public policy ground if 
such enforcement would be contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) the 
interests of India; or (Hi) justice or morality."2I 
According to the Supreme Court of India a narrower concept of public policy should 
be applied when the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards are concerned, but 
throughout the detailed discussion of this matter explains that the recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitration award on the grounds of it being contrary to public policy 
may be possible if it is contrary to the fundamental policy, the interests of India, or the 
concept of morality and justice. As one might see this public policy clause has a somewhat 
broader interpretation than the concept of international public policy due to the position 
held by the Supreme Court of India. 
In Swiss case law in Art. 190 Para. 2 e) of the 1PRG the substantive law meaning and 
the procedural law meaning of public policy is clearly distinguishable. The essence of the 
procedural law public policy is that each party should be granted the right to an irrespective 
judgment that is an appropriate procedure, the adequate portrayal and evaluation of facts. 
The substantive law public policy means firstly the fundamental principles of the rule of 
law, the intrinsic values which all arbitration awards must respect. 
During the interpretation of the procedural public policy several notable cases can be 
found in the Swiss case law. It was held that the mere fact that an arbitration award has no 
justification is not a procedural violation of public policy. In reference to the independence 
of the experts used by the tribunal independence, used by experts for the Swiss Federal 
Court has thus held a position that, until an expert has no personal interest in the outcome 
of a legal proceedings there can be no talk about violations of public order.22 
The Swiss Federal Court came to a very interesting conclusion in relation to the 
procedural public policy in another case. In the event that the tribunal gives an opportunity 
for certain facts to be considered as evidence, but later on lets the parties know that these 
facts were not portrayed in an appropriate way (and therefore will not consider them), we 
may talk about the violation of procedural public policy. However, if the tribunal gives the 
20
 In relation to this see Carbonneau, T. E.: Alternative Dispute Resolution. Melting the Lances 
and Dismounting the Steeds. Chicago, 1989. 66-67. 
21
 The case of Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. was quoted by Redfern, A.— 
Hunter, M.: Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration. London, 20044. 473. 
22
 In connection with this see Müller, Ch.: International Arbitration. A Guide to the Complete 
Swiss Case Law (Unreported and Reported). Zürich-Basel-Geneva, 2004. 180-181. 
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authorization for the attachment of such evidence, then later on-the Federal Court ruled 
that-without the breach of good faith without prejudice to its decision may not arbitrarily 
change it. The Federal Court also points out that by doing so the tribunal violates the 
contractual legal relationship existant between the tribunal and the parties and that is 
contrary to the theory pacta sunt servandaP 
In my opinion, this case is very interesting in two respects. Firstly, the argument 
mentioned above is good at relating the concept of procedural and substantive public policy 
also highlighting the fact that there is a kind of contractual relationship between the parties, 
because the parties subjected themselves to the tribunal's decision, instructed the tribunal to 
make a judgment in the matter and due to this analogy the tribunal also bares certain 
obligations.24 
As far as the substantive public policy concept is considered, here the acting tribunal-
that is the Swiss Federal Court-is responsible for considering for specific matters whether 
there has been a secondary offense, which is contrary to the fundamental principle of the 
rule of law. 
Based on the available case law of the pacta sunt servanda principle, a serious 
violation of the principle of good faith, the prohibition of the abuse of power, that is in fact 
the violation of a principle with an apparently significant moral content of private 
international law may justify the violation of public policy from the substantive point of 
view. 
The Federal Court in a case held that it may be viewed as the violation of good faith 
with particular attention to the violation of culpa in contrahendo-aná shall therefore be 
considered as basis for the invalidation of an arbitration award for the violation of public 
policy—if either party during the contracting process fails to provide all necessary 
information that the other party did not know about and could not have known about that 
was needed for the other party to make an informed decision.25 The view of the Federal 
Court is of fundemental importance that the violation of good faith and the abuse of power 
materialised so that the arbitration award may be invalidated on the grounds of it being 
contrary to public policy shall be examined via the second article of the Swiss OR.26 
23
 In connection with this see Müller: op. cit. 190. 
24
 It seems appropriate to refer to the fact that this quality of modern day arbitration shows 
much relation to the concept of arbitration in Roman Law, where the receptum arbitrii known as 
pactum also emphasizes the contractual nature of the legal relationship. For the concept of receptum 
arbitrii see Földi, A.-FIamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói (The History and Institutions of 
Roman Law). Budapest, 2009 l3. 542. For the arbitration in Rome see Roebuck, D.-De Loynes de 
Fumichon, В.: Roman Arbitration. Oxford, 2004. For the legal nature of the arbitration contract see 
Újlaki, L.: A választottbírósági szerződés jogági elhelyezettsége és tipológiája (The legal position and 
typology of the arbitration agreement). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 46 (1991), 216-225. 
25
 See Müller: op. cit. 191. 
26
 Article 2 of the OR points out that „Haben sich die Parteien über alle wesentlichen Punkte 
geeinigt, so wird vermutet, dass der Vorbehalt von Nebenpunkten die Verbindlichkeit des Vertrages 
nicht hindern solle. Kommt über die vorbehaltenen Nebenpunkte eine Vereinbarung nicht zustande, so 
hat der Richter über diese nach der Natur des Geschäftes zu entscheiden. Vorbehalten bleiben die 
Bestimmungen über die Form der Verträge." 
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Therefore the good faith procedure demanded at the creation of contractual obligation 
prescribed by Swiss private law acts as a canon during the invalidation process of an 
arbitration award on the grounds of it being contrary to public policy.27 
In Swiss case law/practice the Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS (Tribunal Arbitral du 
Sport) plays a unique role in the viewpoint evolved in relation to the invalidation of an 
award on the grounds of collision with public policy. The CAS was founded by the 
International Olympic Association. The CAS is based in Lausanne it is an arbitrary 
institution judging cases involving international legal matters under Swiss law.28 
Numerous requests for the invalidation of the decision on the grounds of it being 
contrary to Swiss public policy made by the CAS have been submitted to the Federal Court 
also based in Lausanne. The Federal Court has rejected all requests based on the decision 
being in conflict with substantive public policy.29 The Federal Court in sports-law cases 
held that the concept of conflict with public policy shall be viewed as an international 
concept rather then a domestic one, which in essence prohibits the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments that are incompatible with fundamental legal or moral principles 
established in civilized countries. 
In the case of Marc Biolley v. Association Turkish FA in 2007 the Federal Court held 
that an award is contrary to substantive public policy ifit breaches such fundamental rules 
of substantive law that by doing so it becomes incompatible with the present rule of law 
and system of values. In the interpretation of the Federal Court such is the prohibition of 
the abuse of law and what is even more substantial in sports law questions the prohibition 
of discriminating provisions and the protection of incapacitated persons. 
Several requests for invalidation have been submitted against rulings by the CAS of 
the grounds of them being contrary to the principle of good faith and the equal treatment 
and are therefore contrary to Swiss public policy. 
It is worth referring to the case of Raducan v. IOC in the year 2000 Sydney Olympic 
Games, acting under the CAS ad hoc arbitration tribunal found that Romanian female 
gymnast, Andreea Raducan, who had admittedly taken a pill containing a banned ingredient 
had commited a doping violation. Andreea Ruducan later on based her request for 
invalidation on the fact that there was an inexplicable difference in the quantity of the urine 
sample provided by her during the doping test (100 ml) and the urine sample examined by 
the laboratory (62 ml) and due to this the arbitration body should not have judged the claim 
27
 In connection with good faith in Swiss law see Földi, A.: A jóhiszeműség és tisztesség elve. 
Intézménytörténeti vázlat a római jogtól napjainkig (The principle of good faith and honesty). History 
of Institution from Roman times till today). Budapest, 2001. 48-52. The second Article of the ZGB 
for the concept of good faith uses the expressions Treu und Glauben, bonne foi, and buonafede. 
28
 The quite informative website of the CAS is: http://www.tas-cas.org/ In connection with the 
functions of the arbitration besides the regulation and certain decision on the website see in detail 
Blackshaw, I. S.-Siekmann, R. C. R.-Soek, J. (eds): The Court of Arbitration for Sport: /984-2004. 
The Hague, 2006. 
29
 In connection with this see Mitten, M. J.: Judicial Review of Olympic and International 
Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations. Marquette University Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, (2009) 9-14, 9. see http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1376317. 
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as it has done previously in another case where the integrity of the urine sample was not 
sufficiently justified the examined sports fellow was not condemned and according to the 
Romanian gymnast her conviction was violation of the principle of equal treatment. 
According to the Federal Court that fact that Andreea Raducan made a statement 
during the process that resulted in her admitting to taking the pill containing a banned 
ingredient makes this case completely different to the one referred to in the request for 
invalidation and therefore we may not speak of the violation of equal treatment.30 
From the point of view of our topic it is even more interesting to take into account the 
fact whether the seat of the CAS arbitration is always seen as Lausanne-regardless of where 
geographically speaking the Arbitration Board's proceedings are actually conducted-and 
whether the procedure is governed by Swiss law. Thus the CAS arbitral judgments-except 
in Switzerland-may be viewed as a foreign arbitration award, which in case of recognition 
and enforcement of judgments is to be considered under the public policy clause of the New 
York Convention subpara, e) of Article V. 
In the case law of the United States we can experience in several cases that the 
judgment made by the CAS was applied for to be invalidated on the grounds of collision 
with public policy. 
It is worthwhile mentioning the case of Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic 
Federation,31 According to the facts of the case a medium distance runner female sports 
fellow had an increased ratio of testosterone to episterone of 6:1. According to the rules of 
the International Amateur Athletic Federation this increased ratio suggests that the athlete 
was using a banned substance for doping which presumption may be rebutted by the athlete 
submitting clear and convincing evidence, demonstrating that the increase was due to a 
physiological or pathological state. During the process Mary Slaney failed to produce such 
evidence. 
Her intention was to invalidate the judgment on the grounds that it is in collision with 
the public policy of the United States of America that the conviction relies on a test which 
is scientifically invalid and is discriminative against female athletes. The Second Circuit 
Court of the USA denied her request pointing out that the recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitration award may only be denied on a small scale of the public policy clause of the 
New York Convention. This is only possible in the case of when the judgment would be in 
violation of the fundamental concepts and the enforcement of the judgment would be 
contrary to a paramount principle of law. According to the viewpoint of Second Circuit the 
rules above-mentioned and the procedures for determining may in no way be viewed as one 
that is in accordance with the conditions of the application of the public policy clause. 
In connection with this Matthew J. Mitten-in light of the position held by the Swiss 
Federal Court and the courts of the USA-draws the conclusion that the public policy clause 
in connection to the recognition of arbitration awards in connection to the Olympic Games 
and international sports instead of individual national approaches shall be interpreted 
throughout a transnational concepts of universal lex sportiva. 
This approach according to Mitten actually meets the objective set by Judge Pierre 
Coubertin which states that it is an important goal for the Olympic movement to respect the 
fundamental ethical principles.32 
30
 In detail see Mitten: op. cit. 11-12. 
31
 For summary of the case see Mitten: op. cit. 15-16. 
32
 In connection with this see Mitten: op. cit. 17. 
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As a counter example Matthew J. Mitten -and with a critical opinion-refers to a 
judgment made by the European Court in 2006. In the case of Meca-Medina and Majcen v. 
Comm 'n of European Communities the European Court of Justice allowed two Slovenian 
swimmers to contest an arbitration award by the CAS.33 The arbitration tribunal in its 
judgment moderated the suspension of doping misdemeanor at the Brazil swimmers world 
cup from four years given by the International Swimmers Association Federation 
Internationale de Natation, FINA) to two years. The European Court of Justice allowed the 
case to be retried with the conditions to view if the two year suspension was proportionate 
in light of the provisions ordering the freedom of competition and services in the Treaty of 
Rome. According to the European Court of Justice these sports law provision by prohibiting 
the swimmers from part-taking in professional swimming and challenges have a distinct 
economic impact on the swimmers and it should be investigated if these doping rules are 
compatible with the above-mentioned principles of the European Community law. 
It is of the utmost importance to note that the European Court of Justice found that the 
criteria defined in the doping rules are adequate and the sanctions are not disproportionate, 
not excessive, that is not contrary to European Community competition law, but it seems 
that the European Court of Justice in this case appears to have taken into account other 
considerations than just those defined in the New York Convention or the Swiss IPRG in 
the decision of invalidating of the CAS arbitration award. 
According to Mitten the opinion set out in the above-cited case is unlucky because it 
might result in the suppression of the evolution of cohesive legal interpretation of 
international Olympic games and international sports whereas according to Mitten's opinion 
the achievement of such an international sports legal system would be salutary in which the 
achievement of a homogenic interpretation of public policy should be achieved.34 
In order to understand whether the Swiss case law considers the concept of public policy 
international or transnational it is expedient to refer to a judgment made by the Swiss 
Federal Court in 1995 that the manual of Hunter-Redfern describes in detail.35 According to 
the justification of the judgment during the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
arbitration award in-when clearly implied that the international aspects of public policy 
must be borne in mind-a Swiss court has a very narrow margin. In view of the Swiss Court 
if the recognition and enforcement should be denied on grounds of a procedural error then 
this is possible only in the case if the procedural error is contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the Swiss jurisdiction or is in serious violation of the sense of justice. 
In another case the Federal Court came to the guiding position that Art. 190 Para. 2 e) 
of the IPRG should be interpreted by taking into consideration of the universal concept of 
public policy which is independent from the dispute and applicable substantive law. 
33
 See the whole case at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:224:0008:0008:EN:PDF 
See the bulletpoints of the case at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/ 
pdf/2009-02/cp060065en.pdf 
34
 In connection with this see Mitten: op. cit. 19. 
35
 See Redfern-Hunter: op. cit. 473. 
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The violation of public policy is distinguishable if the judgment is contrary to the 
ethical values of the civilized countries, which values are therefore to be valid above at an 
above all nations.36 
The above-quoted Trezzini summarizes the respected Professor Pierre Lalive's opinion 
that invalidation on grounds of the public policy clause has three known levels. Firstly one 
may speak of the domestic public policy concept which arises as a result of national 
provision and may prevail in domestic conditions. Secondly one may mention the Swiss 
public policy which is of national origin but is applied in the international dimension and 
thirdly the supranational and transnational and really may refer to the international public 
policy which is not the product of the national jurisdiction but the public policy concept 
which may be derived from the civilized countries and the perception and attitude of 
international commerce.37 
From those mentioned above the conclusion can be drawn that in the dimension of 
international arbitration the application of the transnational concept of pubic policy is 
salutary. In case of this public policy concept-as it may be seen from the case cited above-
the strict distinction between the concept of substantive and procedural public policy seems 
artificial. However, it is important to conclude that when defining the concept of 
international public policy covered by sacrosanctus legal values it is almost impossible to 
proceed without the implantation of individual countries, legal cultures and morals. 
36
 See Müller: op. cit. 171. 
37
 See Trezzini: op. cit. 131. See further Lalive, P.: Ordre Public transnational ou réellement 
international et arbitrage international. Revue de l'Arbitrage, 1986. 329 sqq. 
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Abstract: With use of the Internet, a new form of contract has appeared: the electronic contract, which is 
concluded online. Most of these involve a relationship of two parties: a consumer who is in a relatively vulnerable 
position, and a business entity. There are numerous examples of such transactions: youngsters downloading music 
from a website and paying for it-as they would in a music store. Many physical goods can also be purchased 
online-e.g. even though they live in Europe, the authors of this article regularly purchase books from the US. 
There are numerous ways such transactions can take place: one of the most obvious ways is buying goods on 
Amazon or eBay, on the website of a company, or purchasing goods using e-mail communication. The article 
attempts to summarize the choice of law rules affecting electronic contracts in the US and in Europe-i.e. to give an 
overview of which country's or state's law would apply to a contract concluded online, what the limits are on such 
a transaction and which state's laws can protect us in case of a breach. 
Keywords: Private international law, internet law, choice-of-law, electronic contracts, consumer sales, Rome I. 
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I. Introduction 
With widespread usage of the Internet, a special field of private international law has 
emerged (hereinafter referred to as: "PIL" or, using its US name, "conflict-of-laws"), 
growing strongly over the last decade: the law of electronic contracts. Consumers conclude 
contracts through the Internet in developed countries every day: they buy goods, reserve 
hotel rooms and other services, download paid music from websites, etc. In such 
transactions, choice-of-law clauses are used regularly. Reviewing the latest developments, 
we discover numerous cases and statutes in the United States dealing with this topic, with a 
similar situation in the European Union. 
In this area of private international law, we believe that both Europe and the US have a 
lot to learn from each other. In general, the US leads with proactive thinking in applying 
new technologies and in reflecting the latest developments in the world. On the other hand, 
Europe has a tradition-continuously eroding, but still existing-of making clear rules with 
the public can become relatively easily acquainted. Furthermore, consumer law is 
traditionally at the centre of EU commercial law and additionally, there is currently an on-
going wave of consumer legislation activity. A new law for consumer contracts was adopted 
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at the end of 2011,1 and a separate proposal was also made for a common European sales 
law,2 all indicative of the continued importance of the field. 
In this paper we wish to focus on the rules of e-sales and not on provisions related to 
other contract types. We will be dealing with the laws of consumer contracts; laws governing 
other kinds of private contract may contain different provisions. Importantly, we will only 
deal with the problem of applicable law, and will not discuss substantive law, jurisdiction 
and other related issues. 
II. The parties' choice of law 
1. General rules 
The question of which law to apply to a contract has an elementary effect on remedies for 
any breach, since there are enormous differences between the Anglo-Saxon and European 
continental legal approaches affecting contracts.3 On the other hand, with the unification 
efforts of the EU, some parts of the problem in Europe appear to have been resolved. As 
with substantive law, we rarely find specific, written rules targeted at electronic consumer 
contracts-in this regard the US and the EU systems are similar. Thus we must consider the 
general landscape of consumer law and contract law. Equally for applicable law, we need to 
have a broad view of the general rules in order to consider special cases. 
Reviewing the laws applicable to contracts, we discover only small differences 
between US and EU rules: on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, the law chosen by the 
parties must by default be applied to an e-sales contract. In the US, the Second Restatement 
on conflict-of-laws4 expresses this idea, and even though it is not a law with binding force, 
the approach is followed by all states. Article § 187 of the Restatement states the following: 
"(I) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and 
duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have 
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue. 
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and 
duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not 
1
 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance. OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, 64-88. 
Cf. Micklitz, H.-W.-Reich, N.: Crónica de una muerte anunciada: The Commission Proposal for a 
Directive on Consumer Rights. Common Market Law Review, 46 (2009) 2, 471-519; van Boom, W. 
H.: The Draft Directive on Consumer Rights: Choices Made & Arguments Used. Journal Of 
Contemporary Research. 5 (2009) 3, 452-462. 
2
 Proposal for regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common European 
sales law. COM (2011) 0635 final. 
3
 Smits, J. M.: Diversity of Contractual Law and the European Internal Market. In: Smits, J. M. 
(ed.): The Need for a European Contract Law-Empirical and Legal Perspectives. Groningen, 2005. 
156-163; Eando, O.: Performance and Remedies in the Law of Contracts. In: Hartkamp, A.-Hesselink, 
M. et ai. (eds): Towards a European Civil Code. Dordrecht-London-Boston, 1994. 201-222; Talion, 
D.: Breach of Contract and Reparation of Damage. In: Towards a European... op. cit. 223-237. 
4
 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (l)-(2) (1971). 
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have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless 
either 
(a) The chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and 
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, or 
(b) Application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental poli-
cy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the 
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local law 
of the state of the chosen law." 
We find similar provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to 
as: "U.C.C."). The U.C.C. cannot be considered a black letter law since it was published as 
a uniform model act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI). However, since it is built into each 
state's law and is applied similarly throughout the US, it has a key role in US sales law. 
U.C.C. § 1-301 2003 asserts the following: 
"Territorial Applicability; Parties' Power to Choose Applicable Law 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable 
relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the 
law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and 
duties. 
(b) In the absence of an agreement effective under subsection (a), and except as 
provided in subsection (c), [the Uniform Commercial Code] applies to transactions 
bearing an appropriate relation to this state. 
(c) If one of the following provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] specifies the 
applicable law that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the 
extent permitted by the law so specified: 
(1) Section 2- 402 
(2) Sections 2A- 105 and 2A- 106 
(3) Section 4- 102 
(4) Section 4A- 507 
(5) Section 5-116 
[(6) Section 6- 103] 
(7) Section 8-110 
(8) Sections 9- 301 through 9- 307." 
In Europe, Art. 3(2) of the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contracts 
(hereinafter referred to as: "Rome I Regulation" or "Rome /")5 grants the parties the right 
5
 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) OJ L 177, 2008.07.04, 6. Cf. Callies, G.-P. 
(ed.): Rome Regulations. Alphen aan den Rijn (The Netherlands), 2011, 17-353; Ferrari, F.-Leible, S. 
(eds): Rome I Regulation. München, 2009; Leible, S.-Lehmann, M.: Die Verordnung über das auf 
vertragliche Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht ("Rom 1"). Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft, 
54 (2008), 528-543; Mankowski, P.: Die Rom I-Verordnung-Änderungen im europäischen IPR für 
Schuldverträge. Internationales Handelsrecht, 7 (2008), 133-152; Pfeiffer, T.: Neues Internationales 
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to make such a choice.6 The regulation or, to be more precise, Art 6 thereof clearly expresses 
that the parties may choose the law applicable to a contract. 
2. Limitations of choice 
In all legal systems, the parties' choice of law for a contract, and especially for a consumer 
contract has limitations. Firstly, in the US, the law chosen must have a substantial 
relationship with the contract.7 In Europe- in our personal opinion-this is not a requirement. 
Secondly, in all jurisdictions including Europe and the US, the application of a law can 
be rejected if it is in conflict with some important provisions that the forum has to validate. 
Two types of such rules can be distinguished. Above all other issues, the public policy of 
the forum may contain such important rules.8 Art. 9(2) and (3) of R o m e I states that nothing 
in the regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the 
l aw of the forum. According to the legal literature, is a reference to the most essential, 
imperative laws of a country, for example laws protecting consumers and employees.9 
Along with these rules, the overriding mandatory provisions of the l aw of the country may 
also be give effect where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been 
performed, when those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the 
contract unlawful. In considering whether to give effect to such provisions, regard shall be 
Vertragsrecht-Zur Rom I-Verordnung. Europäisches Zeitschrift fúr Wirtschaftsrecht, 19 (2008), 622-
629; Plender, R.-Wilderspin, M.: The European Private International Law of Obligations. London, 
2009. 93-434; Stone, P.: EU Private International Law. London, 2010. 287-346; von Armbrüster, 
Ch.-Ebke, W. F.-Hausmann, R.-Magnus, U.: Staudinger Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch-
Einleitung zu Rom I-VO. Berlin, 2011; von Armbrüster, Ch.-Hausmann, R.-Magnus, U.: Art. 1-10 
Rom l-VO. Berlin, 2011 ; Magnus, U—von Armbrüster, Ch.-Ebke, W. F.-Hausmann, R.: Artikel 11-29 
Rom l-VO; Artikel 46 В, С Egbgb. Berlin, 2011; Wagner, R. : Der Grundsatz der Rechtsvvahl und das 
mangels Rechtswahl anwendbare Recht (Rom I-Verordnung)-Ein Bericht über die 
Entstehungsgeschichte und den Inhalt der Artikel 3 und 4 Rom 1-Verordnung. IPrax-Praxis des 
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts, 28 (2008), 377-386. 
6
 Cf. Tang, Z. S.: Parties' Choice of Law in E-Consumer Contracts. Journal of Private 
International Law, 3 (2007) 1, 113-136. 
7
 See the above-mentioned Sections. Cf. Hay, P.-Borchers, P. J.-Symeonides, S. C.: Conflict of 
Laws. 5th ed., St. Paul, 2010. 1090-1098; Weintraub, R. J.: Commentary on the Conflict of Laws. 
New York, 6th ed., 2010. 517. et seq.; Rühl, G.: Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of 
Contacts. In: Gottschalk, E.-Michaels, R.-Rühl, G.-von Hein, J. (eds): Conflict of Laws in a 
Globalized World. Cambridge-New York, 2007. 160. et seq. 
8
 For the US rules cf. Healy, J. J.: Consumer Protecion Choice of Law: European Lessons for 
the United States. Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 19 (2009), 537. et seq. 
9
 Bonomi, A.: Mandatory Rules in Private International Law-The Quest for Uniformity of 
Decisions in a Global Environment. In: Sarcevic, P.-Volken, P.-The Swiss Institute of Comparative 
Law (eds): Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. 1, 1999. 215-248; Wojewoda, M.: Mandatory 
Rules in Private International Law-With Special Reference to the Mandatory System under the Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, 7 (2000) 2, 183-213; Dickinson, A.: Third-Country Mandatory Rules in the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations: So Long, Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu? Journal of 
Private International Law, 3 (2007) 1, 53-88; Benzenberg, E.: Die Behandlung ausländischer 
Eingriffsnormen im internationalen Privatrecht. Eine Studie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
internationalen Schuldrechts. Jena, 2008. 
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had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-
application. 
Moreover, in certain instances, the law of the consumers' habitual residence also has 
relevance. In Europe, the rule is expressly stated in Rome I: according to Art. 6(2), the 
parties may not "lower" the level of consumer protection the consumer would have in the 
absence of such a choice.10 There's a similar problem with EU consumer law: its provisions 
cannot be overridden by the choice of the parties." In the US, the situation is more 
complicated. According to § 187(2)(b) of Restatement (second) of conflict of laws, the law 
chosen by the parties cannot be applied in case the "[...] application of the law of the 
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially 
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which 
[...] would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by 
the parties." We can see that the status of the law which would protect the consumer in the 
absence of a choice by the parties is governed as a public policy issue. Moreover-
surprisingly and strangely for Europeans-the state interest consideration has to be applied 
to ascertain whether the state has a greater interest in order for the provisions to apply. It is 
also important to emphasize that in Europe, the only substantive provisions that may be set 
aside are those that would harm the consumer. In sharp contrast with this, in the US the 
whole choice becomes invalid. However, since in most cases the results will be the same 
this is only a theoretical difference.12 
It can be ascertained that "[...] the American courts have been inconsistent in 
protecting consumers by enforcing the laws of their home states".13 In several cases, 
fundamental public policy was recognized by the court of a foreign jurisdiction. In most 
cases, the law of the consumer's habitual residence either precludes any choice of law or 
prohibits waivers under the substantive rules.14 In certain cases, however, contrary to the 
general rule, courts have ruled otherwise.'5 
Beyond the above, it is important to mention that an earlier version of the U.C.C. in its 
§ 1-301 also contained provisions for some time the provided protection for consumers in a 
similar way to how it is done in Europe. In 2001, the U.C.C. was amended, but since the 
states-except for the Virgin Islands-did not promulgate the amendment, the NCCUSL later 
(in 2007) reverted to the previous legislation.16 According to the 2001 revision, in general, 
parties would have had more freedom to choose a law, even one with no connection to a 
contract. However, this did not apply to consumer contracts, where the requirement for a 
10
 Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation. 
"Such a choice may not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection 
afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, 
in the absence of choice, would have been applicable [...]" 
cf. Healy: op. cit. at 536 et seq. 
11
 Numerous provisions on this issue can be found in consumer law directives. Therefore we only 
cover their main goal here without deeper analysis. 
12
 Riihl: op. cit. at 170. 
13
 See Healy: op. cit. at 536 et seq. 
14
 Rühl: op. cit. at 169. 
15
 For such cases see Healy: op. cit. 
16
 For background see Graves, J. M.: Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure 
of Revised U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform. Selon Hall Law Review, 36 (2005), 
535; Weintraub, R.: Commentary On The Conflict Of Laws. op. cit. 513 et seq. 
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reasonable relation remained.17 Yet consumers were also expressly protected, since the 
chosen law was not allowed to vary legislation of the state or country in which the consumer 
resided.18 As already mentioned, this legislation was not well received and was revoked in 
2007. 
3. Special rule for software 
Beside the Second Restatement and the U.C.C., we must also consider the rules of the 
Uniform Information Transaction Act (UCITA). The National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) voted to approve the Uniform Information Transaction 
Act (UCITA)19 on July 29, 1999. The Act was intended to become a modification, a new 
Article 2B of the U.C.C. At an early stage, the American Law Institute also supported this 
work but eventually, the document was adopted solely by NCCUSL. The Act created special 
rules for software licenses and transactions. By the time of writing, it has only been adopted 
by two states, Maryland and Virginia.20 In 2003, following harsh criticism,21 the NCCUSL 
withdraw UCITA from consideration for endorsement by the American Bar Association. 
Please note that the provisions of UCITA were generally made for software licenses but its 
scope also covers the sale of software. In a mixed transaction, where computer software and 
physical goods (e.g. a computer) are sold together, UCITA may be only applied to the 
software part of the transaction unless the primary subject matter is the sale or licensing of 
software.22 Regarding choice of a law, UCITA § 109 states that "the parties in their 
agreement may choose the applicable law. However, the choice is not enforceable in a 
consumer contract to the extent it would vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement 
under the law of the jurisdiction whose law would apply [...] in the absence of the 
agreement." 
17
 U.C.C. § 1—301(3X1) (2003). 
18
 U.C.C. § 1-301(3)(2) (2003). 
"Application of the law of the State or country determined pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) may 
not deprive the consumer of the protection of any rule of law governing a matter within the scope of 
this section, which both is protective of consumers and may not be varied by agreement: (A) of the 
State or country in which the consumer principally resides, unless subparagraph (B) applies; or (B) if 
the transaction is a sale of goods, of the State or country in which the consumer both makes the 
contract and takes delivery of those goods, if such State or country is not the State or country in which 
the consumer principally resides." 
19
 The original text as adopted in 1999 available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ 
ucita/ucita200.htm. Later, in 2000 and in 2002 it was modified. Cf. Ballon, I. C.: E-Commerce and 
Internet Law (Volume 2, 2001). West, 2009, 20-17. et seq.; Delta, G. B.-Matsuura, J. H.: Law of the 
Internet. Aspen, 2011. 13-97 (§ 13. 07) et seq. 
20
 On the other hand, more than a dozen states have introduced versions of UCITA, but they 
never got adopted. D. Hart, J.: Internet Law: A Field Guide. Arlington, 2008. 501. 
21
 "Writing a law which makes it almost impossible to sue software publishers for defects is a 
poor way to manage the escalating level of software customer dissatisfaction with bad software and 
bad support." Kaner, C.-Pels, D. L.: Ucita: a bad law that protects bad software. Network World, 1999 
available at http://www.badsoftware.com/networld.htm 
22
 Delta-Matsuura: op. cit... at 13-99 (§ 13. 07). 
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III. The law applicable in the absence of a choice 
1. Europe 
In the EU, in the absence of any choice of law made by the parties, Art. 4( 1 )(a) Rome I 
Regulation, in theory dictates that the law of the habitual residence of the seller should be 
applied.23 However, this does not hold in our case, since in order to protect24 the consumer, 
Art. 6(1) Rome I Regulation reverses the rule for consumer contracts: in such cases, the 
habitual residence of the consumer must be applied.25 Though a condition for this rule is 
that the professional (the business entity) must conduct activity in the country of the 
consumer. 
The law applicable to contracts for downloading software, music and films over the 
Internet is generally the law of the country where the consumer has his or her habitual 
residence, provided that is the location of the download process and that the site presents a 
request to conclude a contract.26 A passive website through which concluding a contract is 
not possible, cannot be considered to be activity in that country.27 The situation is similar 
with respect to third states (non-MSs). If a company from a third state maintains a website 
and contracts can be concluded through the website, the habitual residence of the consumer 
will likely have relevance. If someone concludes a consumer contract with a New York 
based company and buys goods from New York via the Internet, the contract may be a 
consumer contract according to Art. 6 of Rome I, and the general rules of the Regulation28-
which would lead us to the law of the seat of the company, i.e. to New York law-cannot be 
applied. Of course, in order to reach this conclusion, the term "directed activity" has to be 
interpreted, taking into consideration all circumstances of the case (the targeted activity 
test).29 In the test, anything may have relevance: the offer on the website, shipping 
conditions, the e-mails the parties sent each other, etc. A good question is what should 
happen if the website is passive, but the consumer writes an email to the company in order 
to purchase something. In this case too, all circumstances of the sale may have relevance: 
the advertisements on the company's website offering worldwide delivery, where the 
contract was concluded, where the parties were based, where the computer was, where the 
goods were to be delivered, where payment took place, the place of breach, etc.30 The 
application of this test merits some criticism, since some vagueness remains in most of the 
cases after reviewing the circumstances.31 
23
 "[... I a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the 
seller has his habitual residence". 
24
 For the scope of protection see Tang: op. cit. 213-229. 
25
 Dicey, A. V.-Humphrey. J.-Morris, C.-Collins, L.: The Conflict of Laws-Fourth Cumulative 
Supplement to the Fourteenth Edition. Oxford, 2011. 393-394; Leible-Lehmann: Die Verordnung... 
op. cit. at 537. 
26
 Gillies, L. E.: Electronic Commerce and International Private Law. Hampshire—Burlington, 
2008. 141. 
27
 Ragno, F.: The Law Applicable to Consumer Contracts under the Rome I Regulation. In: 
Ferrari, F.-Leible, S. (eds): Rome I Regulation, op. cit. 147. 
28
 Esp. Art. 4( 1 )(a) Rome I Regulation. 
29
 Callies: op. cit. at 124-155. 
30
 Fawcett, J.-Harris, J. M.-Bridge, M.: International Sale of Goods In The Conflict of Laws. 
Oxford, 2005. 1221 et seq. 
31
 Gillies: Electronic Commerce, op. cit. 141. 
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2. USA 
Contrary to the European solution, where there are unified rules, the situation in the US is 
by far more challenging. Even though the parties' right to the choice of law is granted by all 
states, the other rules of the Restatement (second) of conflict-of-laws is respected only by 
approximately half of them (23 jurisdictions).32 The other states employ different 
approaches: this is one of the reasons why American choice-of-law rules seem quite chaotic 
for Europeans. Among these approaches we may find the following main principles as well 
as combinations thereof: 
— The classic "place of contracting" principle (12 states take this approach)33 
— Centre of gravity test (significant contact approach, used by four states and Puerto 
Rico)34 
— Better law approach 
— Governmental interest approach (applied, e.g. in California)35 
— Law of the forum 
— Place of performance 
— Purpose of the agreement36 
§ 188 of the Second Restatement uses the following choice-of-law principles:37 
— The law of the state/country that has the most significant relationship to the 
transaction and the parties. Under this principle, factors considered are the place of 
contracting, negotiations and performance, the location of the subject matter of the 
32
 Symeonides, S. C.: The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present, Future. Leiden, 
2006. 88; Symeonides, S. C.: Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002: Sixteenth Annual 
Survey. American Journal of Comparative Law, 51 (2003) 1. 
33
 Hay-Borchers-Symeonides: Conflict of Laws, op. cit. at 1159 et seq. 
34
 Ibid, at 1175 et seq. 
35
 The court "must search to find the proper law to apply based upon the interests of the litigants 
and the involved states". Reich and Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 553, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31. 33 (1967) 
36
 Hay-Borchers-Symeonides: Conflict of Laws, op. cit. at 1164 et seq. 
37
 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971) 
"(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by 
the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to be 
taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: 
(a) The place of contracting, 
(b) The place of negotiation of the contract, 
(c) The place of performance, 
(d) The location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the 
parties. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the 
particular issue. 
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the 
local law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203." 
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contract, and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties. 
- The place of negotiations and the place of performance, if they fall in the same state. 
Clearly, for international e-commerce transactions this principle is not applicable. 
By comparison, the U.C.C. states in its § 1—301(b) that "in the absence of an agreement 
[...] the Uniform Commercial Code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation 
to this state". The term 'appropriate relation' is not defined in the U.C.C. However, it 
"should be interpreted to mean the 'most significant relationship'; the term should not be 
regarded as merely inviting the courts to apply their non-UCC rules".38 In this sense, it is 
similar to Restatement the second. 
Surprisingly for European scholars, we do not find specific rules for consumer or 
e-consumer contracts. In this regard two circumstances may have significance. In certain 
cases, American courts employ the "public policy trick" to apply the laws of the consumer's 
habitual residence.39 There is also relevant new case law: the court in Boudreau v. Scitex 
Corp.40 held that because the e-mails and other communications concerning the contract 
were received in Massachusetts, the law of that state should be applied. Such case law can 
be rooted in the legal thinking of an old landmark case, the Chinese hair case, in which a 
New York based buyer and a Chinese seller concluded a sales contract. The exact location 
where the parties concluded the contract could not be identified. In that case, because the 
place of performance was New York, the court applied NY law.41 However, in other cases it 
was emphasized that the place of performance (i.e. of delivery) cannot alone constitute a 
connection to apply the law of the state in which it took place. 
Summarizing the above, we may ascertain that if the place of performance and the 
consumer's residence are in the same state as in most e-commerce transactions, we may 
assume that the law of the consumer's habitual residence will be applied, just like in Europe. 
However, as in Europe, in an e-contract all circumstances may have relevance. In the US, 
protection is granted with reference to public policy. 
IV. Some other relevant provisions-territorial limits in the US and the country 
of origin principle in the EU law 
/. Territorial limitations in the US 
Besides choice-of-law rules, there are some very important provisions that may also have 
an effect on the law to be applied. A good example can be found in New York State law.42 
Here, the courts held in several instances that the New York General Business Law (G.B.L.), 
38
 Anderson on The Uniform Commercial Code. West, 1981. § 1-105:24 363. 
39
 Riihl: Party autonomy..., op. cit. at 169. 
40
 For the US interpretation of the term "place of contract" in e-commerce transactions see 
Street, F. L..-Grant, M. P.: Law of the Internet. Charlottesville, 2004. 3-83 § 3.04 et seq. 
41
 Xuchang Rihetai Human Hair Goods Co. v. Hanyu Intem. USA Inc., 2001 WL 883646, 45 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
42
 A well-structured compendium of New York consumer law cases collected by Justice Thomas 
A. Dickerson (Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department of the New York State 
Supreme Court) available on the internet year to year. For the last year (2011) see 
h t t p : / / w w w . n y s b a . o r g / C o n t e n t / N a v i g a t i o n M e n u 2 1 / C o m m i t t e e P a g e s / C l a s s A c t i o n / 
CONSUMERLAW2011.pdf (February 1, 2012) 
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which contains some important provisions for consumers, prescribes in §349 that the 
transaction in which the consumer is deceived must occur in New York. "Following this 
latest interpretation of 'territorial reach' by G.B.L. § 349, the court in Truschel v. Juno 
Online Services, Inc., a consumer class action suit alleging misrepresentations by a New 
York based internet service provider, dismissed the G.B.L. § 349 claim because the named 
representative entered into the internet contract in Arizona. Notwithstanding the [...] 
territorial limitation, the Court in Peck v. AT&T Corp, consumer class action involving cell 
phone service which improperly credited calls causing (the class) to lose the benefit of 
weekday minutes included in their calling plans, approved a proposed settlement on behalf 
of residents in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut."43 It was emphasized that "it would 
be a waste of judicial resources to require a different class action in each state [...] where 
the defendants have marketed their plans on a regional [basis]". 
2. The country of origin principle in Europe 
In the EU as well, there is a serious problem with electronic contracting, involving the 
country-of-origin principle44 used in the directive on electronic contracting (hereinafter 
referred to as: "Directive").45 According Art 3 of the Directive, 
"1. Each Member State shall ensure that the information society services provided by a 
service provider established on its territory comply with the national provisions 
applicable in the Member State in question which fall within the coordinated field. 
2. Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the 
freedom to provide information society services from another Member State." 
This complicated text in practice means that the service provider "brings" its laws to 
another state, and may have the same benefits as domestically. Consequently, in a case 
where a corporate website (The Sunday Mirror) caused harm by releasing news about 
singer Kylie Minogue, the European Court of Justice held that compensation to be paid 
cannot be higher than in the state where the website is based (in practice, where the 
43
 Consumer Law 2005 Update-The Judge's Guide To Federal And New York State Consumer 
Protection Statutes page 17, available at 
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu21/CommitteePages/ClassAction/Consumer_ 
Law_2005_Update.pdf 
44
 Blasi, M.: Das Herkunfislandprinzip der Fernseh- und der e-Commerce-Richtlinie. Köln-
Berlin-München, 2004; Fallon, M.-Meeusen, J.: Le commerce électronique, la directive 2000/31/CE 
et le droit international privé. Revue critique de droit international privé, 91 (2002) 3, 435-490; 
Bönig: The European Directive... op. cit.; Drasch, W.: Das Herkunftslandprinzip im internationalen 
Privatrecht. Baden-Baden, 1997; Mankowski, P.: Das Herkunftslandprinzip als Internationales 
Privatrecht der e-commerce-Richtlinie. Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 100 (2001) 
2, 138-139; Thünken, A.: Das kollisionsrechtliche Herkunftslandprinzip. Frankfurt, 2003, 23; Hönig, 
N.: The European Directive on e-Commerce (2000/31/ЕС) and its Consequences on the Conflict of 
Laws. Global Jurist Topics, 5 (2005) 2, 17-18; Naskret, S.: Das Verhältnis zwischen Herkunfts-
landprinzip und Internationalem Privatrecht in der Richtlinie zum elektronischen Geschäftverkehr. 
Münster-Hamburg-London, 2003. 
45
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market ("Directive on electronic commerce") OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, 1-16. 
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website's owner has its seat).46 Thus, even if compensation awarded abroad were higher 
and thus the provider's obligations were greater, laws of the website's "homeland" have to 
be applied-overwriting classic rules of collision. 
However, the Directive has some "hidden" provisions for contracts in its Annex, which 
state that Arts 3(3), 3(1) and 3(2) do not apply to "the freedom of the parties to choose the 
law applicable to their contract" and to "contractual obligations concerning consumer 
contacts". As a result, in our case we do not have to take into consideration the Directive's 
provisions regarding applicable law. If these provisions were not included, we would have 
to apply the seller's law to the contract, and not that of the consumer. 
IV. Conclusions 
The system of remedies is significantly different in Europe than in the US. Consequently, in 
a legal dispute, the question of which law should be applied follows right after the 
procedural issues not covered by this article (e.g. in which state to sue, or how to enforce a 
judgment). It is clear that sometimes it may be beneficial for consumers to force the court to 
apply the law of their habitual residence in order to achieve a successful suit. As we have 
seen, this is possible in most cases, irrespective of habitual residence or nationality. In this 
regard the US jurisdiction appears less stable than the European one, but its basic approach 
is similar in most instances. 
46
 Joined cases C-509/09 and C-l 61/10. Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 25 October 
2011. eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v MGN 
Limited (C-161/10), not published yet in the ECR. 
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and Challenges 
Abstract. This article examines the development and particular nature of the rule of law in the European Union 
against the background of the wider legal and political theoretical debate on the principle. It hence analyses the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Treaty revisions on the rule of law. It argues that the principle 
has developed greatly since the first mention of it in the case law of the Court and contends that the principle has a 
particular focus in the EU on judicial protection in light of human rights. Nonetheless it is hard to apply the 
dichotomies running through the debates in legal and political theory to the development of the principle in the 
EU; an idiosyncratic mix of features seems to emerge. Moreover, this article also takes the case study of the 
external dimension of migration control to assess the current challenges to the rule of law in the EU. It thereby 
uncovers ways of working in the EU that are hard to reconcile with the rule of law requirements. 
Keywords: rule of law, European Union, judicial protection, human rights, migration control 
Introduction 
The rule of law seems a self-evident value for academics and policy-makers and has been 
almost unanimously promoted in the post Cold War world. It is a constitutional cornerstone 
of the EU; the Treaties refer to it multiple times as a foundational value. It seems nonetheless 
that this cornerstone is becoming more porous: it suffers from a lack of conceptualisation 
and is under pressure in some EU policies. 
This article puts the development of the rule of law in the EU in the wider scholarly 
perspective of the legal and political philosophy debates on the principle. What kind of rule 
of law is the EU actually adhering to or promoting? Firstly, this article argues that although 
indeed the EU seems to adhere to a "thick" or "substantive" notion of the principle, it seems 
nevertheless primarily focused on rather formal aspects, such as on judicial review, albeit in 
light of fundamental rights protection. Secondly, this article argues that, contrary to what 
may be conventional wisdom, compliance with the rule of law is at risk in some EU policy 
sectors due to the proliferation of new forms of governance. 
The structure of this article is hence as follows. Section I briefly sets out the main 
conceptual dichotomies running through the debate on the rule of law in legal and political 
philosophy. This presents the different notions and discourses on the principle as 
background. It thereby informs the subsequent analysis of the principle in the EU. The 
development of the principle from it being first invoked by the CJEU in its landmark Les 
Verts case law (1986) to its current constitutional dominance is described in Section II. This 
analysis uncovers idiosyncratic features of the principle in EU law. The first two sections 
* 
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also aim to give a brief overview, or summary, of the main lines of thinking on the rule of 
law in the EU. Finally, Section III takes the case study of the external dimension of EU 
migration control to assess how the rule of law fares in contemporary EU policy making. 
The assessment reveals that despite uplifting rhetoric on the principle its full potential is not 
yet attained in this EU policy area. 
1. Theoretical and Conceptual Discussions on the Rule of Law 
The rule of law arguably suffers from a lack of clear conceptualisation. Many scholars have 
already suggested that as a concept it is perhaps so elusive that this made it in fact so 
universally and globally acceptable.1 Craig even issues a "health warning" to those 
venturing into the rule of law debate; 2 there are so many diverging conceptions and 
academic discussions that the concept is held to become "elusive"3, "essentially contested"4 
and perhaps even "less clear today than ever before".5 This may be overstating it a bit. In 
the Union's "Holy Trinity" of "democracy, human rights and the rule of law", "human 
rights" have the Charter and international treaties to give them substance and "democracy" 
has its ultimate conceptual core in majority-rule through free and fair elections.6 Articulating 
what "the rule of law" means is however rare, also on the national level.7 In the EU there is 
no codified agreement on what the principle should mean, apparently not because it is so 
fiercely publicly contested but exactly because it is not,8 This evokes the slightly 
disconcerting question: if indeed there is no shared notion within the Union, then what is it 
actually claiming to "safeguard", "consolidate" or "support"? And if it is indeed true that 
the principle is so elusive for those actors, can it credibly constrain policies? After all, 
constraining-and not "guiding"-State power is the classic objective of the rule of law as 
traditionally perceived in the liberal-democratic nation-state.9 
The substance, requirements and characteristics of the rule of law are also the object of 
much contention within political and legal theory. This section offers neither an extensive 
nor a conclusive description of what the rule of law means and how it evolved over time. 
Instead, to illustrate that it is "an essentially contested concept", this section aims to give 
some background to the main disputes that exist over its meaning. The rationale for delving 
1
 Tamanaha, B. Z.: On the rule of law-history, politics, theory. Cambridge, 2004. 3. 
2
 Craig, P.: The Rule of Law. Appendix 5 in House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, HL Paper. 2006-
2007. 97. 
3
 Tamanaha: op. cit. 3. 
4
 Waldron, J.: Is the rule of law an essentially contested concept (in Florida)? Law and 
Philosophy, 21 (2002) 2, 148. 
5
 Fallon Jr., R.: The "Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse. Columbia Law 
Review, 97 (1997)1, 1. 
6
 Of course, democracy is not merely majority-rule; an appropriate democracy needs to include 
minority rights and constitutional limitations on law-making and (constitutional) change. 
7
 Pech, L.: The Rule of Law as a constitutional principle of the European Union. Jean Monnet 
Working Paper-NYU School of Law, 4 (2009), 42-43. 
8
 Pech, L.: Rule of Law as a guiding principle of the European Union's external action. CLEER 
Working Papers, 3 (2012) 22. See also Chesterman, S.: An International Rule of Law? American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 56 (2008), 332. 
9
 Tamanaha: op. cit. 114-119. 
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into this conceptual debate is that the development of the rule of law in the EU could be 
analysed and understood along some of these lines. 
Since its origins in "the classics" and medieval times, the rule of law has expanded 
into a concept fundamental to the liberal-democratic nation-state.10 The main dichotomy 
running through the theoretical debate is that between "thin" or "formal" versus "thick" or 
"substantive" concepts of the rule of law. The thinnest version is the "rule by law" 
conception: merely meaning "the government acts through laws" thereby avoiding "rule by 
men". To illustrate, some claim that the Chinese regime adheres to this notion." To endorse 
that conception of the rule of law would however be a misinterpretation of the liberal 
thought in which the concept evolved; "rule by law" lacks the notion of effective limitations 
on government power. 
Therefore, the dominant thin version of the rule of law in liberal thought understands it 
as "formal legality".12 According to central legal theorists such as Hayek and Raz, the rule 
of law's fundamental function would be "guiding the behaviour" of citizens.13 Hence, it 
requires first of all general, prospective, clear and certain laws as the basis of government 
action. Secondly, a set of institutions were deemed necessary by Raz to effectuate the rule 
of law requirements, namely an independent judiciary with open and fair hearings and 
review of administrative and legislative action, and a limitation of security services' 
discretion, such as the police's.14 What is important to understand is that this formal legality 
is "substantively empty"; it essentially only imposes procedural requirements. According to 
some, this "value free nature" made it so widely acceptable.15 Possibly, to the shock of 
some, Raz pointed out that indeed slavery and the rule of law as formal legality could be 
perfectly well reconcilable.16 
Thick (or substantive) theories bring-to different extents-individual rights into the rule 
of law concept. As Dworkin put it: 
"I shall call the second conception of the rule of law the 'rights' conception. It assumes 
that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights 
against the state as a whole. (...) It does not distinguish, as the rule book conception does, 
between the rule of law and substantive justice...".17 
Some have voiced their concern over the anti-democratic implications of such a rights-
based rule of law regime and its inherent judicialisation of politics, by taking the German 
Rechtsstaat as example.18 The thickest substantive version of the rule of law also takes 
socio-economic "welfare" rights into the "dynamic concept" of the rule of law.19 
10
 For example, Plato already discussed the rule of law: Aristotle, Politics, book 3, part XVI. 
11
 Tamanaha: op. cit. 3, 92-93. 
12
 Summers, R. S.: A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law. 6 Ratio Juris, 1993. 127. 
13
 Raz, J.: The Rule of Law and its Virtue. In: Raz, J.: The Authority of Law. Oxford, 1979. 214; 
Hayek, F. A.: The Political Idea of the Rule of Law. Cairo, 1955. See also Waldron, J.: The Rule of 
Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory. Ratio Juris, 2 (1989), 84-85. 
14
 Tamanaha: op. cit. 3, 92-93. 
15
 Ibid. 94. 
16
 Raz: op. cit. 221. 
17
 Dworkin, R.: Political Judges and the Rule of Law. Proceedings of the British Academy, 64 
(1978) 259, 262. 
18
 Tamanaha: op. cit. 108. 
19
 See e.g. International Commission of Jurists: The Rule of Law in A Free Society: A Report of 
the International Congress of Jurists. Geneva, 1959. 
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The rule of law fell also prey to the left-right divide in politics. On the left, mostly in 
Marxist philosophy, the rule of law was seen as a concept of the ruling elite to enforce the 
order of property protection and privilege.20 On the right, especially in the US, the rise of 
the welfare state was seen as a considerable threat to the rule of law understood as formal 
legality, with the generality of government action believed to be in jeopardy by the mounting 
unaccountable administrative machinery of the state interfering ever more individually, or 
even arbitrarily, in citizens' lives.21 
Although it seems that today in (Western) liberal democracies when the rule of law is 
invoked, it comes in the same "package" with democracy and human rights, this need not 
conceptually be the case. In fact, that is problematic: making the rule of law the "mother" 
concept and thus the battleground for clashes over human rights, social values and 
substantive equality comes at the cost of losing clear conceptual boundaries of the principle. 
Recently, theorists have attempted to reconceptualise the rule of law for our times of 
globalisation.22 For obvious reasons this debate is highly relevant when looking at the rule 
of law and the EU, itself being the world's most successful post-nationalist political 
structure. This reconceptualisation is not straight-forward exactly because the rule of law is 
so inextricably linked to the nation-state. In the global arena many of the essential state-like 
powers are not present. Nonetheless, the rule of law even in its thinnest version could add 
much to the ongoing construction of a rule-based global order with its own institutions, 
including those for review of state and individual action, thereby arguably reducing the 
much described "anarchy" in international relations. However, from the strand of critical 
legal theory others have pointed to the "perversity" of the global rule of law in legitimising 
and "organising irresponsibility" for human rights violations.23 
2. Development of the rule of law principle in the EU 
This section gives a brief overview of how the rule of law principle came to the constitutional 
forefront in EU law. It traces mostly the case law of the CJEU and the subsequent treaty 
revisions. From this analysis two questions will be answered: I ) To what conceptual notion 
of the rule of law does the EU adhere? 2) What are the dominant elements of the rule of law 
in the EU? 
2.1. Development of the rule of law in the Court's case law 
It was not until 1986 that the rule of law principle became explicit in the EU legal order; the 
Court held in the landmark Les Verts case that the Community is "based on the rule of 
law".24 However, already before that defining case, the rule of law was implicitly embedded 
in the constitutional structure of the Community. Especially former Art. 164 TEC (later Art. 
220 TEC), akin to Art. 31 of the ECSC Treaty, indicated the rule of law by stipulating that 
"the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the 
20
 Tamanaha: op. cit. 73-77. 
21
 Ibid. 60-72. 
22
 Zifcak, S.: Globalisation and the Rule of Law. London, 2005. 
23
 Veitch, S.: Law and irresponsibility-on the legitimation of human suffering. London, 2007. 
24
 Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, ECR [1986] 1339, para. 23. 
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law is observed" (emphasis added).25 And although the Court had already referred to these 
Articles in its case law before 1986, the "Community based on the rule of law" formula 
signalled a watershed in the Court's role in the constitutionalisation of the principle. In this 
formula the Court thus aligned with the French notion of Communauté de droit (French was 
the language of the procedure), or German notion of Rechtsgemeinschaft.26 This notion 
signals indeed the post-nationalist nature of the EU; in contrast to the Rechtsstaat.21 
In Les Verts the Court had to decide on whether acts of the European Parliament could 
also be annulled under Art. 173 TEC (now Art. 263 TFEU); something that was not stipulated 
by the Treaty as it limited this to acts of the Council and the Commission. However, the 
Court held that notwithstanding this limited list of institutions under Art. 173 TEC 
"...the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, 
inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty. (...) the Treaty established a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality 
of measures adopted by the institutions. Natural and legal persons are thus protected 
against the application to them of general measures which they cannot contest directly 
before the Court by reason of the special conditions of admissibility laid down in the 
second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. (...) The general scheme of the Treaty is 
make a direct action available against 'all measures adopted by the institutions ... 
which are intended to have legal effects' (...) An interpretation of Article 173 of the 
Treaty which excluded measures adopted by the European Parliament from those 
which could be contested would lead to a result contrary both to the spirit of the Treaty 
as expressed in Article 164 and to its system."28 
Hence, the Court introduced the rule of law principle to extend its own jurisdiction and 
the judicial protection offered. In subsequent cases the Court invoked the principle of the 
"Community based on the rule of law" to make similar strides to embolden judicial review 
in the EU.29 For example, in the Sogelma case the Court of First Instance held that an EU 
25
 Fernandez Esteban, M. L.: The Rule of Law in the European Constitution. The Hague, 1999. 
104. She argues that "it results from the analysis of the case law of that the Court of Justice uses both 
Art. 164 of the European Community Treaty and the expression Rule of Law indistinctively". Pech: 
The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. 15, ftnt. 47, argues that this conclusion is not warranted; 
in fact according to him "it may be more accurate to contend that Art. 220 EC initially offered the 
only written basis from which the Court could convincingly derive the principle of a Community 
based on the rule of law." I agree with the Pech on this point; the references in Art. 164/220 EC did 
not yet encompass the full breadth of the Rule of Law principle. 
26
 See for these terms the French and German versions of the judgment. 
27
 It is interesting that the Court did not use the term "Rechtsstaat"; Pech convincingly argues 
that this, obviously, was not deemed appropriate as the Community was not a State. See for a more 
extensive discussion: Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. 11. 
28
 Les Verts, paras 23-24. 
29
 See for example the Zwartveld case in which the Court linked the Les Verts "Community 
based on the rule of law" with the duty of sincere cooperation (then Art. 5 TEC). In casu, the Court 
held that the Commission was under an obligation to provide documents and witnesses to a Dutch 
judicial investigation. Order of the Court in Case C-2/88 Imm., J. J. Zwartveld and Others, ECR 
[1990] 1-3365, especially paras 16-17. 
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agency act, in casu of the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), could fall under the 
action for annulment, something not foreseen in the Treaty. It argued that "it cannot be 
acceptable, in a Community based on the rule of law, that such acts escape judicial 
review".30 In the Commission v. EIB case the Court employed a similar argument to 
adjudicate an act of the Management Committee of the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
under the action for annulment.31 This was also not explicitly foreseen in the Treaty text.32 
The Court, with some judicial activism, thus produced dynamic interpretation to fix 
gaps injudicial review in the EU legal system. In the words of AG Mischio's Opinion in the 
1990 Busseni case: 
"...the Court has on a number of occasions relied on Article 164 of the European 
Community Treaty and the principles deriving from it for the purpose of giving broad 
and coherent interpretation to those provisions of the Treaty which deal with the 
various means of redress, even going so far, when the need arises, as to remedy 
omissions and lacunae within it."33 
It is interesting to see that the Court thus understood the rule of law mostly in 
procedural terms of judicial remedies: the complete system of remedies needs to be 
effectively in place so that decisions of public authorities can be reviewed independently.34 
This serves of course the effective judicial protection of individuals and other entities (the 
"subjective" function), but also serves to check the legality of measures taken, the latter 
mostly referring to the availability and appropriate choice of legal basis and the hierarchy 
of norms to safeguard the institutional balance in the Union (the "objective" function).35 
However, it seems that the Court has increasingly moved towards linking this 
"procedural" or "formal" rule of law concept (dominated by judicial protection) with 
fundamental rights protection. Of course, some of the elements of the formal rule of law 
concept are human rights themselves (e.g. right to an effective remedy)36 but it seems that 
the rule of law is increasingly seen as connected to general fundamental rights protection at 
large. Some recent case law is illustrative in this respect. The controversial Kadi case is 
perhaps the best example. It concerned a so-called "blacklisted" individual (i.e. under anti-
terrorist policies) whose assets had been frozen; he sought to annul that measure. The Court 
of First Instance had held that no judicial remedy could be offered within the EU legal 
order as the origin of the contested Regulation was a UN Security Council resolution.37 As 
30
 Case T-411/06, Sogelma v. EAR, ECR [2008] 11-2771, para. 37. However, the Court had 
before also declared an application under former Art. 230 TEC inadmissible because it involved an 
agency: Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, ECR [2005] 1-2077, paras 36-44. 
31
 Case C-15/00, Commission v. EIB, ECR [2003] 1-7281, para. 75. 
32
 See former Art. 237(b) TEC. 
33
 Opinion of AG Mischio in Case 221/88, ECSC v. Acciaierie e Fernere Busseni spa in 
liquidation, ECR [1990] 1-495, pt. 20. 
34
 Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. 15. See also Jacobs, F.: The sovereignty 
of law: the European way. Cambridge, 2007. 35. 
35
 See for the objective v. subjective functions: Esteban: op. cit. 122. 
36
 See e.g. Art. 47 Charter. 
37
 Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 of 6 March 2001 prohibiting the export of certain 
goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and 
other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
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this thus concerned international law, the Court of First Instance held that it did not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.38 The Court of Justice however decided otherwise and 
held that 
"...the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of 
prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle 
that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a 
condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to review in the framework of 
the complete system of legal remedies established by the Treaty. ( . . . ) Review by the 
Court of the validity of any Community measure in the light of fundamental rights 
must be considered to be the expression, in a Community based on the rule of law, of a 
constitutional guarantee [our emphasis] stemming from the EC Treaty as an 
autonomous legal system (,..)."39 
The clear link between the "formal" rule of law requirements and the "substantive" 
protection of fundamental rights is thus clear. Also in the PKK case the Court has held that 
in a "Community based on the rule of law" restrictive measures cannot go unchecked by the 
judiciary.40 In the UFA case, although the eventual outcome was not beneficial for the 
applicants, the Court linked these elements perhaps most explicitly when it held: 
"The European Community is, however, a community based on the rule of law in 
which its institutions are subject to judicial review of the compatibility of their acts 
with the Treaty and with the general principles of law which include fundamental 
rights. Individuals are therefore entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights 
they derive from the Community legal order (,..)."41 
2.2. The rule of law in EU Treaty making 
Quite surprisingly, it was not until the Maastricht Treaty (entry into force in 1993) that the 
rule of law was explicitly mentioned in EU's constitutional text. However, this was still 
"mostly symbolic"42 and was in no way as strongly worded as the Court had done in Les 
Verts. Instead the preamble to the Treaty indicated that the Member States "confirmed their 
attachment" to inter alia the rule of law. The Amsterdam Treaty (entry into force in 1999) 
finally repeated the Court's formula and stated thus that the "Union is founded on the 
337/2000 [2001] OJ L67/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin 
Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 
[2002] OJ LI39/9. 
38
 The Court of First Instance did however hold that it would have jurisdiction if jus cogens 
norms would be in question. See: Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European 
Union and Commission of the European Communities, ECR [2005] 11-03649, para. 226. 
39
 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and A! Barakaat Internationa! 
Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, ECR 
[2008] 1-03651, paras 285 and 316. Strictly speaking the Court only adjudicated the EU implementing 
measure of the UN resolution. 
40
 Case C-229/05 P, PKK and KNК v. Council, ECR [2007] 1-439, paras 109-110. 
41
 Case C-50/00 P, UPA, ECR [2002] 1-6677, paras 38-39. 
42
 Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. 17. 
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principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States" (emphasis added).43 
The Treaty of Lisbon changed the wording from "principles" to "values", something 
generally seen as insignificant in academic analysis.44 Also, over the course of the Treaty 
revisions, the rule of law has been worded in the Treaty as an objective for EU's foreign 
policy (Arts 21(1) and (2b) TEU), as condition for the accession of new Member States 
(Art. 49 TEU), and as ground for punitive measures against Member States in (or risking) 
"serious and persistent" breach of the rule of law (Art. 7 TEU).43 The Charter also refers to 
the rule of law in its Preamble, but here still as "principle". From this brief overview, three 
conclusions are appropriate. Firstly, the Treaty text also clearly presents the rule of law 
principle separately but in package with human rights and fundamental freedoms, something 
that, as argued above, increasingly emerges from the Court's case law as well. Secondly, the 
rule of law is also used as a, what Pech calls, "politico-legal benchmark": current and 
potential Member States need to act in accordance with the rule of law to enjoy full EU 
membership.46 And thirdly, perhaps more than other constitutions, the Treaties clearly 
present the rule of law as a value to be exported in the Union's external relations.47 
2.3. What Notion and Understanding of the Rule of Law in the EU? 
Taking the legal and political theory debate as presented in section 2 and the analysis of 
case law and Treaty revisions in sections 3.1. and 3.2. as background, this section attempts 
to establish what kind of rule of law the EU is adhering to. 
A prima facie analysis of the development of the rule of law in the EU may seem to 
indicate a development from a "thin" or "formal" to a "thick" or "substantive" notion of the 
concept. It seems that when the principle was developed by the Court it focused on 
providing the remedy as such; it served therefore to expand the "complete system of 
remedies" and to assert the independence of the EU legal order. Also, the rule of law 
principle provided the Court with an opening to assert and extend its own jurisdiction. The 
focus then gradually shifted to the rule of law as necessary principle to ensure human rights 
protection.48 However, contrary to what some academics argue, this does not necessarily 
imply that the Union now adheres to a full "substantive" notion of the rule of law as 
discussed in the theoretical debate. That notion implies that the rule of law includes human 
rights and perhaps even democracy; essentially that there is no rule of law if that law is 
unjust or immoral. 
Although it is true that the Union legal order, mostly through the Charter and accession 
to the ECHR, has increasingly acknowledged rule of law principles (e.g. right to effective 
43
 Art. 2 TEU. Laurent Pech shows convincingly in his long article that the rule of law is indeed 
a principle "common to the Member States": Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. 
44
 See Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. 21. 
45
 Art. 7 TEU has never actually been used against a Member State. 
46
 Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. para. 4.2.1. 
47
 Larik argues that the EU Treaties are not an odd outlier when it comes to wording such 
explicit principles to guide external relations. Although it is one of the "most explicit" such 
constitutional provisions, he considers them "the vanguard of a global trend". See Larik, J.: Shaping 
the international order as a Union objective and the dynamic internationalisation of constitutional law. 
С LEER Working Papers, 5 (2011 ), 36-37. 
48
 See for such a conclusion Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. 53. 
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remedy) as fundamental rights, and it is also true on a conceptual level that the rule of law 
always includes some moral ideals and minimum rights,49 this does not necessarily entail 
that the rule of law concept is now fully "substantive". Indeed, the rule of law and human 
rights go now hand in hand in the Union legal order, as also shows from the Treaty, but the 
Court invokes the rule of law mostly to justify decisions related to legal remedies. That this 
rule of law often serves fundamental rights protection would not necessarily alter that 
conclusion: it does not mean that human rights are an inherent part of the rule of law. It 
means however clearly that the rule of law and fundamental rights are principles inextricably 
linked. Supporting and obvious evidence for an intertwined but separate legal and 
conceptual understanding of the rule of law and fundamental rights would also be the 
separate wording of the principles in the Treaty in Art. 6 TEU. I would thus agree with 
Arnull when he argues that such a rule of law notion for the Union enables conceptualising 
"a meaning which is distinct from, though complementary to, that of the other principles on 
which the Union is said to be founded".50 
However, applying the political and legal theory debate to the Union legal order also 
shows that this debate wields only limited relevance. Rather a more mixed and nuanced 
picture emerges in the EU where, as said before, the rule of law is increasingly connected to 
fundamental rights protection. The rule of law, although itself lacking clear justiciability,51 
is thus the "umbrella" principle from which different specific principles are derived that are 
connected with the assertion of the independent Union legal order as founded as a 
Rechtsgemeinschaft in which fundamental rights are protected.52 Additionally, as explained 
in the previous section, from the Treaty it becomes evident that the rule of law also evolved 
into a "politico-legal" benchmark for current and future Member States and that it 
increasingly became an overarching value in EU's external relations. All these aspects are 
peculiar features of the rule of law in the EU. 
3. Challenges for the rule of law in the EU: the external dimension of migration control 
One may assume that after such solid case law by the Court and the explicit constitutional 
enshrinement of the principle, the rule of law is now in safe hands in the EU. That 
assumption may be further emboldened by the increased jurisdiction for the Court after the 
Lisbon Treaty; the court now has formal jurisdiction over a wider range of EU entities and 
policy fields.53 There is, however, reason to be cautious on this optimistic conclusion. 
The policy field of the external dimension of migration control provides an excellent 
case to put EU's rhetorical commitment to the rule of law to the test. It is an area in which 
49
 Ibid. 28. 
50
 Arnull, A.: The Rule of Law in the European Union. In: Arnull, A.-Wincott, D. (eds): 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union. Oxford, 2002. 254. 
51
 Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional... op. cit. 9, 30, 46. 
52
 Esteban: op. cit. 175. 
53
 The Lisbon Treaty added to the institutions of the Union also the agencies and other bodies of 
the EU, see e.g. Art. 263 TFEU. Former third pillar dealing with Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters (PJCC) is now also firm in the jurisdiction of the Court, albeit with a five-year 
transitional period, see Art. 10, Protocol on transitional provisions. The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) still falls outside its jurisdiction. 
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internal and external aspects of the rule of law meet: it presents both an area where far-
reaching administrative actions are taken to limit irregular migration, thus calling for 
judicial review, and where the Union "goes abroad" to persuade third States to cooperate 
with its migration policy, thus calling for rule of law promotion. 
3.1. The External Dimension of EU s Migration Control Policy 
For those not familiar with the external dimension of migration control it may be good to 
outline in this section the main features of this policy field. At the outset it should be noted 
that in the EU there exists no clearly circumscribed policy field bearing the name "external 
dimension of EU migration control". Also, there is no single EU entity dealing with this area. 
However, roughly speaking, this "external dimension" refers to all those policies to be 
implemented outside the EU (although often by or with the support of the EU) that aim to 
contribute to EU migration control. Cooperation with third State governments or 
international organisations is usually indispensable for this. Hence, it means that migration 
concerns have become part of EU's wider external relations. 
With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty the foundations were laid for EU migration and 
asylum policy. It was not until 1999 that the European Council in Tampere called for greater 
coherence between internal and external policies of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
field.54 In the subsequent years ever more attention was given to this important political aim 
of the EU. Cooperation of third States with EU's migration control agenda is now regarded 
as crucial by EU policy makers.55 
Nowadays, the main EU strategic document on the "external dimension" is the "Global 
Approach for Migration and Mobility" (GAMM, as recently the Commission proposed a 
renewed version) which is intended to address the external dimension of migration in a 
coherent way.56 Different approaches to the external dimension come together in this 
document: the "migration-development nexus", the preventive "root causes" approach and 
restrictive migration control.57 The emerging core instrument for the "external dimension" 
seems to be the "Mobility Partnership" which includes components such as a readmission 
agreement, cooperation with Frontex (EU Border Agency), enhanced mobility for certain 
groups of third-country nationals and capacity-building programmes for foreign security 
services (such as border guards).58 However, also the implementation of EU visa policy by 
airlines on foreign airports can be considered part of the "external dimension".59 The same 
54
 European Council (1999), Conclusions of the Presidency, Tampere. 
55
 See e.g. European Council: The Stockholm Programme An open and secure Europe serving 
and protecting citizens. OJ 2010, С 155/01, at 28. 
56
 See for the recently proposed changes: European Commission Communication: The global 
approach to migration and mobility, COM(2011) 743 final. The original Global Approach was 
adopted in 2005. 
57
 ibid. 5-7. 
58
 See European Commission Staff Working Document: Mobility partnerships as a tooI of the 
global approach to migration, SEC(2009) 1240. Mobility Partnerships have also been at the centre of 
EU's response to the migration flows resulting from the Arab Spring: European Commission 
Communication: A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean 
countries, COM(2011) 292 final. 
59
 Gil-Bazo, M. T.: The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the European Union's 
Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited. 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 18 (2006) 3-4, 573. 
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goes for extraterritorial Frontex joint operations, also because they are often dependent on 
arrangements with third State governments or international organisations. 
Along with this greater attention for the "external dimension" came a body of academic 
literature addressing it from different disciplinary directions, most notably from political 
and legal scholarship. Concepts such as "externalisation", "extra-territorialisation" or 
"remote border control" were developed to understand this new push in JHA policy-
making.60 Although the meanings of these concepts diverge, the red line running through 
them is the conclusion that the EU is pursuing ever more policies that aim to "shift the 
border outside".61 This is done 1) by making external entities (e.g. third States, international 
organisations, private entities) responsible for elements of migration control or 2) by 
operating those controls outside EU territory. Some have understood this as an "effective" 
way to limit unwanted irregular migration while maintaining mobility for EU citizens and 
pre-authorised travellers.62 From legal scholarship several contributions have also identified 
challenges resulting from these "externalisation" approaches to safeguarding human rights 
and the rule of law.63 
3.2. Challenges for the Rule of Law 
The scope of this article does not allow for an extensive overview of all the external 
dimension practices and all the possible challenges for the rule of law. However, a few 
elements of the external dimension are identified to highlight the extent to which the rule of 
law is under pressure in these practices; most notably Frontex joint operations. Three such 
elements are presented: secret and unclear ways of working, lack of legal basis, lack of 
judicial remedies and the risk to external rule of law promotion. 
Firstly, much of the external relations initiatives in this field are shrouded in secrecy 
and fuzziness. Many of the working arrangements between EU governments or agencies 
(e.g. Frontex) and third State authorities are not publicly accessible. They are also not 
subject to the regular constitutional procedures for international treaty-making as foreseen 
in the Treaty, thus also excluding involvement of the European Parliament.64 Moreover, 
effective monitoring is lacking. For example, when joint operations of EU Agency Frontex 
60
 See respectively Boswell, C.: The external dimension of EU migration and asylum policy. 
International Affairs, 79 (2003) 3, 622; Cremona, M.-Rijpma, J. J.: The extra-territorialisation of EU 
migration policies and the rule of law. EUI Working Paper, Law, (2007)1, 12; Guiraudon, V.: Before 
the EU border: remote control of the "huddled masses". In: Groenendijk, K.-Guild, E.-Minderhoud, 
P. (eds): In Search of Europe's Borders. The Hague, 2003, 194-195. 
61
 See Eavenex, S.: Shifting up and out: The foreign policy of European immigration control. 
West European Politics, 29 (2006) 2, 330. 
62
 Guiraudon: op. cit. 194-195. 
63
 See e.g. Fischer-Lescano, A.-Löhr, T.-Tohidipur, T.: Border controls at sea: requirements 
under international human rights and refugee law. International Journal of Refugee Law, 21 (2009) 2, 
256-296; Den Heijer, M.: Europe beyond its borders: refugee and human rights protection in 
extraterritorial immigration control. In: Ryan, B.-Mitsilegas, V.: Extraterritorial immigration control. 
Leiden, 2010. 169-198; Weinzierl, R.-Lisson, U.: Border management and human rights, a study of 
EU Law and the Law of the Sea. Berlin, 2007. 
64
 They are so-called "soft law" often under the name of "working arrangements" therefore not 
scrutinised by the European Parliament under Art. 218 TFEU. 
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"go abroad" no independent monitors are entitled to join.65 It is therefore not always clear 
what is happening in these operations on the high seas or in the territories of third States. 
Within such joint operations it is often difficult to establish liability for actions. As many 
actors are usually involved (Frontex, Member States, international organisations and third 
State authorities) it is difficult to disentangle the web of actions.66 All these factors make it 
difficult for individuals to challenge decisions taken in the course of such operations. 
Because several human and refugee law rights are at stake, these decisions (for example, to 
return a boat with migrants without examination of individuals) may have serious 
repercussions for the lives of those targeted individuals. There are clear risks that individuals 
are returned to a country where his or her life is in danger, in contravention of the non-
refoulement principle. The secret and unclear ways of working make it however extremely 
difficult to establish liability and to build a case worth bringing to a European court.67 
Secondly, for many of the practices in Frontex joint operations, such as interception at 
sea, there is no clear legal basis available in EU law or international law of the sea. Recently 
some efforts have been undertaken to provide such a legal basis in EU law.68 For activities 
on the high seas, the law of the sea applies, with its principles of freedom of the high seas 
and right of navigation for the flag State.69 This is not the place to discuss in detail the 
different justifications under maritime law to stop, search and divert boats in international 
waters, but those options are limited. "Search and rescue" or "absence of nationality", 
sometimes invoked by Frontex,70 are indeed relevant grounds but cannot serve, in my 
opinion, a priori to justify a general and proactive policy of intercepting vessels even if 
65
 During the negotiation of Frontex' new mandate in 2011, some MEPs attempted to include a 
standard independent monitor system of its operations, this is however not included in the new text. 
This is why the Greens voted against the new Regulation in the EP, see The Greens/European Free 
Alliance in the European Parliament: Révision Frontex: des garanties insuffisantes pour le nouveau 
mandat de l'agence. Press Release, 12 July 2011. 
66
 Baldaccini, A.: Extraterritorial border controls in the EU: the role of Frontex in operations at 
sea. In: Ryan, B.-Mitsilegas, V. (eds): Extraterritorial immigration control: legal challenges. Leiden, 
2010. 230. 
67
 See also Mitsilegas, V.: Extraterritorial immigration control in the 21st century: the individual 
and the State transformed. In: Ryan, B.-Mitsilegas, V. (eds): Extraterritorial immigration control 
legal challenges. Leiden, 2010. 39-68. 
68
 European Commission: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code) and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, COM(2011) 
118 final, Annex IV. This proposal to allow for border checks in third countries is currently under 
review by the EP. 
69
 See Arts 87 and 90, UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). 
70
 Frontex Press Kit: Backgrounder on operations. 2010, I: "Joint operations coordinated by 
Frontex represent Europe's biggest search and rescue operation. " Search and rescue is an obligation 
under international law; see mostly the SAR (Search and Rescue), UNCLOS (United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) Conventions. See also 
Council (2010). This Decision is however challenged before the CJEU by the EP on grounds of 
exceeding the implementing powers under Art. 12(5) SBC, see: Action brought on 14 July-European 
Parliament v Council of the European Union, Case C-355/10, OJ 2010, C246/58. The case is pending. 
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they themselves do not indicate a state of distress.71 Neither they can serve to justify push-
back practices.72 Hence, the extra-territorial policy of Frontex JOs should be seriously 
scrutinised on grounds of a lacking adequate legal basis under EU an international law. This 
is not only hard to reconcile under "thick" but also under "thin" notions of the rule of law, 
such as the dominant formal legality notion. 
Thirdly, in many situations there is no remedy available for individuals targeted in the 
wider external dimension. "Extra-territorialising" migration control entails the inherent 
consequence that individuals have increasingly limited access to a European court, as they 
are simply not in Europe, to challenge decisions nevertheless taken, prepared or supported 
by European administrative authorities. It thus results in extending the "executive" reach of 
Europe beyond its territory, without accompanying it with a sound judicial framework. And 
even if migrants are under the control of European authorities, such as in Frontex joint 
operations on the high seas, there is often no remedy available to challenge the decisions 
taken by the border guards before they are being implemented. This is thus irrespective of 
that fact, as highlighted above, that these decisions may have serious human rights 
repercussions. In the recent Hirsi case the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also 
clearly held that the right to an effective remedy under Art. 13 ECHR was violated by 
returning a boat of African migrants from the high seas to Libya.73 Hence, this core right 
flowing from the rule of law is deemed to be under pressure in these operations. However, it 
should be seen in a wider context; by aiming to keep migrants as closely to their country of 
origin as possible the EU is also making it complicated for refugees to reach European 
territory and subsequently get their refugee status recognised in a fair and impartial case. 
Lastly, these "externalisation" pushes by the EU increasingly jeopardise its self-
proclaimed image as a power that exports its core values, such as the rule of law. The 
academic "Normative Power Europe" thesis would arguably have a hard time explaining 
these external policies of the EU.74 The dominant restrictive pushes in the external 
dimension field, such as the readmission agreements and Frontex joint operations, thus 
delegitimize the rhetoric from Brussels about human rights and the rule of law. Apart from 
the expected long-term international relations repercussions resulting from this, it is also 
hard to reconcile with the Treaties that so vehemently proclaim that the rule of law should 
guide external policies. 
This uncovers the diverging nature of the internal and external "functions" of the rule 
of law in the EU; respectively to constrain administrative action and to promote the 
principle externally. It is especially the constraint function of the rule of law that is easily 
71
 Article 110(1 .d), UNCLOS authorizes the visiting of a ship on the basis of suspicion that the 
ship is without nationality. Art. 98 UNCLOS, and the above-mentioned additional conventions, lay 
down a "search and rescue" obligation. These articles can indeed be legal bases for intercepting a 
vessel. However, these legal bases must not become a justification to stop any boat for which there is 
a "suspicion" that migrants are on board. Boarding without any of these legal bases available is thus 
problematic, although apparently vessels have been boarded without any clear distress situation, see 
Papastavridis, E.: "Fortress Europe" and Frontex: within or without international law? Nordic Journal 
of International Law, 79 (2010), 86, ftnt. 56. 
72
 In the UNCLOS there is no legal basis for the coercive push-back of vessels to third States. 
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 ECtHR, Hirsi and others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, judgment of 23 February 2012. 
See especially paras 205-207. 
74
 See Manners, I.: Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms? Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40 (2002) 2, 235-258. 
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disregarded in EU external relations, as it is assumed that third parties, and not the EU 
itself, should improve on its rule of law record. However, the extraterritorial migration 
control evidences how this assumption may sometimes be unfounded. 
Conclusion 
This section offers a brief overview of the main conclusions of this article and adds a few 
critical notes. As we have seen in this article, the rule of law has made a remarkable 
development in the EU. From the first mention in Les Verts in 1986 it has now become a 
prominent constitutional cornerstone. Through the sometimes daring and dynamic case law 
of the Court it developed a strong emphasis on judicial protection to safeguard human rights 
in the EU. The Treaty has followed, albeit with delay, and now prominently features the rule 
of law as a foundational value of the EU, alongside other values such as fundamental rights 
and democracy. It is thus clear that in the EU the rule of law cannot be easily captured in the 
"all-or-nothing" theoretical dichotomy on "thin" versus "thick" notions of the principle. 
Instead, the principle is accorded idiosyncratic "procedural" features of judicial review but 
is nevertheless strongly connected with fundamental rights protection. Moreover, the 
constitutional text of the EU also holds the rule of law to be a "politico-legal benchmark" for 
current and future members and stresses the guiding role of the principle in external relations. 
No matter how far the rule of law has indeed developed in the EU, the analysis in this 
article also uncovered persisting weaknesses. In the external dimension of migration control 
there are secret and unclear ways of working emerging that present serious threats to 
effectively upholding the rule of law. Moreover, the lack of judicial remedies accessible to 
individuals on the move who encounter "externalised" EU administrative actions and of 
inadequate legal basis for the carried out activities are at odds with basic rule of law 
requirements. In fact, problems in the EU with regard to legality, especially related to lack 
of adequate legal basis, may not be limited to the case study assessed in this article. It 
would hence be interesting for future academic contributions to examine whether peculiar 
features of EU governance prompt such problems. There may be a general trend in the EU, 
due to its specific sui generis nature, under which cooperation and initiatives are first 
"experimented" and, if they are deemed successful, given a proper legal basis only later on. 
The analysis in this article has also highlighted the different functions of the rule of 
law internally and externally, respectively dealing with the constraint of administrative 
action and with the promotion of the principle abroad. These two functions are in an uneasy 
relationship in fields such as the external dimension of migration control where restrictive 
administrative action of EU authorities and promotion of the rule of law are sometimes 
difficult to reconcile. 
So, with these identified challenges, the development of the rule of law in the EU 
cannot be expected to have reached its final stage. In fact it is well possible that the Court 
will further extend its jurisdiction to offer increasingly extensive judicial protection as new 
administrative strategies and ways of working feature in the European "executive" branch. 
Therefore, both from an academic and policy perspective the rule of law will expectedly 
remain an area of high interest. Although the substance of the principle, and especially its 
relation with fundamental rights, will remain an area of contestation for theorists, it seems 
that the development of the principle in any given polity will follow its idiosyncratic path 
resulting in different mixtures of and connections between "formal" and "substantive" 
elements. 
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Abstract . The purpose of this paper is to discuss the mergers and acquisitions activity from various perspectives. 
The concept of mergers and acquisitions always has a strong economic background, which will be considered even 
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acquisitions, the economic background of mergers and acquisitions will be examined. From legal point of view 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the mergers and acquisitions activity from various 
perspectives. Mergers and acquisitions always have a strong economical background, which 
will be considered even if the concept is discussed from a legal perspective. 
After clarification of the basic terms of mergers and acquisitions, the economic 
background of mergers and acquisitions will be examined. From legal point of view this 
paper mainly concentrates on the relevant directives in the law of the European Union. The 
scope of this paper does not spread out to the relevant competition law rules in relation to 
the mergers, because of the different character of competition law rules and company law in 
strict manner. 
The special alchemy of a merger or acquisition is the principle that "one plus one 
makes three". The key principle behind buying a company is to create shareholder value, 
over and above that of the sum of the two merging companies. Two companies together are 
more valuable than two separate companies -at least that is the reasoning behind merger and 
acquisition.1 
This rationale is particularly alluring to companies when times are tough. Strong 
companies will act to buy other companies to create a more competitive, cost-efficient 
company. The companies will come together hoping to gain a greater market share or to 
Ph.D. student. Department of Business, Agricultural and Labour Law, Deák Ferenc Faculty of 
Law and Political Sciences, Széchenyi István University, H-9026 Győr, Egyetem tér 1. 
E-mail: dobosi@sze.hu 
1
 http://www.investopedia.eom/university/mergers/mergersl.asp#axzzlXAYBiC3G, time of 
download: 11.10.2011 
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achieve greater efficiency. Because of these potential benefits, target companies will often 
agree to be purchased when they know they cannot survive alone. The other main grounds 
and accelerators of mergers and acquisitions will be discussed in chapter 2.2. 
1. Basic Elements of Mergers and Acquisitions 
1.1. Distinction between Mergers and Acquisitions 
Although mergers and acquisitions are often meant in the same sense and used as they were 
synonymous, the terms merger and acquisition mean slightly different things. 
When one company takes over another and clearly establishes itself as the new owner, 
the purchase is called an acquisition. From a legal point of view, the target company ceases 
to exist, the buyer "swallows" the business and the buyer's stock continues to be traded. So 
in this case, when a company buys a majority stake of a target company's shares, the 
companies will not merge. 
In the pure sense of the term, a merger happens when two firms, often about the same 
size, agree to go forward as a single new company rather than remain separately owned and 
operated. This kind of action is more precisely referred to as a "merger of equals".2 Both 
companies' stocks are surrendered and new company stock is issued in its place. For 
example, both Daimler-Benz and Chrysler ceased to exist when the two firms merged, and a 
new company, DaimlerChrysler, was created. 
In practice, however, actual mergers of equals don't happen very often. When a deal is 
made between two companies in friendly terms, it is typically proclaimed as a merger. 
Usually, one company will buy another and, as part of the deal's terms, simply allow the 
acquired firm to proclaim that the action is a merger of equals, even if it's technically an 
acquisition. Being bought out often carries negative connotations, therefore, by describing 
the deal as a merger, deal makers and top managers try to make the takeover more 
comfortable. 
A purchase deal will also be called a merger when both CEOs agree that joining 
together is in the best interest of both of their companies. But when the deal is unfriendly-
that is, when the target company does not want to be purchased so the stronger firm 
swallows the target firm-it is always regarded as an acquisition.3 
1.2. Economic Rational of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Regardless of their category or structure, mergers and acquisitions all have one common 
goal that is to create synergy that makes the value of the combined companies greater that 
the joint value of the two parts. The success of a merger or acquisition depends on the 
extent this synergy is achieved. 
Synergy is the most important word that allows for enhanced cost efficiencies of the 
new business. Synergy takes the form of revenue enhancement and cost savings. By 
merging, the companies hope to benefit from the following elements: 
- Cost reductions: Mergers usually results cost-reductions, for example reduction of 
the number of employees. Consider all the money saved from reducing the number 
2
 http://finance.mapsofworld.com/merger-acquisition/difference-between.html, time of down-
load: 11.12.2011 
3
 Ibid. 
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of employees from accounting, marketing and other departments. Job cuts will also 
include one of the former CEOs, who typically leave with a compensation package.4 
- Economies of scale: Mergers also translate into improved purchasing power to buy 
equipment or office supplies, when placing larger orders, companies have a greater 
ability to negotiate prices with their suppliers. 
- Acquiring new technology: To stay competitive, companies need to stay on top of 
technological developments and their business applications. By buying a smaller 
company with unique technologies, a large company can maintain or develop a 
competitive edge. 
- Improved market reach and industry visibility: Companies buy companies to reach 
new markets and grow revenues and earnings. A merge may expand two companies' 
marketing and distribution, giving them new sales opportunities. A merger can also 
improve a company's standing in the investment community: bigger firms often 
have an easier time raising capital than smaller ones. 
The above synergies are not automatically realized when two companies merge. In 
some cases when two businesses are combined they may gain a better position, but 
sometimes it works in reverse. In many cases, one and one add up to less than two.5 
1.3. Types of Mergers6 
With regard to business structures, there are a number of different mergers. A couple of 
these types are listed below, distinguished by the relationship between the two merging 
companies. This distinction is based on an economical perspective; the types of mergers 
based on the Directive 2011/35/EU7 will be discussed below. 
- Horizontal merger: The merger of two companies that are in direct competition and 
share the same product lines and markets. 
- Vertical merger: The merger of a customer and a company or a supplier and a 
company, which is the merger of two companies active in different levels of 
production or supply chain. 
- Market-extension merger: The merger of two companies that sell the same products 
in different markets. 
- Product-extension merger: The merger of two companies selling different but related 
products in the same market. 
- Conglomeration: The merger of two companies that have no common business 
areas. 
4
 http://www.investopedia.eom/university/mergers/mergersl.asp#axzzlXAYBiC3G, time of 
download: 11.12.2011 
5
 Harka, O.: Mergers and Acquisitions. Acta Universitatis Szegediensis, Szeged, 2004. 5. 
6
 Based on the classification of Harka: op. cit. 6. 
7
 Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on Art. 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty 
concerning mergers of public limited liability companies; hereinafter referred to as: "Third Directive", 
which was replaced by Directive 2011/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
April 2011 concerning mergers of public limited liability companies; hereinafter referred to as 
"Merger Directive" 
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1.4. Types of Acquisitions 
From business perspective, acquisition may be only slightly different from a merger. Like 
mergers, acquisitions are actions through which companies seek economies of scale, 
efficiencies and enhanced market visibility. Unlike all mergers, all acquisitions involve one 
firm purchasing another there is no consolidation as a new company. Acquisitions are often 
congenial, and all parties feel satisfied with the deal. Other times, acquisitions are more 
hostile. 
According to the main view of the jurisprudence, we can distinguish between share 
deal and asset deal. In the strict sense, share deal corresponds more to the term of 
acquisition. In the case of an asset deal an asset or assets will be acquired, without acquiring 
shares of the target company. 
In an acquisition a company can buy another company with cash, stock or a 
combination of the two. Another possibility as we discussed above, which is common in 
smaller deals, is for one company to acquire all the assets of another company. 
Regardless of their category or structure, all mergers and acquisitions have one 
common goal: they are all meant to create synergy that makes the value of the combined 
companies greater than the sum of the two parts. The success of a merger or acquisition 
depends on whether this synergy is achieved.8 
2. Conducting an Acquisition Transaction in General 
2.1. The Offer 
When the management of a company decides to carry out a merger or acquisition with a 
public listed company, they will start with a tender offer. 
The process usually starts on the way that the acquiring company carefully and 
discreetly buys up shares in the target company with the aim of building up a position. Such 
takeovers are highly regulated and strictly reviewed in all jurisdictions. In Hungarian Law 
this topic is regulated in the Capital Market Act.9 
2.2. Tender Offers 
We should discuss two principles regarding to the tender offer. One is the "all shareholders 
principle"; the other is the "best purchase price principle". Based on the first all 
discrimination between shareholders is undersaid. Based on the later principle, except for 
two step transactions, all shareholders accepting the offer must receive the highest price 
that was paid to any shareholder during the course of the tender; this however does not 
exclude the possibility of offering different countervalues to the shareholders during the 
course of the tender. 
Regarding to the process of the takeover with the assistance of financial advisors and 
investment bankers, the acquiring company will work out an overall price that it is willing 
to pay for its target in cash, in shares, or both. Investors in a company that is aiming to take 
8
 http://www.investopedia.eom/university/mergers/mergersl.asp#axzzlZBqHYklz, time of 
download: 11.10.2011 
9
 Hungarian Capital Market Act No. 120 of 2001. 
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over another one must determine whether the purchase will be beneficial to them, therefore 
the value of the target must be determined.10 
Of course the two sides of a merger and acquisition deal will have different ideas about 
the worth of a target company; the buyer to achieve the lowest possible price, but the seller 
will tend to value the company as high as possible. 
The most common method of valuation, which is usually carried out with the assistance 
of various experts (lawyers, auditors, investment bankers), is the comparison with other 
companies in an industry. Some other methods of assessment that may be used are the 
following11: 
- Comparative Ratios: The most frequently used of these are the price/earnings ratio 
and the price/sales ratio. 
- Replacement Cost: Acquisitions may be based on the cost of replacing the target 
company, by considering the time needed to assemble a good management, to 
acquire property and to get the right equipment. This method of establishing a price 
however cannot be used in the service industry where the key asses are people and 
ideas which are hard to value and develop. 
- Discounted Cash Flow: This is used as a key valuation tool in mergers and 
acquisitions. It determines the current value according to its estimated future cash 
flows. Forecasted free cash flows are discounted to a present value using the 
company's weighted average cost of capital.12 
2.3. The Target's Response 
When the tender offer has been made, the target company can do the following: 
- Accept the terms of the offer. In case the target's management and its shareholders 
are satisfied with the terms of the transactions, they will accept these terms. 
- Other option is the attempt to negotiate. In the case when the tender offer price is 
not being high enough for the target company's shareholders, or the specific terms 
of the deal are not good enough, then they might try to negotiate better terms. 
Execute a poison bill or some other hostile takeover is also possible. 
- Or the last option is to find a "white knight". The target company's management 
may seek out a friendlier potential acquirer as an alternative. If a "white knight" is 
found, it will offer an equal or higher price for the shares than the hostile bidder. 
2.4. Closing the Deal 
Finally, once the target company agrees to the tender offer and regulatory requirements are 
met and all permissions are obtained, the merger deal will be executed by means of a 
transaction. In a merger in which one company buys another, the acquirer will pay for the 
target company's shares with cash, stock or both. 
10
 Gran, A.: Abläufe bei Mergers & Acquisitions. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 60 (2008), 
1411. 
11
 According to Wegen, G.: Mergers and Acquisitions in Germany. The Comparative Law 
Yearbook of International Business, 14 (1992), 35-37. 
12
 Miller, E. L.: Mergers and Acquisitions, A Step-by-Step Legal and Practical Guide. New 
Yersey, 2008. 31-40. 
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A cash-for-stock transaction is fairly straightforward, the target company's shareholders 
receive a cash payment for each share purchased. If the transaction is made with stock 
instead of cash, then there is a simply exchange of share certificate. 
2.5. Merger Control 
Nowadays, merger control bears also relevance in relation to mergers. In most jurisdictions 
the importance and relevance of competition law is continuously growing, therefore the 
decision-making bodies of merging companies must always be aware of the restrictions and 
limitations imputed by merger control. 
As written above, the scope of this paper does not spread out to the relevant competition 
law rules regarding the mergers, because of the difference character of competition law 
rules and company law in strict manner. 
3. Merger and Acquisition Legislation in the Law of the European Union 
As in non-European jurisdictions, recent general European trends towards a more market-
inclined (shareholder-valued) approach have been observed in corporation attitudes in the 
last 30 years. For example, the Washington Post reported on 11 March 1999: 
"...The change in corporate culture and behaviour here in the past few years has been 
nothing short of radical. The government-coddled climate in France, the cosy 
shareholder relationship in Germany, the secretive empires of the Italians—are all 
giving way to American-style cowboy capitalism... "'3 
The issue of regulatory conformity in the area of company law in the European Union 
drew particular attention from the other jurisdictions around the time when its internal 
market was completed in 1992. 
Now, there are four relevant company law directives in relation to corporate 
reconstruction in the EC: the Merger Directive which regulates mergers between public 
companies, the sixth company law directive, which covers the division of an existing public 
company into entities, the directive, which concerns cross-border mergers and the Takeover 
Directive. 
3.1. The Third Company Law Directive 
Mergers of public companies and divisions of them were conceived within the same idea at 
the time of proposal of the third and sixth directives. The Third Directive was initially 
proposed in 1970 and was adopted based on Art. 54 (3) (g) of EC Treaty in 1978, concerning 
mergers between public companies. 
Under the definition of the Third Directive, there were four types of mergers: mergers 
by acquisition of another company, mergers by formation of a new company, acquisition of 
a wholly owned subsidiary, and analogous operation. The Merger Directive also contains 
these four types of mergers. To characterise a merger type of amalgamation in a word, all 
the assets and liabilities of the acquired company (or companies) are transferred to the 
13
 Swardson, A.: In Europe, An Urge to Conquer Hostile takeovers set new standard. Washington 
Post, (1999/03/11), 1. 
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acquiring company and dissolved without any process of winding up. EU member states 
were obliged to implement the Third Directive by October 13, 1981.14 The Third Directive 
has been substantially amended several times. In the interests of clarity and rationality the 
Third Directive was replaced by the Merger Directive. 
3.1.1. The Scope and the Different Types of Mergers 
Article 1 of the Merger Directive regulates the personal scope of the directive, namely the 
public limited companies, formed validly under national law. The Member States do not 
have to apply the Merger Directive in cases where the company or companies, which are 
being acquired or will cease to exist are the subject of bankruptcy proceedings, proceedings 
relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies, judicial arrangements, compositions and 
analogous proceedings. Based on Art. 2, the Member States shall, as regards companied 
governed by their national laws, make provisions for rules governing merger by the 
acquisition of one or more companies by another and merger by the formation of a new 
company. 
Articles 3 and 4 describe the different types of mergers. Merger by acquisition shall 
mean the operation whereby one or more companies are wound up without going into 
liquidation and transfer to another all their assets and liabilities in exchange for the issue to 
the shareholders of the company or companies being acquired of shares in the acquiring 
company and a cash payment, if any, not exceeding 10% of the nominal value of the shares 
so issued or, where they have no nominal value, of their accounting par value. 
According to Art. 4, merger by the formation of a new company shall mean the 
operation whereby several companies are wound up without going into liquidation and 
transfer to a company that they set up all their assets and liabilities in exchange for the issue 
to their shareholders of shares in the new company and a cash payment, if any, not 
exceeding 10% of the nominal value of the shares so issued or, where they have no nominal 
value, of their accounting par value. Hungarian regulation refers to the two main types of 
mergers: Para. 80 and Para. 81 of the Hungarian Act on Business Associations15 mention 
the two main types of mergers, namely the merger by the formation of a new company and 
merger by acquisition. 
3.1.2. Indirect Protection of Shareholders 
it is important to note that the Merger Directive does not contain explicit provisions for 
direct shareholder protection. We can evaluate the disclosure duties and the expert 
examination during the merger process as indirect protection of shareholders. 
Article 5 contains the details of the draft terms of merger, meanwhile Art. 6 prescribes 
a disclosure duty, namely that draft terms of merger must be published in the manner 
prescribed by the laws of each Member State in accordance with Art. 3 of Directive 68/151/ 
EEC. These rules correspond to the typical information model favoured by EC legislature 
and the ex ante protection of shareholders and creditors. We can find the correlating 
Hungarian provision to the draft terms of merger in Paras 79 and 279 of the Hungarian 
Company Act. 
14
 Ueada, J.: A Comparative Study on Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions: Modelling the 
UK. Germany, the US and Japan for Regulatory Harmonisation. International Company and 
Commercial Law Review, 15 (2004), 358. 
15
 Act No. 4. of 2006 on Business Associations. 
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A merger shall require at least the approval of the general meeting of each of the 
merging companies. The laws of the Member States shall provide that this decision shall 
require a majority of not less than two thirds of the votes attaching either to the shares or to 
the subscribed capital represented. Although, there are possibilities for exemptions laid 
down in Arts 7 and 8. 
The directive does not contain rules regarding to convening of the general meeting or 
exercising of right to vote. Accordingly, there is no harmonisation regarding these questions. 
3.1.3. Report Concerning the Merger 
As described above, mergers and acquisitions always have a strong economical background. 
Article 9 bears in mind this fact, so it prescribes that the administration or management 
bodies of each of the merging companies shall draw up a detailed written report explaining 
the draft terms of merger and setting out the legal and economic grounds for them, in 
particular the share exchange ratio. 
The report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties which have arisen. One 
or more experts, acting on behalf of each of the merging companies but independent of 
them, appointed or approved by a judicial or administrative authority, shall examine the 
draft terms of merger and draw up a written report to the shareholders. However, the laws 
of a Member State may provide for the appointment of one or more independent experts for 
all the merging companies, if such appointment is made by a judicial or administrative 
authority at the joint request of those companies. Such experts may, depending on the laws 
of each Member State, be natural or legal persons or companies or firms. 
In the report the experts must in any case state whether in their opinion the share 
exchange ratio is fair and reasonable. Their statement must at least: 
- indicate the method or methods used to arrive at the share exchange ratio proposed; 
- state whether such method or methods are adequate in the case in question, indicate 
the values arrived at using each such method and give an opinion on the relative 
importance attributed to such methods in arriving at the value decided on. 
The report shall also describe any special valuation difficulties which have arisen. 
Each expert shall be entitled to obtain from the merging companies all relevant information 
and documents and to carry out all necessary investigations. 
Based on Art. 11, all shareholders shall be entitled to inspect at least the following 
documents at the registered office at least one month before the date fixed for the general 
meeting which is to decide on the draft terms of merger: 
- the draft terms of merger; 
- the annual accounts and annual reports of the merging companies for the preceding 
three financial years; 
- an accounting statement drawn up as at a date which must not be earlier than the 
first day of the third month preceding the date of the draft terms of merger, if the 
latest annual accounts relate to a financial year which ended more than six months 
before that date; 
- the reports of the administrative or management bodies of the merging companies; 
- the reports of the experts. 
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3.1.4. Protection of Creditors Based on Arts 13-15 and the Effects of Mergers 
The laws of the Member States must provide for an adequate system of protection of the 
interests of creditors of the merging companies16 whose claims antedate the publication of 
the draft terms of merger and have not fallen due at the time of such publication. 
To this end, the laws of the Member States shall at least provide that such creditors 
shall be entitled to obtain adequate safeguards where the financial situation of the merging 
companies makes such protection necessary and where those creditors do not already have 
such safeguards. 
Such protection may be different for the creditors of the acquiring company and for 
those of the company being acquired. Holders of securities, other than shares, to which 
special rights are attached, must be given rights in the acquiring company at least equivalent 
to those they possessed in the company being acquired, unless the alteration of those rights 
has been approved by a meeting of the holders of such securities, if such a meeting is 
provided for under national laws, or by the holders of those securities individually, or unless 
the holders are entitled to have their securities repurchased by the acquiring company. 
The disclosure duty can be seen as one of the main guaranties of creditor protection in 
the directive. Thus Art. 18 prescribes that a merger must be publicized in the manner 
prescribed by the laws of each Member State, in accordance with Art. 3 of Directive 68/151/ 
EEC, in respect of each of the merging companies. The acquiring company may itself carry 
out the publication formalities relating to the company or companies being acquired. 
Article 19 contains the effects of merger, which effects have to be mentioned under the 
fundamental principles of mergers. Correspondingly, Para. 80 and Para. 81 of Act on 
Business Associations also repeat some of these principles. 
A merger shall have the following consequences ipso iure and simultaneously: The 
transfer, both as between the company being acquired and the acquiring company and as 
regards third parties, to the acquiring company of all the assets and liabilities of the 
company being acquired. The shareholders of the company being acquired become 
shareholders of the acquiring company and the company being acquired ceases to exist. 
3.1.5. Liability Rules Based on Arts 20 and 21 
As mentioned above, the provisions concerning the personal liability of shareholders and 
experts are very important elements of creditor protection. 
Based on Art. 20 of the Directive, the laws of the Member States shall at least lay 
down rules governing the civil liability towards the shareholders of the company being 
acquired of the members of the administrative or management bodies of that company in 
respect of misconduct on the part of members of those bodies in preparing and implementing 
the merger. 
The laws of the Member States shall at least lay down rules governing the civil liability 
towards the shareholders of the company being acquired of the experts responsible for 
drawing up on behalf of that company the report referred to in Art. 10 (1) in respect of 
misconduct on the part of those experts in the performance of their duties. 
It has to be repeated, that the scope of the Merger Directive extends only on domestic 
mergers. However, the expectations of the business life forced out the rules relating to the 
16
 See Bakos, К.: Gläubigerschutz bei der Umwandlung von Gesellschaften. In: European 
Legal Studies and Research; International Conference of PhD Students in Law. 3rd ed., Timisoara, 
2011. 40-52. 
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cross-border mergers. Before the examination of the detailed rules of the Cross-Border 
Merger Directive17, we shall discuss the SEVIC System Case in order to demonstrate the 
importance of the regulated legal institution of cross border mergers. 
3.2. The SEVIC System Case18 
The scope of the freedom of establishment regarding companies was in rapid movement 
over several years. Already in Daily Mail, Centros, Überseering and Inspire Act corporate 
mobility within the EU was under ECJ's scrutiny. However, SEVIC was the first case 
dealing with a cross border merger. 
Until recently, it was highly disputed whether such transactions can be implemented. 
Member states, such as Austria and Germany did not provide for cross-border mergers, the 
legal situation was unclear. Apart from the formation of a European Company by merger, 
secondary EC law equally did not provide for an explicit legal basis in the area of corporate 
law. With regard to tax law, however, provisions on cross-border mergers existed since 
1990, which recently had been updated and extended. Until SEVIC, the prevailing doctrine 
remained that cross-border mergers into Germany were not possible.19 
3.2.1. The Facts of the SEVIC Case 
SEVIC Systems Aktiengesellschaft ("SEVIC") with its registered office in Germany and 
Security Vision Concept SA ("SVC") with its registered office in Luxembourg entered into 
a merger agreement in which they agreed to dissolve SVC without liquidation and to 
transfer the whole of its assets to SEVIC. 
The local court in Neuwied refused the application for registration of the merger in the 
German corporate register, citing as grounds that Para. 1 ( 1 ) of the German Reorganization 
Act20 provides solely for mergers between legal entities established in Germany. This, 
however, is not given in the present case, because the transferring company is incorporated 
under Luxembourg Law. Because of cross-border mergers were not possible under the 
German law; various forms of organization were established by drawing up contracts in 
order to achieve a result that was as close as possible to that of a merger.21 
SEVIC brought an action against that rejection decision before regional court in 
koblenz. Since the latter had doubts as to whether Para. 1 (1) of the German Reorganization 
Act complies with Arts 43 and 48 EC, it decided to stay the proceedings and referred to the 
ECJ the following question for a preliminary ruling according to Art. 234 EC: 
"Are Articles 43 and 48 EC to be interpreted as meaning that it is contrary to freedom 
of establishment for companies if a foreign European company is refused registration of its 
proposed merger with a German company in the German register of companies under 
17
 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on 
cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, hereinafter referred to as: "CBM Directive". 
18
 Case C-411/03, SEVIC Systems AG, [2005]-ECR 1-10805. 
19
 Dorait, M.: Cross-border mergers-A glimpse into the future. European Company and 
Financial Law Review, 4 (2007), 23. 
20
 Reorganization Act 1994 (Deutsches Umwandlungsgesetz 1994); hereinafter referred to as: 
"Reorganization Act". 
21
 Becker, A.-Begemann, A.: The German Law on Crossborder Mergers Following the Sevic 
Decision. The Comparative Law Yearbook on International Business, 31 (2009), 201. 
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Paragraphs 16 et seq. of the Reorganization Act, on the grounds that Paragraph 1 (1) (1) of 
that law provides only transformation of legal entities established in Germany?" 
In the opinions of the Advocate General of 7 July 2005 proposed that Arts 43 and 48 
EC preclude legislation of a member state not permitting the registration in the national 
corporate register of mergers between companies established in that member state and 
companies of other member states. 
In the Advocate General's view Para. 1 (1) of the Reorganization Act constitutes a 
discriminatory rule, since the provision in question treats companies quite differently 
depending on their place of establishment, by permitting mergers if the companies in 
question are established in Germany and prohibiting them if one of those companies is 
established abroad. An absolute and automatic prohibition which is consequently applicable 
in a general and preventative manner to all cases of cross-border mergers cannot be satisfied, 
irrespective of the possible harm or risks associated with them.22 
3.2.2. The ECJ's Decision 
With the decision of the ECJ it was clarified that both the transferring company as well as 
the acquiring company enjoy the protection of the freedom of establishment. The court held 
that the provision at stake constitutes a restriction of the freedom of establishment. In the 
ECJ's view the mere fact that-unlike for mergers within Germany-no provisions for 
registration of cross border mergers exist, represents a restriction within the meaning of 
Arts 43 and 48 EC. Nevertheless, the ECJ denied all arguments submitted by the member 
states. This decision in the SEVIC Case was in line with the court's earlier judicature.23 
The three key takeaways of the SEVIC judgement: 
- The right of establishment applies to cross-border mergers. This holds true, even if 
there are no provisions harmonizing such transactions. 
- Second, the difference in the treatment of internal and cross-border mergers 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment. 
- Third, such restrictions can be permitted only if it is justified by imperative reasons 
in the public interest and provided that it is both appropriate and does not go beyond 
what is necessary.24 
3.3. Directive on Cross-border Mergers 
Cross border mergers constitute a very efficient method of corporate restructuring which 
could contribute subsequently to the strengthening of the international market. As described 
above, Merger Directive regulates national mergers of public limited liability companies; 
there was no EU legal framework which regulated cross border mergers until 2005.25 
This was due to completely different approaches to the issue. Some Member States 
(e.g. Germany) did not allow cross border mergers because they were afraid of possible 
circumvention of their company and employment law safeguards. If a company wanted to 
22
 Decher, C. E.: Cross Border Mergers: Traditional Structures and SE-Merger Structures. 
European Company and Financial Law Review, 4 (2007), 6. 
23
 Schindler, С. P.: Cross-Border Mergers in Europe-Company Law is catching up! European 
Company and Financial Law Review, 3 (2006), 188. 
24
 Dorait: op. cit. 24. 
25
 The CBM directive was implemented in Hungarian law by the Act No. 140 of 2007 on cross-
border mergers of limited liability companies. 
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merge with a company from another merger State, there were numerous legislative 
difficulties which restricted the choice. This situation limited significantly the methods of 
corporate restructuring which were available to EU companies and as a result restricted 
their business organisational freedom under the EC Treaty. 
After many years of negotiations, the CBM Directive was finally adopted in December 
2005. The European Commission strongly believed that it was necessary, with a view to the 
completion and functioning of the single market. Because of the following reasons we 
cannot overemphasise the importance of the CBM Directive. 
Consistently with the legal framework of European Company Law, the CBM Directive 
is legally based, first of all, on the right of establishment. The mobility of companies of any 
Member State within the European Union, in terms of either transferring seat or setting up 
new companies or branch in the territory of another Member State, is the result of the 
creation and functioning of a Single Market, namely an area without internal frontiers in 
which free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is guaranteed.26 
It contributes to the growth of companies and so it allows to European companies to be 
competitors of US and Japanese firms. 
ECJ in the SEVIC case confirmed that cross-border mergers already had to be accepted, 
because of the guarantees enshrined in the fundamental freedoms. CBM Directive removed 
remaining uncertainties. But it is important to note that the CBM Directive does not cover 
private law transactions with the same effect (merger in broad sense), i.e. share deals and 
asset deals. 
3.3.1. Aim of the CBM Directive 
From an economic point of view, European companies may be willing to "move" within the 
European Union by cross-border mergers since they allow to rationalise corporate structures 
and to gain efficiencies in terms of economies of scale.27 
Since the CBM Directive requires to be implemented in each Member States, the CBM 
Directive does not aim at dictating uniform rules to be applied by the Member States, but 
rather at laying down guidelines, inspired to common principles and without conflicting 
with national systems, to be followed in order "to facilitate the carrying-out of cross-border 
mergers between various types of limited liability companies governed by the laws of 
different Member States."28 
3.3.2. The Scope of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive 
The directive shall apply to mergers of limited liability companies formed in accordance 
with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within the Community, provided at least two of them are 
governed by the laws of different Member States. 
A company, which has its registered office in a Member State adopting the 
incorporation theory could follow the provisions of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive and 
merge with another company. This allows "letter-box" or pseudo-foreign companies with 
26
 Ugliano, A.: The New Cross-Border Merger Directive: Harmonisation of European Company 
Law and Free Movement. European Business Law Review, 18 (2007), 588. 
27
 Rogers, P.: Cross-Border Mergers. International Company and Commercial Law Review, 13 
(2002), 343. 
28
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non-EU origins to participate in cross-border mergers. This contrasts with the rules on the 
formation of the European Company (Socieatas Europaea-SE), the SE Statute requires 
forming companies of SEs to have their head office within the European Union, unless, in 
certain limited cases the Member State relaxes this requirement.29 
The merging companies have to be limited liability company which means a company 
as referred to in Art. 1 of Directive 68/151 (First Company Law Directive) or a company 
with share capital and having legal personality, possessing separate assets which alone serve 
to cover its debts and subject under the national law governing it to conditions concerning 
guarantees such as are provided for by the First Company Law Directive for the protection 
of the interests of members and others.30 As far as the first category of limited liability 
companies is concerned, the First Company Law Directive includes both private and public 
limited liability companies. This constitutes an advantage of the Cross-border Mergers 
Directive because it could also be used as a method of corporate restructuring and cross-
border establishment by some small- and medium-sized enterprises formed as private 
limited liability companies. Thus, cross-border methods is not a corporate financial 
technique limited only to large listed companies, smaller companies with limited liability 
can also enjoy this product of the European integration. We should not forget that the small 
and medium-sized companies are special and sensitive parts of the internal market and 
deserve always the care of the European legislature. 
The second category of companies which fall within the scope of the Directive are 
companies with limited liability31 which comply with some requirements of the First 
Company Law Directive (registration, accounting, publicity, capacity, nullity, 
representation). 
A further condition is prescribed by Art. 4 ( 1 ) (a) of the Cross-Border Merger Directive: 
cross-border mergers shall only be possible between types of companies which may merge 
under national law of the relevant Member States. 
If national company law does not grant right to a company to merge with another 
domestic company, the company will not have the right to participate in a cross-border 
merger. 
The Cross-Border Mergers Directive describes three ways of completing a merger in 
compliance with the Third Directive. 
Article 2 (2) states that merger means an operation whereby: one or more companies, 
on being dissolved without going into liquidation, transfer all their assets and liabilities to 
another existing company, the acquiring company, in exchange for the issue to their 
members of securities or shares representing the capital of that other company and, if 
applicable, a cash payment not exceeding 10% of the nominal value, or, in the absence of a 
nominal value, of the accounting par value of those securities or shares or two or more 
companies, on being dissolved without going into liquidation, transfer all their assets and 
liabilities to a company that they form, the new company, in exchange for the issue to their 
members of securities or shares representing the capital of that new company and, if 
applicable, a cash payment not exceeding 10% of the nominal value, or in the absence of a 
29
 Papadopoulos, T.: Legal Perspectives on the Scope of the Tenth Company Law Directive on 
Cross-Border Mergers. European Current Law, 17 (2008) 10, 78. 
30
 Directive 2005/56 Art. 2. 
31
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nominal value, of the accounting par value of those securities or shares; or a company, on 
being dissolved without going into liquidation, transfers all its assets and liabilities to the 
company holding all the securities or shares representing its capital. 
3.3.3. Conditions Relating to Cross-border Mergers 
Article 4 contains the detailed conditions relating to cross-border mergers. Save as otherwise 
provided in the CBM Directive: cross-border mergers shall only be possible between types 
of companies which may merge under the national law of the relevant Member States; a 
company taking part in a cross-border merger shall comply with the provisions and 
formalities of the national law to which it is subject. The laws of a Member State enabling 
its national authorities to oppose a given internal merger on grounds of public interest shall 
also be applicable to a cross-border merger where at least one of the merging companies is 
subject to the law of that Member State. This provision shall not apply to the extent that 
Art.21 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 is applicable. 
The provisions and formalities shall, in particular, include those concerning the 
decision-making process relating to the merger and, taking into account the cross-border 
nature of the merger, the protection of creditors of the merging companies, debenture 
holders and the holders of securities or shares, as well as of employees as regards rights 
other than those governed by Art. 16. 
A Member State may, in the case of companies participating in a cross-border merger 
and governed by its law, adopt provisions designed to ensure appropriate protection for 
minority members who have opposed the cross-border merger. 
3.3.4. Procedural Rules of the CBM Directive 
The procedural mechanism, on one hand, is consistent with that provided by the Merger 
Directive on domestic mergers and, on the other hand, in consideration of the international 
features of the mergers in question, constantly refers to the national laws of the participating 
companies.32 
The first step of the merger process is the drawing up of common draft terms of the 
cross-border merger by the management of administrative organs of each of the participating 
companies. Article 5 provides the minimum mandatory content, which might be integrated 
by the Member States with the implementation of directive. In particular, the following 
details have to be specified in the draft terms: 
- the form, name and registered office of the merging companies and those proposed 
for the company resulting from the cross-border merger; 
- the ratio applicable to the exchange of securities or shares representing the company 
capital and the amount of any cash payment; 
- the terms for the allotment of securities or shares representing the capital of the 
company resulting from the cross-border merger; 
- the likely repercussions of the cross-border merger on employment; 
- the date from which the holding of such securities or shares representing the 
company capital will entitle the holders to share in profits and any special conditions 
affecting that entitlement; 
32
 Ugliano: op. cit. 602. 
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- the date from which the transactions of the merging companies will be treated for 
accounting purposes as being those of the company resulting from the cross-border 
merger; 
- the rights conferred by the company resulting from the cross-border merger on 
members enjoying special rights or on holders of securities other than shares 
representing the company capital, or the measures proposed concerning them; 
- any special advantages granted to the experts who examine the draft terms of the 
cross-border merger or to members of the administrative, management, supervisory 
or controlling organs of the merging companies; 
- the statutes of the company resulting from the cross-border merger; 
- where appropriate, information on the procedures by which arrangements for the 
involvement of employees in the definition of their rights to participation in the 
company resulting from the cross-border merger are determined pursuant to Art. 16; 
- information on the evaluation of the assets and liabilities which are transferred to 
the company resulting from the cross-border merger; 
- dates of the merging companies' accounts used to establish the conditions of the 
cross-border merger. 
The common draft terms must be made public in each of the Member States of the 
Participating Companies in accordance with the respective rules set out under Art. 3 of the 
First Directive, at least one month before the date of the general meeting convened to 
decide on the draft terms. 
3.3.5. Reports on Common Draft Terms 
The common draft terms must be accompanied by two types of reports. The first one 
includes the reports drawn up by the management or administrative organ of each 
participating company for the purpose of explaining and justifying the legal and economic 
aspects of the transaction, as well as the relative implications for members, creditors, and 
employees.33 
The second one covers the reports drawn up by independent experts, natural or legal 
persons, acting in the interest of each participating company, but independent of them, and 
appointed and approved by a judicial or administrative authority. 
3.3.6. Approval by the General Meeting 
Further to the exam of the reports of the management body and of the independent experts, 
the general meeting of each of participating companies is to approve the common draft 
terms of the cross-border merger. The general meeting of each of the merging companies 
may reserve the right to make implementation of the cross-border merger conditional on 
express ratification by it of the arrangements decided on with respect to the participation of 
employees in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. 
3.3.7. The Merger Phase 
The law of the Member State to whose jurisdiction the company resulting from the cross-
border merger is subject shall determine the date on which the cross-border merger takes 
effect. 
33
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The law of each of the Member States to whose jurisdiction the merging companies 
were subject shall determine, with respect to the territory of that State, the arrangements, in 
accordance with Art. 3 of Directive 68/151/EEC, for publicising completion of the cross-
border merger in the public register in which each of the companies is required to file 
documents. 
The registry for the registration of the company resulting from the cross-border merger 
shall notify, without delay, the registry in which each of the companies was required to file 
documents that the cross-border merger has taken effect. Deletion of the old registration, if 
applicable, shall be effected on receipt of that notification, but not before. 
3.3.8. Protection of Creditors and Shareholders 
The protection of creditors and shareholders is guaranteed under the CBM Directive 
through the provisions and formalities of national laws to which the participating companies 
are subject, so such interests are protected in compliance with the national provisions of the 
Member States governing domestic mergers.34 It is noteworthy, however, that such national 
provisions and formalities should be applied "taking into account the cross-border nature of 
the merger". 
This provision seems to allow Member States to include additional protections to such 
categories in case of cross-border mergers.35 
In the light of the procedural overview, it is possible to argue that the CBM Directive 
may provide the European companies with significant advantages in engaging in cross-
border transactions. 
It is a very positive development for the internal market that both national and cross-
border mergers are regulated at EU level. The fact that private companies as well as public 
companies could take part in cross-border mergers and acquisitions does not restrict the 
benefits of freedom of establishment and EU corporate restructuring to one category of 
companies only (as the Merger Directive does). 
The Cross-Border Mergers Directive also embraces companies with no head office in 
the Community and prescribes a very relaxed cash balance requirement if any Member 
State allows it, allowing transactions similar to public offers of shares. 
3.4. Takeover Directive36 
If we examine the basic directives in the Law of European Union regarding to mergers and 
acquisitions, we shall also mention briefly the takeover directive, which was adopted on 21 
April 2004. It came into force on 20 May 2004 and had to be implemented into national law 
by all Member States by no later than 20 May 2006. The main objectives of the Directive, 
when it was first tabled before the European Parliament were to provide a framework of 
common laws for takeovers in the EU, address the barriers to takeovers and ensure an 
adequate level of protection for minority shareholders across the EU in public offers. As a 
34
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35
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result of over 14 years of either languishing in stalemate or being the subject of intense 
political negotiation and debate, the Directive in its final form is a product of political 
compromise. 
Under the Takeover Directive, individual member nations are supposed to create a 
regulatory framework for takeovers, including appointing supervisory agencies to review 
and approve proposed takeovers. The directive also mandates equal treatment of 
shareholders, states that bids must be conducted in a timeframe long enough to allow people 
to reach informed decisions, and requires companies offering to make takeovers to provide 
projections on how they will affect employment. Each member nation is expected to use the 
Takeover Directive in establishing their own laws for handling takeovers. 
After the passage of the Takeover Directive, some critics accused it of including 
protectionist language and of actually hindering takeovers, rather than facilitating them. 
Others felt that the legislation did not go far enough in terms of clarity and protections for 
people involved in takeovers. The conflict between these sides is illustrative of the results 
of the compromise negotiations used in developing the directive.37 
Many European Union members had difficulty implementing this piece of legislation. 
Implementation proposals have varied in scope and nature as the individual governments of 
member nations work to implement the directive. In some cases, reorganizations and 
reforms have been needed within a nation's financial regulatory system to meet the terms of 
the directive and this has required substantial negotiation and discussion. 
Conclusion 
Generally speaking, the European harmonisation process carried out in the view of creation 
and consolidation of a European Company Law seems to have been developed through two 
different tracks:38 On the one hand, harmonisation of national rules and laws through the 
enactment of directives; on the other hand, creation of European Company forms (i.e. the 
SE), as supranational corporate vehicle, through the adoption of regulations. 
In relation to the first track, it has been widely discussed by the scholars, the necessity 
and the effect of harmonisation measures as to company laws in the context of European 
Union, especially in the light of the so-called "Delaware effect" stemmed from the US 
experience.39 
On the one side, harmonisation has been regarded as a mean to avoid such an effect 
and the "race to the bottom" that it might imply, namely to avoid that the country with the 
most liberal and flexible company legislation might be the most attractive and might be 
followed by other countries, on the other hand, absence of harmonisation of national 
company laws has been supported on the grounds that it may encourage competition 
between countries and, as a result, the creation of "the best company law". 
37
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Consistently, the company law directives regarding to merger and acquisitions do not 
prevent each Member State from applying its own company law, but they ensure minimum 
standards which have to be met in order to avoid the possible negative effects mentioned 
above. 
"A dynamic and flexible company law [...] is essential for deepening the internal mar-
ket and building an integrated European capital market. Essential for maximising the 
benefit of enlargement for all Member States, new and existing. "40 
40
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament-
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union-A Plan to 
Move Forward, 2003/0284, Introduction. 
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The State of Facts of Robbing of a Grave in Early Medieval 
German Laws1 
Abstract. In the present paper we analyse the state of facts of robbing of a grave in German folk laws. We pay 
special regard to the issue to what extent the impacts of Roman law and the Church and primarily German 
customary law can be demonstrated in the system of state of facts and sanctions of specific laws. This investigation 
requires the analysis of the legal source base as well as some examination in the history of language, which allows 
a comparative analysis of the issue and helps to highlight the various layers of the norms of German folk laws by 
the example of this state of facts. 
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Introduction 
Almost all of German codices-except for Lex Saxonum, Lex Thuringorum and Ewa 
Chamavorum-extensive\y discuss legal protection of the grave and the dead body and 
sanction persons who disgrace the grave and the dead body. So, this scope of issues is dwelt 
upon in details by Edictum Theodorici,2 Lex Visigothorum? Lex Burgundia rum? Edictus 
Rothari? Lex Salicaf Lex Ribuaria? Pactus Alamannorum? Lex Alamannorum9 and Lex 
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Baiuvariorum}0 This paper first examines Gothic, Burgundián and Langobardic sources (I); 
then, analyses Frankish sources (II); finally, surveys the provisions of South German, i.e. 
Alemannian and Bavarian sources (III). 
Several questions arise with respect to the lapidary provision of Edictum Thoderici stating 
that a person who has demolished/ruins a grave shall suffer death." (Edictum Theodorici, 
the code of the eastern Gothic ruler, Theoderich the Great I was also created around 500; it 
did not rest with the principle of personality but applied to the population of both Gothic 
and Roman origin; it was based on the collections of imperial decrees and Paulus's 
Sententiae.l2) The historian Cassiodorus relates several cases when Theoderich took direct 
measures to open graves. He gave an order to his official, Duda to open a grave and take the 
gold and silver in it for public purposes.13 Yet, the ruler commanded that the corpse should 
remain untouched and he arranged for restoring the grave with proper decoration, and-as he 
could obtain the treasure only through funestum scelus-he gave reasons for this act stating 
that in the relevant case (as it were referring to a cause excluding unlawfulness) it was 
possible to take the gold and silver from the grave because it was the living and not the 
dead who needed them. In his notice to Anna comes-as it is related by Cassiodiorus-
Theoderich condemns robbing of the grave; more specifically, in case of a priest called 
Laurentius he instructs his comes to make sure that the perpetrator should not keep the loot 
if it is proved that the priest has disturbed the peace of the dead while searching for treasures 
in the grave.14 Yet, paying regard to the perpetrator's ecclesiastical status, he waives his 
punishment alluding at the greater punishment to come by which he means-and this is 
difficult to decide-either divine punishment or the chastisement imposed by the bishop.15 In 
the so-called Formula comitivae privatarum left to us by Cassiodorus, the provision by 
which Theoderich assigns certain duties to his comeses, among others, he charges them 
with arranging for the peace of the dead, preventing the graves from being deprived of 
marble cover, columns from their decorations, and the corpses and the ashes from being 
treated undeservedly, impiously, contrary to the requirements of pietasJ6 This provision 
reveals that Theoderich the Great ordered to punish the act of robbing of a grave/desecration 
of a grave as well as those who has demolished or impaired a sepulchre, for example, in 
order to obtain building material or remove a grave which limits the use of their estate.17 
10
 Lex Baiuvariorum (ed.: Nótári, T.: Lex Baiuvariorum. Szeged, 2011.) 19, 1-8. 
11
 Edictum Theoderici (ed.: Bluhme, F.: Momimenta Germaniae Historica, Leges nationum 
Germanicatum, V. Berlin, 1889.) 110. Qui sepulchrum destruxerit, occidatur. 
12
 Nótári, T.: Római köz- és magánjog (Roman Public and Private Law). Kolozsvár, 2011. 493. 
13
 Cassiodorus: Variae (ed.: Mommsen, Th.: Momimenta Germaniae Historica,, Auctores 
antiquissimi, XII. Berlin, 1894.) 4, 34, 129. 
14
 Ibid. 4, 18, 122. 
15
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This is not surprising as it is known of the ruler that he saw to it that Antique buildings 
should be protected.18 
It is, however, questionable if the death penalty ordered by Edictum Theoderici was of 
German origin ex asse indeed. To get an answer to this question, Roman legal regulation 
and the Council regulations of the period should be looked at. In accordance with classical 
Roman law, sepulchrum violatum, the act of ruining/desecration of the burial place as 
delictum with a sacred background-since the burial place was protected under divine law, 
more specifically res religiosa-resulted in popularis actio; so, it could be applied for by any 
citizen if it was not brought by the relatives.19 In the former case the amount of penalty 
depended on the judge's decision, in the latter it was one hundred sestertius; the relevant 
action at law was actio de sepulchro violate, which involved infamia.20 At the same time, 
an imperial decree in force in the provinces only, which can be, perhaps, linked with the 
name of Tiberius, threatened persons who desecrate a burial place with death penalty.21 In a 
more general scope, through jurists' interpretatio desecration of a grave became indictable 
offence, since the provisions of lex Iulia de vi publica and lex Iulia de vi privata, applicable 
only to disturbing of a burial in relation to the dead, were extended to desecration of a 
grave, which from then on became punishable by forced labour, relegatio, deportatio or 
death.22 Armed grave robbers just as highwaymen (latrones) were punished by death.23 
The content of Paulus's Sententiae does not show a clear picture: one of the loci 
stipulates that the perpetrator should be punished by deportatio if he is honestior and by 
mine labour if he belongs to humiliores,2* and, according to the other locus, by death if he 
belongs to humiliores.25 Iulianus Apostata's decree threatens to apply the punishment for 
robbery of a church, i.e. capital sanction, to robbing of a grave/desecration of a grave.26 
Gordianus ranks the act of trading with parts, building components of a grave among 
crimen laesae maiestatis,21 and Constantinus I punishes persons who take building materials 
away from a sepulchre by a further penalty, ten pound gold to be paid to the treasury.28 
Valentinianus IPs decree from 385 excludes persons who desecrate a grave from the scope 
of any later amnesty,29 and Valentinianus Ill's decree from 447 gives detailed regulation of 
the punishment to be imposed on perpetrators of the act in terms of their status: if the 
perpetrator is a clerical, he should be deprived of his dignity and should live in eternal 
exile, if he is a slave, colonus or a freeman with no property he should suffer death, if he is 
18
 Dahn, F.: Die Könige der Germanen, III. Verfassung des ostgothischen Reiches in Italien. 
München, 1866. 170. ff". 
19
 Cf. Ulpianus D. (ed.: Mommsen, Th.: Corpus Iuris Civilis, I. Berlin, 195416.) 47, 12 pr. 
20
 Nótári: op. cit. 343. 
21
 Cumont, F.: Un rescrit impérial sur la violation de sépulture. Revue Historique 163. 1930. 
341-366., 242. ff. 
22
 MacerD. 47, 12, 8; Mommsen, Th.: Römische Strafrecht. Leipzig, 1899. 6654. 
23
 Ulpianus D. 47, 12, 3, 7. 
24
 Paulus, Sententiae (ed.: Riccobono, S.: Fontes iuris Romani anteiustiniani. III. Firenze, 
1940.) 1, 21,4-5. 
25
 Ibid. 5, 19A 
26
 Codex Iustinianus (ed.: Krueger, P.: Corpus Iuris Civilis, II. Berlin, 1908s.) 9, 19, 5. 
27
 Ibid. 9, 19, 1. 
28
 Ibid. 9, 19, 4. = Codex Theodosianus 9, 17, 4. 
29
 Codex Theodosianus (eds: Mommsen, Th.-Meyer, P. M., Berlin, 1905.) 9, 38, 8. = Lex 
Romana Visigothorum 9, 28, 1. 
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a notable, he should be deprived of half of his property and should be infamis, and if an 
imperial official fails to prosecute this crime he should be deprived of his office, property 
and honour.30 The Council of Toledo IV held in 633 orders to discharge priests who 
desecrate a grave of their office and obliges them to three years' repentance.31 
In the light of all that it can be established that Theoderich the Great punishes robbing 
of a grave/desecration of a grave by death penalty fully in harmony with the spirit and 
provisions of Roman (imperial) law that took increasingly firm action against this crime, 
and most probably in the course of that lays special emphasis on protecting buildings and 
valuable sepulchres, which intention is quite clear from Constantinus I's above-mentioned 
decree already.32 
Lex Burgundiorum33 contains the following provision: a husband can dismiss his wife 
with impunity for three reasons: if she has committed adultery, crime, desecration of a 
grave, and in these cases the judge should pass sentence on the wife.34 (It needs to be 
added that in case a wife leaves her husband, in accordance with Burgundián law, she shall 
suffer death by being drowned in a swamp.35) Connections with Roman law are absolutely 
clear again, for in one of his decrees Constantinus I vests the husband with the right to cast 
off his wife if she has committed adultery, magic or pandering, and, albeit, this list does 
not include desecration of a grave, the decree empowers the wife to divorce if her husband 
is guilty of manslaughter, mixing poison or desecration of a grave.36 Lex Romana 
Burgundiorum issued for the Roman population adopts this provision, and ranks 
desecration of a grave among causes for divorce that a wife can refer to.37 {Lex Romana 
Burgundiorum-which was also called Papianus from the erroneous version of Papinian's 
name-was created at the turn of the 5th and 6lh c. upon the instructions of King Gundobad, 
and contained provisions for the inhabitants of the territory considered former Roman 
subjects. It was made on the basis of three collections of imperial decrees: Codex 
Gregoriánus, Codex Hermogenianus and Codex Theodosianus, Paulus's Sententiae and 
one of Gaius's works, however, not by abridgement but by rewriting the content.38) In 
view of the fact that the Burgundián law mentions desecration of a grave committed by the 
wife together with adultery to be punished by death penalty, it can be presumed that its 
30
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anteiustiniani, III. Berlin, 1878.)///. 5. 
31
 Concilium Toletanum IV. {a. 633) (ed.: Mansi, J. D.: Sacrorum conciliorum nova amplissima 
collectio. IX. Firenze, 1763.) 46. 
32
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sanction could not be any milder.39 To understand to what extent it was translated into 
practice, it is worth looking at the letter of Sidornius Apollonaris bishop of Clermont, in 
which he describes an event when he caught perpetrators looting graves in the act and 
driven by righteous anger he immediately punished the robbers instead of delivering them 
to the bishop having competence-later, he regretted what he had done, however, he made 
it clear that they would have been punished by death penalty anyway in accordance with 
ancient unwritten law.40 
In the mirror of all that-just as in the case of Edictum Theoderici the severity of the 
sanction should be traced back to Roman impact rather than to its presumed roots in German 
folk laws.41 
Although it extensively drew on Roman law, Visigothic law preserved several elements 
arising from ancient German customary law, for example, the conpositio system prevailed 
for a long time—this regime stipulated pecuniary compensation for serious offence in case 
the perpetrator was a free man. Accordingly, Lex Visigothorum sets forth the following 
provisions under the title De violatoribus sepulchrorum. The same locus contains two states 
of facts: ruining of a grave (literally opening of a grave), robbing of the clothes or ornaments 
of the yet unburied dead person: if the perpetrator is a free man, he shall pay one pound 
gold to the relatives of the deceased and shall return the objects taken, if there are no 
inheritors, the penalty equal to seventy-two solidus is due to the treasury; furthermore, the 
perpetrator shall be hit one hundred times by a whip. If the perpetrator is a slave, after he 
has been hit two hundred times by a whip-just as in the Roman system where capital 
punishment was always preceded by verberatio42-he shall be burnt.43 Flogging, which is 
introduced by the term "praeterea " and should be executed on per petrators in a free status 
too, is most probably the result of later addition since there are good chances that the core 
of the provision evolved as early as during the period of Eurich (466-484) or Leovigild 
(568-586), and this sanction was included in punishments only during the period of 
Recceswind (653—672), however, this punishment, which can be presumed to be original, 
and the sanction under Roman law significantly overlap.44 
In accordance with the next provision related to the grave: if any body-specifically a 
free man-has taken the sarcophagus because he needed remedium, he will be bound to pay 
twelve solidus to the relatives of the dead person; if this has been done by a slave upon his 
master's command, then his master shall pay instead of him; and if this act has been 
committed by a slave at his own discretion, then he shall be hit one hundred times by a 
whip, and once he has returned the misappropriated things, he shall restore the original state 
39
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of the grave.45 The term remedium calls for some explanation since it cannot be interpreted 
as medicine, drug. There is a good chance for presuming that the objects related to the dead 
person were required as requisites of magical rituals since ceremonies conducted by this 
kind of aids were widely accepted both in Roman and German religious belief.46 All this 
seems to be supported by the fact that Burchard of Worms discussed desecration of a grave 
under the title De arte magica in Liber decretorumd1 Yet, as a matter of fact, it cannot be 
ruled out that the sarcophagus was stolen not for some mystical cause but for the pure 
reason that the thief wanted to use it, which is far from surprising since both Roman law 
and early medieval lawmaking deals with the issue of double burial and clearly prohibit it.48 
This might explain the fact that the law orders to punish a perpetrator in free status by a 
penalty of a relatively low amount.49 
It can be stated that in the legal system of Ostrogoths and Burgundians robbery of a 
grave/desecration of a grave was punished by death presumably upon the impact of Roman 
law; western Gothic law represents some kind of transition between Roman and German 
legal tradition: while slaves suffer death for this act, free persons are punished by pecuniary 
penalty only, which will be accompanied only later by corporeal punishment, flogging.50 
Langobardic laws, more specifically Edictus Rothari created in 643, distinguish three 
states of facts, which serve protection of the dead person and the grave. With regard to 
murder committed in secret (morth) the law orders to punish persons who plunder a dead 
person (plodraub) by eighty solidus in addition to the conpositio of manslaughter (nine 
hundred solidus),51 which shall be paid to the relatives of the killed person.52 If somebody 
robs a dead person found in a riverbed or outdoors who was not killed by him (raibraub) 
and hides the corpse, he shall pay eighty solidus to the relatives of the deceased. However, 
if he finds a dead person, plunders him, and then notifies the fact to the neighbours, and it 
becomes clear that he took the valuables found with the dead person as a reward and not 
with the intention to misappropriate them, then it will not be necessary to investigate the 
matter, once he has returned the valuables.53 There are good chances that plodraub and 
45
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raibraub,S4 i.e. plundering of a dead person, might have been states of facts regulated by 
German unwritten law a long time before Rothari's code, and the eighty solidits as payable 
amount appears at several other points in Edictus Rothari, for example, in the state of facts 
of marhwuorfin, i.e. throwing a free man off of a horse.55 (It should be added that 
linguistically raibraub and plodraub show close connections with the term walaraupa 
contained in Lex Baiuvariorum,56 which means plundering of a person killed in action.57) 
However, if somebody ruins a grave and throws out the corpse (grapworfi,58 he shall pay 
nine hundred solidus to the relatives of the dead person, and if there are no relatives, then 
this amount will be collected by the gastaldus or sculdhais for the treasury.59 This 
punishment more or less corresponded to the fine ordered by Constantinus I (ten pound 
gold), however, as it has been described above, the imperial decree threatened the 
perpetrator with death penalty in addition to the above.60 (The nine hundred solidus amount 
of the conpositio is applied with regard to other crimes that seriously prejudice public 
interest in Edictus Rothari, for example, in case of causing scandalum at a meeting,61 
attacking a traveller on the way to the king,62 distraint of a horse or a herd without the 
king's licence,63 and the above-mentioned assassination, morth.64) Presumably, the high 
amount of conpositio was assessed not in view of the motive but because public peace was 
endangered, i.e. the legal interest meant to be protected by the king65 was prejudiced.66 If 
the perpetrator was unable to pay the conpositio, he became a life-long servant of his 
creditor, in accordance with Liutprand's provision.67 In case robbing of a grave/desecration 
of a grave was committed by a slave, he was to suffer death, in accordance with the 
provisions of King Grimoald,68 which might have been an innovation of the king since 
during the reign of King Rothari when a slave committed a crime, then his master had to 
54
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pay the conpositio and he could not exercise the option to deliver the slave to the authorities 
in order to get rid of the penalty.69 
Just as in western Gothic law, in Langobardic law it is possible to discover the German 
legal roots in judging the act, i.e. the delictum character, which required the perpetrator to 
pay conpositio; the crimen character, i.e. the option of capital punishment, was introduced 
later-but, contrary to western Gothic law, Langobardic law did not reach this level in case 
of perpetrators with a free status.70 
I I 
From among Frankish sources, first, it is worth investigating Lex Ribuaria noted down in 
the first half of the 7th c.71 Under the title De corporibus expoliatis the law distinguishes 
plundering of an unburied corpse and an already buried corpse. In case of plundering an 
unburied corpse, if the perpetrator admits his act, he shall pay sixty solidus, if he denies it 
and he has been proved to have committed the act, he shall pay one hundred solidus and the 
dilatura, or he shall take a cleansing oath together with six fellow oath-takers-this issue 
will be discussed later.72 Dilatura is usually interpreted in the sense of default penalty-
nevertheless, the term covers the reward to be paid to the delator, the person who makes the 
charge.73 In the above-mentioned case of plundering the dead person the perpetrator shall 
pay two hundred solidus.79 
It should be noted that a few titles later Lex Ribuaria returns to this issue and under the 
title De corpore expoliato expounds the state of facts of plundering an unburied and a 
buried corpse again, however, here it no longer distinguishes a perpetrator who admits his 
act from the one who denies it. The robber of an unburied corpse shall pay one hundred 
solidus, shall return or compensate for the robbed valuables and shall bear the reward of the 
person who makes charges.75 Compared to the state of facts referred to in the above-
mentioned title, the difference is that in the former the lawmaker might have presumed that 
the injured party had been killed by the perpetrator, and for this reason inserted the 
distinction between an admitting and denying perpetrator in the text subsequently, which is 
supported by the fact that a cleansing oath to be taken together with six fellow oath-takers 
is completely senseless in case of a perpetrator who admits his act. In the light of that, the 
latter title refers to the state of facts when the plundered person has not been killed by the 
69
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robber.76 With respect to the two hundred solidus penalty imposed on the person who 
plunders an already buried person there is no difference between the two titles, but the latter 
adds a stipulation to it, concordant with Lex Salica, stating that the perpetrator will be 
considered wargus until-emphatically until and as long as-he has paid the conpositio to the 
relatives of the injured party.77 
The analysis of the relevant loci of Lex Salica is significantly more problematic than 
the examination of the folk laws containing fairly clear provisions, discussed so far, which 
can be attributed to a considerable extent to uncertainties of the texts left to us, therefore-
for the avoidance of doubt-we shall consistently use the terms of Eckhardt's editiofr In the 
most reliable manuscripts (A2, A3, A4, C5, C6) the state of facts of plundering a yet 
unburied dead person in a free status can be found under the title De supervenientis vel 
expoliationibus, and the law orders to punish it by one hundred solidus penalty.79 In 
agreement with Eckhardt, the term chreumusido can be translated as body snatching 
(Leichenberaubung).80 However, a few titles later the state of facts of body snatching occurs 
again (under the title De corporibus expoliatis), and on this locus there are considerable 
differences between the manuscripts that belong to group A and group C, since the texts of 
group С set out sixty-two and a half solidus penalty and speak about the corpse of a dead 
person only (corpus hominis mortui) fr yet, the texts of group A stipulate conpositio 
amounting to sixty-three solidus and mention the corpse of a killed person (corpus occisi 
hominis)}1 Eckhardt corrected the term freomosido in the glossary (interpreted by him as 
robbing of a free man) and replaced it by chreoosido that occurred before;83 yet, no matter 
which text version we accept, the amount of the conpositio set out in the two titles are by 
no means equal, which is adopted by Lex Salica-Karolina, too.84 At the same time, newer 
manuscripts (D, E) mention body snatching at one place only, and they order to punish it by 
sixty-two and a half solidus fr There are good chances that Lex Salica Karolina did not 
adopt the two separate states of facts—specifically: the differentiation of plundering a person 
killed by the robber (occisus) and of a dead person not injured by the robber (mortuus)-
76
 Nehlsen: Der Grabfrevel... op. cit. 136. 
77
 Lex Ribuaria 88, 2. Si autem eum ex homo traxerit et expoliaverit, CC sol. cum capitale et 
dilatura culpabilis iudicetur, vel wargus sit (hoc est expulsus), usque ad parentibus satisfecerit. 
78
 Eckhardt, К. A. (ed.): Lex Salica. Momimenta Germaniae Historica, Leges nationum 
Germanicarum, IV. 2. Hannover, 1969. 
79
 Lex Salica 14, 9. Si quis hominem mortuum antequam in terra mitatur in furtum expoliaverit, 
malb. chreumusido sunt den. Hl M quifac. sol. С cupl. iud. 
80
 Eckhardt, К. A. (ed.): Pactus legis Salicae. Momimenta Germaniae Historica. Leges 
nationum Germanicarum, I. 4/1. Hannover, 1962. 281. 
81
 Lex Salica 55, I. (C6) Si quis corpus hominis mortui antequam in terra mitatur in furtum 
expoliaverit, malb. freomodiso sunt den. II MD quifac. sol. LXII semis culp. iud. 
82
 Ibid. 55, 1. (Al) Si quis corpus occisi hominis antequam in terra mittatur expoliaverit in 
furtum, mal. uuaderio hoc est f . sol. LXIII culp. iudic. 
83
 Eckhardt: Pactus... op. cit. 205. 
84
 Lex Salica Karolina 17, 1. Si quis hominem mortuum antequam in terra mittatur in furtu 
expoliaverit. IVM denariis qui faciunt solidos С culpabilis iudicetur.; 57, 1. Si quis corpus hominis 
mortui antequam in terra mitatur per furtum expoliaverit, MMD denariis qui faciunt solidos LXII 
semis culpabilis iudicetur. 
85
 Ibid. 19, 1. (D) Si quis corpus occisi hominis, antequam in terra mittatur, in furtum 
expoliaverit, mallobergo chreo mardo (sunt dinarii MMD qui faciunt) solidus LXII semis culpabilis 
iudicetur. 
THE STATE OF FACTS OF ROBBING OF A GRAVE IN EARLY MEDIEVAL GERMAN LAWS 2 4 5 
because it did not become deeply rooted in legal literacy. On the other hand, it maintained 
the double amount of conpositio: sixty-two and a half and one hundred solidus, which 
might have meant that the man who robbed the valuables of a dead person was obliged to 
pay one hundred solidus, while the one who killed his victim first and then plundered him 
was obliged to pay, in addition to blood money for murder, sixty-two and a half solidus.*6 
In case of plundering a dead slave, the perpetrator shall pay thirty-five solidus to the 
slave's master,87 if, however, the objects with the slave did not exceed the value of forty 
denarius, then the perpetrator was obliged to pay merely fifteen solidus.88 
All these amounts of conpositio properly harmonise with other blood moneys of Lex 
Salica: a robber of a free man shall pay sixty-two and a half solidus, too,89 just as those who 
intrude into an alien courtyard90 or commit bodily injury causing paralysis of the hands;91 
similarly, a person who plunders a live slave shall pay thirty-five or fifteen solidus.92 The 
conpositio amounting to one hundred solidus occurs in the case of robbing of a sleeping 
person.93 
Actual robbing of a grave is dealt with by the groups of older manuscripts (A, C, K) 
under two titles: De supervenientis vel expoliationibus and De corporibus expo/iatis. In 
case of the first, the man robbing a grave shall pay two hundred solidus.9* The second locus 
(according to groups A and C) again stipulates indemnification of two hundred solidus, 
however, it includes the stipulation containing the term wargus, which gives rise to 
extensive disputes, that condemns the perpetrator as wargus until he has discharged his 
debt. A person considered wargus is compelled to live outside society until the relatives of 
the injured party ask the judge to let him return, until which time nobody, not even his next 
of kin or relatives can give him bread or shelter; so, he gets into a kind of exlex status, and 
anybody who breaches this prohibition shall pay fifteen solidus.95 The groups of manuscripts 
D and E explain the term wargus by the word expellis, and again add that the perpetrator 
can live his life solely as an outcast until paying off the conpositio.96 
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From among provisions on desecration of a grave, up to now in literature the greatest 
attention has been paid to title 55 of Lex Salica,97 as it is here that the word wargus can be 
read as a synonym of expulsus or expellis, which was translated by Jacob Grimm as robber 
or wolf, in view of the fact that the person cast out of the community is the inhabitant of the 
wilderness just as a beast, and anybody can kill him with impunity just as a wolf.98 This 
conception was confirmed by Wilda's view99 which stated that close connection can be 
made between wargus, interpreted by him in the context of restlessness (Friedlosigkeit), 
and the Old Norse vargr (malefactor, wolf)-in spite of all the criticism,100 this view 
prevailed both in older101 and contemporary German legal history.102 
For example, Mitteis defines Friedlosigkeit-in organic relation to the legal content of 
the meaning of the term wargus-as follows: it includes violation of the interests of the 
people and the state (for example, body snatching, since thereby the perpetrator makes it 
impossible to exercise the cult of the dead), acts committed with vile intentions, by stealth-
due to all that the perpetrator will become an outlaw (exlex, outlaw), his wife shall be 
considered a widow and his children orphans, from then on he must live in the wilderness, 
far from any human community, just as if he were a werewolf (Werwolt, gerit caput 
lupinum).m Kaufmann also connects the phrase wargus with the Anglo-Saxon word vearg 
and the Old Norse word vargr, and relates the person cast out of the community-specifically 
concerning the robbing of a grave considered religious crime-to a wolf that lives outside 
human society, civilisation.104 In his interpretation, Erler goes even further: he calls the 
attention to the aspect of the wolf in Old German religion based on which it was associated 
with body snatching, corpse/carrion eating and therefore was considered a death demon—so, 
he provides further indicium with regard to a desecrator of a grave or a body snatcher for 
relating him to a wolf.105 It should be underlined that Erler considered this identification an 
allegory, imagery manifesting itself in law as well as one of the most magnificent documents 
of archaic thinking.106 A similar position, a position unambiguously considering body 
snatching/desecration of a grave one of the major crimes, was taken in this respect by 
parentes rogare ad iudicem debeant. lit ei inter homines liceat hcibitare, si tarnen auctor sceleris, 
mallobergo turnichal, (sunt dinarii VIIIM qui faciunt) solidus CC culpabilis iudicetur. Et qui eum, 
antequam cum parentibus defined satisfaciat, ospicium dederit, (sunt dinarii DC qui faciunt) solidus 
XV culpabilis iudicetur. 
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Amira107 and His108 too. In literature it was Nehlsen who called the attention for the first 
time-quite properly-to the point that in relation to this state of facts extreme care should be 
taken when comparing sources, especially in involving northern sources.109 
When interpreting this locus-to get an answer to the question whether the wargus 
locus covers an institution of ancient German customary law ex asse indeed—it is worth 
examining ecclesiastical lawmaking as well. The Council of Toledo IV held in 633 classified 
desecration of a grave as sacrilegiumf Poenitentiale Romanum from the 8lh c. sentences a 
clerical who commits desecration of a grave to seven-year penitence, including three years 
on bread and water,111 in other words, it imposes the same punishment as on a layman 
committing manslaughter,"2 and Poenitentiale Casinense dating from the early 8lh c. 
prescribes five-year penitence"3 (exactly as many as in case of kidnapping/abduction),114 
just as the Frankish Poenitentiale Parisiensef5 Poenitentiale Merseburgenseue and 
Poenitentiale Hubertensef1 If the perpetrator was not willing to submit to either secular 
punishment (payment of conpositio) or ecclesiastical penalty (penitence), the Church had 
the opportunity to excommunicate him from the Church, i.e. apply anathema against him.118 
This sanction was applied, for example, against those who caused damage to ecclesiastical 
property, who stubbornly refused to pay reparation,"9 however, similar punishment was 
imposed in accordance with Poenitentiale Vinniai on clericals who committed homicide 
and who were allowed to enter the community again only after long penitence, reconciliation 
with the relatives of the injured party.120 The sanction of Poenitentiale Columban?21 created 
in Gallia, which can be definitely compared with this provision, states that a homicida who 
107
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does not submit to secular punishment must be expelled from the community and can enter 
it again when a clerical attests that he has paid the conpositio to the relatives of the injured 
party.122 In accordance with Lex Salica the relatives themselves stand witness that payment 
of the conpositio has been made. 
In case of abduction of nuns, the expulsion of a perpetrator who fails to perform the 
punishment imposed on him is prescribed by Lex Baiuvariorum, too,123 and the phrase 
"expellatur de provincia " used by it is a clear reminiscence of the phrase "wargus sit, id est 
expellis " of Lex Salica.124 
On the other hand, ecclesiastical lawmaking contains, in addition to excommunication, 
prohibition of maintaining contact with the outcast person. For example, the relevant canon 
of the Council of Aries concluded in 5 06125 was inserted in Collectio vetus Gallica created 
between 585 and 626/27, which forbids any kind of connection with the outcast person.126 
In 511, the Council of Orléans I127 set similar regulations; what is more, it subjected persons 
breaching this prohibition to anathema (excommunicatio). 
Based on all that it can be declared that the provision of Lex Salica highly corresponds 
to the ecclesiastical lawmaking of the period, i.e. the efforts of the Church to outcast those 
from society who are reluctant to pay the penalty, and to ensure that all kinds of solidarity 
and communication with them shall be prohibited until it is proved credibly-by testimony 
of the relatives of the injured party in Lex Salica-that they have discharged the statutory 
sanction. As the Church introduced this practice from the late Antiquity already, the current 
ruler, who took such action against perpetrators in case of robbing of a grave/desecration of 
a grave, could rely on the support of the Church. As far as Lex Baiuvariorum is concerned, 
ecclesiastical assistance in drafting the text can be considered fairly clear; however, based 
on that even in case of Lex Salica the contribution of the clergy to editing cannot be ruled 
out either.128 
Now, it is worth examining what the term wargus covers in Lex Salica and to what 
extent it can be considered a surviving element of ancient German linguistic tradition and 
written law. Three loci in Wulfila's Gothic translation of the New Testament are noteworthy 
with respect to the translation of the verb damnare and its derivatives. It interprets the text 
on condemnation of Jesus in the Gospel according to St. Matthew (et damnabunt eum 
122
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morte) by the phrase "jah gawargjand ina daupan ",129 in which gawargjand corresponds to 
the Latin verb damnare.m The noun damnatio in one of the loci of St. Paul131 is translated 
into Gothic by the word wargipau2 and in another locus133 condemnatio corresponds to the 
Gothic noun gaw arge ins. 134 
The term wargns in this form occurs for the first time in one of Sidonius Apollinaris^ 
letters, which relates that a woman was abducted by varguses, i.e. highwaymen, and 
explains that this is how local robbers are called (latrunculi))35 In chronological order this 
locus is followed by the relevant passage of Lex Salicaf6 however, this law contains both 
the noun wargus and the verb wargare in relation to kidnapping an alien slave where 
plagiavit is explained by wargaverit:137 this locus supports that wargare means to kidnap 
(to abduct).13* The first loci of the Carolingian Age can be found in the Anglo-Saxon 
Heliand: Judas ends his life warg an w argil,139 the convicted rogues crucified alongside 
Christ die as rogues deserve to die (waragtrewe),140 and the author puts the word giwaragean 
into Christ's mouth regarding those condemned to the pains of hell.141 Tatianus's Old High 
German translation of the Gospel contains firwergif42 and forwergiton143 as equivalent of 
maledicti}44 In the mirror of all that it is not surprising that the authoritative lexicon lists 
the phrases wiergan and weargcwedolian as equivalents of maledicere, maledictio, 
maledictus and malignari,145 The terms anathemazatus, maledictus, profugus, vagus and 
rapax that appear in ecclesiastical lawmaking, applied by the lawmaker to a person expelled 
from the community, can be taken as the equivalent of the pharses wargus, gawargjan, ware 
etc.146 
Based on the above, Nehlsen excludes a limine that the phrase wargr (vargr) means 
wolf with respect to early medieval sources, and adds that the (mostly Old Norse) underlying 
129
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sources are from the 11th c. or from later periods, and thereby he deprives the Friedlosigkeit 
theory of one of its most important bases. He asserts that the term wargits is the German 
equivalent of the ecclesiastical usage, the loci of Lex Salica (and Lex Ribuaria) indicate 
merely borrowing of ecclesiastical lawmaking and do not prove the ancient German theory 
and continued existence of ancient German faith.147 Furthermore, he makes it clear that 
expulsion from the community did not incur ipso facto, instead, the perpetrator had to 
wander the world alone as Cain (more Cain vagus et profogus) only as a consequence of 
failure of the payment of conpositio, i.e. refusal of statutory punishment.148 Therefore, in 
this case living the life of a wargits is the consequence of defiance of the law, as it seems to 
be supported by the phrase "si nolnerit emendare et reddere "144 in Lex Baiuvariorum)50 
On the other hand, still with regard to the phrase wargits, the question arises why the 
later groups of texts of Lex Salica (E) completely omitted this term from the text. Probably 
because this folk law term without any explanation would have been no longer interprétable 
in the Carolingian Age.151 The Middle Latin term wargits appears to be related to the 
following German words: the Old Norse vargr (malefactor, wolf, the Anglo-Saxon wear g 
(outcast, damned, malefactor) and the Old High German warg/warch (enemy, devil) and the 
Gothic words: gawarjagjan (to condemn), wargipa and gawargeins (judgment, 
condemnation).l52 Furthermore, the following words can be considered related phrases: the 
Old Saxon giwaragean (to condemn a malefactor), warg/warag (malefactor, devil), wurgil 
(rope), wargtreo (gallows), the Old English warhtreo (gallows-bird), the Old Norse 
gorvargr (cattle thief, kaksnavarher and brennuvargr (arsonist murderer), mordvargr 
(murderer) and vargdropi (descendant of an outcast))53 The etymology of all these phrases 
that can be traced back to the Old German word *цагуа is not fully clarified;154 yet, if we 
presume to find its origin in the Indo-European root *uer-gh (to wind, to press, to strangle), 
then wargits might mean strangler and the person to be strangled)55 In the mirror of the 
above, Schmidt-Wiegand can see a clear connection with the meaning wolf, at the same 
time, he claims that it should be investigated whether this word carried the meaning host is 
(alien, enemy) in ancient German times already, and as underlying words he refers to the 
Langobardic waregang and the Old English waeregenga (alien, protection seeker))56 
Consequently, it should be analysed in what connection, chronology the meaning 
malefactor is related to the meaning wolf, in other words, which meaning can be considered 
primary with respect to the phrase wargus/vargr. It can be declared beyond doubt that the 
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meaning malefactor is much earlier in terms of the age of the source since sources from the 
Continent in this sense occur from the 6,h c. already, while the meaning wolf beside the 
meaning malefactor can be documented only in Old Norse sources from five centuries 
later-on the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the Old Norse terminology was 
basically developed later than the Continental one.157 In the light of that, the Old Norse 
phrase vargr-irrespective if either 'malefactor' or 'wolf ' is considered the primary 
meaning-belongs to a later layer compared to Continental terms and even within Old 
Norse.158 Also, it should made clear that both on the Continent and on northern territories 
relatively few traces of pagan tradition can be found in laws written down since all the rules 
wanted by enacting such laws was to eliminate ancient German elements and introduce 
Christian thinking and legal awareness.159 After all, Schmidt-Wiegand finds that wargas as 
a legal term should be interpreted in a wider sense: as expulsion from the community, and 
refuses the primacy of the meaning wolf/werewolf although he acknowledges the 
significance of further development of the term to this direction both on the Continent and 
in the north. Expulsion (Acht) was imposed on perpetrators of all the acts (desecration of a 
grave /robbing of a grave, manslaughter by arson, assassination, breach of peace, etc.) that 
was denoted by the Gothic and Old Norse legal language by the phrase fairina and 
nidingsverk, respectively, and whose sanction, i.e. expulsion, was expressed by the Old 
Swedish word utlcegher, the Old Norse utlagr, the Anglo-Saxon utlath, the Middle High 
German ëlos and the Middle Latin exlex. Transformation of the meaning outcast and its 
extension by the meaning wolf can be undoubtedly connected with the fact that it was noted 
in Lex Salica already that a malefactor who has failed to pay conpositio hides in the forest 
(per silvas vadit),m and later he was denoted by the phrase wealdgenga by the Anglo-
Saxon sources and skögarmadr by the Old Norse sources.161 
Alemannian law regulates the issue more specifically and-to put it more exactly-it 
determines the amount of conpositio depending on the status of the dead person. Pactus 
Alamannorum]62 noted down in the early 7th c. sets up the following system. In case of 
killing a free man, if the perpetrator in a free status delivers taken valuables to the relatives, 
no investigation need to be conducted due to robbing of the dead person,163 if, however, he 
does not deliver them, he shall pay forty solidus,164 If the perpetrator took the valuables of a 
157
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liberated dead person, he paid thirteen solidus and one tremisse,165 and if the "injured 
person" was a slave, the sum of conspositio amounted to twelve solidus.166 If the dead 
person was an Alemannian woman in a free status, then the perpetrator had to pay eighty 
solidus or had to take a cleansing oath together with twelve fellow oath-takers.167 In case of 
a liberated woman, the perpetrator had to pay twenty-six solidus and two tremisse,168 and in 
case of a woman in a slave status he had to pay twelve solidus or had to take an oath 
together with twelve fellow oath-takers.169 The forty solidus payable in case of a free 
Alemannian injured party corresponds to the conpositio of bodily injury-a cut off ear 
according to the source170 or to the penalty that had to be paid when somebody placed an 
object with a value higher than one solidus beside the dead person.171 The conpositio 
payable in case of female injured parties amounted to twice the sum to be paid by male 
persons, however, this principle was not enforced with regard to servants. Pactus 
Alamannorum contains a further provision, which regulates the state of facts of plundering 
a yet unburied person killed by a third party: in this case the law-just as Edictus Rothar)n— 
prescribed conpositio of eighty solidusJ73 However, the interpretation of the locus raises 
difficulties as the phrase regarding plundering a buried dead person (i.e. actual robbing of a 
grave) was, beyond any doubt, inserted in the text later—as it is shown by the uneven 
linguistic structure. Consequently, there are good chances that Pactus Alamannorum 
originally defined only two states of facts in this scope: the crime called plodraub and 
rairaub in Langobardic law, and the state of facts of robbing of a grave was interpolated in 
the text of the law only later.174 
Lex Baiuvariorum regulates issues related to dead persons and the grave in an 
independent title (De mortuis et eorum conpositione). In case of homicide committed in 
secret, if the perpetrator throws the corpse in the river or hides it so that it could not be 
found, he shall pay forty solidus (and the law gives an explanation: because the dead person 
cannot be provided with decent burial) in addition to blood money; and if somebody throws 
a corpse washed ashore into the water again, he shall pay twelve solidus)75 In case of an 
injured party in a slave status the amount of conpositio is one hundred and eighty solidus)76 
These loci contain the phrase murder, i.e. murdrida and camurdrit. Two further passages 
serve the protection of an unburied corpse. One of them stipulates that a person who wounds 
a corpse by an arrow to drive away birds settling on it shall pay twelve solidus)17 In 
165
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accordance with the other locus, a person who wounds the body of a person killed by 
somebody else shall pay twelve solidus as conpositio, both in case of serious mutilation 
(cutting off the head, hands, feet or ears) and wounds causing minor bleeding (as the dead 
person died not long ago).178 With regard to a perpetrator who prevents burial of a dead 
person, the question has arisen in literature if the making of the state of facts go back to 
pagan or Christian traditions: Dahn supported the former,179 while His the latter view180— 
most probably properly, paying regard to the powerful ecclesiastical contribution to creating 
Lex Baiuvariorum. 
The importance of burying the dead person is implied by the provision which stipulates 
that an alien burier must be given one solidus as reward-this passage supports the 
significance of the ecclesiastic impact as the reasons of the law refers to a locus in the New 
Testament,181 which makes burial of the dead person obligatory.182 This thought was highly 
emphasised in old Christian authors already, for example, Lactantius claimed that it is 
forbidden to leave a man made in God's own image unburied so that he should end up in 
the bowels of beasts, he should be returned to earth where he comes from.183 The provision 
of Lex Baiuvariorum that takes position against heathen burial ceremonies is meant to 
strengthen this thought, too.184 
With regard to actual desecration of a grave/robbing of a grave in case of an "injured 
party" in a free status the law prescribed payment of forty solidus and conpositio imposed 
on theft with respect to the valuables taken, i.e. compensation of185 ninefold amount of the 
value.186 Forty solidus as conpositio is not different from that of mutilation since, for 
example, the perpetrator was obliged to pay this amount for cutting off a foot.187 (It is worth 
adding that while this state of facts was punished by Langobardic law by conpositio of nine 
hundred solidus,188 the Bavarian law contended itself with a fraction of it—at the same time, 
it should be noted that while in accordance with Edictus Rothari in the absence of any 
relatives this amount was due to the king, Lex Baiuvariorum is silent about the fact that in 
this case the amount of conpositio would be due to the duke's treasury.189) 
In addition to robbing of a grave, the law provides for taking the clothes of unburied 
dead persons (waluraupa):'90 if the person who has killed them has taken them along, he 
should pay double indemnification, if they have been taken by somebody else, not the 
perpetrator of the murder, then he shall pay the usual amount for theft,191 i.e. nine-times 
conpositio}92 Accordingly, the differentiation between clothes taken by the murderer and 
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somebody else can be found in the Bavarian law, too, just as in Langobardic and Alemannian 
law. The issue of double conpositio mentioned here, however-as it was underlined by 
Brunner already l93-is far from being unproblematic. It can be presumed that here the law 
imposed the payment of the double amount of the usual conpositio and not of the valuables 
taken on the perpetrator as it was stipulated by law, for example, in case of acts committed 
against travellers.194 Nehlsen—in our view properly-presumes ecclesiastical impact behind 
the stipulation of this unusually high amount in the law.195 (This title of Lex Baiuvariorum 
contains two stipulations, which sanction taking of the boat of another person.196 It arises as 
a question why the two passages covering boats were placed beside the provisions on dead 
persons. It is possible that somehow it has to do with the ancient pagan burial form where 
the dead person and his valuables were put on a boat and were set afloat.) 
With regard to the provisions of Lex Baiuvariorum concerning robbing of a grave-and 
plundering of dead persons in general-it should be stated that they do not contain any 
provisions that go back to ancient German legal customs or have the perpetrator expelled 
from the community; what is more: it is this law where the impact of the Christian Church 
is the most striking with respect to judging these crimes. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to provide a comparative analysis of the state of facts of 
robbing of a grave, paying regard to the question to what extent elements of Roman law, 
canon law and primarily German customary law can be demonstrated in specific codes. As 
part of that the Gothic, Burgundián, Langobardic, Frankish, Alemannian and Bavarian 
Volksrecht have been examined. As a result, with regard to all these codices it can be 
established that formulation of the state of facts of robbing of a grave/desecration of a grave 
and the related sanction clearly draws on Roman and canon law roots and-although, as a 
matter of fact, these provisions organically fit in with the spirit and system of sanctions of 
German folk laws-neither the system of sanctions, nor the images related to it imply any 
genuine connections with ancient German (pagan) thoughts and religion. 
193
 Brunner: op. cit. I. 879. 
194
 Lex Baiuvariorum 4, 30. 
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 Nehlsen: Der Grabfrevel... op. cit. 134. 
196
 Lex Baiuvariorum 9, 9. 10. 
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LENKE FEHÉR 
Kelemen László: Miként vélekedünk a jogról? Szociálpszichológiai kutatás 2010 
(How we are thinking on law? Sociopsychological research in 2010). Line Design 
Kiadó, Budapest, 2010. 215 p. 
The above-mentioned book-based on social-political research-tries to give an adequate 
answer to the complex question, how people are thinking on law, in particular criminal law 
and criminal justice. The answers given to the questionnaire of the survey are mirroring the 
opinion of the different social groups on such important issues like public security, risk of 
victimisation, fear of crime. The survey shows, how the people get informed on public 
affairs, which sources of news, written and electronic media surfaces are held by them 
authentic, credible and which ones are regarded less reliable. There are further questions 
concerning the level of democracy; the role of participation of people in public life, and 
their possible influence on it; the level of living standards; on the role and importance of 
voting at the elections for the political decisions; the necessity of fight against corruption 
and so on. The research gives a short insight into the nature, quality and extent of changes 
before and after changing the political regime in Hungary. 
The survey was finished and the book was published in 2010, before the elections. 
During the two-year period of the research, the data of questionnaires of the two samples 
was compiled and elaborated (consisting altogether 1100 persons), moreover the manuscript 
had been prepared and the book had been published, working with several thousands of 
data. 
The topic has an interdisciplinary approach, covering two disciplines: law and 
psychology. The book consists of seven parts, out of which four deals with the essential 
questions (like on the aim of the research, the theoretical background, the research 
methodology, the research results) while the last parts include the annex, diagrams and list 
of background literature. 
In the theoretical background, the work discusses and summarises the meaning of 
social representations and functions, including the connected researches, it analyses the 
questions of belief in justice, the law and order, the system-approval and system-critic, 
enriching it with the findings, results of the different empirical studies. 
After discussing the general questions, the book leads the reader to the field of criminal 
law and criminology. First, an overview is given on the causes of criminality, the aim of 
punishment as well as the connected most relevant theories. The book provides an analysis 
of the definition and the role of victim, the injured party as well as summarising the most 
important theories and research results on victimisation and fear of crime. Concerning 
victimisation, the book consist criminal statistical data and several references to the 
connected legal literature, empirical research results. There is a reference also for an earlier 
work of the author, on which the present survey is based, the recent one applies however 
many more case-study, a wider scope of investigation and consequently constituting an 
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important step forward in its content as well as methodology. At discussing the sanction 
system, the book deals with several theoretical questions, among others the pro and contra 
arguments, opinions on death penalty.1 Finally, the chapter dealing with methodology 
provides the content of the questionnaire, the samples, introduces the data on survey and 
analyses them, summarises the main results. The research findings are rich, adequate and 
well structured. 
In the survey extended to 1100 persons, two different samples played a role: a nation-
wide representative sample, consist of 1000 persons and a sample of 100 persons with 
finished legal studies. The two samples were compared on the basis of socio-demographical 
characteristics, the interests on actual problems of society, as well as on political party 
preferences. The author made an analysis in both samples concerning the multidimensional 
context of the basic distribution and differences of dependent and independent variables, 
too. 
The research aimed at identifying what is the common opinion of the present society 
in certain questions. The questionnaire contained both legal and psychological questions. 
The interesting research gives answer for some very actual questions, like the relationship 
between the severity of sanction system and the decreasing criminality; the question of 
reducing the so-called "crime of living" by decreasing unemployment or increasing social 
benefits, etc. 
Among the legal issues, the especially important questions of legislation and legal 
practice, as well as the realisation of basic principles of criminal justice can be found. 
Besides these, the research deals with the causes of criminal behaviour and prevention of 
crime. Before getting a deeper insight into the content of the questionnaire, on the basis of 
studying the book, maybe it seems to be an additional question to deal with the opinions on 
death penalty, which is for a long time does not constitutes part of the sanction system. 
However, studying further the research structures, the reason and logic of this question 
becomes clearer. 
The rate of questioned women in the representative sample is 53%, while in the sample 
of lawyers 59%.2 Thus, in the second sample the women were slightly overrepresented. It is 
very important that the survey contains several data regarding gender-related distribution, 
too. For instance, the answers on possible connection of increasing social support and 
decreasing criminality; or the questions whether support or oppose the legalisation of drugs: 
increase of social support could decrease criminality according to 39% of the answers in 
the women, while 31% in the man sample. The gender-related distribution is missing 
however in the answers of questioning the possible prohibition of abortion. We can see the 
distribution according age-groups (94% of the youngest and 54% of the eldest3 population 
disagree with the possible prohibition of abortion) and school-education (86% of the 
persons with higher education and 53% with lower education disagree with the possible 
prohibition of abortion), too. It should be noted that most of the interviewed persons 
however disagree with the possibility of prohibition of abortion. Discussing the possible 
legalisation of soft drugs, according to the data of research, great majority of man and 
woman is against legalisation. 31% of man involved in the research and 24% of women 
1
 Death penalty was cancelled in Hungary by the decision AB (23) 1990. (VI. 31.) of the 
Constitutional Court. 
2
 Seep. 72. 
3
 70-79 years old. 
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involved supported the idea of legalisation of soft drugs. The man involved in the sample of 
research seems to be more permissible in this question, than woman.4 
Looking at some of the main findings I would refer to the followings.5 Concerning the 
question on legislation, legal practice, prevention was regarded as the most important issue 
by the majority in the sample of lawyers, while in the representative group the majority 
supported the strengthening of punishments. The answers with the opinion on strengthening 
the sanction system, basically more or less anticipates the attitude towards the theoretical 
restoring of the death penalty-institution: in the representative sample (except inhabitants of 
Budapest or the sample of higher education) the majority of answers support restoring death 
penalty. In the sample of lawyers however the majority was against death penalty. The 
survey contains a great amount of data in this respect. It should be referred that the author 
in the theoretical introduction of this topic, gives an analyses and summary on the arguments 
pro and contra on death penalty, the human rights aspects, the possibility of error in law and 
other questions, too. 
In both sample, it was a general opinion that people have higher fear of crimes of 
violence, than it is a real risk. According to gender-related data, 63% of women and 51% of 
men have fear of criminal victimisation.6 As far as criminal justice is concerned, in the 
representative sample there is a strong negative attitude, while in the sample of lawyers 
there is a positive opinion with some critical remarks (one quarter of the cases). 
It is also very interesting that in the representative sample the world is regarded as 
unjust, the system needs reforms, however there was a positive attitude towards participation 
in public life and possibility of election. In the sample of lawyers, as a consequence of 
higher education and social status, in all of these questions there was a positive attitude. 
The research results discussed in the book are valuable and innovative. The book is 
based on elaborating the most interesting and actual aspects of the survey. The excellent 
work-which made an effort of discovering, mapping the essence, and important 
characteristics of different opinions-represents an important contribution to the 
interdisciplinary approach of the given thematic. 
4
 Seep. 117. table 41. 
5
 See p. 162. 
6
 Seep. 128. 
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Osztovits András (ed.): A Polgári törvénykönyvről szóló 1959. évi IV. Törvény 
Magyarázata (Commentary on Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code). Opten Kft., 
Budapest, 2011. 2418 p. 
In an international comparison, the literature of legal commentaries is rather modest in 
Hungary. This is particularly true in the area of private law. In the twenty years following 
the fall of communism, only two commentaries on the Civil Code were published (a loose-
leaf version by HVG Orac, which was edited by Ferenc Petrik, and a commentary by KJK/ 
Complex, which was edited by György Gellért)} 
This might seem surprising in the light of earlier traditions of Hungarian civil law 
studies, which produced outstanding examples of scholarly work such as Magyar Magánjog 
(Hungarian Private Law), which was published between 1899 and 1905 under the editorship 
of Armin Fodor, or the six-volume commentary that was published in 1941 with the same 
title and was edited by Károly Szladits. Both are useful even today and discuss certain 
issues in greater detail than the contemporary commentaries. Another work worth 
mentioning is the two-volume Civil Code commentary that was published in 1981 and 
edited by Gyula Eörsi and György Gellért. Other than the sections that deal with provisions 
which have been repealed since, this commentary can still be used even today. 
The commentary edited by András Osztovits, a Supreme Court judge, aims to join this 
tradition The two-volume commentary is the work of twenty authors. 
This is a remarkable book because each one of the authors is a member of the younger 
generation of civil law experts. They are young academics who also have connections to the 
practical side of the law in one way or another, with some of them practicing as lawyers 
(such as Gergely Baross, Dániel Bán, Ádám Boóc, Adám Fuglinszky, Zoltán Nemessányi or 
István Sándor). Almost all of them teach law in one of Hungary's law schools. Most authors 
have a lengthy list of past publications, including contributions to books in the same vein as 
with this commentary. This new book afforded them the opportunity to provide a synthesis 
of their earlier work from a different aspect. 
Compared to previous commentaries, there is a certain shift of focus in this book. For 
example the section dealing with persons is considerably more detailed than what can be 
found in other works (almost 300 pages). Contractual securities and delictual liability also 
receive significant attention, and the book also addresses inheritance law in detail (on 
almost 300 pages). 
One of the characteristic features of this new commentary is that it discusses the 
distinguishing features of various legal concepts. This can be very useful for legal 
professionals who practice law. It is important to note that the book's analysis of contracts 
is not limited to those regulated in the Civil Code; contracts that are used in practice but not 
specifically defined in the Civil Code are also discussed in detail. 
It is a reasonable question whether it makes any sense to publish a new book in 2011 
with commentary on the current Civil Code. The draft version of the new Civil Code is now 
publicly available and the Parliament is expected to pass it into law during the autumn 
session. This, however, does not mean that the current Civil Code will be rendered useless 
' This was later complemented by a commentary published by Magyar Hivatalos Közlönykiadó. 
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in the foreseeable future. Contracts and other legal relationships will be governed by this 
Civil Code for years to come. This is particularly true of long-term contracts (e.g. bank loan 
agreements with terms of 20 or 30 years). Therefore, a new commentary that analyses the 
current Civil Code can be very useful even with the imminent introduction of the new 
legislation. 
The thoroughness of the book means that its readers will be able to rely on it with 
confidence in their day-to-day application of the Civil Code. The publisher should be 
commended for not placing restrictions on the authors in terms of volume and from not 
shying away from publishing a book that runs to more than 2,400 pages. 
Obviously, the length of a legal text will not determine its success. But anybody who 
opens this book will immediately realise that it more than meets the standards of legal 
writing that are expected in this genre. 
We recommend this Commentary on the Civil Code to all legal practitioners and we 
are sure that they will find it very useful. 
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V. Varano-V. Barsotti: La tradizione giuridica occidentale. Vol. I. Testo e materiali per 
un confronto civil law common law. G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 4th ed., 
2010. 596 p. 
1. Writing a comparative law course book is certainly not one of the easiest tasks. The 
future authors have to face various difficulties. Firstly, they should decide about the scope 
of the book. Should it encompass all the main legal systems including, for instance, China 
or India, or is it enough to focus on the law of European countries? Secondly, the width of 
the manual is also very problematic. How detailed discussion of the chosen legal systems is 
needed for the goals of university teaching? If it is short, the risk to become too vague is 
real. If the chapters are longish and detailed, the students may find the whole subject boring 
and unpromising. Lastly, the methodological bases can also raise serious concerns, since 
they are not as unambiguous as they may seem at the very first glance. Is it still adequate to 
follow the traditional path-paved by such classics as René David or Konrád Zweigert-of 
presenting legal families or groups, or should it better approach legal systems as unique 
legal cultures? This line of questions can easily be continued: is the discussion of 
supranational legal orders, e.g. EU Law, needed in such a manual?, should the historical 
method be widely applied in the presentation?, are the effects of globalization worthy of 
consideration?-these points are perfectly enough to illustrate the difficulty of this task. 
Thus, authors should really make proper choices at the very beginning and keep in mind 
that these choices will deeply determine both the outcome and the academic reception of 
their work. 
The first edition of this Italian volume was published in 2002. Originally, it was a 
course book written by professors and researchers of the University of Florence for basic 
comparative law studies ("Sistemi giuridici comparati"). The fourth edition in 2010, 
however, underwent some serious changes; both its scope and content have been extended. 
The most important novelty is that the volume has a lot of new content. For instance there 
is an almost twenty pages long section in Chapter Two which elaborates on the special 
features of East European legal systems. Furthermore, the sections about the legal systems 
of Latin-America, China, Japan, India and Islamic Countries are also entirely new parts. 
Additionally, several parts of the book has been rewritten or considerably expanded. So, it 
has already changed a lot compared to the earlier editions, therefore, it is worthy of a 
detailed presentation. The lessons arising from this brief study may even be interesting for 
the broader academic circles. 
2. The structure of the book can be summarized as follows. Chapter One deals with certain 
introductory questions. It briefly touches upon some points of the history of comparative 
law, and also discusses its nature, functions and aims. Moreover, it also analyzes how 
certain scholars tried to classify the legal systems of the world. The various approaches of 
Arminjon-Nolde-Wolff, David, Zweigert-Kötz and Mattéi are discussed in detail. 
Chapter Two is dedicated to the tradition of civil law. The first two sections are based 
on a historical approach. Section One discusses the formation of continental civil law prior 
to the codifications of the 19th century. Besides the impact of Roman law it focuses on the 
role of universities in legal development-emphasizing the prominent place of the University 
of Bologna-and presents the different legal schools (Glossator!, Canonisti, Commentatori 
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and Umanisti) contributing to this development. The features of modern codes Code civil 
(1804), Allgemeines Landrecht (1794), Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1900), Zivilgesetzbuch 
(1912)-are the main issues of the next section. Many question related to these codes are 
examined, including their historical context, structure and influence on other legal systems. 
Section Three surveys the system of legal sources in civil law. It stresses that legal rule in 
these systems mainly means the rules expressed in codes or acts, and it also analyzes the 
typical hierarchy of norms in civil law. Furthermore, such questions as the organization of 
the judicial system as well as the role of courts in legal development are also examined. The 
last section of this chapter is devoted to the legal systems of Eastern Europe, and after a 
detailed historical introduction describing both the Socialist period and the democratic 
transition; it presents the main peculiarities of the region. The role of constitutional courts 
as "creatures and creators" of democratic transitions is well explained. 
Common Law tradition is presented in Chapter Three which is comprised of four 
sections. The structure of this chapter resembles the earlier one and this editorial solution 
considerably emphasizes the similarities of the two legal traditions. The first section 
contains a general introduction to common law, and explains it from a predominantly 
historical perspective, focusing on the formation and the main features of the system of 
writs and on the nature of Equity. The 19th century and recent history of English court 
system is the topic of Section Two. It presents the main provisions of the Judicature Acts of 
1873-1875 as well as the newest changes in the last twenty years. Section Three analyzes 
the sources of common law and mostly focuses on the functioning of the doctrine of binding 
precedent and on problems related to statutory interpretation. The main features of the legal 
system of the United States are the topic of Section Four. It mainly discusses the separation 
of powers provided by the Constitution, the judiciary, the unification of law and the role of 
different legal sources in U.S. law. As for constitutional justice the section also analyzes the 
famous case of Marbury v. Madison in detail. 
The last two chapters deal with the legal systems of the Scandinavian countries and the 
legal systems outside of the Western world. The chapter about Scandinavian law surveys 
every important question including historical development, Nordic legal cooperation and 
the place of travaux préparatoires in the system of legal sources. Chapter Five-Encounters 
of the Western legal tradition-could perhaps be regarded as the most unconventional part of 
the whole book. It tries to briefly describe certain important, non-European legal systems in 
order to make the panorama of the book more complete, but the authors mostly focus on the 
influence of Western law, not on the entirety of these systems. Every section of the chapter 
drafts the main lines of a given legal system and discusses the influence of the Western 
legal tradition. For instance in the section devoted to India, one can read about the influence 
of common law legal culture including Bentham's idea on codification, as well as the effect 
of US constitutional law in modern Indian law. Latin-America, China, Japan, India and 
Islamic countries are analyzed through same lenses. 
3. As a first remark, it should be mentioned that this book is really suitable for university 
teaching. It is rich in information and data; thanks to the several appendixes attached to 
each chapter. These appendixes are parts of important legal documents (such as the index of 
the Code civil or the preamble of the Chinese constitution), case excerpts, and some pages 
of important scholarly papers. So, law students can really get acquainted with the major 
legal systems of the world from this manual. 
An overview of our introductory questions might also be useful and interesting. 
However, here, we have to start with the problem of methodology since methodological 
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choices always comprehensively determine the practical content. As the underlying concept 
it is obvious that the volume's approach is strongly linked to the premises of post-World 
War II comparative law. It is apparent at many points. For instance, as the title shows it, the 
authors share the view of René David that civil law and common law-even though there are 
unambiguous differences between these two European legal traditions-can be unified in a 
more comprehensive legal unit due to many, mostly philosophical reasons. For David this 
was the so-called droit occidental,' for the authors this is the tradizione giuridica 
occidentale. It should also be mentioned that this approach implies two premises at least. 
On the one hand it expects that these legal traditions converge since a longer period, on the 
other hand it also presupposes that the main task of comparative law is the study of 
similarities. 
This is a well-developed starting point but some new trends in comparative law should 
also be taken into consideration. A wave of cultural comparative law2 has begun in the mid-
nineties-for example the works of Pierre Legrand or David Nelken can be mentioned here-
and this new approach questions the very basics of this "classic" way of thinking. These 
scholars doubt the neutrality of the traditional functional approach developed by Zweigert 
and widely applied by comparatists, and they also advocate the research of differences of 
legal systems.3 For instance, the so-called "convergence thesis'-supposing the gradual 
convergence of civil and common law-was explicitly rejected by Legrand, who argued that 
due to many reasons-for instance the different conceptions of legal rule and the divergence 
of legal thinking-it is simply impossible, even under the scope of European integration.4 
Obviously, the emergence of cultural approach in comparative law does not mean that 
course books and comparative law readers should completely be rewritten. It is unnecessary 
since these cultural theses are also hot issues and they are questioned and debated from 
many points in the international comparative law scholarship. For instance a Finnish scholar 
advocates the preservation of a moderate version of functionalism contrary to all post-
modem critics, that is, the use of this method without relying on Zweigert's famous 
presumption of similarity.5 However, the integration of certain insights of culturalism-the 
sensitivity toward differences, the approach of law as a cultural phenomenon, or the 
research of various attitudes in legal cultures-into the book's conceptual background can 
surely be an important point. 
Each chapter contains a comprehensive discussion of its subject matter. From this 
aspect, the volume seems to be balanced, only the parts on non-Western legal systems are 
slightly shorter. This difference reflects that the main aim of the book is the presentation of 
Western Law in the broadest sense. It is certainly a good choice, since the very detailed 
1
 David, R.: Existe-t-il un droit occidental? In: XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 
Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema (eds. K. H. Nadelmann-A. T. von Meheren-J. Hazard). 
A. W. Sythoff, Leiden, 1961. 56-64. 
2
 For a detailed analysis see: Whitman, J. Q.: The Neo-Romantic Turn. In: Comparative Legal 
Studies. Traditions and Transitions (ed. by P. Legrand and R. Munday). Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003. 312-344. 
3
 For the origins of this approach see: Frankenberg, G.: Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking 
Comparative Law. Harvard International Law Journal, 1985/2. 411 —456. 
4
 Legrand, P. : European Legal Systems are not Converging. The International and Comparative 
Law Quaterly, 1996/1. 52-81. 
5
 Husa, J.: Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance. Rabies Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht, 2003/3. 419^147. 
BOOK REVIEW 2 6 3 
discussion of non-Western systems could raise difficult problems. First of all, due to the 
linguistic deficiencies, it is very hard to find adequate information on the everyday 
functioning of these legal cultures. In Western languages, except for a few basic articles,6 
real knowledge on the socio-legal reality of these systems is hardly accessible. However, 
without this information the comparatist risks to fall into the trap of dilettantism. It is 
perfectly enough to recall how broad the gap between the written norms and their application 
was in the Socialist law. Thus, the avoidance of a detailed discussion of non-Western legal 
systems seems to be a legitimate decision in a course book. 
Lastly, the volume also successfully avoids the dangers of Eurocentrism, even though 
it mostly focuses on the Western Legal Tradition. It presents each important non-Western 
legal culture to a certain degree-perhaps the world of traditional African legal cultures7 is 
the only missing link. The approach of these chapters focusing on the historical Western 
influence is also justifiable, since the reception of Western legal patterns is, perhaps, the 
most interesting point for European law students, and on the other hand, Western researchers 
are also more or less familiar with this issue. All in all, from the point of view of its scope 
the volume reflects good editorial decisions. 
The main advantage of this manual, however, lies in a slightly different point. This 
volume of Varano and Barsotti has a certainly innovative character as a course book, which 
is why it is really able to raise concerns on the future of both comparative law course book 
writing and, moreover, comparative law in general. The discussion is more than needed 
since one thing should be obvious for all comparatists: research and teaching of comparative 
law cannot be effectively continued without taking into account how the world has changed 
in the last twenty years due to the fundamental transformation of the political and economic 
relations. 
6
 Cf. for instance: Kim, C.-Lawson, C. M.: The Law of the Subtle Mind: the Traditional 
Japanese Conception of Law. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1972/2. 491-513. 
7
 For a different approach see for instance: Gambaro, A.-Sacco, R.-Vogel, L.: Le droit de 
l'Occident et d'ailleurs. LGDJ, Paris, 2011. 415-443. j . j.» 
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CSABA VARGA* 
Philosophising on Law under 
the Ambrella of Marxism in Hungary 
Abstract. From amongst legal theories of Socialisms' Marxism, Hungarian scholarship played a rather balancing 
role all along. Characterised by dialogue and successful mediation, it strove to take a middle-of-the-road stance 
within the Socialist orbit. It took the professional requirements of scholarship rather seriously within the bounds of 
feasibility at varying times. Under restrictive conditions and despite ideological dictates, it filled a fermentative 
role. All in all, it made both ( 1 ) the sociological approach and (2) the historico-comparative perspective accepted 
in the Socialist world by transcending legal positivism and especially "Socialist normativism", on the one hand, 
and by breaking out from domestic/regional self-seclusion, on the other. Moreover, it (3) introduced the ontological 
perspective, built upon the epistemological perspective, exclusive till then, and thereby it could attribute ontic 
significance to the self-explanation and self-representation of different legal cultures, usually treated as having 
merely an ideological importance; and (4) by developing a law and modernisation theory, it could address Central 
and Eastern Europe in a responsive way. The overview starting by assessing the legacy in the end of WWII 
concludes in a parallel characterisation of the state of scholarship and its achievements throughout the countries 
concerned by the end of the Soviet rule. Through and owing to all this, the Hungarian pattern offered a relatively 
near-to-optimum alternative, a kind of optimality in its solutions and responses. 
Keywords: Marxism, Leninism, "Socialist normativism", legal philosophy and sociology, comparatism, ontology/ 
epistemology, law and modernisation 
1. P r e l i m i n a r i e s 
In t h e t e r m s o f t h e l e g a l i d e o l o g y o f t h e C o m m u n i s t d i c t a t o r s h i p , g r a d u a l l y e s t a b l i s h i n g 
i t s e l f in H u n g a r y a c c o r d i n g to S o v i e t p a t t e r n s wi th S t a l i n i a n - c u m - V i s h i n s k y a n i n s p i r a t i o n s 
a f t e r W W I I , t h e l ega l p h i l o s o p h y a s c u l t i v a t e d in t h e i n t e r w a r p e r i o d a n d r e n e w e d in t h e 
p o s t - w a r p e r i o d c o u l d o n l y q u a l i f y a s a r e m n a n t o f t h e d e s p i s e d " b o u r g e o i s " con t inu i ty , p a r t 
o f a p a s t t o b e d o n e a w a y w i t h a n y w a y . In a pos i t ion o f d e g r a d a t i o n f r o m t h e outse t , it s o o n 
b e c a m e s u b j e c t t o t h e po l i t i c a l a t t a c k s w a g e d aga ins t e v e r y t h i n g c o m i n g f r o m the n a t i o n a l 
h e r i t a g e , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t tha t th is l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y h a d i n d e e d r e p r e s e n t e d an i m p o s i n g 
c u l t u r e a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l h i g h l i g h t , n u r t u r e d by h i g h l y v a l u e d s c h o l a r s in b o t h the i n t e r w a r 
a n d t h e p o s t - w a r s h o r t - l i v e d c o a l i t i o n p e r i o d s . In v i e w o f its r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o u t p u t a n d 
d y n a m i c p o s t - w a r r e - s t a r t , o n e m a y r e m e m b e r q u i t e a f e w r e m a r k a b l e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s 
i n d e e d . F o r i n s t a n c e , J u l i u s M o ó r - d e m o c r a t and l e g a l p h i l o s o p h e r , t h e f irst p o s t - w a r 
m e t r o p o l i t a n r e c t o r - s e t a n e x e m p l a r y p a t t e r n for f a c i n g t h e pas t , f o r m u l a t i n g e th ica l a n d 
s p i r i t u a l l e s s o n s f o r a n e w start in a s u b l i m e and i n s p i r i n g way.1 W i t h c o n s t a n t e f f o r t s a t 
Emeri tus Research Professor, Inst i tute for Legal Studies, Centre for Social Sciences , 
Hungar ian Academy of Sciences, H-1250 Budapest , P.O.B. 25 ; Emeritus Professor , Department of 
Legal Philosophy, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, H - 1 4 2 8 Budapest 8, P.O.B. 6. 
E-mai l : varga@jog.mta .hu; homepage: ht tp: / /drcsabavarga.wordpress .com 
1
 Cf . his CV and Bibliography by the present author , introducing Moór , J.: Schriften zur 
Rechtsphilosophie. (Hrsg. : Cs. Varga, Budapes t ) , 2006. and <ht tp: / /phi losophyoflaw.wordpress .com/>, 
ix-xxi i . 
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reaching a synthesis. Barna Horváth just paved a new path, opening up further theoretical 
prospects.2 József Szabó of Szeged, having launched his career by laying the foundations of 
jurisprudence in the methodology of sciences, faced a multitude of new tasks, such as an 
understanding and at least psychological explanation of Anglo-American lawyerly 
mentality and a description of the ultimate motives of state jurisdiction and public 
administration. And, last but not least, István Losonczy of Pécs produced a summary of his 
so-called realistic legal philosophy (it having by then been developed into a systematic 
doctrine).3 Well, all this ensured the promise of a smooth continuation. 
Of course, we can regard it open to question whether or not this legal philosophy 
(especially of Moór and J. Szabó) could have advanced from the kind of reliable, intelligent 
and self-critical reflexive thought that was fellow-traveller to Western European and Atlantic 
models, to an independent trend, ensuring an internationally pro-active presence. Well, all 
our respect and esteem notwithstanding, my personal answer could at most be a rather 
hesitating "yes". And we may also add that in the case of some of the period's most self-
aware reformers (especially Horváth and Losonczy), the chance of a positive answer is not 
more secure either, as they failed, despite the considerable volume of their academic output, 
to surpass the stage of outlining claims, packed with sketches and improvisations, but 
without arriving at explications extended into full theories as tested through their application 
to partial problems, within the working period spanning from their professorial appointment 
to the Communist takeover (i.e. a quarter of a century in the case of Horváth and one decade 
in the case of Losonczy). Yet it can be regarded as a fact that even their disciples (on behalf 
of Horváth, pioneering in school-founding at Szeged, István Bibó, József Szabó and Tibor 
Vas,4 as well as Vera Bolgár who, having just launched her career, followed her master by 
soon emigrating, and on behalf of Moór, all along a lonely thinker who had not established 
a school of thought, Kornél Scholz) chose challenging paths, each of his or her own; 
meaning, all in all, that jurisprudence in Hungary covered practically the entire range of 
theoretical approaches then cultivated in Europe. Thus the uni-directionality of the 1920s 
(Moór), followed by the antagonism of the emerging companion (Horváth) as rival to the 
former, in fact ended by being replaced by a series of mutual stimulations and inspirations, 
matured in group discussions. 
2
 Back in 1948, he was even planning an international symposium within the metropolitan 
Pázmány Péter University. Cf. Horváth, В.: The Bases of Law / A jog alapjai. [1948.] (ed.: Cs. Varga), 
Budapest, 2006. 
3
 Cf., as a posthumous edition, Losonczy, I.: Abriß eines realistischen rechtsphilosophischen 
Systems (Hrsg.: Cs. Varga), Budapest, 2002. For a contrasted narrative of personal dramas, cf. Varga, 
Cs.: Philosophysing on Law in the Turmoil of Communist Take-over in Hungary (Two Portraits, 
Interwar and Post-war). In: The 2005 ALPSA Annual Publication of the Australian Legal Philosophy 
Students Association (ed.: M. Leszkiewicz). Brisbane, 2005. 82-86. [on Moór] and 86-94. [on 
Losonczy], 
4
 Cf. Die Schule von Szeged. Rechtsphilosophische Aufsätze von István Bibó, József Szabó und 
Tibor Vas. (Hrsg.: Cs. Varga), Budapest, 2006. 
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2. Cold War Period 
a) Liquidation of "Residues " 
Shortly after the Communist takeover, a frontal attack started against everything with a 
flavour of the past, i.e. deterrence from following tradition through discrediting past 
thoughts and hindering their survival; in short, prevention of the national heritage from 
exerting any influence at all. This act of political and ideological liquidation was 
accomplished within one or two years. It was executed, e.g. through political measures like 
the mercilessly fanatic pseudo-journalism of George Lukács calling for purges or through 
the Communist-Party-initiated thought-police5 instituted as the Committee for Science 
Policy destined to replace the Academy of Sciences, staffed by young professionals, mostly 
holocaust-survivors, headed by Erzsébet Fazekas (a Muscovite historian, practically 
unknown until then), wife of Ernő Gerő, who all along rivalled Rákosi for number one 
leadership. Such a purge became manifest through dismissing the old staff, deteriorating 
their existential conditions, blocking their academic chances and dissociating them from 
prevalent professional networks (e.g., through a series of partisan debates generated by 
new-comer Communists such as, in law, Imre Szabó, János Beér, Gyula Eörsi and Márton 
Sarlós).6 In sum, the "new" was in fact built in utter irrelevance of and disrespect for the 
"old" in an inherently destructive manner, by fulfilling a political commission via 
administratively marshalled means-as is usual in a dictatorship.7 
5
 Involving mathematicians Gy. Alexits and I. Fenyő as well as historians like P. Hanák, L. 
Zsigmond and J. Szűcs. 
6
 See, e.g. Vas, T.: A burzsoá jogfogalom meghatározásának marxista bírálata [Marxist criticism 
of the bourgeois concept of law]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 5 (1950), 3-6 and Földesi, T.: Hogyan 
használjuk fel ma Marx és Engels bírálatait a burzsoá jog- és államelméletekről? [How to use the 
criticism offered by Marx and Engels in the struggle against the bourgeois theories of law and state?]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 9 (1954), 169-177. As the best species of intimidation, calling every ones 
bluff, cf. also '"A Horthy-fasizmus állam- és jogbölcselete'": Az ELTE AJK tanácsülésén 1955. 
január 29-én rendezett vita Szabó Imre készülő könyvének IX. fejezetéről [Legal philosophy and 
theory of state of the Horthy-fascism: Eötvös Loránd University Faculty Board debate on ch. 9 of 
Imre Szabós book under preparation], (ed.: Cs. Varga), Jogelméleti Szemle, 2004/3 in <http://jesz.ajk. 
elte.hu/vargal9.htmi>. 
7
 For its literary outcome, see, first of all by Szabó, I.: L V. Sztálin tanítása a nyelvtudományról 
és a jogi felépítmény kérdése [The teaching of I. V. Stalin on linguistics and the issue of legal 
superstructure]. Az MTA Társadalmi-Történeti Tudományok Osztályának Közleményei II (1951), 91-
104 and Jogtudományi Közlöny, 6 (1951), 155-160; I. V. Sztálin tanítása és a jogelmélet kérdései 
[The teaching of I. V. Stalin and the issues of legal philosophy]. Az MTA Társadalmi-Történeti 
Tudományok Osztályának Közleményei, 2 (1950), 113-122 and Jogtudományi Közlöny, 6 (1951), 
723-727; Vita haladó jogi hagyományaink kérdéséről [Debate on our progressive legal traditions]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 6 (1951), 653-662; A szocialista törvényességről [On Socialist legality]. 
Társadalmi Szemle, 8 (1953), 796-810; Állam- és jogtudományunk elméleti alapjainak néhány fö 
vonása [Main characteristics of the theoretical foundations of our science on state and law]. In: Az 
Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Evkönyve, 1955. (ed.: L. Tamás) Budapest, 1956. 37-43. 
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b) Soviet Uniformisation 
In the absence of any genuine domestic preliminaries8 or self-generated scholarly results-
which proves most obviously that the Marxism of Socialism came into being as solely 
motivated by direct politico-ideological considerations and was bound to remain all along 
alien to any mature sense of scholarship-, the construction of Marxist theory in Hungary 
took a start through translation of pitiably crude and theoretically poor brochure-style 
militant pieces from the Soviet literature,9 which had in its time had the Bolshevik mission 
to replace the certainly not overly-sophisticated but didactical instruction manuals of Tsarist 
Russia. By supporting the Communists' putschist political hegemony, a Hungarian post-
epigonism of the Soviet Stalin-epigonism became the yardstick of party-political 
trustworthiness, signalling its actors' deep personal and professional identification with the 
cause of Socialist revolutionarism.10 
c) Denial of the Past 
The fate of Marxist legal theorising in Socialist Hungary became strangely defined from the 
beginning by an overtly purposeful monograph on the overall history of legal philosophising 
in Hungary. This work, prepared au pair with the Communist takeover to fulfil (through 
officialised academic debates on the field of law) most of the latter's political function, had 
the expressed vocation to close down the past for ever. Rejecting and trampling down the 
values of the past by closing them back in the junk-room of an alleged pre-history, it simply 
condemned past achievements as harmful and, therefore, to be surpassed and forgotten, 
never to be resumed. No wonder that it earned its author a Kossuth-prize, the very first and 
highest official recognition of lawyerly intellectual accomplishment by the new regime. 
This book was the first Marxising grand monograph by Imre Szabó, bearing all the 
"stylistic" marks of Leninism-Stalinism," which-guided by the author's intention to 
display his own legal-philosophical talents as well-built in fact a pile of cadavers out of his 
forerunners, in order to show how to "transcend" (while not staining itself with any attempt 
at retrospection as to the merits) and to "surpass" them (even if not troubled by genuine 
understanding). 
It is a paradoxical after-effect (certainly neither intended nor foreseen at the time by 
the author) that these scarcely buried cadavers proved in fact to remain practically alive-
owing to the bare fact that by being memorialised in a monograph, the past of legal 
8
 With a sole and rather miserable exception. Cf., for its overview, Varga, Cs.: Die Entwicklung 
des rechtstheoretischen Denkens in der Ungarischen Räterepublik. In: Der Kampf der politisch-
rechtlichen Auffassungen in der Geschichte und Gegenwart. Materialen des multilateralen 
Symposiums vom 16. bis 18. September 1986. Berlin, 1988. 122-136. 
9
 Published in translation and/or reviewed by Soviet or domestic authors in Szovjetjogi 
cikkgyűjtemény [Collection of articles from the Soviet law] I-IV (1951-1954). 
10
 As a typical example, cf., by Vas, T.: Az állam- és jogtudományok néhány kérdése az SzKP 
XX. Kongresszusa után [Some questions of the science on state and law after the 20th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 11 (1956), 193-199. as well as Néhány állam- és 
jogelméleti kérdés az SzKP XXIII. Kongresszusának tükrében [Some questions of the theory of state 
and law in the mirror of the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 21 
(1966), 516-519. 
11
 Szabó, I.: A burzsoá állam- és jogbölcselet Magyarországon [Bourgeois theory of state and 
law in Hungary]. Budapest, 1955. 
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theorising could earn a positive memory and reputation within the Hungarian profession up 
to the present day. Otherwise speaking, notwithstanding its official rejection and ideological 
annihilation and eradication, this very past could still be integrated into the local Marxism's 
background consciousness, serving as a standard to provide standing inspiration, even if in 
hidden forms. It was as if the author's politico-ideological service had still—albeit through 
detours-been counter-balanced by his own demand for true scholarship, preserved from his 
personal past to some extent.12 For, by the very act of writing, through extensive research, a 
number of elaborate chapters on the subject, he not only expelled past achievements 
intentionally and pars et totus from the circle of official conceivability, but also described 
them thoroughly and comprehensively as no one had before, and, thereby, challenged 
contemporary scholarship by revealing the richness of the approaches predecessors had 
once testified to. By the same act -nolens volens-he reminded readers of the same theoretical 
problems still unresolved, and the past approach (although condemned to become extinct) 
that kept its relevance-while remaining unspoken and unprocessed, yet offering an 
alternative to the officially Sovietised neo-primitive one-sidedness.13 
At the same time, as a mark of its politico-ideological role, canonised declarations 
(standing for scholarly conclusions), too, appeared in ready form in this new theorisation. 
Because, in the spirit of the hurriedly adopted and ruthlessly enforced creed of its new 
fighters, the truth that could be uttered at all actually offered no temporary rest against 
tormenting hesitations and meditations but served as a revolutionary action (trans)forming 
society, like any revolutionary target set by superior command. That is, whatever truth was 
presented, it took the form of a canon officially declared, taken to be valid (and, therefore, 
made unquestionable) until revocation, the doubting or evading of which had to be retaliated 
against as a species of betrayal or sabotage. This attitude survived nearly till the end of the 
era, even if gradually less enforceable as time passed. However, as long as it was virulent it 
excluded even the feasibility of scholarly debates and any collective generation of ideas 
with open-ended chances. Ironically enough and in a tragic manner, this same attitude 
eventually destroyed its main representative as well, the one who had been the first to apply 
it to jurisprudential life in Hungary.14 
12
 The works by Szabó, written in his twenties as a member of the Hungarian minority living in 
the successor-state Czechoslovakia, include, e.g. A jogszociológia munkaköre [The working field of 
legal sociology]. Korunk [Kolozsvár/Klausenburg/Cluj], 10 (1935), 809-815; Jog és erőszak [Law 
and violence]. Korunk. 12 (1937), 523-527; Az időszerűtlen jogtudomány [Untimely jurisprudence]. 
Korunk, 13 (1938) 7-8, 615-618; Szellemtudomány és pozitivizmus [Humanities and positivism] 
Korunk, 15 (1940), 527-534; as well as Néprajz, jog, szociológia: Népi jogéletkutatás [Ethnography, 
law, sociology: research on popular living law]. Társadalomtudomány, [Budapest] 22 (1942), 422-
427. and Népi jogéletkutatás [Research on popular living law]. Társadalomtudomány, 22 (1942), 
483-185. 
13
 It is noteworthy that, e.g. a monograph having remained in manuscript as a juvenile opus-
Szegvári, К.: Somló Bódog [Felix Somló], [Szeged, 1952-53] (ed.: Cs. Varga). Jogelméleti Szemle, 
2004/4 <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/szegvari20.htmU-did not recall any ambivalence of such a kind. 
Applying a powerful (although, in her own way, also politicised) historico-critical method, she not 
only gave a theoretically high-standard summary but also could manage to accomplish it. 
14
 These features (along with the professional revolutionary s habit of only declaring without 
giving a reason) had become integrated into Imre Szabós personality so much that when he became 
withdrawn, widowed and struggling with illness alone, he was also abandoned by one-time 
subordinates as he could not change his mood of being receptive to nothing but one-sided 
communication. This was a personal fate in sharp contrast with that of Viktor Knapp, of a similar 
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Well, this is the context within which the entire legal thought of nearly a decade-
including the reporting (even if with some critical distance) on the patterns that were to be 
taken over imperatively l 5-was built up, and into which the treatment of topical issues-from 
the main strategic debates on the law's continuity16 and superstructural character {vis-à-vis 
its economic basis)17 up to the timely issues of codification and the class-related social 
contents of the kind of will manifested in law-was caged.18 
d) "Socialist Legality", drawn from memory of a progressive past in Europe 
For the first time, it was Imre Szabó who formulated-pars pro toto in his impressive 
monograph laying down the basics of Socialist jurisprudence 19-the requirements of political 
Stalinism, as translated by Vishinsky into the language of legal superstructure. The author 
built his doctrine of Socialist legality on statutory positivism as developed in Western 
Europe in the middle of the 19th century, in order to generalise it as a common feature for 
the entire Central and Eastern European region under the aegis of Marxism, with an 
approach and theoretical foundation that would rigidify Marx's and Engels ' science-
philosophical and science-methodological presuppositions (dating back to the first half of 
the 19th century), by rendering them exclusive as to the domain of theoretical legal thought 
for long decades to come.2 0 
disposition and age, who had the luck of falling out of official favour early enough, due to his 
sympathy towards the Prague spring in 1968. Deprived of the post directing the Law Institute of the 
Academy of Sciences of Czechoslovakia, he had time enough to metamorphose into the common 
attitude of average beings. He behaved as a friend and almost confidential conversation partner even 
in relation to me, despite the rather critical tone I had used when addressing him at East-West 
international conferences (e.g. in roundtable discussions of the European University Institute chaired 
by president Werner Maihofer), and greeted me as one of his most faithful friends during his last 
years, at a ceremony conferring him an honorary doctorship by the Safranyk University at Kosice 
(Slovakia). 
15
 E.g. Peschka, V.: Vita a jogfogalomról a szovjet jogelméletben [Discussing the concept of 
law in Soviet legal theory]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 11 (1956), 190-194. as well as, by Péteri, Z.: Az 
állam- és jogelmélet vitás kérdései a szovjet jogtudományban [Controversial issues of the theory of 
state and law in Soviet jurisprudence]. Cikkgyűjtemény a kiiljoldijog köréből, 6 ( 1956), 41-44. and A 
jogfogalom néhány kérdése a szovjet jogtudományban [Some questions of the concept of law in 
Soviet jurisprudence]. Az MTA Állam- és Jogtudományi Intézetének Értesítője. I (1958), 304-314. 
16
 E.g., Vita a jog és jogtudomány "viszonylag állandó elemeinek" problémájáról [Debate on 
the problem of the "relatively constant elements" in law and jurisprudence]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 6 
(1951), 368-377. and Szotáczki, M.: A kontinuitás és diszkontinuitás kérdése a jogfejlődésben [The 
issue of continuity and discontinuity in legal development]. In: Jubileumi tanulmányok, 2. (ed.: T. 
Pap). Budapest-Pécs, 1967. 359-379. 
17
 Cf., both as a survey and sharp criticism, Varga, Cs.: Autonomy and Instrumentality of Law 
in a Superstructural Perspective. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 40 (1999), 213-235. 
18
 E.g. by Szotáczki, M.: A jogi akarat osztálytartalma [Class contents of the will in law], 
Budapest, 1959. and Az egyéni érdek és az osztályérdek viszonya a tárgyi jogban [Relationship 
between the individual and the class interest in substantive law], Budapest, 1962. 
19
 By Szabó, I.: Interpretarea normelor juridice. [1960] Bucuresji, 1964. / Die theoretischen 
Fragen der Auslegung der Rechtsnormen. Berlin, 1963. 
20
 For the background, cf. Varga, Cs.: The Paradigms of Legal Thinking. [1999] enlarged 2nd 
ed., Budapest, 2012. and <http://www.scribd.com/doc/85083788/VARGA-ParadigmsOfL 
egalThinking-2012>. 
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e) Search for Scholarly Evolution 
All that notwithstanding, a temporary attempt at summarisation appeared true, concealed in 
lecture notes multiplied in a limited number of copies and never made regularly available 
again-, taking advantage of the chances before and after the Revolution of 1956, adjusted 
to the widest conceivable limits of a minimum conformism. For this summa promised and 
even achieved a reliable analysis of contemporary Western trends with thorough critical 
reflection, representing a unique clear moment in Hungarian Socialist legal theorising. 
Marked by Imre Szabó's authority, his associates could at this time commit themselves to 
nothing but scholarly analysis.21 However, not even this enthusiastic restart (only to be seen 
later on as a next-to-mythical memory) was given the chance of becoming the mainstream. 
3. Institutionalisation and Relaxation 
a) Epigonism as Scholarly Ideal 
Nevertheless, the relatively high standard of academic research-carried out under the direct 
control of the director of the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, academician Imre Szabó,-and the fact it was imbued with genuinely scholarly 
ideals, remained all along an exceptional phenomenon, enclosed within the Institute's 
uniquely privileged ivory-tower with no practical impact upon universities.22 Within this 
framework of an almost antagonistic bipolarity between the academia and the universitas, 
the generation close to Szabó's (Tibor Vas, Sándor Feri, György Antalffy and Pál Halász23) 
with the disciples of the latter two (Ignác Pap at Szeged, from whose work perhaps only a 
bibliographical compilation had anything of a lasting value,24 and Mihály Szotáczky at 
Pécs, who exerted some influence in both Hungary and the Socialist orbit but allowed-
despite his often constructive and even provocative questions-his solutions to waste away 
in the forced doctrinarism of Marxism25) could not go beyond epigonism, leading to an 
obvious dead-end. 
In consequence, the official legal theory, developed by the spirit of Communist party 
rank-and-file activism at law faculties, with an overwhelming dominance in both textbooks 
and popular writing, discredited in fact the theoretical profession on the whole, alienating 
from it legal practitioners and social theorists alike, as a mere ideological exercise. Such a 
theorisation could not exert major influence beyond its repeated ritual acts of self-
commitment; it had not become truly destructive either. Ironically enough, as in a reversed 
21
 Antalffy, Gy.-Kulcsár, K.-Peschka, V.-Péteri, Z.-Samu, M.-Szabó, I.-Szotáczki, M -
Sztodolnik, L.: Állam- és jogelmélet [Theory of state and law]. Budapest, 1957. 
22
 The unbridgeable gap between the kinds of scholarship cultivated at the Academy and in 
universities became a legendary memory when Szabó started commissioning his disciples (e.g. 
Peschka) to apply genuine scholarly standards when consulting university staff (e.g. Pál Halász) who 
were preparing for their academic qualification, while reviewing their pre-publications, who were 
struck by the formers cold reflection as a personal attack, and then felt bound to react politically. 
23
 E.g. Halász, P.: A normativizmus és az elméleti jogtudomány [Normativism and theoretical 
jurisprudence]. [Diss.] Budapest, 1963. 
24
 Magyar állam- és jogelméleti bibliográfia 1950-1980 [Bibliography of the Hungarian theory 
of state and law, with English and Russian titles in translation] (ed.: Lajos Nagy), Szeged, 1980. 
25
 Szotáczki, M.: A jog lényege [The essence of law]. Budapest, 1970. 
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game, those cultivating it in such a corrupted manner were themselves pushed by aggressive 
indoctrination. Having contented themselves with having their careers assured in return for 
their political loyalty, university teachers did in fact acknowledge in peaceful (even jovial) 
co-existence both the cautious scholarly advancement by academician Szabó, revered and 
dreaded as the unquestionably number one authority (with due regard to his party, academy 
and university positions), and the incidental excesses by Szabó's students at the Academy. 
At the same time, in a legal-political sense and within the confines of the tolerance of 
our Brave New World of "actually existing Socialism", some inspiration to democratise 
practical legal life and increase economic efficiency by humanising the field of law could 
also finally appear.26 
b) Stalinism in Critical Self-perspective 
Imre Szabó, who had formulated the dogmatic cardinal points of his era all along-while 
also involving supportive companions27-, finally attempted, in a delicate manner but 
increasingly explicitly, a sensible separation from Vishinsky's crude and politically biased 
position.28 Indeed, when criticising "Socialist normativism" while promising its Marxising 
transcendence, he dedicated a monograph to a novel quasi-ontologising realisation, hoping 
that he could develop a systematic magisterial oeuvre in legal philosophy. Despite 
succeeding in having the outcome published in both French and Russian,29 he might 
probably have been aware of his failure, with the work hardly performing anything more 
than a conceptual game. His theorisation on law proper was reducible to law being a 
reflection of something else, as the form of some dubious contents, concluded through the 
usual deductive channels of the dogmatic presuppositions of Marxism, all of which was 
eventually bound to stop exactly where it should have concerned law as such, in an 
explanation of some genuinely legal context. He never reverted to its continuation, never 
addressed ensuing problems. Confined to mere re-stylisation while hardened in doctrinarism, 
he formulated again and repeatedly the spectrum of the ideological tenets of the law of 
Socialism in a succession of further books30-rephrasing former writings (with decreasing 
theoretical depth) by self-dosing nothing but apologetics,31 at times going so far as to justify 
26
 See, above all, by Samu, M.: Az új gazdasági mechanizmus állam- és jogelméleti vonatkozásai 
[The new economic mechanism as assessed by the theory of state and law|. Budapest, 1967. and 
Politika - jogpolitika — jog [Policy — policy of law — law]. In: A Magyar Jogász Szövetség 8. 
munkaértekezlete. Szeged, 1975. 403N17. 
27
 E.g. Péteri, Z.: A szocialista állam- és jogelmélet néhány kérdése az SzKP XXII. 
Kongresszusán [Some questions of the Socialist theory of state and law at the 22nd Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party]. Állam és Igazgatás, 12 (1962), 330-343. 
28
 Cf., by Szabó, I.: Sotsialisticheskoepravo [Socialist law]. [1963] Moscow, 1964; Társadalom 
és jog [Society and law], Budapest, 1964. and Szocialista jogelmélet - népi demokratikus jog 
[Socialist theory of law - peoples democratic law], Budapest, 1967. 
29
 By Szabó, E: Les fondements de la théorie du droit. [1971] Budapest, 1973. / Osnovy teorii 
prava. Moscow, 1974. 
30
 Cf., by Szabó, I.: Jogelmélet [Theory of law]. Budapest, 1977. and A jog és elmélete [Law 
and its theory]. Budapest, 1978. 
31
 Cf., as symbolic re-assertions, by Szabó, I.: Jogi gondolkodásunk szocialista átalakulása [ The 
Socialist transformation of our legal thinking]. Állam és Igazgatás, 10 (1960), 40 I N 14; 
Jogtudományunk nemzeti és nemzetközi jellegéről [On the national and international character of our 
jurisprudence]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 24 (1969), 213-216. and A Nagy Októberi Szocialista 
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theoretically the Bolsheviks' so-called revolutionary justice,32 the plain denial of any spirit 
of law. Through his re-Marxising he may have released the leftist soaring of his early 
juvenile self, backed by the inflexibility of an advanced age. Acting as the pioneer of 
Marxism's theoretical-legal renewal, he searched for additional fora to disseminate his ideas 
in the Socialist world,33 arriving back, in the final analysis, at nothing but a retrograde 
restatement of the genuine renaissance of Marxist doctrinarism. 
In the meantime, his disciples started, as detached in their methodological foundations 
as well, expressing explicit demands to Marxisé legal thought to clear it of its random or 
directly politico-ideological ornaments of constraints (ascribed, even if implicitly, to its 
specific Russian-Soviet implementation, that is, to its Lenin-cum-Stalinist framework, 
which was suited to Asian political traditions). Firstly, they tried to liberate theorising from 
its degradation of serving as a simple auxiliary to the Communist Party's legal policy at the 
given time (which was practised in order to prevent scholars from interfering with actual 
practice).34 Secondly, they separated Marxism as methodology from Socialism as a political 
fact imbued with ideological expectations, in order to enable the former to be freed from 
the latter's irrelevance to academic scholarship.35 This was succeeded by further innovative 
efforts at clarification.36 
c) Diversification with New Trends 
Szabó's younger students (Kulcsár and Peschka) as well as those affiliated with Tibor Vas 
(Péteri) or socialised in the metropolitan university (Samu and Sztodolnik) soon made their 
voices heard, heralding their own problem-sensitivity and facing the risk, then, of being 
seen as intellectually independent. Within the programmatically declared anti-pluralism of 
Marxism at the time-such that scholarly truth was one and indivisible, with any competition 
or variation amounting to subversion (to be eliminated and retaliated against at once)-, any 
reinterpretation of the established canon, even if inferred from Marx's texts (taken as a 
revelation, by the way), provoked excitement by its very existence as a supposedly wilful 
challenge to ideological indoctrination. This was dreaded and feared, calling for existential 
Forradalom hatása a marxista jogelmélet fejlődésére [The influence of the Great October Socialist 
Revolution on the development of Marxist legal theory). Magyar Tudomány, 22 (1977), 803-810. As 
an attempt at offering some contrast, see also Samu, M.: Szocialista jogszemléletünk fejlődése [The 
development of our Socialist view on law]. Magyar Jog, 22 (1975), 135-142. 
32
 Szabó, I.: Forradalom és törvényesség [Revolution and legality]. Állam és Igazgatás, 19 
(1969), 199-208. 
33
 Szabó, I.: KarI Marx und das Recht Vorträge. [1976] Berlin, 1981. 
34
 Peschka, V.: A magyar állam- és jogtudományok és a társadalmi gyakorlat [Hungarian studies 
on state and law and the social practice]. A: MTA Társadalmi és Történelmi Tudományok Osztályának 
közleményei, 13 (1964), 429-441. 
35
 Peschka, V.: Marxista és szocialista jogelmélet [Marxist and Socialist theories of law]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 23 (1968), 165-172. 
36
 As the most significant moment, cf. V. I. Lenin - Osvonopolozhnik sotsialisticheskogo prava 
[Lenin as the founder of Socialist law]. In: Lenin о prave [Lenin on law]. Moscow, 1969. 274-321. 
For their uncensored text, cf. Szabó, I.-Kulcsár, K.-Péteri, P.-Varga, Cs. in Állam- és Jogtudomány, 
13 (1970), 3-57; and also Varga, Cs.: Lenin and Revolutionary Law-making. International Review of 
Contemporary Law. [Brussels] (1982) 1, 47-59. / Lénine et la création révolutionnaire du droit. Revue 
internationale de Droit contemporaine. [Bruxelles] (1982) 1, 53-65. 
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rétorsion, because this was also held to be liable to become easily multiplied and lead to 
unforeseeable, hard-to-control conclusions. 
Two creative personalities got farthest on that road, marking the path for the 
development of legal theorising in Hungary. Kálmán Kulcsár's legal-sociological stand37 
and Vilmos Peschka's legal philosophy38 were equally built on systematic foundations, the 
former on the harmonisation of Marxism with legal sociologising in Western Europe and 
the Atlantic world, the latter on re-scheming Marxist positions when confronted with 
contemporary (mostly German) legal philosophising. This double direction was 
complemented by the axiologism of Zoltán Péteri39 and the criticism on the Rule of Law by 
László Sztodolnik.40 As the Soviet empire stood for a monolithic bloc in which divergences 
could, if at all, arise unevenly-through diversion of either foreign politics (Yugoslavia, and 
then Albania and Romania) or ideology (Yugoslavia, and partly Poland)-, the growth of 
research into independent trends and schools meant not only a significant enrichment of 
jurisprudential thought but also a diversification of Socialist jurisprudence that could reveal 
latent potentialities developed from within. Notably, Kulcsár institutionalised legal 
sociology in Hungary in a way that disseminated its approach in the centres of orthodoxy 
(Moscow, Sofia and Bucharest as well). As a conceptual-analytic positivist, Peschka 
investigated a series of topics relevant to Marxist legal philosophising in order to build up 
his own Marxian orthodoxy step by step, derived critically from both Marxism and its roots 
in classical German philosophy, integrated with a number of insights taken from 
contemporary international monographic literature.41 
37
 Cf., by Kulcsár, К.: A jogszociológia problémái [Problems of legal sociology]. Budapest, 
1960. {rev. ed. A jogszociológia alapjai [The foundations of legal sociology], Budapest, 1976.}, A jog 
nevelő szerepe a szocialista társadalomban [The educational role of law in a Socialist society]. 
Budapest, 1961. followed by his collections Társadalom, politika, jog [Society, politics, law], 
Budapest, 1974. as well as Gazdaság, társadalom, jog [Economy, society, law], Budapest, 1982. 
38
 Cf., by Peschka, V.: A jogviszonyelmélet alapvető kérdései [The foundational issues of a 
theory of legal relations], Budapest, 1960; Jogforrás és jogalkotás [Source of law and law-making]. 
Budapest, 1965; Grundprobleme der modernen Rechtsphilosophie. [1972] Budapest, 1974. / Gendai 
hötetsugaku no kihon mondai. Kyoto, 1981; Max Weber jogszociológiája [Webers legal sociology]. 
Budapest, 1975; Die Theorie der Rechtsnormen. [1979] Budapest, 1982. and Jog és jogfilozófia [Law 
and legal philosophy], Budapest, 1980. 
39
 Cf., by Péteri, Z.: Die Kategorie des Wertes und das sozialistische Recht. Wissenschaftliche 
Zeitschrift der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, 
15 (1966), 427-429 and Az értékek objektív megalapozásának kérdései a szocialista jogelméletben 
[Questions of the objective foundation of values in the Socialist theory of law]. Állam- és 
Jogtudomány, 2! (1978), 433-437 as well as Influence of Natural Law on Positive Law. In: Etudes en 
droit comparé / Essays on Comparative Law (ed.: Z. Péteri). Budapest, 1966. 45-60. Cf. also, by 
Szotáczki, M.: Jog és igazságosság [Law and justice]. Jog és Társadalom, 1968/2, 12-24 and A 
szocialista jog és igazságosság [Socialist law and justness]. Magyar Jog, 17 (1970), 394—399. 
40
 Sztodolnik, L.: Metamorphoses of the Rechtsstaat Idea. Annales Universitatis Budapestiensis 
de Rolando Eötvös nominatae, Sectio juridica, 4 (1962), 171-191, preceded by Péteri, Z.: Sulla 
cosidetta "Rule of Law". Democrazia e Diritto, [Roma] (1960), 1-18. 
41
 For an obituary assessment, cf. Varga, Cs.: Vilmos Peschka (1929-2006). Archiv für Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie, 93 (2007), 253-255. 
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Such a substructure provided the medium for further initiatives to evolve as launched 
by the following generation, dedicated to a critical survey of the state of legal 
philosophising,42 clarification of its methodology and43 ontological reconstruction,44 as well 
as elaboration of the systemic correlations between law, language and logic.45 
d) Comparatism 
The re-institutionalisation of legal comparatism which meant, at an international level, 
integration of Socialist law in the legitimate world-wide families of law by having it 
recognised as an independent type amongst them, and in a Hungarian context, 
professionalisation (or rehabilitation) of law as a specific subject of cognition46-was indeed 
42
 E.g. as a manuscript of 1966 banned by Szabó at his time. Varga, Cs.: A jogmeghatározás 
kérdése a 60-as évek szocialista elméleti irodalmában [Questions relating to the definition of law in 
the Socialist theoretical literature of the 60s]. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 22 (1979), 475—488, followed 
by his Quelques problèmes de la définition du droit dans la théorie Socialiste du droit. Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit, 12 (1967), 189-205. 
43
 E.g. Varga, Cs.: Quelques questions méthodologiques de la formation des concepts en 
sciences juridiques. Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 18 (1973), 205-241. as well as Eörsi, Gy.: 
Jogelméleti torzó [A torso in legal theory]. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 23 (1980), 353-381. 
44
 E.g. by Varga, Cs.: Lukácss Posthumous Ontology as Reviewed from a Legal Point of View. 
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 22 (1980), 439—447. and The Place of Law in 
Lukács Ontology. In: Hungarian Studies on György Lukács II. (ed.: L. Illés et al.) Budapest, 1993. 
563-577. 
45
 E.g. Varga, Cs.: On the Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning. Logique et Analyse, 
(1973) 61-62, 21-78 and in Études de logique juridique, V. Publ. Ch. Perelman. Bruxelles, 1973. 
21-78; Law and Its Approach as a System. Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 21 
( 1979), 295-319. and Informatica e Diritto, [Florence] 7 ( 1981 ), 177-199. as well as Leibnitz und die 
Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung. Budapest, 1986. and in Materialismus und Idealismus im 
Rechtsdenken. Geschichte und Gegenwart (Hrsg.: K. A. Mollnau). Stuttgart, 1987. 114-127. 
46
 In the Communist world, the first initiative was taken by B. T. Blagojevic in the Titoist 
Belgrade to found an Institut za uporedeno pravo (1955), with a specific law to grant it the status of a 
scientific institute (1974). Cf. <http://www.icl.org.yu/m7e.html>. In the Muscovite empire, re-
orientation followed slowly and gradually, as started in Czechoslovakia. Cf., e.g. Bystricky, R.: Za 
marxistickou srovnávací právovédu [For a Marxist comparative jurisprudence]. Právník, [Prague] 
(1962) 8, 625 et seq.; Boguszak, J.: К otázce tzv. srovnávací pràvovëdy [To the question of 
comparative jurisprudence!. Právník, (1962) 9, 803-806; Knapp, V.: Verträge im tschechoslowakischen 
Recht (Ein Beitrag zur Rechtsvergleichung zwischen Ländern mit verschiedenen Gesellschafts-
ordnung). Rabeis Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 27 (1962), 495-518; 
Svoboda, M.: Jëstë к marxistické srovnávací pràvovëdë [Once more on a Marxist comparative 
jurisprudence], Právník, (1963) 5, 388 et seq.; Knapp, V.: К otázce socialistické srovnávací právní 
vëdy [To the question of a socialist comparative science of law], Právník, (1963) 5, 391—402. It was 
followed by Zivs, S. L.: О metode sravnitelnogo issledovaniia v nauka о gosudarstve i prave [On the 
method of comparative research in the sciences of state and law], Sovietskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 
(1965) 3, 23 et seq.; Kanda, A.: Základni problémy srovnáváni právnich systému ruznach 
ekonomickych soustav [Foundational problems of comparing legal systems pertaining to differing 
economic regimes]. Právnické Studie, (1965) 4, 699-720; Tshikvadze, V. M.-Zivs, S. L.: Sravnitelnoe 
pravovedenie v praktike mezhdunarodnaia nautshnaia sotrudnitshestva [Comparative jurisprudence in 
the practice of international scientific cooperation]. Sovietskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, (1966) 2, 12-21; 
Posch, M.-Petev, V.: Vergleichung in der Rechtslehre. Staat und Recht, (1966) 1, 89 et seq.; by 
Knapp, V.: Quelques problèmes méthodologiques dans la science du droit comparé. Revue roumaine 
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a deed with momentous consequences, although, in fact, it required mere re-ideologised 
justification rather than reconstruction from its very roots (as in case of, e.g. legal sociology), 
implemented through measures of scientific organisation rather than by theoretical 
construction. That is, once Szabó (note it was he who had formerly expelled the discipline 
from legal curricula) decided to establish a section (with Zoltán Péteri as head) for the 
comparison of laws in his Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences-thereby complementing the extended documentation already compiled (serving 
the political establishment with up-to-date information on the laws of the Soviet Union, and 
of all peoples' democracies as well as of the leading "capitalist" countries) with comparative 
source-compilations and monographs-, well, under such conditions Szabó's methodological 
re-foundation of, with manifold initiatives in developing, a specifically "Socialist" approach 
to the comparison of laws soon resulted in a genuine movement permeating the whole 
Socialist world, the covert aim of which was clearly to have Socialist law internationally 
recognised as a full member within the families of law on Earth. This effort was crowned 
with success, so much so that, as a by-product, it also made it impossible to reject the 
doctrine of Socialist law on political or ideological grounds from that time on. Or, the 
"Marxist conception of law", till then a limine ousted as a perverted ideology,47 became 
transformed, with the Cold War degenerating into lukewarm Peaceful Co-existence, into a 
societal product prevalent in its own right, simply to be acknowledged as one of many 
flourishing trends, standing for "the theory of Socialist law".48 
As a secondary effect, all this also resulted in the growing professionalisation of law, 
on account of the fact that comparison became widespread as a method, a pre-requisite of 
any genuinely academic research in law. Consequently, from this time on domestic issues 
had to be treated, first, in a Socialist comparative context and, second, in contrast with other 
des sciences sociales. Série de Sciences juridiques, (1967) 1, 76 et seq. / Nëkteré metodologické 
problémy srovnávací právní vêdy. Právník, (1968) 2, 91 et seq. The very first scholarly stand in favour 
of legal comparison in Hungary is Szabó, I.: La science comparative du droit. Annales Universitatis 
Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae Sectio juridica, 5 (1964), 91-134; then Eörsi, Gy.: 
Comparative Analysis of Socialist and Capitalist Law. Co-Existence, (1964) 2, 139-151; followed by 
Varga, Cs.: Összehasonlító jog és társadalomelmélet [Comparative law and social theory]. Állam- és 
Jogtudomány, 9 (1966), 732-736. and again by Eörsi, Gy.: Réflexions sur la méthode de la 
comparaison des droits dans le domaine du droit civil. Revue internationale de droit comparé, 19 
(1967), 397—H8. and<http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ridc_0035-3337_1967_ 
num_19_2_14824>. This is the field where Péteri's scholarly oeuvre could grow into his own 
direction. See, as earliest writings of that genre by Péteri, Z.: Z cinnosti Ustavu Státu a Práva 
Madarskej Akadémie Vied v oblasti srovnávacíeho práva. Právny Obzor, [Bratislava] (1968), 634-
639. and Some Aspects of the Sociological Approach in Comparative Law. In: Droit hongrois - droit 
comparé / Hungarian Law - Comparative Law (ed.: Z. Péteri). Budapest, 1970. 75-94. Editing 
national reports for the world congresses of comparative law became a constant job for him since 
1966 until recently, beginning with Etudes en droit comparé / Essays in Comparative Law. Budapest, 
1966. For an overview, cf. Tóth, J.: Rechtsvergleichung in Osteuropa. Journal der Internationalen 
Juristen-Kommission, [Geneva] 6 (1965), 277 et seq. 
47
 See, e.g. Kelsen, H.: The Communist Theory of Law. New York-London, 1955; Lapenna, I.: 
State and Law Soviet and Yugoslav Theory. London, 1964. and Stoyanovitch, K.: La philosophie du 
droit en U.R.S.S. (1917-1953). Paris, 1965. 
48
 Cf., as a representation, Szabó, I.: The Socialist Conception of Law. In: International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. 2. (ed.: R. David). Tübingen, 1976. Ch. III, 49-84. 
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("capitalist", "bourgeois" or "imperialist") solutions. In addition, practically all monographs 
in Hungary also had to be founded upon a historical sketch, outlining the particular 
development as leading to the contemporary present. 
The question of why this innovative initiative, born at a right time, has not resulted in 
a scholarly accomplishment suitable to form grand theories as well-beyond some 
remarkable comparative historical monographs,49 doctrinal elaborations and overviews5 0-
remains an enigma even now. 
e) (Re)Discovery of Western Legal Philosophy 
At a time when the ideological combat against "phenomena of anti-Marxism" was still at its 
peak31 and the indivisibility of Marxism's truth was officially declared (ruling out even the 
chance that diverging directions or competitive views on its issues could be heard at all), a 
collection of papers, based upon some preliminaries,52 was eventually published as a full 
representation of Hungarian legal theoretical thought.53 With its critical reflections on 
"bourgeois" trends, however, it tacitly rehabilitated the latter's fascinating richness and 
methodical values, re-integrating them into its own sphere. In addition to exploratory papers 
treating post-war and contemporary schools (which had broken continuity in Hungary),54 
49
 Eörsi, Gy.: Comparative Civil (Private) Law. Law Types. Law Groups, the Roads of Legal 
Development. [1975] Budapest, 1979. and Varga, Cs.: Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. 
[1979/1991] 2nd ed., Budapest, 2011. and <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/varga-
codification-as-a-socio-historical-phenomenon-1991/>. 
50
 E.g. Eörsi, Gy.: A skandináv jogról és jogtudományról [On Scandinavian law and 
jurisprudence]. Budapest, 1974. and Asztalos, L.: Polgári jogi alaptan. A polgári jog elméletéhe: 
[The basic doctrine of civil law], Budapest, 1987. 
51
 The assessment of social sciences from a sole "class struggle" perspective permeated so 
powerfully the Hungarian Academy of Sciences even in the second half of the 1960s that on the 
demand of József Szigeti (director of the Academys Institute of Philosophy, soon rewarded by 
becoming a member himself of the Academy), a committee (to be presided over by him) was set up to 
co-ordinate the fight against "phenomena of anti-Marxism". On behalf of the Academys Institute for 
Legal Studies, Imre Szabó-the only ordinary member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences at the time 
to be a jurist, who preferred, if such a choice could be made, scholarship to thought police-
commissioned me, a strikingly low-ranking beginner, to represent him amongst institute directors, 
confined to reporting on nothing but the theoretical work carried out anyway in the Institute with a 
critical perspective on Western trends. 
52
 E.g. Szabó, I.: A hegeli jogfilozófia tárgya és a marxista jogelmélet [The subject of the 
Hegelian philosophy of law and Marxist legal theory]. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 9 (1966), 527-537; 
Kulcsár, К.: Marxizmus és a történeti jogi iskola [Marxism and the historical school of law]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny. 10 (1955), 65-85; by Peschka, V.: A magyar magánjogtudomány jogbölcseleti 
alapjai [Legal philosophical foundations of the civil law doctrine in Hungary], Az MTA AJI Értesítője, 
3 (1959), 37-74 and Thibaut és Savigny vitája [The debate between Savigny and Thibaut], Állam- és 
Jogtudomány, 17 (1974), 353-381. 
53
 Kritikai tanulmányok a modern polgári jogelméletről [Critical studies on modern Western 
theories of law], (ed.: I. Szabó). Budapest, 1963. 
54
 E.g. Peschka, V.: Das bürgerliche rechtstheoretische Denken in der ersten Hälfte des XX. 
Jahrhunderts. Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungariacae, 19 (1977), 1-29; by Péteri, Z.: 
Gustav Radbruch und einige Fragen der relativistischen Rechtsphilosophie. Acta Juridica Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungariacae, 2 (1960), 113-160. and Az "újjáéledt" természetjog néhány jogelméleti 
kérdése a második világháború után [Some legal theoretical questions of the "revived" natural law 
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their major texts were translated and published in Hungarian, too, in order to serve as 
critical editions of study materials to extend the scope of a genuinely scholarly reflection on 
law5 5-based on my repeated proposals and under my editorship, as a unique achievement in 
the Socialist empire. 
At the same time, some middle-class fellow-travellers of the interwar illegal 
Communism-proudly preserving the scholarly and intellectual values of their civic pas t -
also took part in this burgeoning, mostly through some precious manuscripts papers they 
bequeathed.56 
f ) Mediator in the Region 
In addition to launching Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae in 1957 as an 
English/German/Russian/French quarterly in company of quite a few monographs and 
national reports based on historical comparison, the Institute assumed-partly as directed 
toward the rigid Soviet, East German and Balkan bloc, while intending to build contacts 
after World War II]. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 5 (1962), 469-505; as well as Kulcsár, К.; A jog 
etnológiai kutatásának problémái - ma [Problems of the laws ethnological research today]. Valóság, 
21 (1978), 1-11. 
55
 Modem polgári jogelméleti tanulmányok [Studies from the modem Western theories of law], 
(ed.: Cs. Varga). Budapest, 1977. and Jog és filozófia. Antológia a század első felének polgári 
jogelméleti irodalma köréből [Law and philosophy. Anthology of Western legal theorising from the 
first half of 20th century], (ed.: Cs. Varga). Budapest, 1981. The new tone such an unprecedented 
publication heralded was at once perceived by those of Hungarian political emigration in the West. 
For Hanák, T.: Az elmaradt reneszánsz. A marxista filozófia Magyarországon [Renaissance that failed 
to take place: Marxist philosophy in Hungary]. Bem, 1979. 179 and 207, "However, Hungarian 
philosophical life has another branch or direction as well: one searching for paths to Europes 
philosophical life and heritage. This can be observed first of all in recent [...] chrestomathies 
introducing to the non-Marxist philosophical world like, e.g. Modern polgári jogelméleti tanulmányok 
[...]." "The book of selected legal philosophical studies [...] is an oeuvre supplying a great want." 
One should note, the contract for Jog és filozófia had envisaged a three-part series. The second volume 
was intended to overview post-war western trends, while the third ones endeavour was even more 
pioneering: to be the very first in the world to represent early Soviet-Russian legal theory alongside 
Stalinist and post-Stalinist Soviet developments, complemented by so-called peoples democratic 
Socialist legal theory. Ironically enough, when the second volume had mostly been completed (only 
copyright negotiations being under way) and a substantial amount of funds had been raised (with 
materials collected) for the third volume as well, all this was slowed down and then finally stopped by 
the ongoing financial crisis of the Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The 
deliberateness of such an open-hearted start was also reflected in the late 1960s when "annotations" 
heading in the quarterly Állam- és Jogtudomány for foreign reviews were introduced (1966) and the 
biweekly Jogi Tudósító for translations was launched (1970). The present author collected and 
republished his most-in-the-depths contributions in Varga, Cs.: Jogi elméletek, jogi kultúrák. Kritikák, 
ismertetések a jogfilozófia és az összehasonlító jog köréből [Legal theories, legal cultures: Reviews 
from the field of legal philosophy and comparative law], Budapest, 1994. 
56
 Outstanding in chapters dedicated to deontic logic at a time when it was practically banned, 
cf., e.g. Halász, A.: Szászy-Schwarz Gusztáv és a jogalany. Második traktátus: A fikció [Szászy-
Schwarz on legal personality / tractate on fiction]. [Budapest, 1957] (ed.: Cs. Varga). Jogelméleti 
Szemle, (2005) 3 in <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/vargal6.html>. 
PHILOSOPHISING ON LAW UNDER THE AMBRELLA OF MARXISM IN HUNGARY 2 7 9 
with Yugoslavia as well, which had started a politically and ideologically independent 
"alternative" path-a leading mediatory role to foster reconsideration of the Soviet/Socialist 
approach to law through the critically self-reflecting Hungarian theory.57 
4. Disintegration 
a) New Foundations for Marxism 
The ontological approach of Szabó, focusing on his return to "original" sources, idealised 
in fact the perspective of a hoped-to-come "renewal of Marxism".58 All it achieved was 
precisely contrary to his original intention: perfection of doctrinarism with a spasmodic 
insistence on setting "criteria out of principles".59 Reaching nothing but retrospective 
discreditation, he could, thereby, only achieve rigidifying his own position. Accordingly, 
intents to preserve Marxism's hegemony-despite attempts at clarification at times60-became 
reduced to mere verbosity. 
b) Competitions 
The conceptual-analytic positivism of Peschka initiated deepened polemics as to 
contemporary Western trends.61 Kulcsár's sociologism centred, step by step, on the issue of 
modernisation (generalising, in order to build his own theory, mainly from American, 
Japanese and Indian approaches and case studies).62 On behalf of others, functionalist 
comparative-historical theorisation as an openly epistemo-ontological approach,63 efforts to 
formulate a sociological grand theory,64 as well as expressly methodological reflections65 
57
 E.g. Aktuelle Probleme der marxistisch-leninistischen Staats- und Rechtstheorie. Material 
der Konferenz der Staats- und Rechtstheoretiker der europäischen sozialistischen Länder (Hrsg.: Z. 
Péteri). Budapest, 1968. 
58
 By Szabó, I.: Ember és jog. Jogelméleti tanulmányok [Man and law: Papers in legal theory], 
Budapest, 1987. 
59
 The "second, amended" edition of Szabó, l.: A burzsoá állam- és jogbölcselet Magyarországon 
[Bourgeois theory of state and law in Hungary]. Budapest, 1980. proved to be of an expressly 
provocative effect by its (new) Poreword (16-21.). 
60
 E.g. Peschka, V.: Wider die missverstandene marxistische Rechtstheorie. In: Legal Theory -
Comparative Law. Studies in Honour of Professor Imre Szabó (ed.: Z. Péteri). Budapest, 1984. 11-18. 
61
 By Peschka, V.: Az etika vonzásában (Jogelméleti problémák az etika aspektusából) 
[Problems of legal theory from the aspect of ethics], Budapest, 1980. and Die Eigenart des Rechts. 
Budapest, 1989. 
62
 By Kulcsár, К.: Rechtssoziologische Abhandlungen. Budapest, 1980. and Politikai és 
jogszociológia [Political and legal sociology]. Budapest, 1987. 
63
 Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács World Concept. [1985/1998] 3rd ed., Budapest, 
2012. and <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/the-place-of-law-in-lukacs-world-concept-
19852012/>. 
64
 By Sajó, A.: Társadalmi szabályozottság és jogi szabályozás [Regulation by society and legal 
regulation]. Budapest, 1978. and Látszat és valóság a jogban [Semblance and reality in law], 
Budapest, 1986. 
65
 Sajó, A.: Kritikai értekezés a jogtudományról [A critical treatise on jurisprudence], Budapest, 
1983. 
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and clearly axiological claims66 accompanied them. Well, all these were to re-contextualise-
although not denying openly the tenets of the founders ' Marxism-theoretical legal thought 
in a wide-ranging area of conflicting insights and views. 
c) Western Legal Philosophy Acknowledged 
After the end of the short-lived coalition period following World War II, in the Socialist 
orbit, as is well known, the discourse with both Western European and Atlantic legal 
thought was broken. This very discontinuation was ended definitely when basic works 
representing Western ideas were translated into Hungarian, with the background intention 
of elevating them into part and parcel of domestic literature and academic thought by their 
own right.67 Thereby, a kind of usus68 was also born: referring to, while moreover 
systematically commenting upon, the entire professional heritage within the sole bound of 
66
 Péteri, Z.: Perspectives for a Socialist Axiology of Law. In: Rechtskultur - Denkkultur (Hrsg.: 
E. Mock-Cs. Varga). Stuttgart, 1989. 96-105. 
67
 Cf. also Jog és szociológia [Law and sociology] (ed.: A. Sajó). Budapest, 1979. Later on, 
historical part of Bodenheimer, E.: Jurisprudence The Philosophy and Method of the Law. [1962] 
Rev. ed. Cambridge, 1974. was also translated in Bevezetés a jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetébe. 
Miskolc, 1991. 129 et seq. 
68
 It was not only the bare fact of having masterpieces on ideologically sensitive fields translated 
that was unprecedentedly unique in the whole span of the Socialist period, either in Hungary or 
elsewhere in the bloc. It also became an exclusively Hungarian pattern in the region that ambitious 
anthologies with quite a few papers covering given topics (introduced by analytical surveys and 
accompanied with comprehensive bibliographies) were published in unbroken continuation. See, from 
the series "Jogfilozófiák" [Legal philosophies], launched and edited by Cs. Varga, A társadalom és a 
jog autopoietikus felépítettsége [The autopoietic structure of society and law] (eds: L. Cs. Kiss-A. 
Karácsony). (1994), Alkotmánybíráskodás - alkotmányértelmezés [Constitutional jurisdiction -
constitutional interpretation], (ed.: P. Paczolay) (1995), Joguralom és jogállam [Rule of law and 
Rechsstaatlichkeit] (ed.: P. Takács) (1995), Jog és filozófia [Law and philosophy] (ed.: Cs. Varga) 
(1998, enlarged ed. 2001), Jog és nyelv [Law and language] (ed.: M. Szabó-Cs. Varga) (2000), Jog és 
antropológia [Law and anthropology] (ed.: I. H. Szilágyi) (2000), Hayek és a brit felvilágosodás 
Tanulmányok a konstruktivista gondolkodás kritikájának eszmetörténeti forrásairól [Hayek and the 
British enlightenment: Studies from the historical sources of the criticism on constructivist thought] 
(ed.: F. Horkay Horcher) (2002), Allamtan [Theory of the state] (ed.: P. Takács) (2003), Európai 
alkotmányozás [European constitution-making] (ed.: P. Paczolay) (2003), Természetjog [Natural law] 
(ed.: J. Frivaldszky) (2004, enlarged ed. 2006), and A jogösszehasonlítás elmélete. Szövegek a 
jelenkori komparatisztika köréből [Theory of the comparison of laws: texts from contemporary 
comparatistics] (ed.: В. Fekete) (2006); from the series of "Philosophiae Iuris", Historical 
Jurisprudence / Történeti jogtudomány (ed. .1.: Szabadfalvi) (2000), Scandinavian Legat Realism (ed.: 
A. Visegrády) (2003); and from the series "Prudentia Iuris" published in Miskolc under the editorship 
of M. Szabó, Mai angol-amerikai jogelméleti törekvések [Present-day Anglo-American trends in 
legal theory] (ed.: J. Szabadfalvi) (1996), Logikai olvasókönyv joghallgatók számára [Reader in logic 
for law students] (ed.: M. Bódig-M. Szabó) (1996); and finally, from the series "Bibliotheca Cathedrae 
Philosophiae Iuris et Rerum Politicarum Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány nominatae", 
A jogi gondolkodás paradigmái. Szövegek [Text to the study of the paradigms of legal thinking] (ed.: 
Cs. Varga) [1996] (1998). This was done with the intention partly to speed up western intellectual 
reception and partly in order to avoid entering into copyright procedures, plainly necessary for the 
translation of magisterial works in extenso. 
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critical and adaptive reflections.69 All this having taken place under Szabó's patronage, it 
could already provide a basis for gradually expanding and then simply transcending the 
limits of tolerance of the until then completely closed, Moscow-dictated jurisprudential 
thought; this was also in the form of re-examining its own traditions in a more differentiated 
way, in parallel with (sometimes posthumous) editing of some bequeathed original texts.70 
Such a foundation was already suitable for a comprehensive revaluation of the classical 
Hungarian interwar legal thought and some surviving memories as well.71 
d) Hungarian Legal Theory as a National Corpus 
Assisted by all this, after decades of isolation Hungarian legal philosophy became again 
one of the internationally reputed workshops of vivid intellectual life. Following completion 
of a vast synthesising summary of the entire discipline,72 after more than half a century and 
for the first time since the 1920s,73 repeated encouragements came from abroad requesting a 
retrospective survey with political clichés replaced, from this time on, by diverging 
positions generated through public debates and also by attempts at self-critical evaluation in 
the professional press.74 Also, a bibliographical overview was published in three languages 
spanning the whole Socialist period, and so-called annotations started reviewing the latest 
domestic developments in an international forum.75 
69
 E.g. Pokol, В.: Komplexe Gesellschaft, Eine der möglichen Luhmannschen Soziologien. 
[1990] 2., erw. Ausg., Berlin, 2001. 
70
 E.g. Horváth, В.: Forradalom és alkotmány (Önéletrajz 1944-45-ből) [Revolution and 
constitution: intellectual autobiography from 1944—45]. Budapest, 1993. and Szabó, J.: Ki a káoszból, 
vissza Európába [Away from the chaos, back to Europe]. Budapest, 1993. 
71
 E.g. Hamza, G.-Sajó, A.: Savigny a jogtudomány fejlődésének keresztútján [Savigny at the 
crossroads of the development of jurisprudence]. Állam- és Jogtudomány, 23 (1980), 79-111. 
72
 A monument-like testimony to this process is Állam- és Jogtudományi Enciklopédia 
[Encyclopaedia of the sciences on state and law], I—II. (ed.: I. Szabó). Budapest, 1980. all through 
critical and self-reflective indeed, by contrasting conflicting viewpoints within an emphasisedly 
theoretical framework. 
73
 Somló, F.: Die neuere ungarische Rechtsphilosophie. Archiv fur Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie I (1907-1908), 315-323; by Moór, J.: Somló Bódog [Felix Somló], 
Társadalomtudomány, 1 (1921), 17—40. as well as Vorwort to Somló, F.: Gedanken zu einer ersten 
Philosophie (Hrsg. J. Moór). Berlin-Leipzig, 1926. 3-17; Horváth, В.: Die ungarische 
Rechtsphilosophie. Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 24 (1930), 37-85. 
74
 E.g. Szabó, I.: Az állam- és jogelmélet harminc éve Magyarországon [Thirty years of the 
theory of state and law in Hungary]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 30 (1975), 129-134. and Peschka, V.: Le 
développement de la théorie du droit en Hongrie après la deuxième guerre mondiale. Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit, 16 (1971), 347-354. as well as Varga, Cs.: Current Legal Theory in Hungary. 
Current Legal Theory, 4 ( 1986), 15-21. 
75
 As one of the founding members of the editorial board of Current Legal Theory [Leuwen], 
Csaba Varga undertook the bibliographical and analytical presentation of the new outputs of legal 
theory in Hungary from the beginning up to its cessation (1983-1998), by preparing a long series of 
abstracts in English of Hungarian publications. 
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e) Balance 
As soon as legal philosophy found its proper place under the sun and could explore various 
subjects in touch with other disciplines in a larger theoretical frame, applied research 
evolved, as well. From that time on, with ideological restrictions somewhat relaxed, the 
obvious task at hand was to develop a viable legal policy (on the basis of the given stuff of 
the law and by avoiding, as far as possible, the direct over-politicisation of the issues), 
together with searching for the ways through which the latter's conscious use could foster 
due protection of the law's autonomy and prestige, even under the still extant and politically 
forceful Socialist conditions.76 
A prerequisite to this all was elaboration of a modernisation strategy, within a scheme 
neither discrediting law by its degradation into a substitute stabilising force of the status 
quo ante, nor running ahead, doubling the law's normative substance, but allowing each 
and every step and piece of change to build on one other by becoming integrated, without 
gaps, as fed back within the modernisation process itself.77 
5. End-game of Legal Theorising in Substitution for State Religion 
After the collapse of the political system of Socialism, Marxism as an official ideology 
underwent a strikingly rapid decline. Forced paths prescribed by ideological expectations 
and interventions had already been weakened by that time, and political changes were 
quasi-imminent. By this time, however, political changes happened to coincide with the 
most natural call for a generation change. Having reached an advanced age and withdrawn 
to mostly honorary entitlements, Imre Szabó was only capable of reframing earlier 
accomplishments without formulating any new ideas. His one-time disciples arrived at the 
point of publishing their own final syntheses, which they hoped were to crown their personal 
oeuvres.78 Suddenly and by coincidence, all this anticipated and stood in fact for two 
generations' simultaneous retirement. On behalf of the next generation, a summary account 
of what Marxism had increasingly been and served for was formulated, in the spirit of 
closing the past.79 There were also some essayistic surveys published to draw a temporary 
76
 E.g. A jogpolitika tudományos megalapozásának jogelméleti problémái / Pravogo-
teoreticheskie problemy nauchnogo obosnovaniia pravovoi politiki / Die rechtstheoretischen Probleme 
von der wissenschaftlichen Grundlegung der Rechtspolitik (ed.: M. Samu). Budapest, 1986. and 
Samu, M.: Jogpolitika - jogelmélet [Policy of law-theory of law], Budapest, 1989. A challenging 
project on the borderlines was Takács, P.: Nehéz jogi esetek. Jogelmélet és jogászi érvelés [Difficult 
cases of law: Theory of law and lawyerly argumentation], [1994] Budapest, 2000. 
77
 Kulcsár, К.: Modernization and Law. Budapest, 1992; by Sajó, A.: Jogkövetés és társadalmi 
magatartás [Law-observance and social behaviour]. Budapest, 1980. and Társadalmi-jogi változás 
[Socio-legal change]. Budapest, 1988. 
78
 Kulcsár, К.: Jogszociológia [Sociology of law]. Budapest, 1997. and Peschka, V.: Appendix 
"A jog sajátosságához". Tanulmányok [Appendix papers on to "The specificity of law"]. Budapest, 
1993. 
79
 Above all, Varga, Cs.: Introduction. In: Marxian Legal Theory (ed.: Cs. Varga). Aldershot-
New York, 1993. 13-27. 
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balance.80 For want of a proper distance in time, however, all such endeavours were mostly 
useful only to emphasise the need for a genuine restart.81 
Having just passed the threshold of the third millennium, it is perhaps too early for us 
to prognosticate anything about such a legacy's future. What seems to be taken for granted 
is that Marxism may still have some potential to be present as an additional colour in the 
near future as well.82 Moreover, it may even strengthen its position, at least regarding its 
inherent elements addressing "the quest for community",83 in paradoxical support of 
present-day Christian and other humanistic tendencies. And we can even add to the above, 
from the controversial legacy of Marxism's 20th-century adventure in the history of ideas, a 
number of still living and inspiring concepts imbued with problem-sensitivities, 
methodological insights and definite value-consciousness, such as the principle of historicity 
and the idea of social conditionality. Others include the methodological significance of the 
concreteness of human and social existence, the theory of alienation (with the subsequent 
processes of objectification and reification in societal life accomplished), the immanent 
criticism of Capitalism and forms of post-capitalism as a civilisational idea reduced to 
material production and consumption, the deconstruction of "ideological" constructs, the 
advocacy for indigenous rights in an anti-colonialist spirit, the traditional concern for the 
fate of the Third World and, thereby, also the theoretical criticism of ongoing globalisation. 
6. Temporary Balance 
From among the legal theories of Socialism's Marxism, Hungarian scholarship played a 
rather balancing role all along. This naturally also involved narrowing and distorting 
simplifications, especially in the 1950s, even if somewhat milder as compared to the rest of 
Stalin's "peace camp". Its domestic effect was a hardly justifiable deformation with the loss 
of the sense of true scholarship. However, what it might have developed into if it had 
followed a path similar to neighbours (from Italy via Austria to West Germany), with 
Hungary having been successfully saved from our destiny, may perhaps be most reliably 
judged by the international role Hungarian theoretical legal thought was able to play even 
under such conditions. Well, despite any pressure, interference or direct political control. 
80
 Also formulating a definite value judgement, see, above all, Pokol, В.: A magyar jogelmélet 
állapotáról [On the state of Hungarian legal theorising). Magyar Tudomány, 37 (1992), 1325-1334. 
and Szilágyi, P.: Jogbölcselet [Legal philosophy]. In: Magyarország a XX. században. 5.: Tudomány, 
2.: Társadalomtudományok (ed.: I. Kollega Tarsoly). Szekszárd, 2000. 39-57 and <http://mek.niif. 
hu/02100/02185/html/l 183.html>. 
81
 Cf., retrospectively, A szocializmus marxizmusának jogelmélete [Legal theory of the Marxism 
of Socialism] (eds: Cs. Varga-A. Jakab). Jogelméleti Szemle, (2003) 4 in <http://jesz.ajk.elte. 
hu/2003_4.html> and Marxizmus és jogelmélet [Marxism and legal theory]. Világosság, 45 (2004) 
and http://www.vilagossag.hu/; prospectively, Varga, Cs.: Development of Theoretical Legal Thought 
in Hungary at the Tum of the Millennium [commented by Paksy, M.-Takács, P.: Continuity and 
Discontinuity in Hungarian Legal Philosophy], In: The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 
1985-2005 Transition to the Rule of Law and Accession to the European Union (eds: P. Takács-A. 
Jakab-A. F. Tatham). Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007. 615-638 [638-648]. 
82
 Cf., e.g. by Klenner, H.: Recht und Unrecht. Bielefeld, 2004. and Historisierende 
Rechtsphilosophie. Essays. Freiburg in Breslau. 2009. 
83
 Nisbet, R. A.: The Quest for Community. A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom. San 
Francisco, 1990. 
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the path Hungarian legal philosophy took has from a relatively early period (throughout and 
practically without interruption) been characterised by dialogue (simultaneously in several 
directions) and successful mediation. For it strove to take a middle-of-the-road stance 
within the Socialist orbit, between the dogmatically over-ideologised Muscovite pole 
(represented by the Soviet Union and East Germany, accompanied by post-1968 
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, united in politics and ideology) and the Polish pattern at the 
other limiting point (offering a political-rhetorical servicing of Marxism while actually 
bringing about a Western and Atlantic peripheral copy, with some achievements in genuine 
scholarship)-in addition to the former's rivalry with the Yugoslav Titoan and pre-1968 
Prague directions targeting the revitalisation (or "renaissance") of Marxism, re-dogmatising 
it with a neo-scholastic zeal in fact but refraining from any direct criticism of the West 
when building its qualifiedly Marxist theory. Moreover, Hungarian theorising had attempted 
to take a mediator's role (in representation of the entire Socialist bloc) from the turn of the 
1950s and 1960s on between the Muscovite orthodoxy and the Western world, by exporting 
its rich offering in academic journals and monographic productions mostly in English to the 
rest of the world (especially the Third World). Most Hungarians who contributed to 
conferences in Moscow, East Berlin and other Socialist capitals could share the almost 
absurd experience that they encouraged, initiated and managed the flow of the exchange of 
publications and pieces of information between, say, the Institute for the Theory of State 
and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic (located in the 
Otto-Nuschke-Strasse, next to the Berlin Wall) and the Freie Universität Berlin (some 
thousand steps in distance) exactly via Budapest. What is even more, the contemporary 
Western European and Atlantic (in Soviet terminology: "bourgeois", in East German 
terminology: "imperialist") intellectual influence was mostly channelled via 
conventionalisations brought through a Marxising filter by Hungarian legal philosophy.84 
For owing to its procession through (by tracing it back to) original Marxian sources, all this 
seemed to be irrefutable, and not to be neglected. At the same time, the Hungarian pattern 
maintained a delicate balance between avoiding scandals and maximising the positive effect 
it could provoke.85 
Merely conceivable phenomena do not materialise everywhere, in every circumstance. 
Depending upon specific conditions, even unshaken scholarly freedom in a liberal 
atmosphere may result in theoretical conformism, resulting in (and degenerating into) either 
repeated re-treatment of a single theoretical vision or dominance alternating among a few 
selected sub-mainstreams or schools, constantly switching over into one another. To be 
sure, Hungarian legal theoretical thought has shown optimum internal diversity all along, 
84
 This became apparent to me through the occasions of my regular participation at the [East] 
Berlin Rechtstheoretische Tagungen organised bi-annually by K. A. Mollnau within that Institute as 
well as my decade-long co-operation under the auspices of the Institute for State and Law of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences (with significant involvement by the Institute of State and Law of the 
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences), which was initiated by V. Nersesiants with the view of exploring 
the moment of historicity in theoretical jurisprudence. It is characteristic that neither the Yugoslavs 
nor the Poles took part in these. At the same time, however, Hungarians (Z. Péteri, Cs. Varga and A. 
Sajó) were active in contributing to a bilateral academic co-operation launched by the Belgrade legal 
theory professor R. T. Lukié, President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, for nearly a 
decade. 
85
 It was in such an atmosphere that, e.g. the collection Rozvoj teorii a statu a právu a 
soucasnost (Red. J. Blahoz—V. S. Nersesiants). Praha, 1988. was prepared, including my contribution. 
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from its upswing starting in the 1960s. To mention just one example, the early collection 
edited by Imre Szabó in 1963 already presented on behalf of all those working in the field 
quite an abundance of internal problems of legal Marxism, where his own critical view on 
Socialist normativism (once expounded by Vishinsky) was extended to a re-appraisal of 
legal sociologism and historical approach, legal comparatism and axiologism, natural law 
and the promise of the Rule of Law, and some years later this successful initiative was 
followed by an elaboration of the historical and theoretical foundations of human rights in a 
similarly diversified approach.86 Contrastingly expressed, we might even claim that 
Hungarian legal theory has from the era of political relaxation proved relatively richer in 
trends debating and competing with each other than, say, the almost unchallenged Hart-
unison in Great Britain, which had in fact been monopolistic for decades, after subordinating 
the variety of approaches to a single one, practically without exception.87 
Hungarian legal theorising took the professional requirements of scholarship rather 
seriously within the bounds of feasibility of the times. Possibly trying to neutralise the 
various control channels (especially by the Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, 
responsible for ideological issues, and the Ministry of the Interior attempts at infiltration) at 
all times,88 it could attain quite a recognisably dominant position both in Hungary and the 
Socialist world. For it abstained from the political and ideological excesses recurrent in 
both the Muscovite world and Yugoslavia and Poland, thereby preventing accentuated 
public attention or scandals. Thanks to his over-dominance exerted through personal 
control, Imre Szabó could achieve the circumstance that neither the fora and personalities 
of academia and universitas nor theoretical trends themselves became outlawed in Hungary 
under the label of "anti-state activity". Of course, this also implies that we had no 
emblematic scholar resorting to voluntary exile as some others had to undertake. 
Such and similar features may testify to a high level of commitment, serving the cause 
of scholarship. A theoretical culture like this, constantly forming through internal debates, 
was suitable to produce significant results in a number of varied fields. All in all, under the 
restrictive conditions of Communist dictatorship and despite its ideological dictates, 
Hungarian theoretical-legal scholarship successfully filled a fermentative role, serving as a 
model, in at least four mutually related, basically paradigmatic and crucial fields of the 
theoretical cultivation of legal sciences in the second half of the 20th century: 
(1) through making the sociological approach accepted in the Socialist orbit and, 
owing to its perspective, by presenting the substance of juridicity in the mirror of a new set 
of criteria in addition to the sole ones recognised by the mainstream positivistic approach it 
86
 Socialist Concept of Human Rights (ed.: J. Halász). Budapest, 1966. 
87
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: The Hart-phenomenon. Archiv fúr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 91 (2005), 
83-95. 
88
 Professional socialisation at the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences included, from the outset, appropriation of the linguistic and stylistic ideal of legal 
philosophising practised then and there. This was basically patterned on Karl Marxs and Thomas 
Manns complexity of expression and several-times-periodic construction crammed with recurrent 
interpretive structures, as well as a thoroughly abstract language, made even less easily decypherable 
by the definitely German-originated sentence construction, while also abounding in foreign terms. So 
many impediments built with such a baroque verbosity may have deterred even the targeted readers. 
For sure, the Communist partys professional censors saved themselves not only the almost 
insurmountable trouble of figuring out the possible meaning of these piles of words but they actually 
refrained even from merely consuming them. 
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could "explode" the narrow-mindedness of "Socialist normativism" throughout, arriving at 
a theoretical transcendence that could result in conclusions also appreciable in international 
dimensions; 
(2) through embracing the historico-comparative perspective as, having made it 
accepted generally in the Socialist world, it cultivated it with extraordinary force and 
reliable accomplishments; 
(3) through introducing an ontological perspective (as against the methodology 
adopted in Socialism's Marxism, exhausted by its exclusive epistemological perspective), 
so that it could not only give its developments a theoretical framework but-owing to the 
ontic explanation of the "lawyerly worldview" [juristische Weltanschauung] surpassing the 
inherent limitations implied by the merely epistemic approaches that are usual in social 
practices based on mere ideological forms-could also decisively contribute to breaking 
through any single-focus approach in jurisprudential thought; and 
(4) in all of this-as a common effect in synthesis of all of the former-through evolution 
of a theory of law and modernisation, addressing crucial issues for the future elbowroom 
and possibilities of Central and Eastern Europe in a responsive way and with a long-run 
strategic sensitivity. 
In conclusion, legal theorising in Hungary has sheltered the relative seriousness, 
pathos, scholarly commitment, ethical ambition and strategic and tactical responsibility, 
with the professionalism achievable under the given conditions. Through all this, the 
Hungarian pattern offered a relatively near-to-optimum alternative in its solutions and 
responses, a kind of optimality scarcely challengeable by counter-examples lived through 
under the almost half-of-a-century-long reign of "actually existing Socialism". 
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Abstract. The active participation in the life of the international community of the Holy See is natural. As it comes 
from its nature, vocation and aim, the Holy See acts on behalf of the world-wide spread Catholic Church. Most of 
its bilateral diplomatic relations and international treaties are about the relations between a certain state and the 
local part of the Church. The Holy See is able to exert international activity in the name of the universal Church 
and for the benefit of it in such way that its acts are complied with the rules of the international law. 
It can be read in the manuals of the international law that the Holy See is a sui generis subject of the international 
law. It can hardly be explained for the international law that the Holy See acts in face of "external entities" in the 
name of the universal Church and on behalf of it. This function is either not mentioned or it is seen as "a tradition" 
in the manuals of the international law. It can also happen that this function is viewed as a kind of concession from 
the part of the different states, but one can find other solutions as well. 
In this essay 1 attempt to find a model outside the paradigm of the international law but inside the paradigm of law 
that explains in what way the Holy See is able to exert international activity in the name of the universal Church 
and for the benefit of the universal Church with the help of the mechanism of the jurisprudence. 
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international law, sovereignty, nonce, Church, Holy See 
I. The description of the problem, the horizon of a plausible solution 
1. The difference of way of thinking of the international law 
and the international relations discipline 
Generally, the manuals of international law start from the conceptual way of thinking of 
law, and first they examine the capacity of the aspirant entities for international law on the 
basis of the criteria of statehood of the international law. Although, the Church has the 
greatest number of diplomatic relations in the world (174 diplomatic relations' and several 
hundred concordatarian treaties2), it is difficult for international public law to handle this 
legal fact inside its model of explanation.3 
Ph.D., expert in foreign affairs and church politics, National State Administration Office, 
H-1055 Budapest, Kossuth Lajos tér 2-6. 
E-mail: ronaymiklos@freemail.hu 
' Cf. www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/corpo-diplomatico_ 
index_it.html 
2
 Primary sources: the official gazette of the Catholic Church, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 
Commentarium officiate, Romae, from 1909. (abbr.: AAS), and the official gazettes of the treating 
states. Secondary sources: Raccolla di cocondati su materie ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede le 
Autorita civili (ed.: Mercati, A), Vol. I. 1098-1914, Vol. II. 1915-1954, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis 
1954., I concordati di Pio XII 1939-1958 (eds: Ciprotti-Talamanca), Milano, 1976; / concordati di 
Giovanni XXIII e deiprimi anni di Paolo VI 1958-74 (eds: Ciprotti-Zampetti), Milano, 1976. 
3
 In the Encyclopaedia of Law one can read a train of thought based on the criteria of statehood: 
"Until 1870, the international subjectivity [of the Holy See] was based on the statehood of the secular 
power of the Holy See. After the cessation of the Church State the international subjectivity of the 
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In a logical sense, the approach of the discipline of international relations discipline is 
prior to the international law. The way in which an international actor thinks about itself 
plays a great role in the examinations of international relations discipline. 1) The 
international actor settles its international relations according to its own view-point, 2) if its 
partners accept the international actor as a partner then the partners accept it as it negotiates 
and as it acted and there is no reason to think about the question of "how acceptable that 
actor is". According to the discipline of international relations, every actor represents itself 
on the basis of its self-reflection.4 The discipline of international relations sees international 
law even as a consequence. The advantage of the discipline of international relations in 
case of a Church related international research is that it is not necessary to state first whether 
the Church is a subject or not and if it is then how, but the result will come out in the end as 
an evidence. 
2. Starting point: the crucial role of the canonical legal order in the self-expression 
of the Church 
Therefore it is not pointless how the Church thinks about itself, and this has to be taken in 
consideration during the research. The self-understanding of the Church, which is explained 
by the section of the theology called ecclesiology, characterizes the Church as a sacred 
community that has a united teaching and a united organisation all over the world, and 
functions independently from all human power. 
It seems from the great number of the concordatarian treaties that the Holy See is able 
to act in the name of the universal Church and on behalf of it in face of external entities. On 
a experimental basis it can be stated that the Church succeeds in asserting its self-image. 
The canonical constitutional law plays a key role in shaping up the confidence to contract. 
Thus the canonical constitutional law is such a self-regulation that is at the same time an 
important mean of assertion of the auto-reflection in face of the external entities (states). 
In concordatarian treaties the legal orders of the Church and the local state are seen as 
two ordinary legal orders, between which an international public law treaty establishes 
collisional law. Certain treaties declare themselves as collisional law expressly while others 
contain tacitly. 
One can suspect that it is the structure of the canon law itself (more closely the 
canonical constitutional law) which compel states to establish relations with the Holy See if 
they want to have official contact with the part of the Church living on their territory. 
II. The formation of the canonical constitutional law, its importance and its role 
1. The elaboration of the canonical constitutional law 
The claim for independency from all human power in the teaching and the ecclesiastical 
establishment was shaped up in the period of the cesaropapist rule of the Roman Empire 
(313-476) when the emperor tried to take sides in theological questions as well, but the 
Church resisted. After the fall of the Empire this claim take such a shape that the Church 
Holy See still remained\ although it functioned on the territory of Italy [...]". But this is a paradox and 
not an explanation. Lamm, V.-Peschka, V. (eds): Jogi lexikon. Budapest, 1999. 555. 
4
 The basic work of the identity based school is Wendt, A.: Social Theory of International 
Politics. Cambridge, 1999. 
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communicated with outsiders, it is to say with secular powers, as the independent powers 
generally communicate with each other. One-one and half millennium later one could call 
this way of communication that the Church communicated with other powers in manner of 
foreign relations. At the same time, the Church thought that way of thinking that the Church 
and the secular powers exerts supervision in separate manners over the sacred and profane 
spheres of the human life (gelasian principle, dualism). The first and most famous source of 
this theory is the letter of Gelasius I (49-496) written to the emperor Anastasius. In the 
letter, which was written in 494, taking advantage of the political vacuum after the 
dethronement of Romulus Augustus in 476, Gelasius I wrote that the emperor had to oblige 
to the pope in religious matters and at the same time the clergy have to oblige to the emperor 
in secular matters.5 
The legal appearance of this dualist way of thinking is the famous medieval ius 
commune or otherwise the dual legal system of the utriusque iuris. While its secular branch 
disappeared as a result of claims of the territorial sovereigns, its ecclesiastical branch still 
lives in the catholic canon law of today. Secular sovereigns used willingly the mean of 
instrumentálisadon of religion (cuius regio eus religio). Protestant princes built up directly 
state-church/established church systems (the protestant religious leadership of the country 
was a part of the secular public administration). But the state-church system it was not even 
a choice for catholic sovereigns because the foreign activity and claim for independency6 of 
the Catholic Church, shaped up from the middle of the first millennium, set the task for the 
ecclesiastical leadership to resist the tendency of nationalisation. 
One can assess the development of the theory of sovereignty of the Church as a defence 
of the ecclesiastical self-image, as a reinforcement of the claim for independency. With the 
fact that the Church took part in working out of the theories of sovereignty by the 
development of its own theory of sovereignty (societas perfecta seu sufficiens) in the 16th 
century, the Church made its already existent rule of being a foreign actor more 
approachable, more understandable, more compatible in an institutional sense. The inner 
side of the theory of sovereignty, as an outside dispute, was the development of the 
canonical public law or ius publicum canonicum (which is now colled the canonical 
constitutional law) as an independent branch of the canon law, at the same time with the 
formation of the theory of state sovereignty. In this system the Church formulated itself in it 
as a consistent legal order, which contributed to have a clearer defined borderline between 
the ecclesiastical and secular legal orders. This made it possible to think about the relation 
or the possible conflict between the Church and the local secular power, according to the 
5
 Gelasius I, Epist. VIII. Ad Anastasium Augustum. "Duo quippe sunt, imperatore auguste, 
quibus principaliter mundus hie regitur: auctoritas sacra pontifieum, et regalis potestas. [...] Si enim, 
quantum ad ordinem pertinet publicae disciplinae, [...] legibus tuis ipsi quoque parent religionis 
antistites, ne vel in rebus mundanis [...J quo, oro te, decet affectu eis obbedire, qui praerogandis 
venerabilibus sunt attributi mysteriis?" "Oh, majestic emperor, this world is based on two main things: 
the sacred authority of the pope and the royal power. [...] And ifit is true that priests obey your laws 
upon public order and they do not want to have a say in earthly affairs, [...] is not right and proper that 
you should obey those to whom the right of the function in the divine mistery is given?" 
6
 Before 756, the establishment of the Pontifical State, the Church already had such activity that 
can be called foreign activity today. As it continued after the cessation of the Pontifical State (1870) as 
well, at the time of the Roman question (1871-1929) when the pope did not have a territory. Thus the 
foreign activity of the Church is neither bound to the existence of the Pontifical State nor of the 
Vatican City State. 
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pattern of the collision of classical legal orders, in contrast with the chaotic every day 
practice of ius commune. On the other hands, although the theological bases had to be taken 
into the consideration absolutely, the canonical public law was shaped up by the same legal 
technique as secular theories of sovereignty, and it interpreted the ecclesiastical legal order 
with that kind of legal technique, that is legally analog with secular legal orders. 
Nowadays, the ecclesiastical theory of sovereignty is not emphasised on the lectures of 
history of law, although it takes part in the universal history of law just as the historical 
formation of other legal systems. Its most important early thinkers were Francesco Suarez 
(1548-1617), Robert Bellarmin (1512-1621), Giovanni Battista De Luca (pope under the 
name of Benedict XIV. 1740-1758), Pihring, Engel, Pilcher, Layman, Prospero Farinaccio, 
Van Espen, Fagnani, and Reiffenstuel. 
Thus the statal and ecclesiastical theories of sovereignty live side by side. From the 
different aspects, this phenomenon describes well the way how the Church considers the 
relation between the Church and states: 
1. The Church is basically not in war with states, only it defends its jurisdiction in 
sacred issues. 
2. It exerts its jurisdiction in sacred issues on a very big territory (on the whole Earth) 
that completely coincides with the territory of secular sovereigns (considered legitimate by 
the Church as well). 
3. The basic situation between states and the world-wide spread Church is the peaceful 
coexistence and the fruitful cooperation for the people who live on the given territory, and 
not struggling with each other. 
The simplest way how the Church could express this idea was that the Church 
interpreted itself as a legal order existing parallelly besides the developing secular legal 
orders. 
The clear message of elaboration of the theory of sovereignty and the constitutional 
law is that "outsiders should have a relation to the Church on the basis of international 
law". This message itself calms down the intercourse between the Church and different 
states, as it contributes to the change of the direction of the struggles from the political ones 
to the legal polemy. The latter one less endangers the ecclesiastical public administration 
and institutions. 
This interpretation has an other sense, namely after the laws of separation (19th 
century) with setting up the doctrine of "the states do not know anything about theology" 
'a one-thousand-year-long dream of the Church became true (cf. dual view of sacred and 
profane sphere, principle of Gelasius I.)' Church remained an understandable entity for 
states. States and functionaries of the states are not expected to know about religion, and 
what is more, it is better if they do not know about it as statal functionaries, it is enough if 
they know classical constitutional law, and this is exactly their job. Because of the 
deliberately formed structural analogy in its constitutional system the Church is able to 
communicate through its institutions with the different states, and at the same time it does 
not allow the states near to sacred sphere (dual view). 
1.2. The work on constitutional law as "demonstratio suverenitatis" 
1. The ecclesiastical constitutional law interpreted the Church as an organisation that has 
analog constitutional structure with states and which is built up by the same principles of 
legal technique as the sovereign states. By the interpretation of its constitutional law the 
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Church does not say that it is a state. Just the opposite: it always emphasized that it is a 
sacred entity. Lajolo says the societies that are called to be perfect are only legally equal 
and not from other aspects or according to their nature.7 
2. As it was explained in earlier texts of constitutional law: it is an original quality of 
the Church that as a legal order it is the same with all secular legal orders.8 The work of the 
Church with which it elaborated its self-interpretation according to the technique of 
sovereign legal orders, is not the cause of the sovereignty of the Church.9 Thus the 
ecclesiastical constitutional law work is a 'demonstratio suverenitatis' and not a "creatio 
suverenitatis". Therefore the constitutional law is instrumental, and it is only a technique of 
structuring of the Church as a sacred entity. 
3. By this "demonstratio suverenitatis" the Church makes it clearer for partners that in 
what way it is in dialogue with other legal orders. At the same time the theological reflection 
depicts the Church as an organisation above which none of the powers can stay because of 
theological reasons. For the different states, their politicians and jurists the best expression 
for this phenomenon is in the future too: sovereignty. As Peter Erdő says: "[...] the Catholic 
Church profess itself to be sovereign, and at the same time it is strictly dependent on the 
will and the directions of its founder Christ".10 
4. In the documents of the second Vatican council (1963-1965) the doctrine of 
'societas perfecta' is not used in a strict sense, but after the council the doctrine occurs in 
legal texts with low frequency (exactly in the MP Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum that 
rules the diplomatic function of the Church") and also in the specialised literature. I think, 
this phenomenon has practical reasons (too) and this practical reasons exactly are in 
connection with the international presence and foreign activity of the Church. The Church 
interpretation that was built up in the classical period of the ius publicum ecclesiasticum is 
understandable very well for states and therefore that Church interpretation is a very 
important capital in foreign relations in the long term as well. This Church interpretation 
showed the way to the image about the Church that could be seen by the different states and 
to the image about the Church which determine the relations between the Church and the 
different states. That kind of Church-image of the states guaranties that the states have that 
kind of relation with the Church what is acceptable for the Church. The states accepted this 
sort of relation, and as the practice demonstrates it, the states apply it also today. 
1.3. The nature and character of the canonical legal order as a complete legal order 
This legal order is not established for the defence of a territory or for the defence of 
economic interests, this legal order is not even adapted for this aim and the Church does not 
need for a defence of this things. This legal order is expected to defend the diachronically 
identical maintenance of the revelated message and to guarantee the uniform practice of the 
sanctifying function for the whole humanity. The Church cannot disregard to guarantee its 
7
 Lajolo: I concordati moderni. Brescia, 1968. 493496, and Gismondi-Maccarone-Saraceni-
Spinelli: Rapporti attuali fra Stato e Chiesa in Italia. Justitia, 36, 151. 
8
 The explanation of Jannacone to the concept of "ordinamento giuridico primario": "what 
finds its motivations and basic arguments in its own ecclesiastical society, and from which and in the 
interests of which the legal order comes into being". Cites Jannacone: Lajolo: op. cit. 146. 
9
 Lajolo: op. cit. 33-34. 
10
 Erdő, P.: A magyarországi elválasztási modell alapelvei a katolikus egyház szemszögéből. In: 
AA. VV.: Az állam és egyház elválasztása. Budapest, 1995. 118. 
11
 Paulus VI, MP Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum, 1969. VIII. 8., in AAS 61 (1969) 473-484. 
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independence and the independence of its function from all powers. According to Peter 
Erdő: "If the Catholic Church does not consider even itself fully competent in formation of 
some of its rules [viz. they are in the Church on the basis of the foundation of the Church 
by Christ], the Church can even less accept that this would be the right of the states".12 
Thus the independence of the material of Christ from secular influence, its defence from 
political or other instrumentalisation is that ecclesiastic function of which one derivation is 
the ecclesiastic foreign activity. As it is discernible, the diplomatic function of the Holy See 
is the foreign function of the universal Church and not e.g. of the Vatican City State. 
In fact this was a goal of the ecclesiastic discipline, too, when it was built up in the 
first centuries. The view of constitutional law, that started to develop in the 16th century, 
added one thing to the canon law. This is that one can regard the Church as an organised 
society in which the order of the sanctification and the teaching and the relation of the 
Christian faithfuls to each other are not ruled only by some occasional concert of traditions 
or customs. On the contrary, these things have a consistent order that one can / should 
regard as a complete legal order, and which functions as such legal order and one can 
communicate with this order as such. 
1.4. The importance of the theory of Church's sovereignty on the field of international 
relations 
Naturally, the above-mentioned image of the Church is not the same with the Church-
images built up by the states in their own constitutional laws. Even these Church-images of 
the different states differ from each other as well. This above-mentioned Church-image is 
the same all over the world. This image of the Church is the same at least in such a degree 
that on this basis the states have contact with the Church on the basis of classical 
international relations. This is the key point concerning the international relations of the 
Church / Holy See, this factor is the effective one and not that one based on the internal 
statal law. This image of the Church is present in a very clear mode in practice, namely in 
the thematics of the diplomatic relations of the Holy See and in the thematics of the 
concordatarian treaties. The other way round: if one comprehends the diplomatic relations 
and the international treaties between the Church / Holy See and the states he / she has not 
to treat them as particular or extraordinary, because a very simple mechanism of functioning 
can be found, and this simple mechanism explains the treaties and the diplomatic relations 
between the Church and the states in a simply and evident way. 
2. The Church as a sovereign legal order 
The Catholic standpoint: dualism of the Church and the state 
The viewpoint legal unity of the Church leads to the transformation of the Gelasian principle 
of dual jurisdiction into the principle of two legal orders (Church and state) independent 
from each other. According to Paczolay the Gelasian principle of separation became a basic 
element of the social theory of the Christian way of thinking,13 and the laws of separation in 
the 19th century followed this scheme, too. 
The canon law as a legal verticum extends from the universal ecclesiastical legislator 
(the pope) to the Christian faithful (this is the equivalent term in canon law with natural 
12
 Erdő: op. cit. 120. 
13
 Paczolay cites it repeatedly: e.g. Paczolay, P.: Államelmélet I. Machiavelli és az államfogalom 
születése. Budapest, 1998. 56. 
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person14) and it is effective all over the world, viz. on the territories that are covered by the 
system of the public administration of the Church. Thus it is pointless to make difference 
between the Holy See and the 'other parts of the Church', because the whole Church is one 
continuous legal order from the government of the Church to the single governed Christian 
faithfuls.15 
As it follows, a Christian faithful who was baptised in the Catholic Church, at least 
belongs to two diplomatically represented legal orders, namely under the jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical legal order and under the statal legal order(s) of his / her citizenship(s). At 
first glance, this "problem of simultan subjection to two legal orders" can lead to great 
difficulties. An important part of the diplomacy of the Catholic Church is to represent the 
sacred benefit (and the financial benefits due to supply it) of the Christian faithfuls and of 
the dioceses under which jurisdiction they are against the states on which territories these 
dioceses are situated and of which these Christian faithfuls are citizens in the same time.16 
However, one cannot experience difficulties in practice, because on one hand the Church 
claim for exclusive jurisdiction only in sacred questions (e.g. in the question of the financial 
supervision of those ecclesiastical authorities that functions on the territories of the country 
at issue the Church does not claim any jurisdiction, because this is not a sacred matter), on 
the other hand, modern states only claim for exclusive jurisdiction in secular matters (the 
ius publicum ecclesiasticum or statal ecclesiastical law rules only non-sacred matters). 
Therefore the universal ecclesiastic legal order and the local statal orders do not collide in 
most cases, and as they are different in nature, they "pass side by side". But if there is 
collision in some questions, or there are not but the ecclesiastic and statal parties decide so, 
the two parties can establish collisional law in international treaty between the two legal 
orders. 
2.1. The relation of the international law to the theory of sovereignty of the Church 
It is not the aim of the Church that its sovereignty should be taught at schools and it is not 
the purpose of the theory of the sovereignty of the Church to be taught or formally 
recognized. The aim of the theory of sovereignty is that to make more understandable and 
institutionally more compatible its those mode of existence and action, which exist in 
practice and are acknowledged in the practice, which are also possessed by those other 
entities that are also independent of all other powers. International law coursebooks describe 
that the government of the Church (the Holy See) is independent from all other powers, and 
that "somehow" this government maintains the distant parts of the Church under its 
supervision, and that it stipulates international treaties with secular sovereigns in defence of 
those parts of the Church which are in the territory of this secular sovereigns, and that it 
keeps international contacts with them by ambassadors / nonces. The problem is when a 
coursebook tries to explain the above-mentioned characteristics of the Church as it came 
from the half square kilometre wide Vatican City State or as a kind of survivor of the 
customary law of the Church State ceased to be in 1870 (cf. explain everything from the 
14
 CIC 204. Codex Iuris Canonici auctoritate Ioannis Pauli PP. II promulgatus. Città del 
Vaticano 1989. (Abbr.: CIC + number of canon). 
15
 E.g. the hierarchical and transnational structure of the Catholic Church is able to lead the 
"national" Churches. Dinh, Q. N.-Daillier, P.-Pellet, A.-Kovács, P.: Nemzetközi közjog. Budapest, 
2003. 225. 
16
 Ciprotti, P.: II diritto canonico nella diplomazia ecclesiastica. In: lus populi Dei. Roma, 
without year, 172. 
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criteria of statehood). It is also a problem when a coursebook tries to explain the above-
mentioned characteristics as a "cultural tradition", instead of an approach starting from the 
view of the Church as united legal order all over the world. But in practice this legal unity 
is a key for the states to the Church, they are able to stipulate treaties with the Church on 
the basis of its legal unity. On this basis the states expect from the government of the 
Church to be able to make the parts of the Church which function on the territory of the 
states execute the treaties. And if something works in the practice and it is an active 
component, then sooner or later it is possible to find a theoretical explanation as well. In 
spite of the fact that international public law coursebooks and state theory manuals do not 
mention the theory of sovereignty of the Church and its structural analogy with states, the 
states (the staff that works in foreign ministries, the negotiators, etc.) perceive the legal 
effectivity and the capacity for treaties of the ecclesiastical legal order precisely because of 
the structural analogy. 
3. The importance of the legal order of the Church in the international relations 
of the Church 
My view is that states assess the present capacity of the ecclesiastical legal order and they 
find it able to international relations when states establish foreign relations with the Church. 
The reason why it was important to review the history of the legal order was to clear up 
why this legal order is so understandable, and why is this constitutional law so familiar for 
the states. Firstly, because of the millennium-long common development, secondly, because 
of the common basic terms of Roman law, thirdly, because the work of the legal theory 
which characteristically determines its present shape, has been accomplished in the same 
period of legal history and with the same legal technique as the work of the secular legal 
orders. The formal law analogy of the ecclesiastical legal order and the secular legal orders 
is the result of the above-mentioned common roots and common history, and consequently 
that the ecclesiastical legal order is just as comparable with the secular ones as secular legal 
orders can be compared with each other. Secular decision makers resp. their specialists can 
find solution when they consider establishing the first connection with the Church or 
stipulating an international treaty with the Church. 
III. The capacity of a legal order for international relations 
Lets consider the criteria of the capacity for international relations of an unspecified legal 
order. Bruno Bertagna sought for causes of the international personality of a legal order. 
Among others, he mentions, its capacity that have in its character and its reality: 
"a) The personality comes from the order itself, on the basis of the rule of effectiveness 
[he refers to Verdross, Kelsen and Fedozzi], 
b) The capacity is simply a character which is present by the legal fact, that it is able to 
possess in history the requested characteristics of being in the international order.'"7 
ad a) The inner order and the legal efficiency of the international actor is what makes 
the greatest impression to its foreign partners in the international practice. (In a state with 
an existing statehood, where there is a civil war, one do not know with whom one has to 
17
 Bertagna, В.: Santa Sede ed organizzazioni intemazionali. In: Monitor Ecclesiasticus. 1982. 
141-142. 
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negotiate, who is the real possessor of the power, but if it functions good it can be known in 
the Church.) One can characterize the inner order of an entity by its legal structure. From 
the aspect of the capacity for international relations this is the relevancy of the inner law. 
ad b) The examination of the existence of the capacity for existing in the international 
order points beyond the horizon of the legal thinking, and somehow it is related to the 
discipline of international relations. From the fact that a jurist examines this direction one 
can see that even the jurist demands some help beyond the purely conceptual way of 
thinking of the law. 
Although this approach that is based on the conditions of legal orders seems to be too 
theoretical at a first glance, I think this is the one that stays nearest to the mechanisms that 
functions in practice. The examination of the content of the concordatarian treaties shows 
that these documents contain collisional law or make collisional law between the Church as 
a legal order and the state as a legal order.18 The states consider this legal order to be able to 
contract treaty precisely because it is able to show in a convincing way that if the treaty is 
stipulated the Church-govemment (the Holy See) will be able to put the treaty into effect 
even in the far-away parts of the Church. Not the international public law manuals persuade 
the decision makers of the states about the future fulfilment of the treaties but the 
ecclesiastical legal order itself by its analog structure with statal legal orders and by its 
efficiency in putting its international treaties into effect. Other states also experience that 
the Church puts into effect its treaties well and consequently, they tell this tact to a state that 
is about to contract with the Church. On this field the emphasis is on the practise instead of 
theories. 
IV. The present structure of the ecclesiastical legal order as a condition and owner 
of the capacity for international relations 
In the previous chapters we have observed in what way and under which conditions the 
legal conception of the canon law as a sovereign legal order developed and what were the 
motivations of its development. To be able to maintain the capacity of international relations 
this legal order continuously has to possess a those characteristics which convince the 
future partners about its capacity. Now I will examine all this problem on the basis of the 
canon law codex of 1983 and a few norms which as rules of sectoral law are relevant in the 
topic of international relations of the Church. 
1. The Church as united legal order 
1.1. The government of the Church 
The experience of the origin of the Catholic Church is that it developed by the expansion of 
an initially little community in Jerusalem. Consequently, its structure is based on a 
"downwards" logic. This means that the system is not that the functionaries are elected by a 
smaller community to represent the members on a higher level. As it derives from this 
Church-image, the universal Church has a united structure which is divided into dioceses 
and other units of the public administration. The word "Catholic" comes from the Greek 
18
 See Rónay, M.: lus matrimoniale concordatarium. A comparative approach. Acta Juridica 
Hungarica, 47 (2006) 1, 27. 
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idiom ката ókov ("kata holon" = according the whole), from which one can deduce many 
things about the self-image of the Church and its probable relations with the outside world. 
The government of the Church is led by the legally elected pope,19 with the assistance 
of the Roman curial authorities (CIC 360), which have ordinary auxiliary power (potestas 
ordinaria vicaria). The canon law and the international treaties name the whole of the pope 
and the curial authorities as Holy See (CIC 361). The specialised literature names it as 
Church-government and as the supreme authority of the Church as well. The central element 
of the institutional system of the foreign affairs of the Church is the Secretariat of State. 
The competent authority to stipulate international treaties is the Section for Relations with 
States inside the Secretariat of State, which is named by journalists frequently as the 
"Foreign Ministry of the Vatican". 
1.2. The relations of international treaties to the inner laws of the church-law 
According to the canon 3 of the current law, the treaties stipulated earlier by the Holy See 
remain current instead of the contrary rulings of the present codex. With this rule the 
legislator maintains the usual order in relation of the universal canon law and the 
international law, which is maintained by all countries in relation to the own laws of the 
countries and the international law. This means that international treaties constitute higher 
law compared to the inner law of the legal order. The primary importance of this canon is 
that the international partner knows in advance that if the international partner stipulates a 
treaty with the Holy See the international treaty will be considered and fulfilled in the same 
way in the canon law, as states consider and fulfil their international treaties, namely the 
international treaty reconsiders inner law in case of collision. 
This canon shows the aim of the diplomacy of the Holy See to the partner as well, 
namely that 1) in all greater cases the Holy See negotiates concerning the relation of the 
Church and state and that the Holy See represents directly the dioceses.20 By such a ruling 
of the canon law, the Church interprets the boundary of internal and external world and the 
Church defines this border between the local part of the Church and the local state, and as 
a consequence it is possible to negotiate with the Church on this basis. 2) This gesture is 
that the legislator (the pope) continually invest the ecclesiastical legal order with those 
typical legal characteristics of which the contemporary statal legal orders generally possess. 
Therefore there are the typical gestures of the reception of legal patterns of external legal 
structures in the canon law of today as well. According to Graziani, it is a fact that the 
structure of canon law is capable to have the functions of an ecclesiastical jurisdiction and 
foreign representation.21 
19
 "The bishop of the Roman Church, in whom continues the office given by the Lord uniquely 
to Peter, the first of the Apostles, and to be transmitted to his successors, is the head of the college of 
bishops, the Vicar of Christ, and the pastor of the universal Church on earth. By virtue of his office 
he possesses supreme, full, immediate, and universal ordinary power in the Church, which he is 
always able to exercise freely." CIC 331. 
20
 Cardinale, I.: Le Saint-Siège et la diplomatie. Paris-Tuornai-Rome-New York, 1962. 14. 
21
 Graziani, E.: Diplomaziapontificia. Enciclopedia del Diritto. XII, without year, 598. 
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1.3. The institution of the nonce as a manifestation of the united foreign function of the 
Church 
The ecclesiastical diplomatic function is ruled by the canon law. The codex contains a main 
figure and the enumeration of the tasks (CIC 362-367), and in its details it is ruled by the 
already mentioned motu proprio (sectoral law) Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum. The 
Church considers and rules its diplomatic function as one function of the universal Church. 
a) The MP Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum states that the task of the papal delegate is 
to foster the relation between the Church and state and this is his task as a main rule. 
b) The codex of '83 repeats this rule but it states that this task has to be done in 
harmony with the local bishops (CIC 354. 7.). 
According to the definition of Oliveri: "The function of the nonce originates from the 
primacy of the bishop of Rome and such a way it fulfils such a task which is attached to the 
authority of the pope. Therefore, all nonces act directly on behalf of the Holy See, while the 
Holy See is an organ of the universal Church and [...] it represents the unity in the diversity 
which is the characteristic of the authority of the successor of Peter."22 
Those who work in this diplomacy get instruction according this point of view. The 
following example illustrates well the idea that derives from the nature of this function. 
Nonces are always ordained priests and bishops, in most cases endowed with a rank of 
titular archbishop. Nonces cannot be laymen, because they do not carry out their functions 
by the right of and on behalf of the Vatican City State, but by the right of and on behalf of 
the Catholic Church as a sacred structure that is extended in all the world. 
The personals who works in the apparatus of foreign affairs of the Church (at the 
Section for Relations with States and the nunciaturs) uniformly are instructed in Rome in 
the 300-year-old the institute of Accademia Pontificia Ecclesiastica.23 This institution was 
founded depressingly for this reason. The training starts after the ordination a priest in form 
of postgraduate instruction. In order to be attached to the Church as such and not to the 
place of their mission, the ecclesiastical diplomatic agents receive new dispositions in 5-7 
years, similarly to their secular colleagues. 
1.4. Establishing diplomatic relation with the Church 
If one sees the problem from a more practical point of view, e.g. from a point of view of a 
politician of a country, it is not the question whether he / she recognizes the Holy See (with 
or without the Church) as a real actor of international relations or not. The question is, in 
what way the politician can negotiate with the Church-part existing on the territory of that 
country. The first impression of the politician will be that the local bishops tell him / her 
that they are not authorized to negotiate in greater questions with the state because they are 
unauthorized by the canon law. Therefore, the politician must decide whether he / she 
follows the way that is required for a valid treaty by the legal order of his future partner or 
he / she backs from the intention. 
However, it always arises in this way in practise, international law jurists do not 
discuss this side of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Church. According to 
the theory of classical international law starting from the criteria of the statehood one can it 
22
 Oliveri, M.: Natura e funzioni dei legati pontifici, nel contesta ecclesiologico del Vaticano II, 
Torino, 1978.162. 
23
 Cf.: www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdeccles/index.htm 
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exclude that such a subject as the universal Church could exist but in practice the states 
negotiate with the Church as a sovereign. As a consequence, the solution as a sui generis 
subject came up in the international law. 
2. The role of the bishop conferences and the bishops during international talks 
The politicians of certain countries often regard the bishops or the bishop conference 
functioning on their territory as their evident partner of negotiation. However these are not 
negotiating partners of the secular governments. The lowest forum with which the states 
can formally negotiate is the Holy See. 
Negotiations or treaties between single bishops or bishop conferences and local states 
are not international negotiations in the real sense of the word. According to Bertagna if 
bishops or their conferences carry out such acts then these ecclesiastical organs perform 
those negotiations with the explicit or at least silent consent of the Holy See. These sort of 
negotiations are not seen, neither within this conditions, as negotiations or treaties between 
the Catholic Church and the given state only those ones which are performed by the pope or 
the Holy See.24 
A historical example can illustrate the above-mentioned ideas. After the Second World 
War the Hungarian government forced the bishops to sign an agreement by deporting 
thousands of nuns.25 Domenico Tardini, who was the cardinal secretary of state of the Holy 
See, notified József Grősz, the archbishop of Kalocsa in advance that the Hungarian bishops 
do not have any jurisdiction to sign such an agreement. After signing the document, the 
Holy See addressed a monitum26 to the Hungarian bishops on 9th October 1950 ("we 
noticed with indignation"27). In this monitum, the Holy See called the attention of the 
Hungarian bishops to the fact that settling the relations between Church and state belongs to 
the jurisdiction of the Holy See.28 It is clear that the Holy See reacts in a sensitive way if 
the local bishops attempt, the diplomatic representation of the Church even if they act under 
pressure. My standpoint is that the agreement of 1950 is invalid by the virtue of the law, 
because it was signed by such people who did not have the jurisdiction for signing such an 
agreement. 
V. Concordatarian law and concordatarian politics 
1. The nature of the concordatarian law 
After the examination of the nature of the ecclesiastical legal order, one can interpret the 
nature of the concordatarian law much easier: the concordat is an international treaty 
contracted beDveen the Catholic Church and a state. In case of a state the treaties are 
24
 Cf.: Bertagna, В.: Santa Sede ed organizzazioni internazionali. Monitor Eeclesiasticus, 1982. 
119. 
25
 Gergely, J.: Az 1950-es egyezmény és a szerzetesrendek feloszlatása Magyarországon. 
Budapest, 1990. 
26
 Monitum: punitive warning. Prohibition from further infringement of law. The Holy See 
gives such a measure to bishops very rarely. 
27
 Zombori, I.: Le relazioni diplomatiche tra l'Ungheria e la Santa Sede. Szeged, 2001. 98. 
28
 Adriányi, G.: A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939-1978. A Mindszenty-iigy. 
Budapest, 2004. 21-22. 
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contracted by the government (the competent authority is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
as the representative of the state on the international level. This method is the same in the 
case of the Church. The treaties are contracted by the Holy See (the competent authority, is 
the Section for Relations with States inside the Secretariat of State. 
The characteristics of all concordatarian treaties29 that 1. they establish collisional law 
between the sacred, global and anational legal order of the Church and a secular legal 
order of a state, 2. and they settle the relations between a part of the Church that functions 
on the territory of the country and the state of the country. 
This definition of the concordatarian law which interprets the international treaties of 
the Holy See as collisional law between sovereign legal orders is in full accordance with 
the international empirical facts 1. how the parties contract concordatarian treaties, 2. what 
their attitude is to the contracted treaties. 
If one examines the concordatarian treaties from the normative view of the international 
law, then one has to start from the point that the Holy See signed the Convention of Vienna 
of 1969 upon the law of international treaties. The participation in this convention shows 
that the Holy See contracts in an analog way with states. This means that when the Church 
contracts concordatarian treaties, it signs treaties it as states do. With doing this the Church 
does not become a state because this is only an analogy, but the international law acts act of 
the Church have the same nature and efficiency as the Church would be a state. 
Bertrams expresses this in a very similar way. He says that the Church is a person of 
international law in an analog sense: the Church is an international law person while it has 
not the same nature with state.30 This means that from the aspect formal law it is the same 
but in its nature is different. Bertagna expresses this such a way that in the sense of the 
international law the activity of the Church is real (namely it is not a legal fiction), the 
difference is that the Church acts in another way and it works for other aims than states.31 
Bertagna summarises why the whole Church contracts a concordat in such a way: The 
concordat as such includes in it that it is stipulated by the supreme authority of the Church, 
or at least the supreme authority of the Church participates in it, namely because of 1. 
theological, 2. canonical 3. and international law reasons.32 He says that 
"1. according to the second Vatican council the totality of the concept of the Church 
subsists in all dioceses inasmuch as the diocesis stays in communion (communio) with 
the other dioceses, first of all with the diocesis of Rome (the bishop of Rome is the 
pope). Therefore, the condition of the theological totality of the diocesis is its being in 
communion with the whole Church. 
2. the concordat concerns the whole Church, otherwise, when the Church contracts 
concordats then it exercises the right and freedom which derives from the nature of the 
whole Church. 
29
 The reason for using this complicated expression is that most treaties do not name itselves as 
concordat, but partial agreement, modus vivendi, exchange of notes and protocoll, etc. All these forms 
belong to the category of concordatarian treaties because their legal mechanism of effectivity is the 
same. 
30
 Cf.: Bertrams, W.: De origine personae morális in Ecclesia. Periodica, 36 (1947) 169-184; 
and Hervada-Lombardia: El Derecho del Puebo de Dios. Navarra, 1970. 259-265. 
31
 Bertagna: op. cit. 113. 
32
 Bertagna: op. cit. 118. and Oliveri, M.: Natura e funzione dei legati pontifici nel conteste 
ecclesiologico del Vaticano II, Torino, 1978. 242-244. 
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3. the concordat, as it comes from its nature, is brought into being by independent and 
autonom subjects, and bishop conferences, archbishops and bishops are not such." 
When the nonces negotiate with states they work under the jurisdiction of the authority 
of the Section for Relations with States.33 Therefore the international treaties of the Church 
are manifestations of the contractual foreign policy of a single office. No wonder that after 
the comparative examination of the treaties, a really consistent contractual foreign policy 
takes shape. 
2. The erga omnes effectivity of the international subjectivity and the unity 
It can be said that the expressis verbis recognition of the international subjectivity and the 
unity of the canonical legal order exists only with those states with which the Church 
contracted an international treaty. But exist some legal statements which confirm the erga 
omnes perceptibility and effectivity of the international subjectivity and unity. 
It is known, e.g. the resolution of the French Court of Nullity (Cour de cassation) in 
1913 France did not have a diplomatic relation with the Holy See at that time. But refering 
to the consensus of the international practice the Court and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
decided that France regards the Holy See as a subject of international law. This example 
shows that not only those countries which have diplomatic relations with the Holy See 
regard the Holy See as an international law subject, but the others as well.34 
There is a resolution of the Italian Constitutional Court of 1978 as well. In Italy they 
wanted to hold a definitive referendum on the Lateran concordat of 1929. (This document is 
different from the Lateran treaty which established the Vatican City State albeit they are 
stipulated in the same day.) However the Italian Constitutional Court passed that resolution 
in 1978 that "the Lateran concordat of 1929 is an international law treaty, with other words, 
a treaty stipulated by independent and sovereign subjects", and as such it is not allowed to 
be taken as an object of definitive referendum. 
From the international fame of these resolutionsone can know that these unilateral 
statal declarations have strong precedential value. Even the justifications of these resolutions 
refer to the wide acceptance of these facts. In the same way, the international treaties also 
have precendetial value. It is also known that the view of precedents is not far from to the 
international law and the diplomatic practice. 
Conclusion: a foreign nature relation between sovereign legal orders 
With the examination of the canonical constitutional law one can show that in the legal 
technique interpretation of its self-reflection the Church consciously endeavoured to use the 
common legal formulas and legal techniques which was based on the Roman law-used by 
exteriors (states) as well-during one and half year thousand. In this way and with the help 
of shaping its legal institutions, the Catholic Church is able express its self-reflection of 
theological nature that it is a united organisation all over the world. It has such a global 
33
 Its current ruling: loannes Paulus II, Const. Ap. Pastor Bonus. De romana curia, 1988. VI. 28, 
in AAS 80(1988) 872. 
34
 Gidel, M.: Quelques idées sur la condition internationale de la Papauté. In: Revue des droit 
international public, XVIII (1911) 589. 
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and anational construction and such a constitutional structure that keeping relations with 
the Church is only possible with regard to this feature. This is the very reason why the 
states negotiate with the Church-government (Holy See) in spite of local bishops or their 
conferences, since this way of negotiation is not made compulsory by the laws of the single 
states for the decision-makers of the states. It follows that if one wants to deal with the 
international relations of the Church he / she cannot avoid the study of the constitutional 
structure of the Church. 
The foreign function of the Church is centralised, the system of nunciatures and 
contractions of international treaties are led by an authority of the Holy See (Section for 
Relations with States inside the Secretariat of State) on the basis of the law MP Sollicitudo 
omnium Ecclesiarum. This authority makes a consequent foreign policy in the international 
treaties and in the diplomatic relations of the Church. 
The examination of the conditions of canon law of the international function capacity 
of the canonical legal order became clear it that the legal capacity of bishops and their 
conferences are ruled by the canon law in way that they are not able to represent the local 
parts of the Church officially in face of the local state. This system assures that the Holy 
See is the lowest representative of the smallest part of the Church as well. During their 
diplomatic activity the states communicate with the global, anational legal order of the 
Church, and in case of a concordatarian treaty the contracting partner of the secular legal 
order of the state is the universal ecclesiastical legal order. 
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Introduction 
The Hungarian Basic Law,1 effective from the first January 2012, has significantly modified 
the competencies of the Constitutional Court. Among several changes it introduced three 
types of constitutional complaints and abolished the former existing actio popularis. Actio 
popularis meant a legal possibility that anyone could turn to the Constitutional Court 
claiming that a law, legal provision or a regulation is contrary to a constitutional provision. 
The petitioner could also request the annulment of that piece of law. Constitutional 
complaint under former jurisdiction was to be lodged only in case of personal injury caused 
by the application of an unconstitutional norm. The aim of the new constitutional complaint 
mechanisms were to protect against personal injuries caused by ordinary courts and provide 
a possibility for constitutional review also in cases where the complainant cannot turn to 
ordinary court. Moreover, the Constitutional Court may supervise the constitutionality of 
legal provisions when applied in certain judicial cases and leads to unconstitutional court 
decision. This article first describes actio popularis and questions if actio popularis and 
constitutional complaint as such could be alternatives to each other. The second part gives a 
brief summary of the new constitutional complaint mechanisms in Hungary and about the 
practice of the Constitutional Court in the first semester of 2012. The author argues that 
concerning effective constitutional remedy the new system so far do not provide a complete 
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Academy of Sciences, H-1014 Budapest, Országház utca 30. 
E-mail: fruzsina.orosz@gmail.com 
1
 Called Fundamental Law in the wording of the official translation of the Hungarian 
constitution. For better understanding this paper uses the translation as Basic Law similarity to 
mainstream legal literature. 
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substitution for actio popularis. Due to the fast transition several methodological questions 
of fundamental importance have to be answered during the first period of the operation of 
the new system. 
I. The actio populáris 
1. Actio popularis in Hungary 1990-2011 
In Hungary, until the new constitution called Basic Law has turned into effect, approximately 
1,600 actions were brought annually at the Constitutional Court within the framework of 
the abstract ex-post facto review of law (actio populáris)2 procedure, which has no standing 
requirement. The ordinary courts adjudicated violations of the rights of the individual, 
while the primary duty of the Constitutional Court was to review the constitutionality of 
laws and regulations. Even in the procedure of constitutional complaint, the Constitutional 
Court could only investigate the unconstitutionality of the challenged law or regulation, and 
this investigation did not have as a mandatory consequence the retroactive exclusion of the 
applicability of the unconstitutional law or regulation in the given case.3 
Therefore, the duty of the Constitutional Court in Hungary, instead of protecting 
individual rights and the rights of the community and of the adjudication of specific cases, 
has been abstract constitutional review.4 The Constitution and the over 20 years of 
constitutional practice interpreting it demonstrated that the democratic protection of the rule 
of law is in the interest of all members of the society. This was the assumption behind the 
legal intrument adopted by Para. 32/A (4) of Act XX of 1949 (the Constitution), the so-
called actio popularis. 
Para. 21 of Act XXXII of 1989 (Act on the Constitutional Court), in force until January 
I, 2012, determined who was entitled to initiate given procedures. Anyone could propose 
an action to initiate a proceeding for the ex-post facto review of a law or a public regulatory 
mechanism, or for the redress of an unconstitutional ommission. "Anyone" was defined by 
Constitutional Court practice to include actual natural and legal persons, who could even be 
foreign nationals or stateless people. The Court protected the assumption of the physical 
existence of the petitioner; generally, this was not something evidence was presented on. 
The vast majority of the Constitutional Court's work consisted of the adjudication of 
these constitutional issues that could be proposed by anyone.5 With regard to the fact that at 
the political transition the Constitutional Court could not monitor the constitutionality of 
the entire legal system, as a consequence of action popularis, the cases that were heard 
came random. Alongside the fact that certain most important proceedings could be initiated 
by "anyone"-constitutionality in the democratic society was subject to the watchful scrutiny 
of the populus. The state effectively protected constitutionality with this broad opportunity 
2 www.mkab.hu/letöltések/evkonyv. 
3
 About competencies of the Constitutional Court under the Act XXXII of 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court and about changes brought by the new Basic Law see in a nutshell The 
Constitutional Court. In: Csink, L.-Schanda, B.-Varga, Zs. A. (eds): The Basic Law of Hungary. 
Dublin, 2012. 157-167. 
4
 Halmai, G.-Tóth, G. A. (eds): Emberi Jogok (Human Rights). Budapest, 2005. 215-216. 
5
 About the abolition of death penalty, see Decision 23/1990. (X. 31.) CC. About the official use 
of personal identification number see Decision 15/1991 (IV. 13.) CC. 
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for bringing an action, declaring that the creation and preservation of constitutionality is in 
everyone's interest and right. 
Over the course of the past 20 years, in spite of these internal values, actio popularis 
had become one of the most disputed elements in Hungarian Constitutional Court practice; 
one of the reasons for this was-as declared by even the president of the Constitutional 
Court-the unbearable workload, inhibiting the adjudication of the cases within a reasonable 
period of time. Consequently, the Basic Law introduced another form of protecting 
constitutionality; it eliminated the actio popularis, and enabled the bringing of an action on 
the basis of individual standing within the framework of a constitutional complaint, not 
only concerning unconstitutional decisions deriving from the application of an 
unconstitutional law or regulation, but also versus decisions or proceedings of an ordinary 
court or of an authority not providing the opportunity for a legal remedy. 
With the elimination of the actio popularis, what has come to the foreground is the 
opportunity for anyone to go to the ombudsman and propose that in the case of an 
unconstitutional law or regulation, the Commissioner for Civil Rights commence a 
proceeding for an ex-post facto review of law before the Constitutional Court. 
In order to ensure a fair transition between the actio popularis and the new system of 
constitutional complaints, during the first quarter of 2012, pursuant to the new Act on the 
Constitutional Court,6 those actio popularis motions could be submitted as constitutional 
complaints whose contents were originally targeted at the ex-post facto review of the 
constitutionality of a law or regulation and were not proposed by a person who would also 
have had standing to do so under the Basic Law. On the basis of the Act on the Constitutional 
Court, however, the petitioner of the terminated proceeding could only file the motion 
containing the constitutional concern in compliance with the law designated in the 
unadjudicated proposal, if his/her proposal also complied with the new rules applicable to 
constitutional law complaints (namely, Para. 26. (2) of the Basic Law)7 and the violation of 
constitutional rights referenced therein amounts to a violation of the Basic Law. 
This means that even though as of the 1st of January, 2012, the ex-post facto review 
proceeding (actio popularis) that could be initiated by anyone had ceased to exist, the new 
Constitutional Court Act provided an opportunity for natural and legal persons to submit 
previously ex-post facto review of law motions as direct constitutional law complaints in 
such cases where the substantive content of their motion indicates a comprehensive 
compliance with the conditions applicable to the submission of a direct constitutional law 
complaint. 
2. The role of the actio popularis proceeding in constitutional adjudication 
The origin of actio popularis can be found as early as in Roman law.8 The word derives 
from the Latin words actio (action) and popularis (of the people). Many forms of actio 
popularis are known in constitutional law. When we mention actio popularis, this primarily 
means that anyone can initiate an ex-post facto review of law and can request the annulment 
of the law. There are states (e.g. Croatia), where in the case of such motion, the authority 
6
 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court. 
7
 See intra. II. 1.2. 
8
 Mercier, P. P.: Citizens Right to Sue in the public interest: The Roman Actio popularis 
revisited, University of Western Ontario Law Review, 21 (1983), 89. and Nótári, T.: Római köz- és 
magánjogi Roman public law and private law). Kolozsvár, 2011. 277. 
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conducting the constitutional review must take action, while there are some other states 
where the motion is only considered a proposal and it is the decision of the authority 
conducting the review as to whether to complete the proceeding (e.g. Israel). The type of 
constitutional complaint where the objective of the proceeding is the annulment of the law 
but the proposing party can only use this method of constitutional protection if the law is 
applied in his/her specific case, therefore he/she/it must show some kind of an involvement, 
is called quasy actio popularis (e.g. the Czech Republic).9 
It was Kelsen, Austrian-American jurist and legal philosopher, who in 1928 first had 
used the expression actio popularis in his work in the context of constitutional law. 
According to Kelsen, actio popularis is the strongest guarantee to enable the filtering out of 
unconstitutional rules. Nonetheless, he did not recommend the introduction of such broad 
standing requirement into Austrian law, because in his view, the possibility for abuse was 
too large, as well as the fact that the Constitutional Court would have certainly become 
inundated with cases.10 
Ex-post facto review of law proceedings that can be initiated by anyone are exceedingly 
rare in European constitutional law; to some extent, Bavaria (provides an opportunity to do 
so although the other German states and German federal states do not employ this form of 
initiating a proceeding), Croatia, Macedonia Republic of the Former Yugoslavia, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The system of constitutionality 
review and within it the circle of those who can initiate a proceeding is extremely varied in 
the various constitutional democracies. In some states, such as Lithuania only a group of 
Members of Parlament or the Government can initiate the review of the constitutionality of 
laws, in Estonia not even Members of Parlament can initiate such proceeding." There are 
states, however, which provide nearly unlimited access to the legal institution of 
constitutional review.12 An exemplary representative of this latter group was the system of 
actio popularis in Hungary, operating until the beginning of January 2012. 
Thus, the essence of actio populáris is that it is not necessary that the petitioner has any 
interest in the success of the proceeding, meaning that it is not necessary for that person to be 
affected. For the most part, the countries establishing the opportunity for actio popularis 
come from the line of post-socialist nations. Actio popularis could be the most important tool 
of direct democracy in a transitional democracy.13 In the peaceful and effective management 
of transitioning into a constitutional democracy, constitutional observations by citizens 
affecting legislative activity may have a significant role, and this form of participation in 
exercising power may also greatly invigorate public sentiment and the sense of joint action. 
Thus, the introduction of actio popularis also reflects a kind of philosophy of democracy. 
The establishment of a proceeding which can be initiated by anyone in constitutional 
democracies is not a shared European minimum requirement in the area of reviewing the 
9
 Sadurski, W.: Rights before courts, a study of constitutional courts in postcommunist states of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The Netherlands, 2005. 6-7. 
10
 Arjomand, S. A.: Constitutional development and political reconstruction from nation 
building to new constitutionalism. In: Arjomand, S. A. (ed.): Constitutionalism and political 
reconstruction. The Netherlands, 2007. 39. 
11
 Sadurski: op. cit. 6-7. 
12
 More about the subject in Study No 538/2009 of the European Commission for democracy 
through law (Venice Commission): Study on individual access to constitutional justice. 
13
 Sólyom, L.: The role of constitutional courts in the transition to democracy-with special 
reference to Hungary. In: Arjomand (ed.): op. cit. 312. 
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constitutionality of laws and regulations. For example, in the case of Montenegro, the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe did not recommend the introduction of actio popularis, 
citing Serbian experiences according to which the opportunity places undue burdens on the 
proceeding court.14 In the Commission's opinion 614/2011 dated March 28, 2011, however, 
it is stated that in Hungary the actio popularis was indeed able to filter out unconstitutional 
laws and regulations adopted prior to the effective date of the Constitution, during the years 
immediately following the political transition.15 
3. The actio popularis and the constitutional law complaint - alternatives? 
In legal literature, actio popularis is often presented as contraiy to the proceeding initiated 
in the form of a constitutional complaint.16 The basis of the comparison is that while in the 
case of actio popularis it is part of its definition that there are no admissibility/standing 
criteria for the review of constitutionality, in the case of a constitutional complaint the 
authority conducting the review (generally the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court) 
always expects that the initiating party be somehow involved in the case. In the case of the 
constitutional complaint, the primary objective of the complainant is to obtain legal remedy 
for their own case, as in the improvement of their own personal or financial position. The 
result of the proceeding can be the annulment of the unconstitutional law, just as in the case 
of the actio popularis based abstract designated review of the law; however, the annulment 
of the unconstitutional law from the perspective of the complainant is merely a tool to 
obtain legal redress in his/her/its own case. To the contrary, in actio popularis, the service 
of public interest, not the service of private interest, forms the backdrop. Although the two 
scopes of review can be contrasted from this perspective, the actio popularis and the 
constitutional law complaint are still not alternatives to each other; doctrinally, there is no 
obstacle to employing them side-by-side. In spite of this fact, in jurisprudence, the two 
legal institutions do not operate simultaneously in any nation. One partial reason for this is 
the workload limit of the authorities conducting the constitutionality review. A constitutional 
complaint with a broad scope and actio popularis cannot be employed in most countries 
without expensive structural expansions and operational reforms in such a way so the cases 
could be resolved within a reasonable length of time. The effective operation of legal 
remedy forums, meaning the realisation of the fundamental principle that the decisions be 
made within a proximity to the injured party, in an easily accessible and prompt manner, 
can suffer because of the complexity of the review system. 
Contrary to actio popularis-the essence of which is that the Constitutional Court 
accepts a motion as long as the petitioner indicates which law or regulation is deemed 
unconstitutional and explains intelligently why-the substantive element of the constitutional 
law complaint is to set up the system of admissibility criteria, the essence of which is that a 
14
 Opinion on the Draft Law on the Constitutional Court of Montenegro of the European 
Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission). Opinion 479/2008. 
15
 Opinion no. 614/2011. of the European Commission for democracy through law (Venice 
Commission) on three legal questions arising in the process of drafting the new cosntitution of 
Hungary. 
16
 E.g. Uitz, R.: May Less be More? Public Interest Standing and the Protection of Constitutional 
Rights. Lessons from Hungary's Actio Popularis. In: Pasquino, P.-Randazzo, B. (eds): La giustizia 
constituzionale ed i suoi utenti, Publicazioni dell'Institutio di Diritto Publico, no. 57, Milan, 2006. 
89-117. 
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law can be annuled only when its application in a specific case has led to a specific violation 
of a fundamental right.17 The admissibility criteria helps that actio populáris and 
constitutional complaints aiming for the annulment of a legal provision could be separated. 
Thus one can only request the abolition of an unconstitutional law in the framework of a 
constitutional law complaint, if the merit of the complainant's case in front of the ordinary 
court is significantly affected by the challenged law. Usually constitutional complaints can 
only be initiated in the case of the violation of the rights and freedoms of the complainant, 
while the actio popularis proceeding usually may be initiated in the case of the violation of 
any constitutional provision. 
The constitutional complaint and the actio popularis may work with similar 
effectiveness regarding the filtering out of unconstitutional laws and regulations in the legal 
system. However, while the constitutional complaint, as a strong point, is able to redress 
individual violations of rights as well, it is a unique characteristic, a strong point of actio 
popularis that the petitioner there acts in the interest of maintaining constitutional 
democracy. Actio popularis as a legal institution relies on the participation of people taking 
action in the interest of the public. 
II. The new system of constitutional complaints in Hungary 
In the first few months of the Basic Law in effect, the Constitutional Court, alongside the 
drafting of a few substantive decisions mainly of lesser significance, established the 
procedural and substantive conditions of exercising its new competences. The Basic Law 
has changed the competences of the Constitutional Court,18 a new fundamental law governs 
the Constitutional Court19 (Abtv.). Under the new legislation, the composition of the cases 
changed completely. In May of 2012, of 686 pending cases, 536 were constitutional 
complaints, while in former years the constitutional complaints only comprised an 
insignificant portion of the Constitutional Court's caseload. In the first semester of 2012, 
approximately half of the constitutional complaints were based on Para. 26 (1) of the Abtv. 
(old type complaints), over a third were based on Para. 26 (2) of the Abtv. (direct complaint) 
and a smaller percentage was based on Para. 27 of the Abtv. (real complaint).20 The primary 
competence of the Constitutional Court has therefore shifted from the ex-post facto abstract 
review of laws to the adjudication of constitutional complaints. 
Over the course of its preparation, during the first half of the year of its operation 
under the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court had prepared the intake of pending 
constitutional complaints supplemented on the basis of the Basic Law and also complaints 
initiated on the basis of a motion for an ex-post facto review of laws, submitted prior to 
January 1, 2012. Additionally, the general and specific tasks and their associated procedures 
in connection with the new constitutional complaints gained definition in the new 
organisational system.21 During the first semester of 2012, in addition to the continuous 
17
 Sadurski: op. cit. 1. 
18
 The Basic Law of Hungary (25 April 2011) Art. 24. 
19
 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court. 
20 www.mkab.hu/statisztika/2012. 
21
 Under the new legislation the Constitutional Court consists of 15 judges instead of the former 
11, and brings its decisions either in plenary session, in 5 member divisions or in a single judge 
procedure. See Decision 1/2012 (I. 3) about the procedural rules of the Constitutional Court, I. chapter. 
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discussion of procedural issues, the Court had clarified many dilemmas of a substantive 
nature as well. The discussion of procedural rules developed in connection with the 
adjudicability of constitutional complaints of various types on the merits (admissibility). It 
is well known that the procedure itself is also a substance:22 If constitutional law complaints 
are stuck as early as the intake procedure stage because of the strict conditions, few 
constitutional complaints remain to be decided on the merits. On the other hand, if the 
admissibility criteria are not self evident, abuses may take place during the intake stage of 
the case, or the inconsistent practice may violate the rule of law, a fundamental pillar of 
constitutional democracy. 
I. The three types of constitutional complaints 
Pursuant to Para. 24 (2) (c) of the Basic Law, on the basis of a constitutional complaint, the 
Constitutional Court reviews the compliance of the law or regulation applied in the given 
case with the Basic Law (old type and direct constitutional law complaint). Pursuant to 
Para. 24 (2) (d) of the Basic Law, on the basis of the constitutional complaint, the 
Constitutional Court also reviews the compliance of the court decision with the Basic Law 
(new type, real complaint). By breaking down the rules contained in the Basic Law, the Act 
on the Constitutional Court established three categories of constitutional complaints. 
1.1. The old type complaint 
Pursuant to Para. 26 (1) of the Abtv. according to Para. 24 (2) (c) of the Basic Law, a person 
or organisation affected in an individual case may turn to the Constitutional Court with a 
constitutional complaint, as long as over the course of the application of an unconstitutional 
law in the court proceeding conducted in the matter, a violation of his/her/its rights has 
occurred and he/she/it had already exhausted available legal remedies or legal redress is 
unavailable. This is what we call the old type constitutional law complaint. 
Constitutional complaints submitted pursuant to Act XXXII of 1989 remained pending 
also as old type constitutional complaints, as long as pursuant to the decree of the 
Constitutional Court, the complainant supplemented his/her/its complaint within the alloted 
deadline (31 March 2012) with the provisions of the Basic Law violated by the challenged 
legal instrument and associated information regarding related constitutional correlations, as 
well as the certification of legal representation required by the new Abtv. 
Pursuant to Para. 73 (1) of the Abtv., in pending cases before the Constitutional Court, 
the proceeding of the Constitutional Court must be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of the Abtv., if the case can be examined in conjunction with the mandates of the 
Basic Law and the standing of the petitioner is established pursuant to the provisions of the 
new Abtv. In case of constitutional law complaints originally submitted prior to December 
31,2011 and still pending on January 1, 2012, in its decree ordering the supplementation of 
the motion, the Constitutional Court also set a deadline of March 31, 2012. 
1.2. The direct constitutional complaint 
Pursuant to Para. 26 (2) of the Abtv., unlike in Section (1), as an exception, the proceeding 
of the Constitutional Court can commence when by virtue of the application or effect of the 
unconstitutional provision the violation of the filing party's rights had occurred directly, 
22
 Tóth, G. A.: Az eljárási alkotmányosság tartalma (The meaning of procedural 
constitutionality). Fundamentum, (2004) 3, 5-33. 
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without a court decision, and no legal remedy is available to redress the unconstitutional 
situation, or the petitioners had already exhausted their legal remedies. This is what is called 
a direct constitutional complaint. 
Newly submitted motions that are based on actio populáris motions from before 2012 
are also treated as direct constitutional complaints. In the case of such constitutional 
complaints, it was also a condition (although the petitioners did not generally take this into 
account) that if the legal regulatory framework enabled the petitioner to tum to an authority 
or a court, they had to exhaust such opportunities for legal remedy. 
From a constitutional law perspective, many have considered it worrysome that 
pending proceedings on December 31, 2011 cannot be completed pursuant to previously 
valid law. More moderate opinions merely thought it desirable that those motions which 
request the completion of a proceeding regarding a violation of the Constitution which at 
the same time can be interpreted as a violation of the Basic Law should be allowed to be 
resubmitted in some form to the Constitutional Court.23 
As a result of the transitional provisions, many motions previously submitted as actio 
popularis became filtered as constitutional complaints through the admissibility procedure. 
The legislator provided a solution in order to keep the petitioners who have been waiting, in 
some cases, for many years, from feeling deprived of their constitutional rights. En masse, 
however, transfonning motions indicating unconstitutionality in abstracto into acceptable 
constitutional complaints will certainly not be successful, because the original complaints 
were not designed to show injury to an individual's rights. 
1.3. The real constitutional complaint 
Pursuant to Para. 27 of the Abtv., according to Para. 24 (2) (d) of the Basic Law, the affected 
person or organisation in a given case can turn to the Constitutional Court against a court 
decision that is contrary to the Basic Law, if the substantive case decision or other decision 
concluding the court proceeding violates the rights of the complainants in the Basic Law 
and the petitioners had already exhausted their legal remedies or no legal remedies had 
been made available. This is what is called a real constitutional complaint. 
The real constitutional complaint is known from German law and has been a desired 
legal institution in Hungary by many for a long time.24 Its practice-meaning the activity of 
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany of reviewing the decisions of the ordinary 
courts from a constitutionality perspective-eases the development of uniform standards of 
constitutionality to be applied by the courts. After the binding conclusion of the lawsuit 
violating the party's fundamental rights, the party can tum to the Constitutional Court 
pursuant to Para. 93 (I) (4) (a) of the Basic Law. The legal literature of past decades 
distinguished the German and Hungarian type of constitutional complaints with the 
adjective "real". In the case of the Hungarian type, pursuant to Act XXXII of 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court, the affected party could only tum to the Constitutional Court with a 
motion requesting the annulment of the law applied in her case. Above annulment, it could 
only be stated in individual, specially justified cases that the application of the 
unconstitutional provision in the case of the complainant is retroactively excluded by the 
Constitutional Court. Consequently, in the past the party submitting the constitutional 
23
 http://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/2011/Abtv.elemzes_20111027_final.pdf. 
24
 E.g. Halmai, G.: Az Alkotmány mint norma a bírói jogalkalmazásban (The Constitution as a 
norm injudicial adjudication). Fundamentum, (1998) 3, 77-81. 
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complaint could not request the potential review of the constitutionality of the litigation 
proceeding and of the ordinary court decision. 
The institution of the real constitutional complaint is of crucial importance because it 
creates an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to monitor the activity of ordinaty courts 
besides monitoring the activity of the legislator. The review is conducted from a 
constitutional perspective, the Constitutional Court has to adjudicate whether the 
interpretation of civil law, of the law of public administration or of criminal law complied 
with the Basic Law. This so-called real constitutional law complaint, however, also has its 
limits in German law: Constitutional review is possible only if the Court's decision is based 
on a material misinterpretation of the basic Law, with particular focus on the extent of the 
violation thereof.25 In the interest of preserving the allocation of functions, separation of 
powers between the courts and the Constitutional Court, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany established, as early as in the first volume of published decisions, the designation 
of special constitutional issue (Specifisches Verfassungsrecht).26 The Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany stated that conducting the proceeding, the finding and evaluation of the 
facts, the interpretation of the laws and their application to the given case continue to be the 
duty of ordinary courts and are exempted from the review of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, except when it concerns a "special constitutional issue".27 
The so-called special constitutional issue gained its currently valid form in 1964, in the 
decision issued in a patent law case, the "Heck'sche formula".28 In essence, this means that 
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany does not review the constitutionality of the 
decision in all cases, only when it concerns a special constitutionality issue. As expressed in 
Bürgschaft and similar, as early as in the Mephisto case, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany stated that without the suspicion of a special constitutional issue, the Federal 
Constitutional Court is not entitled to review a decision even if presumably it would come 
to a different conclusion on the merits than the court adjudicating the civil case.29 
Laws and regulations somehow always impact fundamental rights. It would be contrary 
to the principle of separation of powers and consequently with the goals of the Constitutional 
Court if in all cases one could tum to the Constitutional Court as the final judicial forum. 
The interpretation of laws and regulations and their application in a given case is the duty 
of the ordinary courts. Thus, in the framework of a constitutional complaint, one can only 
tum to the Constitutional Court if the petitioner can substantiate the probability that the 
constitutional problem arising over the course of the judicial proceeding is of particular 
constitutional significance. 
In German legal practice, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany first examines 
whether the motion contains a special constitutional issue. Therefore, the error of the 
disputed court decision must be based on the court ignoring the fundamental rights or 
25
 BVerfG 7 February 1990, BVerGE 81, 242 (Handelsvertreter), 253; BVerfg 19 October 1993, 
BVerfgE 89, 214 (Bürgschaft) 230. 
26
 Kenntner cited by Zakariás, К.: A rendes bíróságok határozatainak alkotmányossági 
felülvizsgálata a német Szövetségi Alkotmánybíróság gyakorlatában (Constitutional supervision of 
decisions of ordinary courts in the practice of German Constitutional Court). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
(2010) 2, 98, 102. 
27
 1 BVerGE, 418 (420), cited by Zakariás: op. cit. 102. 
28
 It is named after Karl Heck, judge of the constitutional court. See Zakariás: op. cit. 98, 102. 
29
 BVerfg 19 October 1993, BVerfgE 89, 214 (Bürgschaft) 230. 
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incorrectly applying the law to a significant constitutional degree.30 First, it is those errors 
in interpretation that can become special constitutional issues which mean the fundamental 
modification of the meaning of a fundamental right and in the context of a specific case, are 
also significant in a substantive legal sense. 
2. Admissibility in the practice of the Constitutional Court 
Over the course of adjudicating constitutional complaints, the Constitutional Court faced 
many interpretive tasks. The clarification of issues in connection with the admissibility of a 
motion and the development of procedure and doctrine will fundamentally define how 
constitutional law complaint legal remedies will operate in Hungary. 
2.1. Involvement31 
Pursuant to Para. 26 and Para. 27 of the Abtv., a condition of submitting constitutional 
complaints is the verification of personal involvement. Pursuant to Para. 52 (4) of the Abtv., 
compliance with the conditions of the Constitutional Court proceeding must be verified by 
the petitioner, therefore it is not enough to refer to involvement in the motion, but all the 
verifying, as in evidentiary facts that prove that fact; when necessary, associated documents 
must be attached.32 It is the subject of this stage of the admissions procedure whether the 
petitioner can verify that the application or entering into force of the law or regulation had 
subjected her to personal or direct violation of her right(s).33 
Even though in its decisions rejecting the admissibility of constitutional complaints, 
the Constitutional Court does not disclose all reasons underlying the decision, in related 
notes it does reference the details and results of the review. In constitutional complaint 
proceedings lodged on the basis of Para. 26 (1) and Para. 27 of the Abtv., the petitioner 
challenges a court decision. In this case, the review of involvement is generally problem-
free, as typically involved parties are those whose rights or lawful interests is directly 
affected by the challenged court decision. In the case of direct complaints lodged pursuant 
to Para. 26 (2) of the Abtv., however, the showing of involvement is a considerably more 
difficult task. In this area, one cannot talk of solidified standards and consistently applied 
rules, trends can be observed instead. The Constitutional Court visibly strives to delienate 
the direct constitutional law complaint from the actio popularis proceeding.34 
The problem is sharply outlined in the case of constitutional complaints former 
submitted as an actio popularis motion prior to the effective date of the Basic Law. In many 
cases, the petitioners have submitted their earlier motion requesting an abstract ex-post 
facto review of law without going into detail on the issue of direct involvement and suffered 
violation of fundamental rights. Cases were rejected, for example, where in connection with 
the reform of the pension fund system reform, the petitioners verified their involvement 
with their private pension fund memberships.35 The essence of the justification of the 
30
 18 BVerGE, 85. (92). 
31
 This subchapter is based on the following article: Bitskey, B.-Gárdos-Orosz, F.: A 
befogadható alkotmányjogi panasz: az első hónapok tapasztalatai (The admissible constitutional 
complaint: first experiences). Alkotmánybírósági Szemle, (2012) 2, 93-95. 
32
 Decision 3105/2012. (VI. 26.) CC. 
33
 Decision 3063/2012. (VII. 26.) CC. 
34
 E.g. Decision 3105/2012. (VI. 26.) CC. 
35
 Decision IV/2856/2012. CC. 
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decision-similarly to other pension fund cases36-is that involvement cannot be determined 
because the referenced provisions only affect the complainant in the event of their future 
application. 
In an other case, complainants, in constitutional complaints directed at the finding of 
government activity counter to the Basic Law in an effort to exclusively possess power, 
have based their personal involvement on the fact that in the text of Article C, Paragraph 
(2)37 Basic Law the word "everybody" is expressly set forth, a concept which encompasses 
all Hungarian natural persons and organisations, including the petitioner itself. On the basis 
of all of the above-according to the petitioners-anyone can submit a constitutional 
complaint if the challenged laws and regulations serve the forceful acquisition or exercise 
of power, or its exclusive possession. 
According to the position of the Constitutional Court, the referenced law sections have 
not been applied against the petitioners, either directly or indirectly, and their coming into 
force did not affect them directly, their individual rights were not impinged upon by the 
adoption of the challenged provisions. For all of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court had 
rejected the admission of the complaint.38 
The reasoning shows that personal involvement as an admissibility criterion sharply 
separates actio populáris and the new type of constitutional complaint. Thus, it is not 
enough to form the foundation of the motion that the petitioner is subject to the effects of 
the law; an actual, verified, personal injury at law must be indicated to have direct 
involvement. 
Upon the examination of personal, direct involvement, it is, however, not desirable to 
draw a distinction between petitioners as to whether they suffered an injury to their rights 
because of the entering into force of a law which has an effect on large numbers of people 
or because of one which expresses general rules applicable to smaller groups. 
The doctrinal development of direct and personal involvement requires great effort. In 
the case of a direct complaint contained in Para. 26 (2) of the Abtv., it has been found that 
on the basis of those laws, and other legal mechanisms defined in Para. 37 (2) of the Abtv., 
which cannot enter into force directly by their nature (such as a resolution for the uniformity 
of law, which is only binding on the courts, or generally those laws and regulations which 
govern the proceedings of authorities and courts, etc.), direct involvement cannot be 
determined. The legal injury in such cases can necessarily only take place through a court 
or authority proceeding and action, therefore only an old type constitutional complaint can 
be initiated pursuant to Para. 26 (l).39 
The directness of the involvement could be also defined by the weight of suffered 
disadvantages. The evaluation of the issue is doctrinally complex, however, because it is 
connected with the criteria applicable to the raising of the fundamental constitutionality 
issue contained in Para. 29 of the Abtv. It is an interesting problem how the weight of the 
injury to rights and the directness of involvement are interconnected. 
36
 Decision 3020/2012. (VI. 21.) CC. 
37
 "No activity of anyone may be directed at the acquisition or exercise of public authority by 
force, nor at its exclusive possession...". 
38
 Referring to Art. 64 b) of the Act CLI of2011 on the Constitutional Court and Art. 30 (2) of 
the Procedural Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
39
 E.g. Decision 3114/2012. (VII. 26.) CC. 
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In connection with involvement, it is also a question as to whether a constitutional 
complaint can only be submitted in case of an injury at fundamental rights, or in case of any 
other right provided for in the Basic Law; possibly in case of the violation of constitutional 
values or in case of unconstitutional omission of the legislator. This latter problem is 
highlighted by those complaints that are based on the violation of the concept of rule of 
law.40 
With regard to the issue of involvement, two more interesting problems are definitely 
worth mentioning from the first half year of practice of the Constitutional Court, in 2012. 
The first is that in the case of certain sector specific, code type laws (for example, laws and 
regulations concerning public education) it has been an ordinary occurrence that advocacy 
groups and trade unions submitted constitutional complaints with regard to such laws or 
regulations which did not affect their rights personally, only the rights of certain employees 
or the rights of practicioners of a given profession. In this case, however, the Constitutional 
Court held that only individual, specifically involved persons can submit the complaint, the 
union for example is not entitled to do so, as it is not directly involved.41 
2.2. A fundamental issue of constitutional significance 
With regard to constitutional complaints, in addition to the Abtv., the Procedural Code of 
the Constitutional Court set forth additional rules. Pursuant to Para. 29 of the Abtv., the 
Constitutional Court shall only admit constitutional complaints in the event of a conflict 
with the Basic Law which materially influences the court decision or in the case of an issue 
of constitutional significance. Paragraph 30 (2) of the Procedural Code, however, lists this 
admissions criterion as the Constitutional Court shall deny the admission of the 
constitutional complaint if the petitioner does not claim conflict with the Basic Law which 
materially influences the disputed court decision, or the problem raised is not a fundamental 
issue of constitutional law. 
Even though the two forms of the statement could mean the same thing grammatically, 
the practice of the Constitutional Court to date shows that it could be a matter of dispute as 
to how the two "or" criteria can be interpreted. Contrary to the Abtv., one of the ways the 
Procedural Code is interpreted is when the "or" criterion in the law becomes a conjunctive 
condition. If the text of the Procedural Code provides an opportunity to deny the admission 
of the complaint, if it does not raise a significant constitutional issue or this question did not 
influence on the merits the court's decision, it actually requires that both criteria are met at 
the same time for admission. 
As a consequence of the foregoing, even though for admission, pursuant to the text of 
the Abtv., it is sufficient in and of itself if the problem raised has fundamental constitutional 
significance, having made that finding, the Constitutional Court will also review whether 
the constitutional law issue had materially influenced the court decision. By the same token, 
even if the Constitutional Court had determined that the constitutional law question had 
materially influenced the court decision, it could be an additional question as to whether 
that was of a fundamental constitutional significance. 
It can assist in understanding the problem if at the time of examining the admission 
issues, we account for the possible legal consequence related dilemmas as well. The true 
question behind the admissions disputes is perhaps that it cannot yet be seen what the legal 
40
 See supra Polish regulation. 
41
 Decision 3091/2012. (VII. 26.) CC. 
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consequence is in the case of a constitutional complaint which successfully designates the 
fundamental constitutionality problem, but cannot show that it had materially influenced the 
court decision.42 
This dilemma is most understandable in the case of real constitutional complaints 
pursuant to Para. 27 of the Abtv., as here it must be weighed how the legal consequence 
resulting from the vacating of the court decision is warranted when the decision was not 
actually materially influenced by the significant constitutional issue. Even in the case of 
complaints lodged on the basis of Para. 26 (1), this question remains in effect, but in the 
case of old type complaints, the legal consequence that is doctrinally easier to trace from 
the regulatory framework is the annulment of the law independently, while keeping the 
challenged court decision in force. 
In the old procedural system pursuant to Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional 
Court, in the case of constitutional law complaints, in addition to the annulment of the law 
or regulation, the Constitutional Court could make a decision regarding the exclusion of the 
applicability of the unconstitutional law or regulation. The Constitutional Court could 
decide in a similar manner regarding the fate of the law and of the court decision. 
In the framework of a direct constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court had 
received such motion where the petitioner found the text "special exception" in Para. 26 (2) 
of the Abtv. and the "or an issue of fundamental constitutional significance" test in Para. 29 
of the Abtv. unconstitutional. In the petitioner's view, these provisions conflict with Para. 
24 (2) (c) of the Basic Law because they might deprive one of the opportunity to submit a 
constitutional complaint to be provided in any case against laws and regulations that are 
contrary to the Basic Law. The fact that Para. 26 (2) only enables the injured party to attack 
a law or provision that are contrary to the Basic Law as an exception is a material limitation 
on the right to tum to the Constitutional Court and makes the initiation of the proceeding 
unpredictable.43 
In the first half a year of practice by the Constitutional Court, few guidelines can be 
gleaned to assist in the definition of Para. 29 of the Abtv. It can be seen, however, that in 
nearly all cases the Constitutional Court had rejected the admission of the motions because 
of the absence of an issue of fundamental constitutional significance. There were multiple 
cases in which the reason why the Constitutional Court did not see an issue of fundamental 
constitutional significance was because the constitutional complaint raised such issues in 
which the Constitutional Court had decided in the past.44 It is important to highlight that in 
these cases the decisions did not employ the doctrine of res judicata, the reasoning did not 
refer to the fact that the Constitutional Court had already made a decision with regard to the 
given law or regulation, but rather it emphasised that a constitutional issue on which the 
Constitutional Court had already issued a decision on cannot be of fundamental 
significance.45 
42
 Refusal of the complaint (Inadmissibility) was justified with not forseeable or not satisfactory 
possible remedies, e.g. Decision 3003/2012. (VI. 21.) CC. 
43
 Decision IV/02229/2012. CC. 
44
 E.g. Decision 3004/2012. (VI. 21.). CC. 
45
 Worries about res judicata [e.g. Decision 3005/2012. (VI. 21.) CC. or Decision 3083/2012. 
(VII. 26.) CC.] see http://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/2011/Abtv._elemzes_20111027_final.pdf. 
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Conclusion 
In January 2012, a broad array of constitutional complaints had been introduced to 
Hungarian constitutional law. During the transitional period of constitutional review from 
actio popularis to a complex system of constitutional complaints, the majority of complaint 
proceedings resulted in the denial of the admissibility of the motion. The petitioners were 
experiencing the same problems in Hungarian law as the ones acting under the previously 
valid law. For the most part, this means cases in connection with the use of wheel clamps, 
rules on keeping animals or landscaping, local taxes (e.g. special taxes, fees), or pension 
regulation. Even these frequently received petitions rarely comply with the procedural and 
most of all, content requirements applicable to new constitutional complaints. 
The development of constitutional democracy following the political transition in 1989 
was effectively assisted by the legal institution of actio popularis. Hungary could be an 
example to the entire world for how constitutional protection operates smoothly as a result 
of the mostly public-interest driven action of natural and legal persons. There might have 
been good reasons in Hungarian law for introducing the new types of constitutional 
complaint. The new system enables the monitoring of the constitutionality of court decisions 
simultaneously with the constitutional review of laws and regulations. The expectations, 
however, are rather high, as the new type of constitutional protection did not complete but 
replaced a fundamentally well functioning system. 
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I. Introduction 
The recently amended Hungarian Citizenship Act1 provides for a preferential naturalisation 
of Hungarians living outside the borders. According to the amendment, a non-Hungarian 
citizen,2 whose ascendant was a Hungarian citizen, or who demonstrates the plausibility of 
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1
 Act No. LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship, Art. 4(3). 
2
 The notions of "citizenship" and "nationality" need to be distinguished on the basis of their 
nature in domestic law and international law. "Citizenship" includes the rights and obligations of a 
person originating from his citizenship. See Moore, J. В.: A Digest of International Law as Embodied 
in Diplomatic Discussions, Treaties and Other International Agreements, International Awards, the 
Decisions of Municipal Courts, and the Writings of Jurists, and Especially in Documents, Published 
and Unpublished, Issued by Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United States, the Opinions of 
the Attorneys-General, and the Decisions of Courts, Federal and State. Vol. III. Washington, 1906. 
273. § 372; Hyde, Ch. Ch.: International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States. 
Vol. II. Boston, 1945. 1066-1067; Garay, J. C.: La théorie de la citoyenneté automatique des étrangérs. 
Revue de Droit International, 4 (1926) 1, 135; Isay, E.: De la nationalité. Recueil des Cours, 5 (1924) 
4, 432; Cogordan, G.: Droit des gens. La nationalité au point de vue des rapports internationaux. 
Paris, 1879. 6. Since the existence of citizenship rights and obligations are relevant from the point of 
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his or her descent from Hungary and provides proof of his or her knowledge of the 
Hungarian language may-on his or her request-be naturalized on preferential t e rms since 1 
January 2011. The changes compared to the previous version of the Act are that the criteria 
of assured livelihood and permanent residence in Hungary as well as the requirement of an 
exam in basic constitutional studies have been waived. 
The main purpose of the broad wording of the phrase "whose ascendant was a 
Hungarian citizen, or who demonstrates the plausibility of his or her descent from Hungary" 
is to enable Hungarians and their descendants living in territories detached during the 20th 
century to acquire Hungarian citizenship. In addition, that wording also embraces those, 
who emigrated in the meantime and lost their citizenship. 
The first significant group of Hungarians living outside the borders emerged in the 
wake of the Peace Treaty of Trianon of 1920.3 In the course of territorial revisions between 
1938 and 1941, a number of Hungarians received back their Hungarian citizenship.4 
However, at the end of the Second World War, Para. 2 of the Armistice Agreement of 19453 
stipulated that the borders of Hungary must be re-established in line with their status as of 
31 December 1937, and any acts and administrative decisions relating to the territorial 
revisions must be terminated.6 Hence, from among the persons, who acquired Hungarian 
view of domestic law, the term "citizenship" is mainly used as a notion of domestic law. See Koessler, 
M.: "Subject," "Citizen," "National," and "Permanent Allegiance". The Yale Law Journal, 56 ( 1946— 
1947), 62-63. "Nationality" primarily means the belonging of an individual to a state irrespective of 
citizenship rights and obligations. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874); Romano v. Comma, 
(Egyptian Mixed Court of Appeal), 12 May, 1925. Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 
1925-1926. Case No. 195., 265. For analyses focusing on nationality in international law, it is the 
bond between the individual and the state that has significance; the existence of rights and obligations 
is irrelevant. Consequently, the term "nationality" has to be used in international law. 
3
 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary. Trianon, 4 June 
1920. Entry into force: 31 July 1921. Arts 61-66. 
4
 Arbitral award establishing the Czechoslovak-Hungarian boundary, Vienna, 2 November 
1938. Annex, Para. 4. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXVIII. 405. Agreement between 
the Kingdom of Hungary and the Republic of Czechoslovakia on regulation on citizenship according 
to arbitral award in Vienna on 2 November 1938, Budapest, 18 February, 1939. For more details 
concerning the arbitral award see Kovács, P.: A propos du chemin vers l'arbitrage de Vienne de 1938. 
In: Kovács, P. (ed.): International Law-A Quiet Strength. Le droit international, une force tranquille 
(Miscellanea in memóriám Géza Herczegh). Budapest, 2011. 31-70. Between 15 and 18 March 1939, 
the Hungarian army invaded the territory of Sub-Carpathia. The ensuing questions of nationality were 
regulated in Hungarian domestic law by Section 5 of Act No. VI of 1939. Award relating to the 
Territory ceded by Romania to Hungary, 30 August 1940. Paras 3-4. Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, Vol. XXVIII. 410. Certain elements of the Second Vienna Arbitral Award became part of 
Hungarian domestic law by way of Section 4 of Act No. XXV of 1940. Territories of the South were 
re-annexed after the invasion of the Hungarian army on 11 April 1941. The ensuing questions of 
nationality were regulated in Hungarian domestic law by Section 4 of Act No. XX of 1941. 
5
 Agreement concerning an armistice between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on one hand 
and Hungary on the other. Moscow, 20 January 1945. Entry into force: 20 January 1945. 
6
 Decree No. 526/1945. M. E. executed the Para. 2 of the Armistice Agreement by stating the 
repealing Acts relating to territorial changes after 1937. 
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nationality in the course of territorial revisions, only those could retain it, who had 
transferred their permanent residence into the territory of the state as of 31 December 193 7.7  
Even though the amendment had a primarily symbolic purpose by granting citizenship 
to Hungarians, who or whose ascendants lost their Hungarian citizenship in consequence of 
historic events and hitherto could not retrieve it for lack of residency in Hungary, this 
measure and the reactions of neighbouring states have raised several questions of 
international law. 
II. Prohibition or Recognition of Dual Nationality 
In accordance with the amendment Hungarians living outside the borders can acquire a 
second nationality in addition to their existing one, and as such become dual nationals 
provided that the state of their former nationality recognises dual or multiple nationality 
(hereinafter: dual nationality). The international community is divided on this matter: a 
number of the states recognise dual nationality, while others refuse it. 
1. Prohibition or Recognition of Dual Nationality in International Law 
It is generally accepted that matters on nationality-as derived from the sovereignty of 
states-fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states, and form part of domaine réservé.* 
Domaine réservé includes matters in which states enjoy absolute and unrestricted discretion. 
The determination of conditions of the granting and loss of nationality as well as the 
prohibition or recognition of dual nationality also count among these matters. However, the 
discretion of states likewise includes the undertaking of international obligations concerning 
these matters, whereby states may establish limits on their own.9 The undertaking of an 
international obligation "places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the 
[sjtate",10 but limits cannot be presumed in the lack of will of the state." Therefore, the 
sovereignty of states and the limits of international law on matters of nationality "are well 
7
 According to Section 1 of the Decree No. 5.070/1945. M. E., individuals, who acquired 
Hungarian citizenship on the basis of the repealed Acts, but their permanent residency was in the 
territory of Hungary as of 31 December 1937 at the time of entry into force of the Decree, that is on 
21 July 1945, could remain Hungarian citizens. 
8
 See the opposite opinion of Hans Kelsen: "[Tjhere are no matters which [...] are 'solely' [...] 
[orj 'essentially' within the domestic jurisdiction of a state" as long as any matter "acquisition or loss 
of citizenship [...] may [also] be the object of an international agreement. The fact that these matters 
are, normally, not regulated by a rule of international law is no reason to assume that they are 
'essentially' within the domestic jurisdiction of the states." Kelsen, H.: The Law of the United Nations. 
A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems. London, 1951. lib. 
9
 See the opposite opinion of Hans Kelsen: "Although the individual states remain competent, 
in principle (even under international law) to regulate everything, they retain their competence only 
so far as international law does not regulate a subject matter and thereby withdraws it from free 
regulation by national law. Under the assumption of international law as a supranational legal order, 
the national legal order, then, has no longer an illimitable competence (Kompetenzhoheit)." Kelsen, 
H.: Pure Theory of Law. Clark, 2005. 338. 
10
 The S.S. Wimbledon (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Poland v. Germany), Permanent 
Court of International Justice, Judgment of 17 August 1923. P.C.I. J. Series A, No. 1, 25. 
11
 The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment of 7 
September 1927. P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 10, 18. 
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compatible".12 The prohibition or recognition of dual nationality is governed by international 
law to such extent only as the state concerned undertakes international obligations pertaining 
to that matter. 
The practice of states concerning dual nationality can be easily ascertained from their 
domestic legal regulations and international obligations. Since Hungarians living outside 
the borders are nationals of neighbouring states, their dual nationality depends on the 
attitude of neighbouring states. 
Notwithstanding that the idea of elimination of dual nationality appeared in the so-
called "Bancroft Treaties'"3 and in the Convention on certain questions relating to the 
conflict of nationality laws of 1930,14 the comprehensive regulation of dual nationality 
emerged at the beginning of the 1960s, when the main purpose of the international 
community was to unambiguously prohibit and abolish this phenomenon. The Convention 
on reduction of cases of multiple nationality and military obligations in cases of multiple 
nationality under the aegis of the Council of Europe was concluded in such an environment.15 
According to Art. 1 of that Convention, persons who acquire of their own free will the 
nationality of another state shall lose their former nationality, if both states are parties to the 
Convention. Since neither Hungary nor the neighbouring states-with the exception of 
Austria-are parties to that Convention, the above-mentioned provision is irrelevant. 
Concerning another problem arising from dual nationality, that is, the conflict of 
citizenship rights and obligations of different states, several bilateral agreements have been 
concluded, which adequately ensure the elimination of its negative consequences and 
guarantee the enjoyment of its positive features. Suffice it to mention the European 
Convention on Nationality of 1997l6-to which Hungary and the majority of neighbouring 
states (Austria, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine) are also parties. Given that Art. 17 of the 
Convention deals with the rights and duties related to multiple nationality, and it contains a 
separate chapter on military obligations in cases of multiple nationality,17 the rights and 
obligations of persons towards the states concerned can be easily distinguished.18 
12
 Triepel, H.: Internationale Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeit. Zeitschrift fúr ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1 (1929), 197. 
13
 The "Bancroft Treaties" were concluded by the United States and other states on naturalisation 
of each other's citizens in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
14
 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws. The Hague, 
12 April 1930. Entry into force: I July 1937. Preamble, Art. 12. 
15
 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in 
Cases of Multiple Nationality. Strasbourg, 6 May 1963. Entry into force: 28 March 1968. 
16
 European Convention on Nationality. Strasbourg, 6 November 1997. Entry into force: 1 
March 2000. 
17
 Ibid. Chapter VII. 
18
 It should be emphasised that Slovakia made the following reservation to Art. 22 on exemption 
from military obligations or alternative civil service: "According to Art. 22, paragraph b, the Slovak 
Republic declares that persons who are nationals of a State Party which does not require obligatory 
military service and who are equally nationals of the Slovak Republic shall be considered as having 
satisfied their military obligations when they have their habitual residence in the territory of the 
Slovak Republic." According to this reservation, Slovakia recognises military service in other states 
depending on the habitual residence in Slovakia-and not depending on the habitual residence in the 
territory of the state concerned as stated in Art. 22(b)-even if the military service is not obligatory. 
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2. The Practice of Neighbouring States Concerning Dual Nationality 
Romania and Hungary concluded an agreement on the elimination of dual nationality in 
1979,19 in line with the contemporaneous practice of socialist states,20 but it was terminated 
in 1990. Currently Romania can be ranked among those states, which recognise dual 
nationality principally on the basis of the Citizenship Act of 1991.21 Romanians, who keep 
their residency abroad, may acquire citizenship similarly to the Hungarian regulation. The 
main purpose of this rule is to promote the gaining of dual citizenship for Romanians living 
in Moldova. Constitution of Romania refers the regulation of nationality to the Citizenship 
Act, as an organic law,22 which does not consider the acquisition of another nationality as a 
ground for the loss of Romanian nationality.23 Consequently there is no rule in Romania on 
the prohibition of dual nationality, and Hungarians living in Romania can become dual 
nationals after requesting Hungarian nationality. 
Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia recognise dual nationality and allow the acquisition of 
another nationality for those living outside the borders similarly to the Hungarian and 
Romanian regulations. The Serbian Citizenship Act of 200424 does not mention the 
elimination of dual nationality; what is more, it offers the acquisition of nationality for 
Serbs living abroad. Since the domestic legal regulation of Serbia is similar to rules of the 
Hungarian Citizenship Act, Serbia obviously does not oppose it. The same holds true for 
the Croatian Citizenship Act of 1991, which likewise allows the acquisition of citizenship 
by Croats even without a domicile in Croatia.25 The Slovenian Citizenship Act of 199126  
and the Act concerning the Settlement of the Status of Citizens of Other SFRY Successor 
States in the Republic of Slovenia of 199927 recognise dual nationality, as well. 
Contrary to the above-mentioned states, Ukraine unambiguously prohibits dual 
nationality; consequently Hungarians living in Ukraine lose their Ukrainian nationality 
upon the acquisition of Hungarian nationality. In addition to the Constitution of Ukraine,28 
the Citizenship Act of 200129 also states that the state recognizes only one citizenship per 
person; therefore in case someone gains another citizenship he or she will automatically 
lose his or her Ukrainian citizenship. 
19
 Agreement between People's Republic of Hungary and Socialist Republic of Romania on 
Solution and Prevention of Cases of Dual Nationality. Bucharest, 13 July 1979. Entry into force: 10 
February 1980. The Law regarding Romanian Citizenship No. 21 of 1 March 1991. 
20
 Hungary concluded such agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic 
Republic, Mongolia, Poland and the Soviet Union, between 1958 and 1981. All of them were 
terminated between 1990 and 1994 for different reasons. See Ugróczky, M.: Az állampolgárság 
szabályozása Európában (Regulation of Nationality in Europe). Acta Humana, 10 (1999) 37-38, 63. 
21
 Law No. 21 of 1991 regarding Romanian Citizenship, Art. 11. 
22
 Constitution of Romania, Art. 5. 
23
 Law No. 21 of 1991 regarding Romanian Citizenship, Chapter 5 on losing Romanian 
citizenship. 
24
 Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia of 2004. 
25
 Act on Croatian Citizenship of 1991, Arts 11 and 16. 
26
 Citizenship Act of the Republic of Slovenia of 1991. 
27
 The settling of the status of citizens of other SFRY Successor States in The Republic of 
Slovenia Act No. 61/99 of 1999. 
28
 Constitution of Ukraine, Art. 4. 
29
 Law on Citizenship of Ukraine of 2001, Art. 2. 
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Austria also belongs to the group of states, which refuses dual nationality.30 This 
statement is well illustrated by the fact that from among the neighbouring states Austria is 
the sole party to the Convention on reduction of cases of multiple nationality and military 
obligations in cases of multiple nationality of 1963. According to the Federal Law 
concerning Austrian Nationality of 1985,31 a person, who acquires a foreign nationality 
upon his application, his or her declaration or express consent brings about the loss of 
Austrian nationality, unless he or she was not previously granted the right to retain that 
nationality. Therefore, a person will lose his or her Austrian nationality in consequence of 
acquiring Hungarian nationality, unless he or she was not permitted to retain it. 
Slovakia is the only country that responded to the Hungarian amendment by legal 
means. According to the rapidly passed amendment to the Slovak Citizenship Act,32 which 
entered into force on 17 July 2010, persons automatically lose their Slovak citizenship, who 
voluntarily acquire another nationality, with the exception of those, who gain it through 
birth or marriage. In this manner, with a view to avoid the dual nationality of persons 
belonging to the Hungarian minority, Slovakia abandoned her former practice, according to 
which dual nationality was recognised and accepted. 
Until 2010, pursuant to the Slovak Citizenship Act,33 Slovak citizenship could only be 
lost upon an explicit personal request for release from the state bond. There existed no 
regulation concerning the loss of citizenship of dual citizens; moreover several conditions 
were required for the elimination of the bond of citizenship. Besides, Slovakia, a member 
state of the Council of Europe, is not a party to the above-mentioned Convention of 1963. 
It is worth noting that a bilateral agreement was concluded by Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary in 1960, according to which persons possessing the nationality of both states had 
to make a choice and decide which nationality they wish to retain. Following the dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia in 1992, the two states should have had to demonstrate that they regarded 
the treaty as effective in order to keep it in force. Hungary did not make a statement on this 
matter; what is more, the act that promulgated the treaty was revoked. Slovakia also should 
have made a notification of succession regarding the agreement, but it did not come to pass 
according to the available and conflicting pieces of information. It appears, therefore, that 
Slovakia has changed her former practice and joined the group of states, which refuse dual 
nationality. 
The overview of domestic regulations and international obligations of neighbouring 
states reveals that Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia recognise dual nationality, 
whereas Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine prohibit it. Hungarians living in the latter three 
states will lose their nationality, if they voluntarily acquire Hungarian nationality on the 
basis of the amendment of the Hungarian Citizenship Act. 
30
 It is worth mentioning Decision No. 1217/В/1991. of the Constitutional Court at this point. In 
that case, the applicant presented that the precondition of acquisition of Austrian nationality by way of 
naturalisation was the loss of his former Hungarian nationality. 
31
 Federal Law concerning Austrian Nationality of 1985, Art. 27( 1 ). 
32
 Law of Slovak National Council of 19th January 1993 regarding Citizenship of Slovak 
Nationality. 
33
 Ibid. Art. 9. 
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III. Human Rights Obligations of States Concerning Nationality 
Human rights obligations of states limiting the regulation of acquisition and loss of 
nationality in domestic law, such as the respect for the right to a nationality, the prohibition 
of (arbitrary) deprivation of nationality and the prohibition of discrimination, need to be 
examined, as well. The relationship of human rights and the domaine réservé of states can 
be illustrated, inter alia, by General Assembly Resolution 36/103 of 9 September 1981,34  
which-unlike the previous resolutions concerning the inadmissibility of interventions-
referred to the respect for human rights in the following manner: 
"The duty of a State to refrain from the exploitation and the distortion of human rights 
issues as a means of interference in the internal affairs of States [...]."36 
Five years later, the International Court of Justice also made a remarkable 
pronouncement in the Nicaragua Case, stressing that "the use of force could not be the 
appropriate method to monitor or ensure [the] respect [for human rights] [...]."37 It may 
readily be inferred from these statements that human rights issues have already left the 
realm of domaine reserve by the 1980s. This conclusion can also be substantiated by an 
important resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law during its session in 
Santiago de Compostela in 1989, which holds that in case of a breach of human rights 
obligations, states cannot evade responsibility by claiming that the matter pertains 
essentially to the reserved domain.38 In other words, states "may no longer invoke the 
inviolability of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in case they are being 
34
 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States. G.A. Res. 36/103, 91st plen. mtg., 9 December 1981, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103. 
35
 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty. G.A. Res. 2131, 1408th plen. mtg., 21 December 
1965, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2141; Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. G.A. 
Res. 2625, 1883rd plen. mtg., 24 October 1970, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625, Annex; Declaration on the 
Strengthening of International Security. G.A. Res. 2734, 1932nd plen. mtg., 16 December 1970, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2734; Non-interference in the international affairs of States. G.A. Res. 31/91, 98th plen. 
mtg., 14 December 1976, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/91; Non-interference in the international affairs of 
States. G.A. Res. 32/153, 106th plen. mtg., 19 December 1977, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/153; Non-
interference in the international affairs of States. G.A. Res. 33/74, 85th plen. mtg., 15 December 1978, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/74; Non-interference in the international affairs of States. G.A. Res. 34/101, 
103rd plen. mtg., 14 December 1979, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/101; Non-interference in the international 
affairs of States. G.A. Res. 35/159, 94th plen. mtg., 12 December 1980, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/159. 
36
 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States. G.A. Res. 36/103, 91st plen. mtg., 9 December 1981, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103, Annex, para 
2.(11)0). 
37
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States of America), International Court of Justice, Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986. I.C.J. 
Reports 1986. (para 268.) 134. 
38
 Institut de Droit International, La protection des droits de l'homme et le principe de non-
intervention dans les affaires intérieures des Etats. Session de Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle, 1989. 
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criticized for serious breaches of human rights."39 For these reasons, the removal of human 
rights issues from the domaine réservé of states thrusts the regulation of nationality in 
certain cases all the more into the realm of international law. 
I. Right to a Nationality and Prohibition of Deprivation of Nationality 
In recent times, states that refuse dual nationality are occasionally criticised on the basis of 
the prohibition of deprivation of nationality. The case of losing nationality as a consequence 
of the acquisition of Hungarian nationality needs to be analysed from the point of view of 
its conformity with international law. 
Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine are equally obliged by international instruments, which 
contain the prohibition of deprivation of nationality. Such instruments include the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,40 and the European Convention on Nationality of 
1997. 
The provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "[e] 
veryone has a right to a nationality",41 was subsequently taken over by the European 
Convention of Nationality.42 The records of debates that took place during the drafting of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights suggest that the purpose of this provision was 
to ensure protection against statelessness,43 but the obscure phrasing leaves room for 
divergent interpretations. The indefinite article "a" before the expression "nationality" is 
similar to the numeral "one" in certain languages-for example, "гше" in French stands for 
either an indefinite article or a numeral.44 Consequently, an absurd theory emerged, 
according to which the right to a nationality actually means the right to one nationality,45 
and serves as a means to eliminate dual nationality. Due to the fact that the purpose of 
regulation was undoubtedly to eliminate statelessness, neither a human right of dual 
nationality,46 nor a prohibition of dual nationality can be deduced from the provision under 
consideration. 
According to the generally accepted view, the right to a nationality includes the right 
to acquisition and retention of nationality.47 Notwithstanding that scholarly opinions 
39
 Sulyok, G.: 2. § [Függetlenség] (2. § [Independence]). In: Jakab, A. (ed.): Az Alkotmány 
kommentárja I. (Commentary of the Constitution I.). Budapest, 2009. 141. 
40
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, 183rd plen. mtg., 10 December 
1948. U.N. Doc. A/RES/217A (III). As generally known, the Declaration is a resolution adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly. Even though the resolutions of that organ are not legally 
binding, the Declaration have become binding as customary international law. 
41
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 15(1). 
42
 European Convention on Nationality, Art. 4(a). 
43
 Verdoodt, A.: Naissance et signification de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme. 
Louvain, 1964. 156-161. 
44
 Real content of the paragraph is expressed exactly by the expression "valamely" in Hungarian 
translation. 
45
 Griffin, W. L.: The Right to a Single Nationality. Temple Law Quarterly, 40 (1966-1967), 
57-64. 
46
 Spiro, P. J.: Dual citizenship as human right. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 8 
(2010) 1, 111-130. 
47
 Chan, J. M. M.: The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right. The Current Trend Towards 
Recognition. Human Rights Law Journal, 12 (1991) 1-2, 3. 
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significantly differ concerning the right to change nationality as that particular right is 
related to the disposition of nationality rather than to the elimination of statelessness. 
The prohibition of deprivation of nationality cannot be directly deduced from the right 
to a nationality, albeit it is closely linked thereto, and as such, it generally follows the right 
to a nationality in international instruments. The epithets "arbitrary" and "unlawfully" are 
frequently attached as attributes to the prohibition of deprivation, but their interpretation 
gives rise to heated debates. "Arbitrary" as an attribute is used by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the European Convention on Nationality, while "unlawful" appears 
alongside "arbitrary" in the Convention on the Rights of Child of 1989. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality without offering a definition of arbitrariness. If the right to a 
nationality is considered as a fundamental human right, any deprivation of nationality that 
results in statelessness can be labelled as "arbitrary" as it would be blatantly incompatible 
with the purposes of the Declaration. It should be added that the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness of 1961 stipulates that states shall not deprive a person of his or 
her nationality, if such deprivation would render him or her stateless. The text of the 
prohibition, however, does not contain any epithets. 
Consequently, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality does not cover 
dual or multiple nationals, who will possess at least one nationality after losing a nationality 
through deprivation. This can be illustrated by Art. 7 the European Convention of 
Nationality that, in addition to the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality in Art. 
4(c), permits states to provide for the loss of nationality in their domestic enactments either 
ex lege, or at the initiative of the state, in case a person voluntarily acquires another 
nationality.48 In addition, the Explanatory Report to the European Convention on 
Nationality49 gives indications concerning the prevention of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality. As regards the substantive grounds, "the deprivation must in general be 
foreseeable, proportional and prescribed by law".50 A deprivation is also arbitrary, if it is 
based on any of the grounds contained in Art. 5(1) on the prohibition of discrimination. The 
Explanatory Report refers to Art. 7 for an exhaustive list of grounds for deprivation, which 
likewise proves that an ex lege loss of nationality in consequence of a voluntary acquisition 
of another nationality cannot be deemed arbitrary.51 
The prohibition of denying the right to change nationality in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights entails the prohibition of deprivation of both the renunciation of 
nationality and the acquisition of another nationality. It cannot be construed, however, as a 
prohibition of deprivation of and a right to retain the former nationality, since the expression 
"change" suggests the loss of that nationality. 
In sum, the regulation of certain states, according to which persons lose their nationality 
in consequence of the acquisition of another nationality, is in conformity with international 
law. The loss of former nationality in Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine cannot be evaluated as 
an arbitrary deprivation of nationality. 
48
 European Convention on Nationality, Art. 7(1 )(a). 
49
 Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality. Available at <http:// 
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/reports/html/166.htm> (26 March 2012). 
50
 Ibid, para 36. 
51
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These regulations should be analysed not only in the context of international law, but 
also in the context of domestic law. In particular, the harmony of the Constitution of 
Slovakia and the amendment of the Citizenship Act calls for thorough examination. 
According to the Constitution "[n]o one shall be deprived of citizenship of the Slovak 
Republic against his or her will".52 This provision begs the question: Can a request for 
Hungarian nationality be regarded as an intention of the person to give up his or her Slovak 
nationality? It can reasonably be argued that a request by a person for another nationality 
cannot be interpreted as a loss of nationality on his or her own will, even if he or she is 
aware of the consequences of that action, namely the loss of Slovak nationality. The will of 
the person concerned only covers the acquisition of Hungarian nationality, from which the 
intention of losing Slovak nationality cannot be convincingly deduced. According to the 
Constitution, the Slovak nationality can only be lost by way of renunciation, but this case 
does not involve such a renunciation.53 The authoritative clarification of this issue is solely 
within the competence of the Constitutional Court of Slovakia. 
2. Prohibition of Discrimination 
A possible violation of the prohibition of discrimination may occur in Slovakia from among 
the neighbouring states. It is open to debate whether the Citizenship Act is discriminative as 
it recognises dual nationality in two cases: if the other nationality is acquired by birth or 
marriage. The European Convention on Nationality expressly mentions the recognition of 
dual nationality, if another nationality is automatically acquired by birth or marriage, thus 
the exceptions of the Act seem to be generally accepted at first glance. It is obvious that 
permitting a child to become a dual national at birth is not discriminative, since he or she 
acquires the other nationality automatically, rather than on request. However, in a case of 
marriage the situation is completely different, since the Act only recognises dual citizenship, 
if the Slovak citizen acquires another nationality in connection with a marriage with a 
foreign citizen, by the existence of that marriage. The legislator presumably had an 
automatic acquisition in mind, but the text does not reflect it unambiguously. Hence it seems 
that in cases of marriage both automatic acquisition and acquisition at request are allowed. 
If either party gains another nationality at request, discrimination between cases on facts 
may occur, because in this case the Slovak nationality can be retained, whereas in every 
other scenario the request of another nationality brings about the loss of Slovak nationality. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not explicitly mention the prohibition 
of discrimination in the context of nationality, but the rule that "everyone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, [...]" 
evidently encompasses the right to a nationality as provided for in Art. 15, as well.54 Thus 
52
 Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Art. 5(2). 
53
 Article 25 of the Citizenship Act of Germany is similar to the regulation of Slovakia, 
according to which "[a] German shall lose his citizenship upon the acquisition of a foreign citizenship 
where such acquisition results from his application [...]". Although this rule is in compliance with Art. 
16 of the Constitution of Germany, according to which "[n]o one may be deprived of his German 
citizenship. Loss of citizenship arises only pursuant to law, and against the will of the person affected 
only if such person does not thereby become stateless." 
54
 Article 2 of the Declaration reads as follows: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." 
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the Declaration prohibits every kind of discrimination regarding to the right to a nationality 
as well as to the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Furthermore, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights of 196655-to which Slovakia is also a party-demands equality 
before the law, the prohibition of discrimination on any grounds, and the granting to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination by the law. 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 195056 does not contain the right to a nationality, and provides for the 
prohibition of discrimination with regard to rights set forth in the Convention only. Even 
though the Protocol No. 12 to the Convention has since introduced a general prohibition of 
discrimination, Slovakia is not a party thereto.57 The European Court of Human Rights 
would have jurisdiction over related cases only, if Slovakia violated a right set forth in the 
Convention or any of its Protocols to which Slovakia is a party. For that reason, both of the 
above-mentioned European instruments are irrelevant. It does not change the fact, however, 
that Slovakia is obliged to eradicate all forms of discrimination under international law. 
IV. Elimination of Statelessness 
The notion of statelessness is not defined by any of the relevant international instruments. 
In theory, statelessness has two forms: de jure and de facto statelessness. Those persons are 
considered de jure stateless, who do not possess the nationality of any state. De facto 
stateless persons, on the other hand, do possess a nationality in a legal sense, but it is not 
real as the rights and obligations, which originate from that nationality, cannot be exercised 
and fulfilled for some reason. 
The international community has primarily focused on de jure statelessness, as states 
have erroneously believed that all de facto stateless persons were refugees. At the United 
Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, the 
participating states, in addition to the conclusion of the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness,58 adopted a number of resolutions, as well. One of these resolutions declared 
that "[t]he Conference recommends that persons who are stateless de facto should as far as 
possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality".59 
Naturally, this pronouncement was merely a recommendation for states and had no binding 
force whatsoever. 
It comes from the general purpose of the elimination of statelessness that states should 
endeavour to abolish both de jure and de facto statelessness. The purpose of the resolution 
quoted above is to avoid becoming de facto stateless and to achieve a real nationality, which 
can only be ensured by the state of nationality-consequently, this requirement should be 
fulfilled by Hungary. 
55
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966. Entry 
into force: 23 March 1976. 
56
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 
4 November 1950. Entry into force: 3 September 1953. 
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 Slovakia signed Protocol No. 12 on 4 November 2000, but has not ratified it yet. 
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 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, New York, 30 August 1961. 
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 United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 
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Subsequent to the loss of their previous nationality, Hungarians living outside the 
borders possess a nationality, which is, in principle, identical to that of Hungarians living in 
the territory of Hungary, but in absence of registered residency, employment and tax-paying, 
they are neither able to exercise several citizenship rights, nor receive a share from social 
benefits. Even so, they do not become de facto stateless, especially in the light of the right 
to vote as provided by the new Act on election of the members of Parliament.60 
V. Effectiveness of the New Hungarian Nationality 
The analysis of the lack of effectiveness of the nationality of Hungarians, who live outside 
the borders need to be distinguished from the analysis of de facto stateless status. De facto 
statelessness manifests itself as the inability of the individual to exercise rights and fulfil 
obligations of citizenship. The examination of effectiveness, however, focuses on factors 
other than citizenship rights and obligations, and concentrates on the genuine link between 
the person and the state.61 According to the judgment passed by the International Court of 
Justice in the Nottebohm Case in 1955, an effective nationality is "based on stronger factual 
ties" between the person concerned and the state. As stated by the judgment, a factor of 
utmost importance is "the habitual residence of the individual", "but there are other factors 
such as the centre of the [person's] interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, 
attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc."62 
In addition to the absence of effectiveness, individuals frequently lack citizenship 
rights and obligations, although it does not originate from the absence of effectiveness. 
Such coincidences typically result from the similar features of requirements formulated by 
states concerning the factors indicating the existence of effectiveness and the exercise and 
fulfilment of rights and duties of citizenship. 
Several individuals currently applying for citizenship have previously had Hungarian 
citizenship, and as such, some sort of link exists between them and Hungary, even though 
their permanent residence can be found elsewhere and they habitually live and work in 
another country, usually along with their families. The bond with Hungary is less genuine 
in case of those individuals, who were born and live in the territory of another state, barely 
speak Hungarian63 and acquire citizenship owing to their ascendants. The preferential 
naturalization does not require the passing of an exam in basic constitutional studies, but it 
is worth noting that this exam remains to be a criterion for other kinds of naturalisation in 
Hungary. Compared to the naturalisation of other persons habitually resident in Hungary, 
the legislator indeed set less stringent requirements for a preferential naturalisation. As a 
result, the nationality of Hungarians living outside the borders can hardly be considered 
effective, especially in light of the fact that it is acquired on the basis of the earlier 
60
 Act No. CCI 11 of 2011 on the Election of the Members of Parliament, Art. 12(3). 
61
 International Court of Justice, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, 
Judgment of 6 April 1955. I.C.J. Reports 1955. 23. 
62
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knowledge means that the person shall answer in Hungarian some questions regarding his data on the 
request form. 
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nationality of ascendants or the demonstration of the plausibility of Hungarian descent, and 
a sufficient knowledge of the Hungarian language. 
In 2004, in a decision concerning a referendum that, had it been successful, would 
have offered citizenship to Hungarians living outside the borders upon presenting "a proof 
of Hungarian nationality",64 the Constitutional Court failed to recognise an objection, which 
sought to draw attention to the lack of real and genuine link.65 Judge Kukorelli, however, 
correctly argued in his dissenting opinion that "a declaration on national status is inadequate 
to prove the existence the close, real (effective) link between the citizen and the state".66 In 
the present case, the link is closer, but it is hardly genuine. 
Bearing all that in mind, the potential consequences of lack of effectiveness on the side 
of the individual also need to be analysed. First of all, it should be emphasized that the 
norms of international law concerning nationality do not impose an obligation on states to 
grant citizenship to persons only in case a genuine link exists. The same applies, of course, 
to Hungary. Given the difficulties related to the determination of a genuine link, such a 
norm would allow states to arbitrarily interfere in matters of nationality, which form part of 
domaine réservé. The intentions of members of the international community do not point 
toward the framing of such rule. 
The academic debate continues on relationship of the principle of effectiveness and the 
diplomatic protection of individuals possessing one nationality-a topic that was discussed 
by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case. In case the principle exists in 
international law as a customary rule, its content is the following: if diplomatic protection is 
provided on the basis of an ineffective nationality, the other state has a right not to recognise 
that nationality. As a consequence of non-recognition, the nationality does not have an 
effect in the field of international law. 
As commonly known, there are two constitutive elements of customary international 
law: an objective criterion, the general practice of states, and a subjective criterion, the 
existence of opinio iuris sive necessitatis.61 When the above-mentioned judgment was 
passed, states applied principles in their nationality regulations, which established a genuine 
link between the individual and the state.68 It does not mean, however that their purpose 
was to create a genuine link in order to bring their regulations in conformity with the 
principle of effectiveness.69 The general practice of states concerning diplomatic protection 
did not put emphasis on the lack of genuine link either.70 In the Nottebohm Case, a reference 
can be found in the rejoinder submitted by Guatemala for the requirement of an effective 
64
 The term "nationality" was used in a historical-biological sense and not as a synonym of 
"citizenship". 
65
 Constitutional Court Decision No. 40/2004. paras I, 2, e) and III, 3. 
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 Ibid. Dissenting opinion of Judge István Kukorelli, para. 1. 
67
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68
 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Second Phase, 
Judgment of 6 April 1955. I.C.J. Reports 1955. 22. 
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 José Francisco Rezek also mentions that the accordance of domestic regulations is not 
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de la nationalité. Recueil des Cours, 197 (1986) II, 357. 
70
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link, but it was not supported by the prevailing state practice.71 According to the dominant 
view in contemporary literature, the rule based on the principle of effectiveness could not 
considered customary international law.72 Judges Klaestad, Guggenheim and Read voiced 
similar considerations in their dissenting opinions.73 
In sum, the Court accepted the arguments of Guatemala, and its decision was influenced 
by other principles.74 It based its judgment on considerations that were not reflected in the 
existing sources of international law, thereby taking a "hazardous course"75 of judicial 
legislation. Following the publication of the judgment the principle appeared to be 
noticeable approved,76 but later it was increasingly criticized. For instance, it was criticised 
that the question of effectiveness was determined on the basis o f subjective criteria,77 the 
vagueness of which could easily lead to arbitrary implementation.78 A few years after the 
judgment in the Nottebohm Case, further objections were raised against the principle of 
71
 Duplique présentée par le Gouvernement du Guatemala. 2 novembre 1954. Nottebohm Case 
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Second Phase, 511-512. In her counter-
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effectiveness in the Flegenheimer Case. The Italian-United States Conciliation Commission 
argued as follows: 
"[W]hen a person is vested with only one nationality, which is attributed to him or her 
either jure sanguinis or jure soli, or by a valid naturalization entailing the positive loss 
of the former nationality, the theory of effective nationality cannot be applied without 
the risk of causing confusion. It lacks a sufficiently positive basis to be applied to a 
nationality which finds support in a state law."79 
In a case analogous to the status of Hungarians living outside the borders, the 
Conciliation Commission denied that the principle of effectiveness may be applicable to 
individuals having only one nationality. One of the main arguments of the Commission was 
that an individual who, in the mobility of modem world, possesses the nationality of a state, 
but lives in another state, where he is domiciled with his family and where his working 
place is located, "would be exposed to non-recognition".80 
Nowadays even the binding nature of the principle of effectiveness is in the centre of 
academic debates. The alteration of the bond of nationality in the modem world obviously 
rules out the inclusion of the principle in an international treaty as well as its establishment 
as a rule of customary international law. In 2000, the International Law Commission held a 
similar view in a report on diplomatic protection: 
"The genuine link requirement proposed by Nottebohm seriously undermines the 
traditional doctrine of diplomatic protection if applied strictly, as it would exclude 
literally millions of persons from the benefit of diplomatic protection. In today's world 
of economic globalization and migration, there are millions of persons who have 
drifted away from their State of nationality and made their lives in States whose 
nationality they never acquire. Moreover, there are countless others who have acquired 
nationality by birth, descent or operation of law of States with which they have a most 
tenuous connection."81 
Following the survey of international treaties, in can be concluded that the principle of 
effectiveness has not been included in any agreement that could promote its consolidation. 
The analysis of the alleged customary nature of the principle also reveals that states do not 
refer to the principle of effectiveness as a basis of non-recognition of nationality.82 Hence 
neither of the elements of customary international law prevails. There is no relevant general 
79
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 First Report on Diplomatic Protection, by Mr. John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur. 
Document A/CN.4/506 and Add. 1. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. П. Part One, 
Documents of Fifty-Second Session. United Nations, New York-Geneva, 2009. 229. Report refers 
also Hailbronner, K.: Diplomatischer Schutz bei mehrfacher Staatangehörigkeit. In: Georg, R.-Stein, 
T. (eds): Der diplomatische Schutz im Völker- und Europarecht: Aktuelle Probleme und 
Entwicklungstendenzen. Baden-Baden, 1996. 36. 
82
 First Report on Diplomatie Protection, by Mr. John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur. 
Document A/CN.4/506 and Add.l. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II. Part One, 
Documents of Fifty-Second Session. United Nations, New York-Geneva, 2009. 229. 
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practice of states nowadays, which is also confirmed by the majority of scholars.83 In the 
lack of general practice, however, the other element of customary international law, the 
opinio iuris sive necessitatis, cannot even come into existence. For these reasons, the 
principle of effectiveness may not serve as a basis for other states to declare a non-
recognition of nationality of individuals, who possess only one nationality. 
The diplomatic protection of dual nationals vis-à-vis to third states is analogous to the 
above-mentioned scenario. Similarly to the situation of individuals, who possess only one 
nationality, the third state may not refer to a lack of effectiveness of nationality of dual 
nationals in order to substantiate its claim of non-recognition of nationality. Therefore, 
diplomatic protection can be provided for dual nationals against third states even on the 
basis of an ineffective nationality.84 
The lack of effectiveness may give rise to problems in one case though-if diplomatic 
protection is provided to a dual national by one state of nationality against the other. Suffice 
it to recall Art. 7 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, which is considered by the 
International Law Commission as a rule of customary nature.85 That article reads as follows: 
"A State of nationality may not exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person 
against a State of which that person is also a national unless the nationality of the 
former State is predominant [,..]."86 
In other words, the claimant state may prove that its nationality is predominant, and as 
such, it can provide diplomatic protection against the other state of nationality. Interestingly 
enough, a non-recognition of predominance may even impinge on an effective nationality, 
because there are exceptional cases, in which both nationalities may be regarded as 
effective. The lack of predominance does not necessarily follow a lack of effectiveness, but 
an ineffective nationality is most likely to serve as a basis for the other state of nationality 
to prove its predominance. 
The establishment of this rule may result in exceptional situations, in which another 
state may exercise diplomatic protection against Hungary in respect of Hungarians living 
83
 Geek, W. K.: Diplomatic Protection. In: Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Vol. I. Aaland Islands to Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944). Amsterdam-
London-New York-Tokyo, 1992. 1050; Randelzhofer, A.: Nationality. In: Bernhardt, R. (ed.): 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Vol. 8. Human Rights and the Individual in International 
Law, International Economic Relations. New York-London, 1982. 421M22; Sloane, R. D.: Breaking 
the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of Nationality. Harvard 
International Law Journal, 50 (2009) 1, 29-37. 
84
 Article 6(1) of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection of International Law Commission 
also states that "|a]ny State of which a dual or multiple national is a national may exercise diplomatic 
protection in respect of that national against a State of which that person is not a national." 
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006. Art. 6. State practice 
appears to be uniform regarding this provision, hence the text of Art. 6(1) can be considered as a 
generally accepted norm. 
85
 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 
2006. 46. The first part of the sentence is a generally accepted norm of customary international law, 
but the exception appears to be a result of progressive development. 
86
 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006. Art. 7. 
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outside the borders and possessing the nationality of both states. Simply put, the other state 
of nationality may provide diplomatic protection against Hungary to a Hungarian national, 
which is hardly in interest of Hungary. 
VI. Obligations Assumed by Bilateral Agreements on Good Neighbourliness 
and Friendly Co-operation 
Bilateral basic treaties were concluded by Hungary and several neighbouring states, namely 
Croatia,87 Romania,88 Slovakia,89 Slovenia90 and Ukraine,91 between 1992 and 1996.92 In 
these treaties states undertook that they develop their relations in the spirit of good 
neighbourliness, confidence and friendly co-operation, and they establish an appropriate 
framework for co-operation and maintain a dialogue in all fields of mutual interest.93 
According to the obligations laid down these basic treaties, Hungary should have 
initiated negotiations prior to the amendment of the Citizenship Act. Matters of preferential 
naturalisation of Hungarians living in the neighbouring states and possessing the nationality 
thereof certainly constitute an area of mutual interest. Slovakia likewise should have 
negotiated with Hungary before its reaction to the Hungarian legislation with a view to base 
inter-state relations on good neighbourliness, confidence and friendly co-operation. 
In order to ensure and maintain friendly relations, the states concerned should co-
operate and consult in every field related to the preferential naturalisation of Hungarians 
living outside the borders. From the point of view of Hungary, an eventual amendment of 
the Citizenship Act or an expansion of citizenship rights by means of facilitating their 
exercise would undoubtedly call for consultations. Neighbouring states, on the other hand, 
which prohibit dual nationality, should also negotiate with Hungary concerning any future 
amendments of the legal consequences related to the loss of their nationality. 
87
 Agreement on Friendly Relations and Co-operation between the Republic of Croatia and the 
Republic of Hungary. Budapest, 16 December 1992. Entry into force: 21. December 1993. 
88
 Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Co-operation and 
Good Neighbourhood. Timisoara, 16 September 1996. Entry into force: 27 December 1996. 
89
 Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the Republic of 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic. Paris, 19 March 1995. Entry into force: 15 May 1996. 
90
 Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation between the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of 
Slovenia. Budapest, 1 December 1992. Entry into force: 4 March 1994. 
91
 Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Ukraine on the Foundations of Good 
Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation. Kiev, 6 December 1991. Entry into force: 16 June 1993. 
92
 In more details see Nagy, К.: Les règles de caractère soft law dans le traités bilatéraux de la 
Hongrie conclus sur la protection des minorités. In: Kovács, P. (ed.): Le droit international au 
tournant de millénaire-l 'approche Hongroise. International Law at the Turn of the Millennium-the 
Hungarian Approach. Budapest, 2000. 18-24. 
93
 Agreement on Friendly Relations and Co-operation between the Republic of Croatia and the 
Republic of Hungary, Arts 1, 8; Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on 
Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighbourhood, Arts 1, 5; Treaty on Good-Neighbourly 
Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic, Arts 
1, 5; Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation between the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of 
Slovenia, Arts 1, 7; Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Ukraine on the Foundations of Good 
Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation, Arts 1, 5. 
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Summary 
Matters on nationality fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states, and form part of 
domaine réservé, in which states enjoy absolute discretion. Given that the discretion of 
states encompasses the undertaking of international obligations concerning such matters, 
the international legal framework needs to be analysed, as well. 
Human rights obligations of states limit the domestic regulation of acquisition and loss 
of nationality in certain cases, particularly in view of the fact that the development of 
international law has led to the removal of human rights issues from the domaine réservé of 
states. Since the purpose of the right to a nationality was undoubtedly to eliminate 
statelessness, the phrase "[ejveryone has a right to a nationality" includes both the right to 
acquisition and retention of nationality. However, it can be construed neither as a human 
right of dual nationality nor as a prohibition of dual nationality. The prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality does not cover dual or multiple nationals, who still possess at 
least one nationality after the losing of a nationality by way of deprivation. Consequently, 
the regulation of certain states, according to which persons lose their nationality in the wake 
of the acquisition of another nationality, is in conformity with international law. In the 
neighbouring states, a possible violation of the prohibition of discrimination may occur in 
Slovakia only. Discrimination between cases on facts may occur as a result of marriage, 
when the Slovak nationality can be retained even if the individual acquires another 
nationality at his or her request. 
The purpose of the Hungarian amendment was primarily to provide a symbolic 
Hungarian nationality for ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders. Even so the lack of 
effectiveness may give rise to problems. It is unquestionable that non-resident Hungarians 
acquire an ineffective nationality, and Hungary is not obliged by international law to grant 
an effective nationality. Since the principle of effectiveness does not have customary nature 
in international law, Hungary may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of individuals 
possessing either one or dual nationality, but in the latter case she may do so against third 
states only. Problems may arise in a case of diplomatic protection of dual nationals between 
the respective states of nationality. A possible consequence of the lack of effectiveness of 
nationality of Hungarians living outside the borders may be that Hungary cannot exercise 
diplomatic protection in respect of them. The other state of nationality, however, can 
exercise diplomatic protection in respect of Hungarian nationals against Hungary. The 
nationality of an individual needs to be further analysed if he or she becomes an effective 
national owing to a permanent residency or a working place in Hungary, which ends his or 
her de facto stateless status. 
The initiation of meaningful negotiations and the promotion of a constructive co-
operation, as envisaged by the bilateral basic treaties, would be essential for the development 
of inter-state relations and for the protection of individuals, who have or will become 
Hungarian nationals. Without dialogue and conciliation in this field, only the emergence of 
further problems appears certain. 
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Sustainable Development and Common Commercial Policy 
I. Introduction 
The Treaty of Lisbon has essentially restructured the legal framework of the EU's external 
relations. The three-pillar system introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht has been integrated, 
and this unified model of the European Union made it possible to determine the Union's 
objectives and principles in the field of foreign actions in a uniform way. This meant at the 
level of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), that the general objectives and principles 
of the EU external relations' must be taken into consideration in the area of trade policy as 
well. Consequently the Union has to take into account not only of trade liberalisation ideas, 
but principles outside the conventional trade policy which include the objectives of 
sustainable development and environmental protection, too. 
Because of these major modifications, the question arises, how the relationship of the 
principles of CCP to the sustainable development and environmental policy can be 
described. Tension between these two policy areas is understandable, because many 
environmental problems are related to the growing scale of global trade activity. 
Consequently real problem is in fact whether the sustainability2 as a principle of the EU's 
external relations can put a restriction on the CCP which is governed predominantly by free 
trade objectives. 
To examine these issues in more detail, the first part of the article gives a general 
overview of the position of sustainable development principle in EU law as well as EU 
external relations (II. Sustainable development and EU external relations), after that the 
second main part focuses on the relationship between the sustainable development and the 
principles of the Common Commercial Policy in the light of the new structure of principles 
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 The terms "sustainability" and "sustainable development" have common roots, but the 
"sustainability" may be used in reference to an objective or aim. On the other hand "sustainable 
development" is a process itself which can lead to "sustainability". This article may apply these terms 
in similar meaning. For detailed analysis of the terminology, see Voigt, Ch.: Sustainable Development 
as a Principle of International Law. Leiden, 2009. and Schwarz, P.: Sustainable Development in 
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and objectives laid down by the Treaty of Lisbon (III. Principles and objectives of the 
Common Commercial Policy). Finally, the article is closed by concluding remarks (IV. 
Conclusions) 
II. Sustainable development and EU external relations 
1. Sustainable Development in the Founding Treaties 
The following analysis does not attempt to add anything to the extent and meaning of 
sustainable development, but it is essential to determine the appropriate term which is 
connected to the objectives and principles of the Union's founding treaties. 
As a matter of fact, the first reference in this regard should be the definition made by 
the World Commission on Environment and Development since it had a considerable 
influence also on the later EC formulations. The Brundtland Commission introduced in its 
report "Our Common Future" the term "sustainable development". According to the oft-
quoted definition "sustainable development" is a progress "that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."3 It 
is commonly known fact that also the definition of report regarded the "sustainable 
development" as a complex phenomenon, since it referred also to the social, economic and 
environmental aspects of sustainable development4 expressly emphasising the struggle 
against poverty.5 Besides, the Brundtland Commission's term was an ethical tenet rather 
than a legal norm. This ethic was trans-border extended to all peoples; consequently it 
established a global ethical stance in relation to the global environmental problems. 
Moreover, this definition was a trans-temporal ethical principle knowing that it was 
extended across generations.6 
The international debate on this issue and the preparation of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio in 1992 affected also 
the EC legislation; as a result, the Maastricht Treaty ( 1992)7 introduced a term corresponding 
to "Sustainable Development" at the level of general objectives of the Community. The 
original EEC Treaty of 1957 specified that the Community has to promote "a harmonious 
3
 Our Common Future. From One Earth to One World. Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development. Parag. 27. <http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-ov.htm#I.3> 
(20.09.2012). 
4
 Ibid. "(...) The concept of sustainable development does imply limits - not absolute limits but 
limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on environmental 
resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. But technology 
and social organization can be both managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic 
growth. (...)". 
5
 Ibid. "(...) Poverty is not only an evil in itself, but sustainable development requires meeting 
the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a better life. A 
world in which poverty is endemic will always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes (...)". 
6
 Hill, A. K. G.: Sustainable Development-An Ethical Construct in Search of a Multilateral 
Expression. BRIDGES between Trade and Sustainable Development, 5. (2001) 8, 13. 
7
 See more detailed about sustainable development in Maastricht Treaty: von Moltke, Konrad: 
The Maastricht Treaty and the Winnipeg Principles on Trade and Sustainable Development. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1995. 
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development of economic activities (...)"8 which was modified to the formula "harmonious 
and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth 
respecting the environment".9 The Member States tried to avoid an obvious statement on 
"sustainable development" but the term "sustainable growth" with the emphasis of "respect 
for the environment" as well as the "balanced development" was a clear signal of a 
commitment to the sustainable development. Moreover, also the Treaty on European Union 
defines the objectives for the Union which included a quotation on "sustainable economic 
progress", a synonym of the "sustainable development".10 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was not so modest as to hide the real term of 
"sustainable development". Accordingly the modified Treaty on European Union ensured 
the aim of the Member States to promote "economic and social progress for their peoples, 
taking into account the principle of sustainable development (. . .)"" and specified as an 
objective that the Union has to encourage "economic and social progress and a high level of 
employment and to achieve balanced and sustainable development (...)."12 The Treaty 
establishing the European Community was amended with a similar reference to the 
"balanced and sustainable development of economic activities", meanwhile also "sustainable 
growth" remained an objective of the Community.13 In addition the most noteworthy feature 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam was the inclusion of principle of integration as an overarching 
objective of Community policies. In terms of that, the Community was obliged to integrate 
environmental concerns into the implementation ot policies with specific regard to 
promoting sustainable development.14 The Treaty of Nice has not modified these clauses. 
As the previous outline shows, the sustainable development is regulated in the primary 
sources of EU as significant objective and as a principle as well. The strongest ties were 
established between the sustainable development and external policies, specifically the 
Common Commercial Policy as a result of the principle of integration of environmental 
concerns. Accordingly the European Union mainstreamed sustainable development into 
different policy areas including also the diverse international trade relations of the Union. 
2. The impact of Sustainable Development principle on the Functioning of EU external 
relations 
However, doubts were expressed about the binding of these formulations, the inclusion of 
references to the sustainable development in the Treaties obviously had favourable effects 
on the EU's strategic decision-making mechanism. 
8
 Treaty Establishing the European Community (EEC Treaty) Art. 2. 
9
 EEC Treaty Art. 2 (emphasis added). 
10
 Treaty on European Union (as laid down by the Maastricht Treaty), Art. 3b. 
11
 See Preamble of Treaty on European Union (as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty), seventh 
recital. 
12
 Treaty on European Union (as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty), Art. В (emphasis added). 
13
 Treaty establishing the European Community (as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty), Art. 2 
(emphasis added). 
14
 Treaty establishing the European Community (as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty), Art. 6: 
"Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of 
the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development." 
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Following that the European Commission made a proposal to establish an ambitious 
sustainable development strategy of the EU which was launched by the Member States at 
the Gothenburg Summit in 2001. The strategy was complementary to the Lisbon Strategy of 
economic and social renewal, adding a new, environmental dimension to that. The strategy 
proposed policy measures to overcome several unsustainable trends and set up a so-called 
new approach to policy-making which attempted to effectuate that the environmental, 
economic and social policies of EU mutually reinforced each other. In order to achieve this 
purpose the European Commission was obliged to submit new policy proposals to impact 
assessment.15 
The European Council renewed the sustainable development strategy in 2005 which 
set out main objectives and actions for priority-mainly environmental-areas.16 Besides in 
2009, in the same year when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the European 
Commission adopted a review of the EU's sustainable strategy and confirmed that 
Sustainable development remains a fundamental objective of the European Union under the 
Lisbon Treaty, but a number of unsustainable trends required urgent actions. In this regard, 
the review emphasised the need to additional efforts in the field of climate change policy, 
energy policy and biodiversity. 
Following the EU strategic decisions making processes two concrete consequences 
can be highlighted from the perspective of the external policies. First, resulted from the 
sustainable development strategy, the Commission agreed to a policy framework for the 
external dimension of these questions,17 and later the Council adopted a strategy on 
environmental integration in the external policies.18 The strategy "Towards a global 
partnership for sustainable development" contextualised the sustainable development and 
took into consideration the position of the developing countries and the globalisation. In 
terms of the strategy, the priority objective of the EU was to ensure the contribution of the 
globalisation to sustainable development. To that end, the EU had to ensure that the 
developing countries are integrated equitably into the world economy as well as help them 
to gather the benefits of trade and investment liberalisation processes. Besides, the EU had 
to provide, within the framework of the external policies, incentives for environmentally 
and socially sustainable production and trade, and strengthen the international financial and 
monetary architecture and promote better and more transparent forms of financial market 
regulation to reduce global financial volatility and abuses of the system.19 The sustainable 
management of natural and environmental resources was also a substantive priority of the 
strategy which covered also an ambitious aim to reverse effectively the current trends in the 
loss of environmental resources at national and global levels by 2015. The strategy also laid 
15
 A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable 
Development. (15.5.2001). COM(2001) 264 final. 
16
 Climate change and clean energy; sustainable transport, sustainable consumption & 
production; conservation and management of natural resources; public health; social inclusion; 
demography and migration; global poverty and sustainable development challenges. See Review of 
the Sustainable Development Strategy-A platform for action. (13.12.2005), COM (2005) 658 final. 
17
 Koutrakos, P.: Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU External Relations. In: 
Cremona, M.-de Witte, В. (eds): EU Foreign Relations Law. Constitutional Fundamentals. 2008. 76. 
18
 Towards a global partnership for sustainable development ( 13.2.2002), COM(2002) 82 final. 
19
 Ibid. 3.1. The last objective is strangely interesting from the perspective of the actual financial 
crisis. 
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down objectives concerning the poverty and social development, the coherence between 
policies, better governance and financing the sustainable development. 
The second consequence of the strategic decision was the setting up of the system of 
Sustainability Impacts Assessments (SIAs). Since 2001, the European Commission carries 
out impacts assessments of all trade agreements between third countries and the EU with 
external consultants. The assessment aims at identifying potential positive and adverse 
effects on sustainable development. The methodology is based on individual sustainability 
indicators in order to measure the impact that further liberalisation and changes in rule-
making might have on sustainability. The indicators are balanced between economic, 
environmental and social fields.20 
III. Principles and objectives of the Common Commercial Policy 
1. The reform of the Treaty of Lisbon 
The objectives and principles of the CCP before the Treaty of Lisbon were laid down in a 
homogeneous, consistent and relatively closed structure. This consistency was based 
primarily, as a leading principle, on the liberalisation, which allowed the legal and political 
framework of the Common Commercial Policy to develop according to the own logic in 
line with its free trade commitments to the international economic law and the legal order 
of WTO. However, the expansion of the external policy horizon of the European 
Communities and the introduction of new policy areas led to conflicts of objectives more 
frequently, causing tensions between the CCP and other external policy areas. Significant 
examples were the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the 
horizontal principle of integration in the field of the environment policy, which was 
indicated above. 
The main actors, the European Commission as well as the Council were trying always 
to meet these "external" requirements, e.g. by means of the integration of sustainability 
principle into the trade policy or inclusion of foreign policy and human rights clauses in the 
bilateral trade agreements, but there were no clear Treaty provisions governing the 
relationship the internal principles of the Common Commercial Policy and these external 
principles and objectives dependent on other policy areas. 
As a result of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Common Commercial Policy has become an 
integral part of the Union's external action. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) have made it clear that the EU 
has to ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and pursue and 
implement the general principles and objectives in the whole field of the EU external 
relations. Consequently the CCP is founded on a two-level structure of principles and 
objectives which encompasses not only inner principles like as the liberalisation but also 
the peripheral principles outside the trade policy including the sustainable development as 
well. In the following section this twofold structure-both internal and external fields-of 
principles are briefly considered. 
20
 Trade and Environment. European Commission, Brussels, 2006. 7. < http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/integration/pdf/trade envt.pdf >. (20.9.2012.). More detailed: Handbook for Trade 
Sustainability Impact Assessment. Brussels, 2006. 
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2. Internal principles of CCP: Trade liberalisation and uniformity 
In context with the internal principles of the Common Commercial Policy first should 
mention the characteristics and the importance of the principle of liberalisation and the 
principle of uniformity. 
The liberalisation principle was already inserted in Art. 110 EEC Treaty, and its extent 
was well shaped through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) quite 
early.21 However, the ECJ stated that the principle of liberalisation did not establish 
"unlimited" duty to remove all trade barriers in relation to other trading partners. In other 
words, protective trade measures can be justified by other objectives of the Treaty, e.g. by 
reason of environmental considerations. 
The principle of liberalisation has remained mutatis mutandis in the Treaty of Lisbon 
incorporated in the new Art. 206 TFEU. In terms of that, the Union has to contribute in the 
common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition 
of restrictions on international trade and foreign direct investment and the lowering of 
customs barriers and other barriers.22 Comparing to the text of the Treaty of Nice, the 
wording of Art. 206 TFEU seems to be not only technically modified but formulated much 
stricter and more categorical. In accordance with the previous formulation in Art. 131 
TEC,23 the Member States "only" aimed to contribute to the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers, and in contrast, the 
expression of Art. 206 TFEU emphasizes in a more definitive form that the EU "shall 
contribute" to that. Besides it cannot be passed over that the reference to the "competitive 
strength of undertakings" in former Art. 131 TEC has disappeared from the modified Treaty 
text. It can be assumed that repeal of this paragraph does not mean substantial change; 
therefore it only has symbolic significance. It may indicate only that the emphasis on tariff 
elimination among the Member States, as well as its impact on the competitiveness is 
already obsolete today, contrary to the Zeitgeist of the 1950s, when the Rome Treaty, as well 
as the previous formulation of the article were composed. That time the Member States 
needed strong arguments for the liberalisation programme in the internal market. 
The principle of uniformity remains also an element of the Common Commercial 
Policy, such as Art. 207 TFEU Section 1 shows that trade policy shall be based on "uniform 
principles." It can be interpreted as a requirement for the customs union, seeing that customs 
union and the internal market would be ineffective without the adequate, uniform regulation. 
In addition to that it is necessary to note that according to the case law of the ECJ, the 
uniformity principle concerns only the internal relations of the EU, consequently, a 
21
 See the following leading cases: 5/73, Balkan, ECR 1973, 1091.; 112/80, Dürbeck, ECR 
1981, 1095. 
22
 Article 206 TFEU (ex Article 131 TEC): "By establishing a customs union in accordance 
with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious 
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on 
foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers." 
23
 Article 131 TEC (as amended by the Treaty of Nice): "By establishing a customs union 
between themselves Member States aim to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious 
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the 
lowering of customs barriers. The Common Commercial Policy shall take into account the favourable 
effect which the abolition of customs duties between Member States may have on the increase in the 
competitive strength of undertakings in those States." 
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commitment to comply with external obligations such as an equal treatment of third states, 
non-discrimination or most favoured nations principle cannot be derived from this Treaty 
provision.24 On the other hand, the principle of uniformity has also helped the ECJ to 
interpret the scope of exclusive competence character of the CCP. In this regard, the 
principle could play a crucial role also in the future, because the Treaty of Lisbon extended 
the limits of competence of the trade policy, but as highlighted above, the principle is 
inadequate to establish the incompatibility of the EU law with international regulations, e.g. 
obligations arising from multilateral environmental or trade agreements. 
3. External principles of the Common Commercial Policy 
As noted in the introduction of this article, the Treaty of Lisbon-as a remarkable innovation-
linked the internal objectives and principles of trade policy to the general principles of EU's 
external relations. In terms of Art. 205 TFEU, the Union's action on the international stage-
including the Common Commercial Policy-has to be based on principles, guided by the 
objectives and conducted in line with the general provisions of the Treaty.25 In other words, 
the internal principles of CCP driven by the free trade concerns are not isolated anymore 
and as a result of the concept of uniform foreign relations introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, also the general principles and objectives must be taken into consideration. These 
general principles and objectives are laid down in Art. 21 TEU,26 which includes approaches 
e.g. to the human rights, solidarity, freedom and equitable (fair) trade, principles of 
international law,27 and the most important from the current perspective is that the 
sustainability and the protection of the environment are incorporated, too. Art. 21 Para. 2 
subpara. 0 emphasises that the EU, working for a high degree of cooperation in international 
relations, helps develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure 
sustainable development. 
This language of the principle does not explain the extent of the term "sustainable 
development", but it is clear that the sustainable development in this formulation puts the 
emphasis on the environmental aspects. The term "international measures" is questionable 
because it can be interpreted in two ways. Its first reading could be that the "international 
measures" encompasses only cooperative, i.e. bi- or multilateral instruments which are 
suitable for ensuring the sustainable development. Although the article refers to the "a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations", this interpretation would quite 
restrict the scope of Union's external action. Consequently, my view is that the term 
"international measures" could be interpreted in a wider sense, specifically it can cover 
beyond the bilateral and multilateral measures also the unilateral actions of the EU (e.g. 
restrictions, taxes for environmental purposes etc.). Hypothetically speaking, it does not 
mean anyway that the article would provide reasons for justification of measures 
contravening international law, but its second interpretation would not disregard the 
24
 See 52/81, Faust/Commission, ECR 1982, 3745. 
25
 Article 205 TFEU: "The Union's action on the international scene, pursuant to this Part, shall 
be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with the general 
provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union." 
26
 Cf. with Art. 21 TEU Paras 1 and 2. 
27
 See commentary for the principles: Grabitz, E.-Hilf, M.-Nettesheim, M: Das Recht der 
Europäischen Union. München, 2011. (via Beck-Online). Art. 21 EUV side-note 1. 
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possibility of taking unilateral actions in order to ensure sustainable development in 
advance. 
Moreover, the sustainable development principle appears in another context, too. 
According to subparagraph d) the EU foster the sustainable economic, social and 
environmental development of developing countries with the primary aim of eradicating 
poverty. However, this formulation differs from the sustainable development principle in 
subparagraph f). On the one hand, this conception of sustainable development seems to be 
much wider, because not only the environmental but also the economic and social 
dimensions are referred. Second, it focuses on the social aspects, to be more precise, the 
accent is put on the fight against poverty. Third, this quotation is applied only to the 
relations established with the development countries; consequently the scope of this 
objective is restricted to a specific area of the Union's external action. 
Even if this listing is not new,28 but the relevance of these principles is recognized in 
the field of CCP first time in the history of EU law. Consequently, the Treaty reform made 
an important contribution to helping ECJ to determine the relationship between the internal 
principles and external principles, in particular the human rights clauses, social standards, 
environmental concerns from entirely new perspectives. 
4. The relationship between the inner and external principles of CCP - Possible conflict 
areas 
Following the strict consistency prescribed by the Treaty, the compliance of the internal and 
the external principles are required. For this purpose, the European Union has to ensure 
consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its 
other policies. The consistency requirement is reinforced by institutional cooperation as 
well, it obliges also the key players of external action. In other terms the Council and the 
Commission, assisted by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
who have to cooperate in order to ensure this consistency.29 The consistency requirement is 
still handled more clearly on the level of the Common Commercial Policy (and other 
external policies laid down in the TFEU),30 because the provisions of Art. 21 on consistency, 
as indicated above, is repeated in Art. 205 TFEU.31 In addition, the binding to the principles 
and objectives of Union's external action is stressed-unnecessarily again-in the Art. 207 
TFEU.32 
According to the grammatical and systematic interpretation of these provisions it is 
unquestionable that the inherent principles and objectives of CCP mostly governed by free 
trade ideas are already subordinate to the general principles of external relations, including 
the sustainable development. As a result, the Treaty of Lisbon affords chance for a well-
28
 Article 11 TEU. Cf. with ex-Art. 11 TEU Para. 1. (As amended by the Treaty of Nice). 
29
 Article 21 Para. 3 TEU. 
30
 See in TFEU Part Five; The Union's External Action. Title I: General Provisions on the 
Union's External Action. 
31
 Cf. with Art. 205 TFEU. 
32
 Article 207 TFEU Para. 2: "The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context 
of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action." 
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built harmony between the trade interests and other, external social policy concerns,33 which 
can pave a way for establishing a value-oriented Common Commercial Policy. 
If several principles and objectives are incorporated in a systematic order, the question 
concerning the potential conflicts between the different areas, principles and objectives are 
always arisen. This issue is specifically relevant in this case because the Treaty of Lisbon 
has inserted several principles and objectives which could be hardly reconciled with the 
logic of Common Commercial Policy and principally with the liberalization principle. 
Therefore, the expected conflict touches upon the trade and environment debate, which has 
importance not only at the level of the European Union, but also in the field of international 
trade, namely the World Trade Organization. The core argument of the debate focuses on 
the indisputable knowledge that the abolition of trade barriers may not have only beneficial 
impacts. However, the damaging effects caused by the liberalisation most often come up 
not in the field of trade but the areas of other social dimensions like as social policy or the 
environment. 
This conflict potential is less concentrated at the level of the European Union than on 
the international field. It is because the EU, as indicated earlier, was always a dominant 
promoter of the environmental issues, and the introduction of the horizontal environmental 
integration principle by the Treaty of Amsterdam required itself a solution of the conflict 
between the environmental and trade policies of the European Union. However, there is a 
significant difference between the impact of the horizontal integrative clause and the new 
hierarchy of principles introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The idea of the present Art. 6 of 
TFEU ("Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities [...] in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development") is established on a coordinated, parallel-like relation 
between the environmental and trade concerns. Practically, such integration is always 
depending on the "substance" in which it should be incorporated. In other words, the 
integrated point of the environment can have different impacts on the different policy areas. 
Contrary to that, the relationship between the environmental concerns and the CCP based 
on the new principle structure introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is not a coordinative but a 
hierarchical relation. A hierarchy is a strict structure in this sense which cannot allow 
"trade-offs" or extensive balancing between the interest of the conflicting areas. As a result, 
according to this hierarchy no measures can be adopted within the CCP which is detrimental 
to the sustainable development and sustainability, i.e. negative effects on the environment 
can not be compensated by the benefit resulted from the trade liberalisation. 
Following these considerations and due to the coherence requirement of the Treaty, the 
objective and principle structure allows solving the conflicts between the abolition of trade 
barriers and the environmental concerns, including the sustainable development principle. 
It does not mean anyway, that the possible conflicts between trade and environment 
are conceptually excluded. At the Union's level, institutional conflicts can be presumed. 
The European Parliament can be regarded as an area of conflict, since it has already made 
clear that the Union has to involve non-economic, sociopolitical approaches closely in its 
external action. Moreover, also the Union's High Representative for Foreign and Security 
33
 Contrary, the "politisation" of CCP is harshly criticised by e.g. Tietje, see Tietje, Ch.: Die 
Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon. Beitrage zum Internationalen 
Wirtschaftsrecht. Heft 83. January 2009. 20. 
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Policy has potentially to face tension, because she must solve the controversy between the 
Member States, Council and Commission. 
It seems rather difficult to represent the external objectives and principles of the EU, 
including the related environmental concerns at the level of the World Trade Organization. 
In other words, what from the viewpoint of consistency of the EU external actions can be 
positively evaluated, it can be regarded as a "threat" from the site of the WTO and its trade 
liberalisation based principles. The question is how the environmental consideration and 
e.g. human rights, or social objectives can be brought into line with exceptions of the 
GATT-WTO legal order (e.g. GATT Article XX). An example for that could be a more 
recent disputed area within the WTO. The relationship between the law of the WTO and the 
multilateral environmental agreements which are encompassing also trade measures is 
actually a topic with high importance.34 Regarding that, the EU as a strong environmental 
promoter, represents the concept of the supremacy of the multilateral environmental 
agreements over the WTO law, consequently the position of the EU is to hinder the legal 
possibility of review of these trade measures under the WTO dispute settlement rules. The 
EU's position in this example can be regarded as a result stemming from the strong 
environmental consciousness of the Common Commercial Policy. In other words, the 
concept of the CCP which is subordinated to the sustainable development fundamentally 
differs from the idea of the World Trade Organization,35 which means a real conflict 
potential. However, it is a conflict, but not an antagonism, because it can be regarded also 
as an opportunity. Since the EU, the leading actor and demandeur for environmental issues 
can have a beneficial influence on trade and environment debate within the World Trade 
Organization in order to build up a framework which substantially integrates the concerns 
of sustainable development into the international trade law. 
Conclusions 
The present article has showed that following the Treaty of Lisbon, the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) became subordinate to the general principles and objectives of 
the EU's external actions. These principles embrace also the environmental concerns, 
namely the sustainable development and protection of the environment. 
34
 See for the details, Vogel, D.: Trade and Environment in the Global Economy: Contrasting 
European and American Perspectives. In: Vig, N.-Faure, M. (eds): Green Giants? Environmental 
Policy of the United States and the European Union. 2004. 231-252; and Baker, S.-McCormick, J.: 
Sustainable Development: Comparative Understandings and Responses. In: Vig-Faure (eds.): Green 
Giants? Environmental Policy... op. cit. 277-302. 
35
 Even though the WTO Agreement contains reference to sustainable development, but this 
preambular language is much restricted, see Voigt, supra note, 127-130. Despite ofthat, some authors 
are arguing that the sustainable development principle is incorporated also ideologically in the WTO 
structure, see for instance, Hartwick, E.-Peet, R.: Neoliberalism and Nature: The Case of the WTO. 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 590, Rethinking Sustainable 
Development (Nov., 2003). 188-211. Generally for the environmental background of the GATT and 
WTO agreements: Macmillan, F.: WTO and the Environment. London, 2001; Rao, P. K.: The World 
Trade Organization and the Environment. London, 2000; Charnovitz, S.: A New WTO Paradigm for 
Trade and the Environment. Singapore Year Book of International Law, (2007) 11; Charnovitz, S.: 
The WTO's Environmental Progress. Journal of International Economic Law, 10 (3) 2007. August. 
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As indicated above, the EU may have to face a twofold conflict in this regard. The 
sustainability must be reconciled with other objectives of the CCP, but the hierarchy 
between the sustainability and other goals of the EU can make definite solutions to the 
supposable conflicts. Also, the possible institutional tensions can be handled thus; the 
conflict potential should not be overestimated for the reason that the rules of the Treaty 
became clearer. In addition, it is hoping that the ECJ's interpretation will add much more to 
this relationship and meaning of sustainable development in this regard. 
Moreover, the integration of sustainability in the trade policy of European Union 
presumably will lead to conflicts to be solved on the international level, e.g. within the 
World Trade Organization. Although the current agenda of the Doha Round includes also 
issues on "trade and environment", but it has not yet resulted in any agreement on that 
problems (nor on other subject, because properly speaking, the negotiations are inactive 
actually). If the negotiations get going again, the real question at stake would be how the 
EU could shape the debate in order to reach an agreement on trade and environmental 
issues. In this sense, the sustainability objective should not be regarded as a "conflict 
causer" but an opportunity to carry the environmentally conscious trade policy into effect 
not only in the EU's but also in multilateral level. 
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